Network Security

&
History
Chapter 1: roadmap
1.1 What is the Internet?
1.2 Network edge
 end systems, access networks, links
1.3 Network core
 circuit switching, packet switching, network structure
1.4 Delay, loss and throughput in packet-switched networks
1.5 Protocol layers, service models
1.6 Networks under attack: security
1.7 History

Introduction 1-2
Network Security
• The field of network security is about:
• how bad guys can attack computer networks
• how we can defend networks against attacks
• how to design architectures that are immune to attacks
• Internet not originally designed with (much)
security in mind
• original vision: “a group of mutually trusting users
attached to a transparent network” 
• Internet protocol designers playing “catch-up”
• Security considerations in all layers!

Introduction 1-3
Bad guys can put malware into hosts via Internet
• Malware can get in host from a virus, worm, or trojan
horse.

• Spyware malware can record keystrokes, web sites visited,

upload info to collection site.

• Infected host can be enrolled in a botnet, used for spam

and DDoS attacks.

• Malware is often self-replicating: from an infected host,

seeks entry into other hosts

Introduction 1-4
Bad guys can put malware into hosts via Internet
• Trojan horse  Worm:
• Hidden part of some  infection by passively
otherwise useful software receiving object that gets
• Today often on a Web page itself executed
(Active-X, plugin)  self- replicating: propagates
• Virus to other hosts, users
• infection by receiving object
Sapphire Worm: aggregate scans/sec
(e.g., e-mail attachment), in first 5 minutes of outbreak (CAIDA, UWisc data)
actively executing
• self-replicating: propagate
itself to other hosts, users

Introduction 1-5
Bad guys can attack servers and network infrastructure
• Denial of service (DoS): attackers make resources (server,
bandwidth) unavailable to legitimate traffic by overwhelming
resource with bogus traffic
1. select target
2. break into hosts
around the network
(see botnet)
3. send packets toward
target from target
compromised hosts

Introduction 1-6
The bad guys can sniff packets
Packet sniffing:
• broadcast media (shared Ethernet, wireless)
• promiscuous network interface reads/records all packets (e.g.,
including passwords!) passing by

A C

src:B dest:A payload

B
 Wireshark software used for end-of-chapter
labs is a (free) packet-sniffer
Introduction 1-7
The bad guys can use false source addresses
• IP spoofing: send packet with false source address

A C

src:B dest:A payload

Introduction 1-8
The bad guys can record and playback
• record-and-playback: sniff sensitive info (e.g., password),
and use later
• password holder is that user from system point of view

C
A

src:B dest:A user: B; password: foo

Introduction 1-9
Outline
• Security Vulnerabilities
• DoS and D-DoS
• Firewalls
• Intrusion Detection Systems
Security Vulnerabilities
• Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite – Steve Bellovin - 89
• Attacks on Different Layers
• IP Attacks
• ICMP Attacks
• Routing Attacks
• TCP Attacks
• Application Layer Attacks
Why?
• TCP/IP was designed for connectivity
• Assumed to have lots of trust

• Host implementation vulnerabilities

• Software “had/have/will have” bugs
• Some elements in the specification were left to the implementers
Security Flaws in IP
• The IP addresses are filled in by the originating host
• Address spoofing
• Using source address for authentication
• r-utilities (rlogin, rsh, rhosts etc..)

2.1.1.1 C Can A claim it is B to

the server S?

Internet
ARP Spoofing
1.1.1.3 S Can C claim it is B to
the server S?
A 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 B Source Routing
Security Flaws in IP
• IP fragmentation attack
• End hosts need to keep the fragments till all the fragments arrive

• Traffic amplification attack

• IP allows broadcast destination
• Problems?
Ping Flood

Internet

Attacking System

Broadcast
Enabled
Network

Victim System
ICMP Attacks
• No authentication
• ICMP redirect message
• Can cause the host to switch gateways
• Benefit of doing this?
• Man in the middle attack, sniffing
• ICMP destination unreachable
• Can cause the host to drop connection
• ICMP echo request/reply
• Many more…
• http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/threats/477.php
Routing Attacks
• Distance Vector Routing
• Announce 0 distance to all other nodes
• Blackhole traffic
• Eavesdrop
• Link State Routing
• Can drop links randomly
• Can claim direct link to any other routers
• A bit harder to attack than DV
• BGP
• ASes can announce arbitrary prefix
• ASes can alter path
TCP Attacks

