Psychology

Does manipulating the time available to image executing a sensorimotor skill impact subsequent skill execution outcomes in a similar manner as manipulating execution time itself? Novice and skilled golfers performed a series of imaged golf putts followed by a series of actual golf putts under instructions that emphasized either speeded or nonspeeded imaging/putting execution. Novices putted less accurately (i.e., higher putting error score) following either putting or imagery instructions in which speed was stressed. Skilled golfers showed the opposite pattern. Although more time available to execute a skill enhances novice performance, this extra time harms the proceduralized skill of experts. Manipulating either actual execution time or imagined execution time produces this differential impact on novice and skilled performance outcomes. These results are discussed in terms of the functional equivalence between imagery and action and expertise differences in the attentional control structures governing complex sensorimotor skill execution.

In contrast to traditional views of the mind as an abstract information processor, recent theories of embodied cognition suggest that our representations of objects and events are grounded in action. In this review, I document recent behavioral and neuropsychological evidence in support of an embodied viewpoint, and I argue that sensorimotor experience plays a pivotal role in the embodied cognition framework. As such, not only can cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience inform sport psychology theory and research, but sport psychology (and motor skill expertise research in particular) is imperative for advancing theories of embodied cognition.

We examined whether individual differences in working memory influence the facility with which individuals learn new categories. Participants learned two different types of category structures: rule-based and information-integration. Successful learning of the former category structure is thought to be based on explicit hypothesis testing that relies heavily on working memory. Successful learning of the latter category structure is believed to be driven by procedural learning processes that operate largely outside of conscious control. Consistent with a widespread literature touting the positive benefits of working memory and attentional control, the higher one's working memory, the fewer trials one took to learn rule-based categories. The opposite occurred for information-integration categories -the lower one's working memory, the fewer trials one took to learn this category structure. Thus, the positive relation commonly seen between individual differences in working memory and performance can not only be absent, but reversed. As such, a comprehensive understanding of skill learning -and category learning in particular -requires considering the demands of the tasks being performed and the cognitive abilities of the performer.

In the current work we asked whether executive function, as measured by tests of working memory capacity, might benefit from an acute bout of exercise and, more specifically, whether individuals who are lower or higher in working memory to begin with would be more or less affected by an exercise manipulation. Healthy adults completed working memory measures in a nonexercise (baseline) session and immediately following a 30-min self-paced bout of exercise on a treadmill (exercise session). Sessions were conducted 1 week apart and session order was counterbalanced across participants. A significant Session × Working Memory interaction was obtained such that only those individuals lowest in working memory benefited from the exercise manipulation. This work suggests that acute bouts of exercise may be most beneficial for healthy adults whose cognitive performance is generally the lowest, and it demonstrates that the impact of exercise on cognition is not uniform across all individuals.

Two experiments demonstrate how individual differences in working memory (WM) impact the strategies used to solve complex math problems and how consequential testing situations alter strategy use. In Experiment 1, individuals performed multistep math problems under low-or high-pressure conditions and reported their problem-solving strategies. Under low-pressure conditions, the higher individuals' WM, the more likely they were to use computationally demanding algorithms (vs. simpler shortcuts) to solve the problems, and the more accurate their math performance. Under high-pressure conditions, higher WM individuals used simpler (and less efficacious) problem-solving strategies, and their performance accuracy suffered. Experiment 2 turned the tables by using a math task for which a simpler strategy was optimal (produced accurate performance in few problem steps). Now, under low-pressure conditions, the lower individuals' WM, the better their performance (the more likely they relied on a simple, but accurate, problem strategy). And, under pressure, higher WM individuals performed optimally by using the simpler strategies lower WM individuals employed. WM availability influences how individuals approach math problems, with the nature of the task performed and the performance environment dictating skill success or failure.

