Venkata Chinnaya Rau V
Venkata Chinnaya Rau V
Venkata Chinnaya Rau V
Innes J drew similarities between the instant case and the English case Dutton v.
Poole [(1677) 2 Levinz 210]. In Dutton v. Poole, a man had a daughter of
marriageable age and wanted to sell a portion of wood that he possessed at the time
to meet his daughter’s wedding portion. The man’s son (defendant) promised to pay
the daughter (plaintiff) £.1000 if the man forbore from selling the wood. The man
forbore but the defendant failed to pay the promised sum. The daughter and her
husband sued the defendant for the sum. Though the defendant made the promise to
his father and the father furnished the consideration for it, it was clear that the
contract was made for the benefit of the plaintiff. The court held that it would be
highly inequitable to deprive the plaintiff of the money and held the defendant liable
to pay the same to her.
JUDGEMENT
Innes J observed that prior to the creation of the contract in question, the
plaintiff had been receiving a sum of money out of her sister’s estate. When
the lady transferred the same to her daughter, the defendant, the contract
stipulated that the same arrangement be continued by her. When the
plaintiff’s sister transferred the property to the defendant, the plaintiff
suffered a loss of annuity that she had been receiving so far. It was held that
such loss formed the consideration for the promise. Hence, the plaintiff was
deemed to have given the consideration.
Kindersley J also arrived at the same conclusion but his reasoning was
different. The deed of gift and the defendant’s agreement to pay the annuity to
the plaintiff were executed at the same time. Thus, they could be considered
parts of the same transaction. The defendant’s promise to pay the plaintiff
was the consideration for the defendant’s mother to transfer the property to
the defendant. Hence, the defendant’s failure to pay the same would amount
to breach of contract and would entitle the plaintiff to sue her for the recovery
of the same. The defendant was held liable to pay the annuity to the plaintiff.
DECISION
The Court observed that according to the definition of “consideration”
provided in Section 2 (d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, it is clear that in a
valid contract, consideration does not have to move solely from the promisee.
The Court held that the defendant was entitled to payment for the annual
sum of money and issued a decree ordering the plaintiff to pay an annuity to
the defendant.
ANALYSIS
According to English Law, the consideration must be moved from the promisee only. If
any other person fulfils the consideration, then the promisee will be a stranger to the
consideration and will not be able to enforce the promise.
But the proposition “Stranger to Consideration” is not applicable in the Indian scenario.
Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act states that-
“When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or
abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing or promises to do or to abstain from
doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the
promise”.[3]
The language in section 2(d) reveals that under the Indian contract act, it is not
mandatory that the consideration must flow from the promisee only, any other person
also can furnish the consideration for the promise.
We can put it this way, that a promise can be enforceable if there is a consideration for it
and it is completely irrelevant who has furnished the consideration – the promisee or any
other person.
In the present case, if we incorporate the gift deed executed by the old lady to the
defendant and the defendant’s promise to the plaintiff, it would be one transaction as
suggested by Justice Kindersley, where the old lady had already furnished the
consideration on the behalf of the plaintiff as the gift deed. Hence, the defendant was
supposed to pay the annuity to the plaintiff according to the promise. As the defendant
failed to do so, the plaintiff could claim the enforcement of the promise even though she
did not furnish the consideration herself.
CASE COMMENTARY
This case clarified the applicability of the doctrine of privity of consideration
to Indian contract law. In this case, the court laid down that the doctrine of
privity of consideration is not applicable in the Indian context.
CONCLUSION
This case explained the applicability and relevance of the doctrine of privity of
consideration to Indian contract law. In Venkata Chinnaya Rau v.
Venkataramaya Garu, the court ruled that the doctrine of privity of
consideration does not apply in India. Under the Indian Contract,
consideration may be provided by the pledge or by someone else. According to
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, consideration may move not from the
promisee, but even from a third person who is not a party to the contract, as
opposed to English law, which requires consideration to move only from the
promisee.
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