Chapter 12 Negotiation Skills

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CHAPTER 12

MANAGING DIFFICULT
NEGOTIATION

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


CHAPTER OBJECTIVES:

1. Understand how to manage the social contract.


2. Consider how to respond when the other party responds
distributively, has more power, or present when you with an
ultimantum.
3. Learn different approaches a negotiator can use when dealing
with difficult people.

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


CHAPTER OUTLINES:
I Managing the Shadow Negotiation & Social Contract

II Responding to the Other Side’s Hard Distributive Tactics

III Responding to Irrationality

IV Responding when the Other Side Has More Power

V The Special Problem of Handling More Ultimatums

VI Responding to Anger

VII Responding When the Other Side is Being Difficult

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


Managing the Shadow Negotiation & Social Contract
o Managing the shadow negotiation & social contract is fundamentally concerned with
determining what ground the negotiation is going to cover and how the negotiators are
going to work together.
o Shadow negotiation occurs in parallel with the substantive negotiation and is concerned
with how the negotiation will proceed.
o The ongoing shadow negotiation is a social contract regarding how the negotiation will
proceed, who has influence and power, and what the boundaries of the negotiation are.
o The social contract and shadow negotiation are concerned with what the negotiation is about
and how decisions are made.
o Negotiators should consider the shadow negotiation carefully before meeting with the other
party so that they are clear in their own minds about the scope of the negotiation and
understand how they would ideally like to work with the other party.

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


3 Strategic Levers to Help Navigate the Shadow
Negotiation
Power Moves Process Moves Appreciative Moves
o Negotiator needed to up the o Build support for changes. o Volunteer expertise to help
ante for maintaining the status o Having support to strengthen improving the situation.
quo. relevant areas in negotiation. o Increased understanding and
o Particularly important to bring o Built a coalition that shaped the trust on both side of the table.
pressure. subsequent negotiation. o Never forced the parties to into
o Parties tend to work based on o Process moves are designed to position they would lose face.
reward systems and benefits. alter the negotiation itself o Improved communication and
o Power moves are designed to through adjustments to the cooperation among the parties.
bring reluctant bargainers back agenda, sequencing, decision o Appreciative moves are
to the table. rule, and the like. designed to break cycles of
o 3 kinds of power moves: contentiousness that may have
i. Incentives led to deteriorating
ii. Pressure tactics communication, acrimony, or
iii. The use of allies even silence.

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


Responding to the Other Side’s Hard Distributive
Tactics
o In distributive model, negotiators will try hard to get information, but don’t share it.
o Negotiators work to convince the other party of the value of staying in the deal, or
enhance the perception of the cost of leaving rather than working to create a value.
o As a party managing a negotiation mismatch, they can respond to these tactics by:
i. Call them on it
ii. Ignore them
iii. Respond in kind
iv. Offer to change to more productive methods

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


Responding to Irrationality
o On of the more challenging negotiation situations occurs when the other party appears to be
completely irrational.
o Negotiators may act irrationally as a hard bargaining tactic, but there are other reasons they
may appear irrational:
i. They are uninformed
ii. They have hidden constraints
iii. They have hidden interest
o Irrationality could be when the parties experienced hard bargaining from the other side such
as extreme offers, unreasonable deadlines, multiple conditions, and constant request for
more information and price reductions.
o Malhotra and Bazerman (2007) caution against labeling negotiators as irrational because
typically they are not and the label does not help the negotiation process.
o When the other party is truly irrational, the negotiators should seriously consider using their
BATNA, imposing a solution if they have more power, or seeking the assistance of a third
party.
Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)
Responding When the Other Side Has More Power
o Relative power can be a good predictor of how a conflict will evolve.
o Other things being equal, when power is unequal, the more powerful party can
achieve his or her goals more readily.
o Power imbalance in negotiation can represent clear dangers to the satisfaction of the
needs of both parties and to the collaborative process.
o Negotiators should consider 4 tactics when dealing with a party with more power:
i. Protect themselves
ii. Cultivate their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)
iii. Formulate the trip wire alert system
iv. Correct the power imbalance

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


The Special Problem of Handling More Ultimatums

o An ultimatums is an attempt “to induce compliance or force concessions from a presumably


recalcitrant opponent”.
o Ultimatums typically have 3 components:
o A demand
o An attempt to create a sense of urgency, such that compliance is required
o A threat of punishment if compliance does not occur
o One particular type of ultimatum is exploding offer which one party presents the other with
a classic no-win, use-it-or-lose-it dilemma.
o An exploding offer has a specific time limit or deadline attached to it, forcing the other party
to decide on a less-than-ideal offer or run the risk of going without anything.
o Such offer have several other components, including:
i. A clear asymmetry of power between the parties
ii. A pressure-inducing test of faith for the recipient of the offer
iii. A restricted set of options
iv. A lack of consideration and respect for the recipient by the offer
v. An apparent lack of good faith on the offerer’s part
Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)
The Special Problem of Handling More Ultimatums

o Robinson (1995) developed one possible response to ultimatum, which he calls the ‘farpoint
gambit.
o The success of the response hangs on the ability to say “Yes, but…” to an ultimatum.
o When first presented with an ultimatum, negotiators should probably try a reasonable
approach such as:
i. Be forthright in addressing the ultimatum
ii. Make sensible
iii. Reasonable counteroffers
iv. Attempt to engage the offerer in joint problem solving.
o If that fails, Robinson advises that the farpoint gambit only be used when all three of the
following condition exist:
i. When the initiator is perceived as behaving unethically and ignores appeals to reasons.
ii. When the respondent is truly interested in the basic offer but needs more time to consider it.
iii. When there are issues central to the deal that genuinely need clarification.

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


Responding to Anger
o Anger and threat of anger in negotiation can be very intimidating.
o Anger is a fundamental human emotion to which everyone can relate.
o Managing angry people in negotiation is not only challenging, but it also can be very stressful.
o Maholtra and Bazerman (2007) suggest 4 strategies for managing angry negotiators:
i. Try to understand why the other party is angry
ii. Give voice to their anger
iii. Sidestep the power of their emotion
iv. Try to help them understand their underlying interests
The purpose of these strategies is to refocus the energy spent on the anger back into the
negotiation.
Understanding why the other party is angry can help negotiators manage the other party’s
anger and to channel the energy more productively.

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


Responding When the Other Side is Being Difficult

o When the other side presents a pattern of clear difficult behavior, 2 possibilities
exits:
i. It is possible that the negotiator does not know any other way to negotiate, but
might be responsive to suggestions for changing his or her behavior.
ii. It may be that the other party has a difficult personality and acts consistently
inside and outside the negotiation context.
o There 3 approaches to deals with difficult negotiators:
i. Ury (1991) Breakthrough Approach: broad based approach that may be used
with any other party who is being difficult, including one using hard
distributive tactics.
ii. Bramson (1981):suggest several different strategies for dealing with
negotiators who have particularly difficult styles.
iii. Weeks (2001): outlines the importance of preparation and management when
confronted with the need to have a difficult conversation with another person.

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)


~END~

Prepared by: Norshahirah Mohd Noor (UMCCed)

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