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The book cover of the 1953 edition of The Rommel Papers, edited by B. H. Liddell Hart. It was one of the foundational texts that built and sustained the Rommel myth.[1]

The term Rommel myth (also known as Rommel legend) refers to the interpretation of the German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel as an apolitical, brilliant commander who was a sacrificial victim of the Third Reich due to his (now disputed) participation in the 20 July plot against Adolf Hitler. The myth has its foundations in Nazi propaganda that used Rommel to highlight Wehrmacht's prowess and instill optimism in the German public, with Rommel a willing participant in the creation of his legend.

Following the war, Rommel emerged as the "good German" and "our friend Rommel", especially in the British interpretation. Rommel's reputation as a chivalrous soldier was used in the interest of the West German rearmament and reconciliation between the Western Allies and the new Federal Republic. The myth proved to be resilient despite attempts to dispel the legend and present Rommel in proper historical context.

Origins

The origins of the myth can be first found in Rommel's drive for success as a young officer in World War I and then in his popular 1937 book Infantry Attacks, which was written in a style that diverged from the German military literature of the time. The book became a bestseller and was supposed to have been read by Hitler.[2][3] He received a promotion to a general's rank from the dictator, who skipped a rank to get Rommel to this level, disregarding seniority. A few months later, Rommel used his connections to Hitler to obtain command of a Panzer division, after he had been turned down by the Army's personnel office which had offered him command of a mountain division. The affront to the military protocol was noted by Rommel's fellow officers, and began to cement Rommel's reputation as Hitler's favorite.[4][5]

German and British propaganda

Rommel's victories in 1940 and 1941 were then played up by the Nazi propaganda, even though his success was achieved in Germany's least strategically important theatre of World War II.[3][6] Rommel's victories in France were featured in the German press and in the February 1941 film Victory in the West, a segment of which, reenacting the crossing of the Somme River, Rommel helped direct.[7] In North Africa, Rommel received help in cultivating his image from Alfred Ingemar Berndt [de], a senior official at the Reich Propaganda Ministry who had volunteered for military service.[8] Berndt was assigned to Rommel's staff and soon became one of his closest aids. Bernd often acted as liaison between Rommel and both the Propaganda ministry and the Fuehrer Headquarters. He directed Rommel's photoshoots and filed radio dispatches describing the battles.[9][10]

Starting with the spring of 1941, Rommel's name began to appear in the British media. In the autumn and early winter of 1941, he was mentioned in the British press almost daily, while at the same time the Reich propaganda machine used Rommel's successes in Africa as a diversion from Wehrmacht's challenging situation in the Soviet Union, after the stall of Operation Barbarossa. The adulation of Rommel in the German press reached new heights, with language such as "sacred enthusiasm", "immortal legend" and "holy geometry".[11][3]

The British contributed to the foundation of the Rommel myth, by embracing the heroic image portrayed by Reich's propaganda, as Rommel resumed offensive operations in January of 1942 against the British forces weakened by redeployments to the Far East. Speaking in the Parlament, Churchill sought to explain the British defeat by describing Rommel as a "extraordinary bold and clever opponent" and a "great field commander". The American press soon began to take notice of Rommel as well, following the country's entry into the war on 11 December, writing that "The British (...) admire him because he beat them and were surprised to have beaten in turn such a capable general". Reaching the British troops, such language had a demoralising effect, to the point that General Auchinleck distributed a directive to his commanders trying to dispel the notion that Rommel was a "superman".[12][13]

The attention of the Western press, especially from the British, thrilled Goebbels who wrote in his diary in early 1942: "Rommel continues to be the recognized darling of even the enemies' news agencies."[14] Rommel was also pleased by the media attention, both domestic and foreign, often discussing it in his letters to his wife. He was the German commander most frequently covered in the German media, and the only one to receive a press conference, which took place in October 1942.[10][15] The press conference was moderated by Goebbels and went well, with foreign media in attendance to hear Rommel declare at its opening: "Today we (...) have the gates of Egypt in hand, and with the intent to act!" At this stage the focus on Rommel was needed because the Wehrmacht was not producing victories anywhere else, and the purpose of his image was to instill optimism and belief in the ultimate German victory.[16]