When designing research to examine the variables underlying creative thinking and problem solving success, one must not only consider (a) the demands of the task being performed, but (b) the characteristics of the individual performing the task and (c) the constraints of the skill execution environment. In the current paper we describe methodologies that allow one to eVectively study creative thinking by capturing interactions among the individual, task, and problem solving situation. In doing so, we demonstrate that the relation between executive functioning and problem solving success is not always as straightforward as one might initially believe.

Stereotype threat (ST) occurs when the awareness of a negative stereotype about a social group in a particular domain produces suboptimal performance by members of that group. Although ST has been repeatedly demonstrated, far less is known about how its effects are realized. Using mathematical problem solving as a test bed, the authors demonstrate in 5 experiments that ST harms math problems that rely heavily on working memory resources-especially phonological aspects of this system. Moreover, by capitalizing on an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms by which ST exerts its impact, the authors show (a) how ST can be alleviated (e.g., by heavily practicing once-susceptible math problems such that they are retrieved directly from long-term memory rather than computed via a working-memory-intensive algorithm) and (b) when it will spill over onto subsequent tasks unrelated to the stereotype in question but dependent on the same cognitive resources that stereotype threat also uses. The current work extends the knowledge of the causal mechanisms of stereotype threat and demonstrates how its effects can be attenuated and propagated.

Can covert sensorimotor simulation of stimulus-relevant actions influence affective judgments, even when there is no intention to act? Skilled and novice typists picked which of two letter dyads they preferred. In each pair, one dyad, if typed using standard typing methods, would involve the same fingers (e.g., FV); the other would be typed with different fingers (e.g., FJ). Thus, if typed, dyads of the former kind should create more motor interference than dyads of the latter kind. Although individuals could not explain how the dyads differed, skilled typists preferred those typed with different fingers. Novices showed no preference. Moreover, a motor task performed while making dyad preference judgments attenuated skilled typists' preference-but only when the motor task involved the specific fingers that would be used to type the dyads. These findings suggest that in skilled typists, perceiving letters prompts covert sensorimotor simulation of typing them, which in turn influences affective judgments about this information.

in two experiments, we explored how novice and expert athletes represent the everyday and sportspecific objects and actions that they read about. novice and expert ice hockey players (Experiment 1) and football players (Experiment 2) read sentences describing everyday or sport-specific situations and then judged whether a pictured item (either matching the action implied in the previous sentence or not) was mentioned in the preceding sentence. the sentences in Experiment 1 consisted of everyday and hockey-specific scenarios. the sentences in Experiment 2 depicted football scenarios implying football-specific or non-football-specific actions anyone might perform. Everyone responded most quickly to items that matched the sentence-implied actions for everyday and non-sport-specific actions. only athletes showed this effect for their respective sport-specific scenarios. Differentiating between the same item in different action orientations is thought to be driven by embodied knowledge containing the sensorimotor characteristics of what one is reading about. We show that possessing this type of representation depends on experience interacting with objects and performing the actions in question.

Stereotype threat occurs when knowledge of a negative stereotype about a social group leads to less-than-optimal performance by members of that group. Although the stereotype threat phenomenon has been extensively studied in academic and cognitively-based tasks, it has received little attention in sport. This article reviews the existent literature on stereotype threat and discusses its implications for sports performance. The causal mechanisms of stereotype threat in sport are examined, followed by a discussion of why the cognitive processes thought to govern negative stereotype-induced performance decrements in academic and cognitively based tasks (e.g., GRE or SAT tests) may not unequivocally extend to sport skills. Finally, factors that should moderate the impact of stereotype threat in sport are outlined. Because stereotype threat has important consequences for athletics (e.g., impairing athletic performance, maintaining the underrepresentation of minority athletes in certain sports), it is a phenomenon that deserves greater attention in sport and exercise psychology research.

