Philosophy

The article considers what happened to the Buddhist concept of selfawareness (svasam : vedana) when it was appropriated by Ś aiva Siddhānta. The first section observes how it was turned against Buddhism by being used to attack the momentariness of consciousenss and to establish its permanence. The second section examines how self-awareness differs from I-cognition (ahampratyaya). The third section examines the difference between the kind of self-awareness elaborated by Rāmakan : t : ha ('reflexive awareness') and a kind elaborated by Dharmakīrti ('intentional self-awareness'). It is then pointed out that Dharmakīrti avails himself not only of intentional self-awareness but also of reflexive awareness. Some remarks on the relationship between these two strands of Dharmakīrtian Buddhism are offered. The conclusion points out that although self-awareness occurs in Buddhism as inextricably linked with anātmavāda, the doctrine of no-self, and sākāravāda, the view that the forms we perceive belong not to external objects but to consciousness, it is used by Rāmakan : t : ha to refute both of these views. An appendix addresses the problem of how precisely to interpret Dharmakīrti's contention that conceptual cognition is non-conceptual in its reflexive awareness of itself.

The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha's (950-1000) contribution to the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṅical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha's position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination.

TRANSLATION Part 1 [0 Introduction] [Jayanta:] Surely Bhaṭṭa [Kumārila] has [already] rained down an immense shower of criticisms on to the [Buddhist] view that apoha is the meaning of a word. 3 i [1 The Support of Apoha] For to explain further: This thing called apoha is taught [by you Buddhists] to be an exclusion, [i.e.] an absence. 4 Now an absence cannot be known as something 3 The whole of the rest of Part 1 is a summary, with some small changes of details, of a few of the arguments in the apoha chapter of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Our understanding of that chapter has been shaped by the translation of it being prepared by John Taber and Kei Kataoka. 4 Dignāga did not, to our knowledge, explicitly assert that apoha is an absence (abhāva). He was interpreted that way, though, by Siṃhasūri (Nyāyāgmānusāriṇī 733,17-18, cited and translated by PIND 2009: 268, note 451): nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhanadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ . 'Nor does the fact that particulars are infinite lead to the problem that [words] would be incapable of denoting. Why? Because [exclusion] is not divided. For exclusion of other referents (arthāntarāpoha) is not divided among the particulars, because it is non-existence (abhāva); and this [exclusion] alone -not the particulars -is denoted by a word.' What Dignāga does state is that apoha is adravya (insubstantial, not really existent): avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt, adravyatvāc ca (Pramāṇasamuccayavrṛtti ad 5:36c, PIND 2009: A14). 'And the fault that [apoha] is not [capable of functioning as] a universal, which might [be thought to] follow from it not being 4 independent, in the way that pots and the like [can be perceived as independent things]. 5 Therefore, this [apoha] must be grasped as being supported by something else. 6 And what this support is of the [apoha] needs to be considered.

The following paper has four sections. In the first the Freudian concepts of repression and resistance are outlined, as they provide the necessary background to Freud's ideas about the censor. It is observed that Freud describes the result of repression in seemingly contradictory ways, and some reflection is applied to this 'problem'. The second section outlines the many aspects of Freud's ideas about censorship in a more comprehensive way than any source known to me. The third section introduces Sartre's critique, and the fourth suggests three Freudian responses to Sartre. These are different from other defenses of Freud that have been undertaken

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The paper gives an account of Rāmakaṇṭha's (950-1000) contribution to the Buddhist-Brāhmaṇical debate about the existence or non-existence of a self, by demonstrating how he carves out middle ground between the two protagonists in that debate. First three points of divergence between the Brāhmaṅical (specifically Naiyāyika) and the Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity are identified. These take the form of Buddhist denials of, or re-explanations of (1) the self as the unitary essence of the individual, (2) the self as the substance to which mental properties belong, (3) the self as the agent of both physical actions and cognitions. The difference of Rāmakaṇṭha's position from both Nyāya and Buddhism is then elaborated. He posits a self, but not one that is an eternally unchanging substance, nor one that is anything other than consciousness. Hence his difference from Nyāya. He falls with Buddhism in holding that consciousness does not require anything other than itself to inhere in, but departs from Buddhism in holding that consciousness is not momentary but enduring. The guiding metaphor here is light, but light considered as a dynamic, qualitatively unchanging repetition of the action of illumination.

The article argues that the importation into psychoanalytic theory of the terms “self” and “subject” is neither true to Freud’s intentions, nor necessary, nor helpful. Having observed how Freud undermined these concepts in both his Topographical Model and Structural Model, the article turns to the position of Ogden. Two of his contributions masterfully deconstruct the concept of “the subject” through a selection of positions advocated by Freud, Klein, and Winnicott. But he then revitalizes the concept in his own way, claiming it to be “central” and “irreducible.” This article argues for a more radical stance than Ogden’s; whereas Ogden is reductionist with regard to the subject, this article argues for eliminativism.

The paper introduces first Nietzsche and then Heidegger’s views on conscience and guilt.  It next identifies the ways in which their stances are opposed.  Finally, it argues that from a psychotherapeutic perspective, it is the Nietzschean ideas that are more likely to be fertile directions of thought for clients.

In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, ‘attention’ is a burgeoning field, with ever increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed towards it in recent years.  In this paper I make a first attempt to contrast how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists would address some aspects of attention that are discussed in that literature.

In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, “attention” is a burgeoning field, with ever-increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed toward it. In this article I make a first attempt to contrast how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists would address some aspects of attention that are discussed in that literature. The sources of what I attribute to “Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas” are the sections dealing with the manas (“internal organ”, “organ of attention”) in the Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyamañjarī, and Praśastapādabhāṣya. The words “Buddhist” and “Buddhism” in this essay refer specifically to the Sautrāntika Buddhism of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (350–430 CE). A comparison involving a later phase of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinking on this matter, a later phase of Buddhism, or a different branch of Buddhism may well yield different results.
Section I lays out the ontological postulates that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists deemed necessary for the explanation of attention. Section II looks at three arguments that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas gave for their principal postulate, the manas, and three corresponding Buddhist responses to these arguments. Sections III and IV look at contrasting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist explanations of, respectively, “shifts of attention” and “competition for attention.” Sections V and VI consider whether the Buddhist model can adequately account for voluntary or endogenous attention, and whether the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika model can adequately account for involuntary or exogenous attention. In the closing section I identify three things that are commonly attributed to attention and that may seem impossible in both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist models; I show how the two Indian models can account for them.

The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jñātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (c. 890 CE), ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming.