Clarke, S., Zohny, H. and Savulescu, J. (eds.) Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-19., 2021
Recent technological developments and potential technological developments of the near future req... more Recent technological developments and potential technological developments of the near future require us to try to think clearly about what it is to have moral status and about when and why we should attribute moral status to beings and entities. What should we say about the moral status of human non-human chimeras, human brain organoids, artificial intelligence, cyborgs, post-humans, and human minds that have been uploaded into a computer, or onto the internet? In this introductory chapter, we survey some key assumptions ordinarily made about moral status that may require rethinking. These include the assumptions that all humans who are not severely cognitively impaired have equal moral status, that possession of the sophisticated cognitive capacities typical of human adults is necessary for full moral status, that only humans can have full moral status, and that there can be no beings with higher moral status than ordinary adult humans. We also need to consider how we should treat beings and entities when we find ourselves uncertain about their moral status.
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Papers by Steve Clarke
about the scope of patient autonomy. Libertarians permit patients to make decisions to undergo medical procedures on the basis of any considerations, including conviction-based hopes, on grounds of respect for freedom of choice. Rational interventionists want to restrict choices made on the basis of conviction‐based hope on the grounds that
choices based on hope incorporate irrationality of a sort incompatible with autonomous decision‐making. In this article, we navigate a middle path between these extremes, arguing that patient decision‐making based on conviction‐based hope ought to be acceptable and permitted in health care when it conforms to norms of practical rationality. These norms allow patients some room to make decisions to consent to undergo medical
procedures informed by conviction‐based hope.
(2002), as a work of ‘generalism’. This term and the term ‘particularism’—both of which are now widely applied—are terms of art Buenting and Taylor coined to characterize views about the philosophy of conspiracy theorizing. I also noted two conceptual problems that have emerged with applications of the generalist-particularist distinction. Maarten Boudry
and M. Giulia Napolitano in “Why We Should Stop Talking about Generalism and Particularism: Moving the Debate on Conspiracy Theories Forward” (2023) took issue with the allegedly confusing way that I used the term ‘generalism’. They also assert that my use of the term ‘generalism’ is reflective of the way it is used by many other philosophers. According to Boudry and Napolitano, confusion in the philosophy of conspiracy theorizing is now rampant; and consequently, it is best if we stop using the terms ‘generalism’ and ‘particularism’ altogether and start talking about ‘lumpers’ and ‘splitters’ instead. More recently M Dentith and Melina Tsapos (2024) have responded to Boudry and Napolitano defending the continued use of the distinction between generalism and particularism. Here I argue for revision of the generalist-particularist distinction, rather than either replacement or retention.
See: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/animsent/vol5/iss29/33/
about the scope of patient autonomy. Libertarians permit patients to make decisions to undergo medical procedures on the basis of any considerations, including conviction-based hopes, on grounds of respect for freedom of choice. Rational interventionists want to restrict choices made on the basis of conviction‐based hope on the grounds that
choices based on hope incorporate irrationality of a sort incompatible with autonomous decision‐making. In this article, we navigate a middle path between these extremes, arguing that patient decision‐making based on conviction‐based hope ought to be acceptable and permitted in health care when it conforms to norms of practical rationality. These norms allow patients some room to make decisions to consent to undergo medical
procedures informed by conviction‐based hope.
(2002), as a work of ‘generalism’. This term and the term ‘particularism’—both of which are now widely applied—are terms of art Buenting and Taylor coined to characterize views about the philosophy of conspiracy theorizing. I also noted two conceptual problems that have emerged with applications of the generalist-particularist distinction. Maarten Boudry
and M. Giulia Napolitano in “Why We Should Stop Talking about Generalism and Particularism: Moving the Debate on Conspiracy Theories Forward” (2023) took issue with the allegedly confusing way that I used the term ‘generalism’. They also assert that my use of the term ‘generalism’ is reflective of the way it is used by many other philosophers. According to Boudry and Napolitano, confusion in the philosophy of conspiracy theorizing is now rampant; and consequently, it is best if we stop using the terms ‘generalism’ and ‘particularism’ altogether and start talking about ‘lumpers’ and ‘splitters’ instead. More recently M Dentith and Melina Tsapos (2024) have responded to Boudry and Napolitano defending the continued use of the distinction between generalism and particularism. Here I argue for revision of the generalist-particularist distinction, rather than either replacement or retention.
See: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/animsent/vol5/iss29/33/
There are a number of ways we could respond to the new challenges these technological developments raise: we might revise our ordinary assumptions about what is needed for a being to possess full moral status, or reject the assumption that there is a sharp distinction between full and partial moral status. This volume explores such responses, and provides a forum for philosophical reflection about ordinary presuppositions and intuitions about moral status.
Many thinkers hold that regular drug users are incompetent to consent to medical treatment. In this article, we set out minimum criteria for agents to count as competent to give informed consent, and argue that regular drug users—even those who are considered addicted to a drug—typically meet these conditions. Though addiction does impair autonomy, it does not impair it to a degree incompatible with the provision of informed consent. Studies of the behaviors of addicts show that they generally retain sufficient control over their behaviors and their decision making to qualify as competent to consent.
Beaucoup de penseurs soutiennent que les utilisateurs de stupéfiants réguliers sont incompétents pour consentir au traitement médical. En cet article, nous établons des critères minimaux pour que les agents qualifiénnent comme comptent en tant que compétent au consentement informé, et soutenons que les utilisateurs de drogue réguliers—y compris ceux qui sont considérés toxicomanes—satisfont typiquement ces conditions. Bien que la dépendance altère l'autonomie, il ne l'altère pas à un degré incompatible avec le consentement informé. Les études du comportement des toxicomanes prouvent qu'ils gardent la maîtrise suffisante de leur comportement et de leur prise de décision pour qualifier comme compétente pour consentir.
The use of electronic monitoring devices in the workplaces of the private sector of capitalist economies is considered from the vantage-point of the doctrine of informed consent, a doctrine that is understood, following Clarke (2001), to be the basis for a general analysis of consenting relations. It is argued that electronic monitoring in workplace situations where employee consent is possible is unacceptable without that consent. The consent-based argument developed is compared with arguments aimed at restricting the use of electronic monitoring in the workplace that are grounded in the values of privacy and autonomy. It is argued that, whereas a consent-based argument leads to the aforementioned decisive conclusion, arguments that are grounded in the values of privacy and autonomy do not lead to any decisive conclusions that could be used to warrant restrictions on the use of contemporary electronic monitoring devices in the workplace.