In two experiments, we examined the attentional mechanisms governing sensorimotor skill execution across levels of expertise. In Experiment 1, novice and expert golfers took a series of putts under dual-task conditions designed to distract attention from putting and under skill-focused conditions that prompted attention to step-by-step performance. Novices performed better under skill-focused than under dual-task conditions. Experts showed the opposite pattern. In Experiment 2, novice and expert golfers putted under instructions that emphasized either putting accuracy or speed-the latter intended to reduce the time available to monitor and explicitly adjust execution parameters. Novices putted better under accuracy instructions. Experts were more accurate under speed instructions. In agreement with theories of skill acquisition and automaticity, novice performance is enhanced by conditions that allow for on-line attentional monitoring (e.g., skill-focused or accuracy instructions) in comparison with conditions that prevent explicit attentional control of skill execution (e.g., dual-task or speed constraints). In contrast, the proceduralized skill of experts benefits from environments that limit, rather than encourage, attention to execution.

In 3 experiments, the authors examined mathematical problem solving performance under pressure. In Experiment 1, pressure harmed performance on only unpracticed problems with heavy working memory demands. In Experiment 2, such high-demand problems were practiced until their answers were directly retrieved from memory. This eliminated choking under pressure. Experiment 3 dissociated practice on particular problems from practice on the solution algorithm by imposing a high-pressure test on problems practiced 1, 2, or 50 times each. Infrequently practiced high-demand problems were still performed poorly under pressure, whereas problems practiced 50 times each were not. These findings support distraction theories of choking in math, which contrasts with considerable evidence for explicit monitoring theories of choking in sensorimotor skills. This contrast suggests a skill taxonomy based on real-time control structures.

Two experiments explored the attention and memory processes governing sensorimotor skill. Experiment 1 compared novice and experienced golf putting performance in single-task (putting in isolation) and dual-task conditions (putting while performing an auditory word search task). At specific intervals, participants also produced episodic descriptions of specific putts. Experiment 2 assessed novice performance following training on the same putting task. In Experiment 1, experienced golfers did not differ in putting accuracy from single-to dual-task conditions and, compared to novices, had higher recognition memory for words heard while putting but diminished episodic memories of specific putts. However, when using an s-shaped arbitrarily weighted "funny putter" designed to disrupt the mechanics of skill execution, experienced golfers produced extensive episodic memories of specific putts but showed decreased dual-task putting accuracy and recognition memory for secondary task words. Trained novices produced results intermediate between the untrained novices and experienced golfers. As predicted by current theories of practice-based automaticity, expertise leads to proceduralized control that does not require constant attention. Resources are free to devote to secondary task demands, yet episodic memory for primary task performance is impoverished. Novel task constraints (e.g., a funny putter) increase attention to execution, compromising secondary task performance but enhancing memory for skill execution.

Two experiments examined the impact of attention on sensorimotor skills. In Experiment 1, experienced golfers putted under dual-task conditions designed to distract attention from putting and under skillfocused conditions that prompted attention to step-by-step putting performance. Dual-task condition putting was more accurate. In Experiment 2, right-footed novice and experienced soccer players dribbled through a slalom course under dual-task or skill-focused conditions. When using their dominant right foot, experts again performed better in the dual-task condition. However, when using their less proficient left foot, experts performed better in the skill-focused condition. Novices performed better under skill-focus regardless of foot. Whereas novices and the less-proficient performances of experts benefit from online attentional monitoring of step-by-step performance, high-level skill execution is harmed.

Abstract 1. Experiments 1-2 examined generic knowledge and episodic memories of putting in novice and expert golfers. Impoverished episodic recollection of specific putts among experts indicated that skilled putting is encoded in a procedural form that supports performance without the need for step-by-step attentional control. According to explicit monitoring theories of choking, such proceduralization makes putting vulnerable to decrements under pressure.

Abstract In two experiments, we explored how novice and expert athletes represent the everyday and sportspecific objects and actions that they read about. Novice and expert ice hockey players (Experiment 1) and football players (Experiment 2) read sentences describing everyday or sport-specific situations and then judged whether a pictured item (either matching the action implied in the previous sentence or not) was mentioned in the preceding sentence.