Military reverses

The situation soon changed, with the successful offensive by the British forces in November 1942. The Propaganda Ministry responded to the crisis by directing the media to minimize reverses and to prevent any appearance of pessimism. The invisibility of Rommel was to be emphasised, resulting in the German press writing the next day that Rommel "can only win". The charade was maintained well into the spring of 1943, even as the German situation in Africa turned precarious. With the evacuation inevitable, Goebbels had the OKH announce in May 1943 that Rommel was on a two-month leave for health reasons, so that the defeat would not be associated with his name. Instead, the campaign was presented, by Berndt, who resumed his role in the Propaganda Ministry, as a ruse to tie down the British Empire while Germany was turning Europe into an impenetrable fortress, with Rommel at the helm of this success. The radio program ran in May 1943; afterwards, the grateful Rommel sent Berndt a case of cigars.[17]

Afterwards, Rommel entered a period of a career limbo, without a significant command.[18] However, he still remained a household name in Germany that conveyed an aura of invisibility.[19] Hitler thus made Rommel part of his strategy in defending the Fortress Europe (Festung Europa) by sending him to the West to inspect fortifications along the Atlantic Wall. Goebbels supported the decision noting in his diary that Rommel was "undoubtedly the suitable man" for the task. The propaganda minister expected the move to reassure the German public and at the same time to have a negative impact on the Allied forces' morale, since the British and American troops both knew how tenacious Rommel could be.[19] A Wehrmacht propaganda company frequently accompanied Rommel on his inspection trips to document his work for the benefit of both domestic and foreign audiences.[20][21] In May 1944 the German newsreels reported on Rommel's speech at a Wehrmacht conference, where he stated his conviction that "every single German soldier will make his contribution against the Anglo-American spirit that it deserves for its criminal and bestial air war campaign against our homeland". The speech lead to an upswing in morale and sustained confidence in Rommel.[22]

When Rommel was injured on 17 June 1944, Propaganda Ministry undertook efforts to conceal the injury so that not to undermine domestic morale. Despite those, the news of the injury leaked to the British press. To counteract the rumors of a serious injury and even death, Rommel was required to appear at the 1 August press conference. On 3 August, the German press published an official report that Rommel had been injured in a car accident. Rommel noted in his diary his dismay at this twisting of the truth, belatedly realising how much the Reich propaganda was using him for its own ends.[22]

Post-war

The historian Lucio Ceva quotes Correlli Barnett: "The Desert War entered the British folk-memory, a source of legend, endlessly re-written as both history and fiction", and argues that even though the myth was of British origin, it found it reflections in post-war West Germany.[23] The historian Peter Caddick-Adams argues that, following a forced suicide, Rommel emerged as the "acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime".[24] The ground was thus fertile for the myth to be reborn after the war, in the interest of the program of the German rearmament and the British–German reconciliation.[25][26]

After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, it became clear to the Americans and the British that a German army would have to be revived to help face off against the Soviet Union. Many former German officers, including Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel, who had served on Rommel's staff in France, were convinced that no future German army would be possible without the rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht. In October 1950, at the behest of West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a group of former senior officers produced the document that later became known as the Himmerod memorandum. Intended as both a planning and a negotiating tool, the document included a key demand for "measures to transform domestic and foreign public opinion" with regards to the German military.[27][28]

Foundational works

Early biographies

Rommel's former enemies, especially the British, played a key role in the manufacture and propagation of the myth.[3][29] The journalist and historian Basil Liddell Hart, an early proponent of the German rearmament and the moral rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht, provided the first widely available source on Rommel in his 1948 book on Hitler's generals, updated in 1951. Portraying Rommel as an outsider to the Nazi regime in the 1948 edition, Liddel Hart concluded the 1951 text with comments on Rommel's "gifts and performance" that "qualified him for a place in the role of the 'Great Captains' of history".[30]

The other foundational text was the 1950 the influential and laudatory biography Rommel: The Desert Fox by Brigadier Desmond Young.[31][32] Young extensively interviewed Rommel's widow and collaborated with several individuals who had been close to Rommel, including Hans Speidel, with Liddel Hart also supporting the project. Young subscribed to the view that Rommel had not been a supporter of Nazism, subtly conveying that he served the regime, but was not part of it.[25][33] The result was predictably positive, "bordering on hagiography", according to the historian Patrick Major.[33]

