Asaf Siniver
University of Birmingham, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Professor of International Security
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Papers by Asaf Siniver
decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah.
Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the “air power
superiority” analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments
in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and
the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the “Lebanese
quagmire” analogy which drew on Israel’s own traumatic experience of
Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these
analogies by the Israeli political–military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on
air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained
from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and
unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies
prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous
studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or
episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies
contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during
the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.
decision making during the 2006 Second Lebanon War with Hezbollah.
Two analogies seemed to dominate internal deliberations: the “air power
superiority” analogy which drew on more than a decade of developments
in military theory and the air-based campaigns of the two Gulf wars and
the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s and late 1990s; and the “Lebanese
quagmire” analogy which drew on Israel’s own traumatic experience of
Israel following the its first war in Lebanon in 1982. The misuse of these
analogies by the Israeli political–military leadership during the war produced a myopic approach which advocated an almost total reliance on
air power rather than ground maneuver to win the war and refrained
from using ground forces for fear of entering another bloody and
unpopular war in Lebanon. The constraining power of these analogies
prevented the consideration of alternative courses of action or the effective calculation of cost-benefit analysis during the war. Whereas previous
studies of the war provided various explanations to singular decisions or
episodes, this paper shows that the air power and quagmire analogies
contained the conceptual boundaries of Israeli decision making during
the war and thus best explain its attraction and limitations.
We therefore seek to redefine the concept of power mediation to project a closer fit between conflicting parties' understanding of their situation and the methods, aims and motivations of their mediators. Breaking away from the existing pure-power spectrum, we propose a heuristic framework that includes four distinct types of power mediation, defined here as real, made, critical and structural power. The contribution of our heuristic model is threefold. First, it assists us in asking the most basic question of social science research, ‘of what is this a case’, which in turn ought to lead to a more sophisticated observation of mediation instances. Concurrently, through the frame of ‘power’, it establishes common understanding of observable phenomena that makes the study of mediation more accessible to the wider audience beyond students of our modest literature. Finally, the synthesis of epistemological and ontological inquiry of conflict and power with the established International Relations (IR) approaches of realism(s), constructivism, critical discourse and structuralism, allows respective real, made, critical and structural types of mediation power to be tested.
A novel framework examines both political and legal dimensions to analyse (i) under what conditions states are more likely to pursue a legal settlement of their territorial dispute via arbitration as opposed to the more popular diplomatic method of mediation, and (ii) what explains compliance with, or defiance of international law in such cases. In so doing, the author sets to reclaim the sui generis nature of arbitration as a unique legal-political method which enables the disputants to maintain the considerable flexibility and autonomy often found in mediation, whilst providing the same final and legally binding solution that adjudication offers.
Exploring a wide range of primary sources, including interviews, archival research, and official documents, and employing qualitative research methods, Siniver applies the analytical framework to four contemporary cases of international arbitration: the arbitration over the Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan (1966-68); the Beagle Channel arbitration between Chile and Argentina (1971-77), the Taba arbitration between Egypt and Israel (1986-88), and the South China Sea arbitration between The Philippines and China (2013-16).
A novel framework examines both political and legal dimensions to analyse (i) under what conditions states are more likely to pursue a legal settlement of their territorial dispute via arbitration as opposed to the more popular diplomatic method of mediation, and (ii) what explains compliance with, or defiance of international law in such cases. In so doing, the author sets to reclaim the sui generis nature of arbitration as a unique legal-political method which enables the disputants to maintain the considerable flexibility and autonomy often found in mediation, whilst providing the same final and legally binding solution that adjudication offers.
Exploring a wide range of primary sources, including interviews, archival research, and official documents, and employing qualitative research methods, Siniver applies the analytical framework to four contemporary cases of international arbitration: the arbitration over the Rann of Kutch between India and Pakistan (1966-68); the Beagle Channel arbitration between Chile and Argentina (1971-77), the Taba arbitration between Egypt and Israel (1986-88), and the South China Sea arbitration between The Philippines and China (2013-16).