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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:2204.01773 (cs)
[Submitted on 4 Apr 2022 (v1), last revised 10 Jun 2022 (this version, v2)]

Title:Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules

Authors:Maneesha Papireddygari, Bo Waggoner
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Abstract:We consider a principal-agent problem where the agent may privately choose to acquire relevant information prior to taking a hidden action. This model generalizes two special cases: a classic moral hazard setting, and a more recently studied problem of incentivizing information acquisition (IA). We show that all of these problems can be reduced to the design of a proper scoring rule. Under a limited liability condition, we consider the special cases separately and then the general problem. We give novel results for the special case of IA, giving a closed form "pointed polyhedral cone" solution for the general multidimensional problem. We also describe a geometric, scoring-rules based solution to the case of the classic contracts problem. Finally, we give an efficient algorithm for the general problem of Contracts with Information Acquisition.
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:2204.01773 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:2204.01773v2 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2204.01773

Submission history

From: Maneesha Papireddygari [view email]
[v1] Mon, 4 Apr 2022 18:05:30 UTC (102 KB)
[v2] Fri, 10 Jun 2022 17:29:20 UTC (103 KB)
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