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@flaskapp.route("/log_injections")
def log_injections():
data = request.args.get("data")
logging.debug(data)

Check failure

Code scanning / CodeQL

Log Injection High

This log entry depends on a
user-provided value
.

Copilot Autofix

AI 6 months ago

To fix the log injection vulnerability, we need to sanitize the user input before logging it. Specifically, we should remove any newline characters from the user input to prevent log injection attacks. This can be done using the replace method to replace \r\n and \n with empty strings.

Suggested changeset 1
server/routes.py

Autofix patch

Autofix patch
Run the following command in your local git repository to apply this patch
cat << 'EOF' | git apply
diff --git a/server/routes.py b/server/routes.py
--- a/server/routes.py
+++ b/server/routes.py
@@ -35,2 +35,4 @@
      data = request.args.get("data")
+     if data:
+         data = data.replace('\r\n', '').replace('\n', '')
      logging.debug(data)
EOF
@@ -35,2 +35,4 @@
data = request.args.get("data")
if data:
data = data.replace('\r\n', '').replace('\n', '')
logging.debug(data)
Copilot is powered by AI and may make mistakes. Always verify output.
@github-cloudlabsuser-112 github-cloudlabsuser-112 committed this autofix suggestion 6 months ago.
@flaskapp.route("/read-bad-file")
def read_bad_file():
file = request.args.get("file")
with open(file, "r") as f:

Check failure

Code scanning / CodeQL

Uncontrolled data used in path expression High

This path depends on a
user-provided value
.

Copilot Autofix

AI 6 months ago

To fix the problem, we need to ensure that the file path constructed from user input is validated and restricted to a safe directory. We can achieve this by normalizing the path using os.path.normpath and then checking that the normalized path starts with a predefined safe root directory. This will prevent path traversal attacks by ensuring that the user cannot access files outside the allowed directory.

  1. Define a safe root directory where the files are located.
  2. Normalize the user-provided file path.
  3. Check if the normalized path starts with the safe root directory.
  4. If the check passes, proceed to open the file; otherwise, raise an exception or return an error message.
Suggested changeset 1
server/routes.py

Autofix patch

Autofix patch
Run the following command in your local git repository to apply this patch
cat << 'EOF' | git apply
diff --git a/server/routes.py b/server/routes.py
--- a/server/routes.py
+++ b/server/routes.py
@@ -6,2 +6,3 @@
 import subprocess
+import os
 
@@ -54,6 +55,12 @@
      file = request.args.get("file")
-     with open(file, "r") as f:
-         data = f.read()
-     logging.debug(data)
-     return jsonify(data="Uncontrolled data use in path expression"), 200
+     if file:
+         base_path = '/safe/directory'
+         fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, file))
+         if not fullpath.startswith(base_path):
+             return jsonify(data="Invalid file path"), 400
+         with open(fullpath, "r") as f:
+             data = f.read()
+         logging.debug(data)
+         return jsonify(data="File read successfully"), 200
+     return jsonify(data="No file specified"), 400
 
EOF
@@ -6,2 +6,3 @@
import subprocess
import os

@@ -54,6 +55,12 @@
file = request.args.get("file")
with open(file, "r") as f:
data = f.read()
logging.debug(data)
return jsonify(data="Uncontrolled data use in path expression"), 200
if file:
base_path = '/safe/directory'
fullpath = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(base_path, file))
if not fullpath.startswith(base_path):
return jsonify(data="Invalid file path"), 400
with open(fullpath, "r") as f:
data = f.read()
logging.debug(data)
return jsonify(data="File read successfully"), 200
return jsonify(data="No file specified"), 400

Copilot is powered by AI and may make mistakes. Always verify output.
Unable to commit as this autofix suggestion is now outdated
if request.args.get("name"):
name = request.args.get("name")
template = f"""<div><h1>Hello</h1>{name}</div>"""
logging.debug(str(template))

Check failure

Code scanning / CodeQL

Log Injection High

This log entry depends on a
user-provided value
.

Copilot Autofix

AI 6 months ago

To fix the log injection issue, we need to sanitize the user input before logging it. Specifically, we should remove any newline characters from the user input to prevent log injection. This can be done using the replace method to replace \r\n and \n with empty strings.