Young's biography was another step in the development of the Rommel myth – with Rommel emerging as an active, in not a leading, plotter. Speidel contributed as well, starting, from the early 1950s, to bring up Rommel's and his own role in the plot, thus boosting his [Speidel's] suitability for a future role in the new military force of the Federal Republic, the Bundeswehr, and then in NATO.[34] The reception of the book in Britain was enthusiastic, going through eight editions in a year. Former military opponents praised` Rommel as a brilliant commander and a resistance fighter, the "good German", with one senior military figure comparing Rommel to legendary commander Belisarius.[33] The praise led Brian Horrocks, former Mongomerry's deputy, to publish an article "The Rommel Myth Debunked" in April of 1950 in which he argued that the 8th Army beat the Africa Corps "fair and square".[33]

The Desert Fox film

The 1951 movie "The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel", based on Young's biography, portrayed Rommel in a sympathetic way, as a loyal, humane soldier and a firm opponent Hitler's policies.[35] The movie played up Rommel's disputed role in the conspiracy against Hitler,[36] while omitting Rommel's early association with the dictator.[35] Critics and the public were hostile in the U.S., but the movie was a success in Britain, along with a less known 1953 movie "The Desert Rats", where Mason resumed his portrayal of Rommel.[37]

The Rommel Papers

1953 saw the publication of Rommel's writings of the war period as The Rommel Papers, edited by Liddell Hart, the former Wehrmacht officer Fritz Bayerlein, and Rommel's widow and son, with an introduction by Liddel Hart. The historian Mark Connelly argues that The Rommel Papers was one of the two foundational works that lead to the a "Rommel renaissance", the other being Young's biography.[1] Meanwhile, Liddel Hart had a personal interest in the work: by having coaxed Rommel's widow to include material favorable to himself, Liddel Hart could present Rommel as his "pupil". The controversy was described by the political scientist John Mearsheimer in his work The Weight of History, who concluded that, by "putting words in the mouths of German Generals and manipulating history", Liddel Hart was in a position to show that he was at the root of the dramatic German success in 1940.[38][39]

Uncritical accounts

Young and Liddell Hart laid the foundation for the Anglo-American myth, which consisted of three themes: Rommel's ambivalence towards Nazism; his military genius; and the emphasis of the chivalrous nature of the fighting in North Africa.[1] Their works lent support to the image of the "clean Wehrmacht" and were generally not questioned, since they came from British authors, rather than German revisionists.[40] The trend continued with other uncritical biographies, such as Rommel as Military Commander (1968) by the military historian Ronald Lewin and Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (1994) by the high-ranking British officer David Fraser.[41]

Fraser's work "encapsulates the post-1945 hagiographic approach", according to the historian Mark Connelly. For example, Fraser includes Rommel among the "great masters of manoeuvre in war", whose personalities "transcend time" and "cut like [a] sabre through the curtains of history".[42] The uncritical tradition also included works by Sir John Squire and General Sir John Hackett. In contrast, German biographies, such as by the military historian Wolf Heckmann, were far less sympathetic.[1]

Reevaluation

Recent scholarship examined Rommel's attitude towards National Socialism, his performance as a military commander, his role in the 20 July plot and his motivations, leading to a different interpretations of the elements of the myth.

Relationship with National Socialism

Rommel was an ambitious commander and one of Hitler's favorite generals; his close relationship with Hitler benefited both his inter-war and war-time career.[5][43] Rommel once had as shot at being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army. At the time, Goebbels, who lobbied for Rommel's appointment, wrote in his diary that Rommel "is ideologically sound, is not just sympathetic to the National Socialists. He is a National Socialist; his is a troop leader with a gift for improvisation, personally courageous and extraordinarily inventive. These are the kinds of soldiers we need".[43] The military historian Robert Citino describes Rommel as "not apolitical" and writes that his owed his career to Hitler, to whom Rommel's attitude was "worshipful".[10]

The historian Alaric Searle recasts Rommel's involvement with the Nazi regime, including Rommel's role as a liaison between Hitler Youth and the Wehrmacht. Young's biography had described Rommel's role in strictly military terms and alluded to a falling out between him and the Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach on ideological grounds. In fact, Rommel had proposed a plan (twice) that would have subordinated Hitler Youth to the army, removing it from the NSDAP control. That went against Schirach's wishes, resulting in Rommel's quiet removal from the project. Searle describes another of Young's assertions, that Rommel first became close to Hitler in the fall of 1938, as “patently untrue”, casting doubts on the rest of Young’s narrative as it pertains to Rommel’s relationship with the dictator.[44] He states that Rommel not only "found favor with the Nazi regime, but [...] was delighted with the preferential treatment he was receiving". In a sign that he "lost touch with reality", as Searle puts it, Rommel wrote to his wife in October 1939 from the devastated Warsaw: "The inhabitants drew a breath of relief that we have arrived and rescued them."[45]

