Mini Case: The Venezuelan Bolivar Black Market
Mini Case: The Venezuelan Bolivar Black Market
Mini Case: The Venezuelan Bolivar Black Market
Mini Case
The Venezuelan
Bolivar Black
Market1
Mini-Case: Venezuelan
Bolivar Black Market
It’s not clear whether Mr. Chávez understands what a
massive hit Venezuelans take when savings and
earnings in dollar terms are cut in half in just three
years. Perhaps the political-science student believes
that more devalued bolivars makes everyone richer. But
one unavoidable conclusion is that he recognized the
devaluation as a way to pay for his Bolivarian
“missions,” government projects that might restore his
popularity long enough to allow him to survive the
recall, or survive an audacious decision to squelch it.
-- “Money Fun in the Venezuela of Hugo Chávez,” The Wall
Street Journal , February 13, 2004, p. A13.
• The official exchange rate on that same day was Bs1598/$. This meant that the gray market rate
was quoting the bolivar about 46% weaker against the dollar than what the Venezuelan
government officially declared its currency to be worth.
• A third method of obtaining hard currency by Venezuelans was through the rapidly expanding
black market. The black market was, as is the case with black markets all over the world,
essentially unseen and illegal. It was, however, quite sophisticated, using the services of a
stockbroker or banker in Venezuela who simultaneously held U.S. dollar accounts offshore. The
choice of a black market broker was a critical one; in the event of a failure to complete the
transaction properly there was no legal recourse.
• If Santiago wished to purchase dollars on the black market, he would deposit bolivars in his
broker's account in Venezuela. The agreed upon black market exchange rate was determined on
the day of the deposit, and usually was within a 20% band of the gray market rate derived from
the CANTV share price.
• Santiago would then be given access to a dollar-denominated bank account outside of Venezuela
in the agreed amount. The transaction took, on average, two business days to settle. The
unofficial black market rate was Bs3300/$.
• In early 2004 President Chávez had asked Venezuela's Central Bank to give him "a little billion"-
millardito-of its $21 billion in foreign exchange reserves. Chávez argued that the money was
actually the people's, and he wished to invest some of it in the agricultural sector.
• The Central Bank refused. Not to be thwarted in its search for funds, the Chávez government
announced on February 9, 2004, another devaluation. The bolivar was devalued 17%, falling in
official value from Bs1600/$ to Bs1920/$ (see Exhibit A). With all Venezuelan exports of oil being
purchased in U.S. dollars, the devaluation of the bolivar meant that the -country's -proceeds from
oil exports grew by the same 17% as the devaluation itself.
• The Chávez government argued that the devaluation was necessary because the bolivar was "a
variable that cannot be kept frozen, because it prejudices exports and pressures the balance of
payments" according to Finance Minister Tobias Nobriega.
Santiago’s
500
2,420 24,200,000
it to make a Alternatives:
recommend a 1. Gray Market $20,000 3,400 68,000,000
solution to his 2. Black Market $20,000 4,080 81,600,000
problem. (gray + 20% )
The solution criteria is to find the "best" effective exchange rate for obtaining the $30,000.
The CADIVI rate, if available for the first $10,000, is the first step. The remaining funds
needed, $20,000, is obtained at the lowest possible cost via the Veb