Suggested changeset 1
server/routes.py

Autofix patch

Autofix patch
Run the following command in your local git repository to apply this patch
cat << 'EOF' | git apply
diff --git a/server/routes.py b/server/routes.py
--- a/server/routes.py
+++ b/server/routes.py
@@ -64,2 +64,3 @@
          name = request.args.get("name")
+         name = name.replace('\r\n', '').replace('\n', '')
          template = f"""<div><h1>Hello</h1>{name}</div>"""
EOF
@@ -64,2 +64,3 @@
name = request.args.get("name")
name = name.replace('\r\n', '').replace('\n', '')
template = f"""<div><h1>Hello</h1>{name}</div>"""
Copilot is powered by AI and may make mistakes. Always verify output.
Unable to commit as this autofix suggestion is now outdated
name = request.args.get("name")
template = f"""<div><h1>Hello</h1>{name}</div>"""
logging.debug(str(template))
return render_template_string(template)

Check warning

Code scanning / CodeQL

Reflected server-side cross-site scripting Medium

Cross-site scripting vulnerability due to a
user-provided value
.

Copilot Autofix

AI 6 months ago

To fix the problem, we need to ensure that any user input is properly escaped before being used in the render_template_string function. This can be achieved by using the escape function from the flask module, which will convert special characters in the user input to their HTML-safe sequences.

The best way to fix this issue without changing existing functionality is to import the escape function from the flask module and use it to sanitize the name parameter before including it in the template string.

Suggested changeset 1
server/routes.py

Autofix patch

Autofix patch
Run the following command in your local git repository to apply this patch
cat << 'EOF' | git apply
diff --git a/server/routes.py b/server/routes.py
--- a/server/routes.py
+++ b/server/routes.py
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-from flask import request, render_template, render_template_string, jsonify
+from flask import request, render_template, render_template_string, jsonify, escape
 
@@ -63,3 +63,3 @@
      if request.args.get("name"):
-         name = request.args.get("name")
+         name = escape(request.args.get("name"))
          template = f"""<div><h1>Hello</h1>{name}</div>"""
EOF
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
from flask import request, render_template, render_template_string, jsonify
from flask import request, render_template, render_template_string, jsonify, escape

@@ -63,3 +63,3 @@
if request.args.get("name"):
name = request.args.get("name")
name = escape(request.args.get("name"))
template = f"""<div><h1>Hello</h1>{name}</div>"""
Copilot is powered by AI and may make mistakes. Always verify output.
Unable to commit as this autofix suggestion is now outdated
try:
hostname = request.args.get("hostname")
command = "dig " + hostname
data = subprocess.check_output(command, shell=True)

Check failure

Code scanning / CodeQL

Uncontrolled command line Critical

This command line depends on a
user-provided value
.

Copilot Autofix

AI 6 months ago

To fix the problem, we should avoid using user input directly in shell commands. Instead, we can use a predefined allowlist of acceptable hostnames or validate the user input to ensure it is safe. Additionally, we should avoid using shell=True with subprocess.check_output to prevent the shell from interpreting special characters.

The best way to fix the problem without changing existing functionality is to validate the hostname parameter against a predefined allowlist of acceptable hostnames. If the hostname is not in the allowlist, we can return an error message. This approach ensures that only safe and expected hostnames are used in the command.

Suggested changeset 1
server/routes.py

Autofix patch

Autofix patch
Run the following command in your local git repository to apply this patch
cat << 'EOF' | git apply
diff --git a/server/routes.py b/server/routes.py
--- a/server/routes.py
+++ b/server/routes.py
@@ -73,5 +73,9 @@
          hostname = request.args.get("hostname")
-         command = "dig " + hostname
-         data = subprocess.check_output(command, shell=True) 
-         return data
+         allowlist = ["example.com", "example.org", "example.net"]
+         if hostname in allowlist:
+             command = ["dig", hostname]
+             data = subprocess.check_output(command)
+             return data
+         else:
+             return jsonify(data="Invalid hostname"), 400
      except:
EOF
@@ -73,5 +73,9 @@
hostname = request.args.get("hostname")
command = "dig " + hostname
data = subprocess.check_output(command, shell=True)
return data
allowlist = ["example.com", "example.org", "example.net"]
if hostname in allowlist:
command = ["dig", hostname]
data = subprocess.check_output(command)
return data
else:
return jsonify(data="Invalid hostname"), 400
except:
Copilot is powered by AI and may make mistakes. Always verify output.
Unable to commit as this autofix suggestion is now outdated
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
@github-cloudlabsuser-112
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