Operational level commander

Certain contemporary historians have been skeptical of Rommel as an operational level commander, such as the military historians Niall Barr and Citino. They point out to Rommel's lack of appreciation for Germany's strategic situation, his misunderstanding of the relative importance of his theatre to the German High Command, his poor grasp of logistical realities, and, according to the historian Ian Becket, his "penchant for glory hunting".[46][10] Citino credits Rommel's limitations as an operational level commander as "materially contributing" to the eventual demise of the Axis forces in North Africa.[10], while the historian Larry T. Addington focuses on Rommel's disobedience and struggle over the North Africa strategy, whereas his initial brilliant success resulted in "catastrophic effects" for Germany in this theatre of war.[47]

The historian Geoffrey P. Megargee refers to Rommel as a "talented tactical leader", but points out his popularity with Hitler and his playing the German and Italian command structures against each other to his advantage. Rommel used the confused structure (the OKW, the OKH and the Italian Comando Supremo) to disregard orders that he disagreed with or to appeal to whatever authority he felt would be most sympathetic to his requests.[48] Rommel often went directly to Hitler with his needs and concerns, taking advantage of the favoritism that the Führer displayed towards him and adding to the distrust that the German High Command already had of him.[49]

Military practitioners have also questioned Rommel's abilities at the operational level. While nearly all acknowledge Rommel's excellent tactical abilities, many military commanders came to accept that Rommel was "possibly the most overrated commander of an army in world history", writes U.S. Major General and military historian David T. Zabecki of United States Naval Institute, quoting the opinion of Wolf Heckmann. Zabecki notes that Rommel's brilliant tactical moves were logistically unsustainable, which eventually led to a strategic defeat. Rommel's insubordination also played a role, leading to a calamitous misuse of resources, when Rommel went over the head of his superior, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, to appeal directly to Hitler to approve an assault on Egypt instead of occupying Malta, as Kesselring and OKW were planning.[5]

Historians also take issue with Rommel's absence from Normandy on the day of the Allied invasion, 6 June 1944. He had left France on 5 June and was at home on the 6th celebrating his wife's birthday. Rommel either planned or claimed to plan to proceed to see Hitler the next day to discuss the situation in Normandy.[50][51] Zabecki calls his decision to leave the theatre in view of an imminent invasion "an incredible lapse of command responsibility".[50]

Role in 20 July plot

Contradictions and ambiguities

The objective assessment of Rommel has been hampered by Rommel's firmly established post-war reputation as a military genius and as someone ambivalent towards the Nazi regime.[46] Recent scholarship, such as the 2002 work Mythos Rommel by French author and cinematographer Maurice Rémy and the 2004 book Rommel: Das Ende einer Legende ("Rommel: The End of a Legend") by the German historian Ralf Georg Reuth, has started the reevaluation of Rommel's role in history.[52]

The picture that emerges is much more complex than the post-war myth. In a 2012 interview with Reuters, the historian Sönke Neitzel states: "On the one hand he didn't commit war crimes that we know of and ordered a retreat at El Alamein despite Hitler's order. But he took huge German casualties elsewhere and he was a servant of the regime. He was not exactly a shining liberal or Social Democrat. Mostly, he was interested in his career".[36]

Caddick-Adams writes that Rommel was a "complicated man of many contradictions",[53] while Beckett notes that "Rommel's myth (...) has proved remarkably resilient" and that more work is needed to put Rommel in proper historical context.[54] Zabecki concludes that "the blind hero worship (...) only distorts the real lessons to be learned from [his] career and battles",[5] and the historian Bruce Allen Watson notes that the legend has been a "distraction" that obscured the evolution of Rommel as a military commander and his changing attitudes towards the regime that he served.[55]