SYN x
SYN y | ACK x+1
ACK y+1
Client
Server

Issues?
• Server needs to keep waiting for ACK y+1
• Server recognizes Client based on IP address/port and y+1
TCP Layer Attacks
• TCP SYN Flooding
• Exploit state allocated at server after initial SYN packet
• Send a SYN and don’t reply with ACK
• Server will wait for 511 seconds for ACK
• Finite queue size for incomplete connections (1024)
• Once the queue is full it doesn’t accept requests
TCP Layer Attacks
• TCP Session Hijack
• When is a TCP packet valid?
• Address/Port/Sequence Number in window
• How to get sequence number?
• Sniff traffic
• Guess it
• Many earlier systems had predictable ISN
• Inject arbitrary data to the connection
TCP Layer Attacks
• TCP Session Poisoning
• Send RST packet
• Will tear down connection
• Do you have to guess the exact sequence number?
• Anywhere in window is fine
• For 64k window it takes 64k packets to reset
• About 15 seconds for a T1
Application Layer Attacks
• Applications don’t authenticate properly
• Authentication information in clear
• FTP, Telnet, POP
• DNS insecurity
• DNS poisoning
• DNS zone transfer
An Example

Finger
Shimomura Showmount
SYN -e
(S) Trusted (T)

 Finger @S  Attack when no one is

around
 showmount –e
Mitnick  What other systems it
 Send 20 SYN packets
trusts?
to S
 Determine ISN behavior
An Example

Shimomura Syn flood

X
(S) Trusted(T)

 Finger @S  Attack when no one is

around
 showmount –e
Mitnick  What other systems it
 Send 20 SYN packets
trusts?
to S
 Determine ISN behavior
 SYN flood T
 T won’t respond to
packets
An Example
SYN|ACK

Shimomura ACK
X
(S) SYN trusted (T)

 Finger @S  Attack when no one is

around
 showmount –e
Mitnick (M)  What other systems it
 Send 20 SYN packets
trusts?
to S
 Determine ISN behavior
 SYN flood T
 T won’t respond to
 Send SYN to S
packets
spoofing as T
An Example

Shimomura
X
(S) ++ > rhosts Trusted (T)

 Finger @S  Attack when no one is

around
 showmount –e
Mitnick  What other systems it
 Send 20 SYN packets
trusts?
to S
 Determine ISN behavior
 SYN flood T
 T won’t respond to
 Send SYN to S
packets
spoofing as T
Denial of Service
• Objective  make a service unusable, usually by overloading the server
or network

• Consume host resources

• TCP SYN floods
• ICMP ECHO (ping) floods

• Consume bandwidth
• UDP floods
• ICMP floods
Denial of Service
• Crashing the victim
• Ping-of-Death
• TCP options (unused, or used incorrectly)

• Forcing more computation

• Taking long path in processing of packets
Simple DoS
 The Attacker usually spoofed
source address to hide originAttacker
 Easy to block

Victim Victim Victim

Coordinated DoS

Attacker Attacker Attacker

Victim Victim Victim

 The first attacker attacks a different victim to cover up the real attack
 The Attacker usually spoofed source address to hide origin
 Harder to deal with
Distributed DoS
Attacker

Handler Handler

Agent Agent Agent Agent Agent

Victim
Distributed DoS
• The handlers are usually very high volume servers
• Easy to hide the attack packets
• The agents are usually home users with DSL/Cable
• Already infected and the agent installed
• Very difficult to track down the attacker
• How to differentiate between DDoS and Flash Crowd?
• Flash Crowd  Many clients using a service legimitaly
• Slashdot Effect
• Victoria Secret Webcast
• Generally the flash crowd disappears when the network is flooded
• Sources in flash crowd are clustered
Firewalls
• Lots of vulnerabilities on hosts in network
• Users don’t keep systems up to date
• Lots of patches
• Lots of exploits in wild (no patch for them)
• Solution?
• Limit access to the network
• Put firewalls across the perimeter of the network
Firewalls (contd…)
• Firewall inspects traffic through it
• Allows traffic specified in the policy
• Drops everything else
• Two Types
• Packet Filters, Proxies
Internal Network
Firewall