References

Citations

  1. ^ a b c d Connelly 2014, pp. 163–163.
  2. ^ Watson 1999, p. 157-158.
  3. ^ a b c d Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 471–472.
  4. ^ Watson 1999, p. 158.
  5. ^ a b c d Zabecki 2016.
  6. ^ Barr 2014, p. 60.
  7. ^ Watson1999, p. 158-159.
  8. ^ Watson 1999, p. 159.
  9. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 124.
  10. ^ a b c d e Citino 2012.
  11. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 136-139.
  12. ^ Watson 1999, p. 166-167.
  13. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 141-143.
  14. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 144.
  15. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 144-146.
  16. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 150-152.
  17. ^ Reuth 2005, pp. 154–158.
  18. ^ Leib 2014, p. 113-115.
  19. ^ a b Leib 2014, pp. 117–118.
  20. ^ Leib 2014, p. 120.
  21. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 159.
  22. ^ a b Reuth 2005, p. 159–161.
  23. ^ Ceva 1990, pp. 97–98.
  24. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 471–473.
  25. ^ a b Searle 2014, pp. 9.
  26. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 471.
  27. ^ Smelser & Davies 2008, pp. 72–73.
  28. ^ Wette 2007, pp. 236–237.
  29. ^ Reuth 2005, p. 2.
  30. ^ Searle 2014, pp. 8, 27.
  31. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 478.
  32. ^ Beckett 2014, pp. 1–2.
  33. ^ a b c d Major 2008.
  34. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 474.
  35. ^ a b Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 480–481.
  36. ^ a b Chambers 2012.
  37. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 481.
  38. ^ Mearsheimer 1988, pp. 199–200.
  39. ^ Luvaas 1990, pp. 12–13.
  40. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 483.
  41. ^ Searle 2014, pp. 7, 26.
  42. ^ Connelly 2014, pp. 169.
  43. ^ a b Reuth 2005, p. 54.
  44. ^ Searle 2014, pp. 19–21.
  45. ^ Searle 2014, p. 24.
  46. ^ a b Becket 2014, pp. 4–6.
  47. ^ Addington 1967.
  48. ^ Megargee 2000, p. 97.
  49. ^ Watson 1999, p. 164-165.
  50. ^ a b Zabecki March 2016.
  51. ^ Lieb 2014.
  52. ^ Becket 2014, pp. 1–2.
  53. ^ Caddick-Adams 2012, p. 485–486.
  54. ^ Becket 2014, p. 6.
  55. ^ Watson 1999, p. 162-163.

Bibliography

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  • Beckett, Ian (2014). "Introduction". In F.W. Beckett, ed. (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Caddick-Adams, Peter (2012). Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New York, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN 9781590207253. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Ceva, Lucio (1990). "The North African Campaign, 1940–43: A Reconsideration". In John Gooch, ed. (ed.). Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War. Abingdon: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-7146-3369-5. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Chambers, Madeline (2012). "The Devil's General? German film seeks to debunk Rommel myth". Reuters. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
  • Citino, Robert (2012). "Rommel's Afrika Korps". HistoryNet. Retrieved 3 March 2016.
  • Connelly, Mark (2014). "Rommel as icon". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Luvaas, Jay (1990). "Liddell Hart and the Mearsheimer Critique: A "Pupil's" Retrospective" (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
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  • Lieb, Peter (2014). "Rommel in Normandy". In F.W. Beckett, ed. (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Major, Patrick (2008). "'Our Friend Rommel': The Wehrmacht as 'Worthy Enemy' in Postwar British Popular Culture*". German History. 26 (4). Oxford University Press: 520–535. doi:10.1093/gerhis/ghn049. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Mearsheimer, John (1988). Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 9780801420894. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Megargee, Geoffrey P. (2000). Inside Hitler's High Command. Lawrence, Kansas: Kansas University Press. ISBN 0-7006-1015-4. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Reuth, Ralf Georg (2005). Rommel: The End of a Legend. London: Haus Books. ISBN 978-1-904950-20-2. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Robinson, James R. (1997). "The Rommel Myth". Military Review Journal. Retrieved 8 February 2016.
  • Searle, Alaric (2014). "Rommel and the rise of the Nazis". In F.W. Beckett (editor) (ed.). Rommel Reconsidered. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books. ISBN 9780811714624. {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Smelser, Ronald; Davies, Edward J. (2008). The myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-83365-3. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Watson, Bruce Allen (1999). Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. ISBN 9780275959234. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Wette, Wolfram (2007). The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674025776. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
  • Zabecki, David T. (Jan 2016). "Rethinking Rommel". Military History. 32 (5). Herndon, Va.: 24–29. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
  • Zabecki, David T. (2016). "March 2016 Readers' Letters". HistoryNet. Retrieved 3 March 2016.
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