Internet
Packet Filters
• Packet filter selectively passes packets from one network interface to
another
• Usually done within a router between external and internal networks
• screening router

• Can be done by a dedicated network element

• packet filtering bridge
• harder to detect and attack than screening routers
Packet Filters Contd.
• Data Available
• IP source and destination addresses
• Transport protocol (TCP, UDP, or ICMP)
• TCP/UDP source and destination ports
• ICMP message type
• Packet options (Fragment Size etc.)
• Actions Available
• Allow the packet to go through
• Drop the packet (Notify Sender/Drop Silently)
• Alter the packet (NAT?)
• Log information about the packet
Packet Filters Contd.
• Example filters
• Block all packets from outside except for SMTP servers
• Block all traffic to a list of domains
• Block all connections from a specified domain
Typical Firewall Configuration
 Internal hosts can access Internet
DMZ and Internet
 External hosts can access
DMZ only, not Intranet
DM
 DMZ hosts can access Z
Internet only X
X
 Advantages?
 If a service gets
compromised in DMZ it Intrane
cannot affect internal t
hosts
Example Firewall Rules
• Stateless packet filtering firewall
• Rule  (Condition, Action)
• Rules are processed in top-down order
• If a condition satisfied – action is taken
Sample Firewall Rule
Allow SSH from external hosts to internal hosts
 Two rules
• Inbound and outbound
Client Server
 How to know a packet is for SSH? SYN
• Inbound: src-port>1023, dst-port=22
• Outbound: src-port=22, dst-port>1023 SYN/ACK
• Protocol=TCP
ACK
 Ack Set?
 Problems?

Rule Dir Src Addr Src Port Dst Addr Dst Port Proto Ack Set? Action

SSH-1 In Ext > 1023 Int 22 TCP Any Allow

SSH-2 Out Int 22 Ext > 1023 TCP Yes Alow
Packet Filters
• Advantages
• Transparent to application/user
• Simple packet filters can be efficient
• Disadvantages
• Usually fail open
• Very hard to configure the rules
• Doesn’t have enough information to take actions
• Does port 22 always mean SSH?
• Who is the user accessing the SSH?
Alternatives
• Stateful packet filters
• Keep the connection states
• Easier to specify rules
• More popular
• Problems?
• State explosion
• State for UDP/ICMP?
Alternatives
• Proxy Firewalls
• Two connections instead of one
• Either at transport level
• SOCKS proxy
• Or at application level
• HTTP proxy
• Requires applications (or dynamically linked libraries) to be modified
to use the proxy
Proxy Firewall
• Data Available
• Application level information
• User information
• Advantages?
• Better policy enforcement
• Better logging
• Fail closed
• Disadvantages?
• Doesn’t perform as well
• One proxy for each application
• Client modification
Intrusion Detection Systems
• Firewalls allow traffic only to legitimate hosts and services
• Traffic to the legitimate hosts/services can have attacks
• CodeReds on IIS
• Solution?
• Intrusion Detection Systems
• Monitor data and behavior
• Report when identify attacks
 Types of IDS

Signature-
Anomaly-based
based

Host-based
Network-
based
Signature-based IDS
• Characteristics
• Uses known pattern matching
to signify attack
• Advantages?
• Widely available
• Fairly fast
• Easy to implement
• Easy to update
• Disadvantages?
• Cannot detect attacks for which it has no signature
Anomaly-based IDS
• Characteristics
• Uses statistical model or machine learning engine to characterize normal
usage behaviors
• Recognizes departures from normal as potential intrusions
• Advantages?
• Can detect attempts to exploit new and unforeseen vulnerabilities
• Can recognize authorized usage that falls outside the normal pattern
• Disadvantages?
• Generally slower, more resource intensive compared to signature-based
IDS
• Greater complexity, difficult to configure
• Higher percentages of false alerts
Network-based IDS
• Characteristics
• NIDS examine raw packets in the network
passively and triggers alerts
• Advantages?
• Easy deployment
• Unobtrusive
• Difficult to evade if done at low level of
network operation
• Disadvantages?
• Fail Open
• Different hosts process packets differently
• NIDS needs to create traffic seen at the end
host
• Need to have the complete network topology
and complete host behavior
Host-based IDS
• Characteristics
• Runs on single host
• Can analyze audit-trails, logs, integrity of files and directories, etc.

• Advantages
• More accurate than NIDS
• Less volume of traffic so less overhead

• Disadvantages
• Deployment is expensive
• What happens when host get compromised?
Summary
• TCP/IP security vulnerabilities
• Spoofing
• Flooding attacks
• TCP session poisoning
• DOS and D-DOS
• Firewalls
• Packet Filters
• Proxy
• IDS
• Signature and Anomaly IDS
• NIDS and HIDS
Internet History
1961-1972: Early packet-switching principles
• 1961: Kleinrock - queueing • 1972:
theory shows effectiveness of • ARPAnet public demonstration
packet-switching • NCP (Network Control Protocol) first
• 1964: Baran - packet-switching host-host protocol
in military nets • first e-mail program
• 1967: ARPAnet conceived by • ARPAnet has 15 nodes
Advanced Research Projects
Agency
• 1969: first ARPAnet node
operational

Introduction 1-52
Introduction 1-53
The first Internet Message Processor (IMP), with L. Kleinrock
Introduction 1-54
 Internet History
1972-1980: Internetworking, new and proprietary nets
• 1970: ALOHAnet satellite network Cerf and Kahn’s internetworking
in Hawaii principles:
• 1974: Cerf and Kahn - architecture • minimalism, autonomy - no
for interconnecting networks internal changes required to
interconnect networks
• 1976: Ethernet at Xerox PARC • best effort service model
• ate70’s: proprietary architectures: • stateless routers
DECnet, SNA, XNA • decentralized control
• late 70’s: switching fixed length define today’s Internet architecture
packets (ATM precursor)
• 1979: ARPAnet has 200 nodes

Introduction 1-55
Internet History
1980-1990: new protocols, a proliferation of networks
• 1983: deployment of • new national networks:
TCP/IP Csnet, BITnet, NSFnet,
• 1982: smtp e-mail protocol Minitel
defined • 100,000 hosts connected
• 1983: DNS defined for to confederation of
name-to-IP-address networks
translation
• 1985: ftp protocol defined
• 1988: TCP congestion
control

Introduction 1-56
Internet History
1990, 2000’s: commercialization, the Web, new apps
• Early 1990’s: ARPAnet decommissioned Late 1990’s – 2000’s:
• 1991: NSF lifts restrictions on • more killer apps: instant
commercial use of NSFnet messaging, P2P file sharing
(decommissioned, 1995)
• network security to forefront
• early 1990s: Web
• est. 50 million host, 100 million+
• hypertext [Bush 1945, Nelson
users
1960’s]
• HTML, HTTP: Berners-Lee • backbone links running at Gbps
• 1994: Mosaic, later Netscape
• late 1990’s: commercialization of
the Web

Introduction 1-57
Internet History

2007:
• ~500 million hosts
• Voice, Video over IP
• P2P applications: BitTorrent (file
sharing) Skype (VoIP), PPLive
(video)
• more applications: YouTube,
gaming
• wireless, mobility

Introduction 1-58
Introduction: Summary
Covered a “ton” of material!
You now have:
• Internet overview
• context, overview, “feel”
• what’s a protocol? of networking
• network edge, core, access • more depth, detail to
network follow!
• packet-switching versus
circuit-switching
• Internet structure
• performance: loss, delay,
throughput
• layering, service models
• security
• history
Introduction 1-59