Talk:Madhyamaka

The school of thought and its subsidiaries are called "Madhyamaka"; those who follow it are called "Mādhyamikas."

Recent edits by Reifingam.

There is some sort of confusion here that I want to clear up before letting the recent edit through. As I understand it, 'existence' is not disputed by Nagarjuna - only inherent existence is disputed. If there were no existents, then all objects would have the same ontological significance as the horn of a hare, a hairy tortoiseshell, etc. and karma would not function. If we recollect that the project of Wisdom is to overturn Nirvana, we can identify that the specific quality of objects that is being invalidated is their efficaciousness as sources of happiness or suffering - a mistaken perception which leads to clinging/grasping (Upādāna/Taṇhā) (20040302 (talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC)) Likewise, can you provide the specific verse of chapter15 of the MMK ? (20040302 (talk) 16:24, 27 January 2012 (UTC))

Candrakiriti, in the Prasannapāda, differentiates between the subtle object of negation, inherent existence, and the course object of negation, mere existence. Both are certainly refuted though in Madhyamaka. See Catuṣkoṭi and chapter 21 of the mmk. Of course Tsongkhapa's system focuses merely on the subtle object of negation, inherent existence. Is this what you are referring to? CO2Northeast (talk) 17:16, 27 January 2012 (UTC)

I understand what you are saying, I currently disagree. Can you please refer to the verse (and it's interpretation) of the Prasannapāda where Candrakirti refutes mere existence? Likewise, I cannot (yet) agree with an unsubstantiated (and unreferenced) argument that the Madhyamaka refute mere existence. Are you likewise denying that the Gelukpa's (followers of Tsongkhapa) are NOT Madhyamikas? On what basis can you make that claim? On the other hand, if you accept that the followers of Tsongkhapa ARE Madhyamikas, then we must accept that there either (a) a difference of opinion on certain aspects of the Madhyamka or (b) that their writings are acceptable. So, for instance - From Hopkins (Meditation on emptiness page 542-543) - "Thus, the sphere of valid establishment is the coarse conventions of the world; within that context what is validly established holds true, and even Buddhas and yogis need not contradict those truths just because their sphere is subtler." -Therefore, 'coarse' existence is not refuted. Of course, he is paraphrasing Candrakirti here (Madhyamakāvatāra VI.82): "If the world does not harm you, based on the world itself refute these conventionalities. You and the world debate about these, and afterwards I will rely upon the stronger." The root text of Nagarjuna, (Ch15 v10) line 2: "non-existence is a view of nihilism". By assuming that the Madhyamaka refute mere existence, one enters into an identification with Nihilism, which is a mistake, and one that Madhyamikas vigorously refute. Therefore, until adequately corrected, I re-iterate that conventional existence is not refuted. (20040302 (talk) 15:57, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

You are talking about the two truths. I am talking about the 4 extremes. There is no doubt what the four extremes are. Also by refuting existence, that does not mean Madhyamaka claims nonexistence. — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast (talk • contribs) 16:18, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Mere existence (continuing from the section above)

A recent edit stated: "Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish. (Ref:Tsondru, Mabja. Ornament of Reason. Snow Lion Publications. 2011, pages 56-58, 405-417.)

Nagarjuna only asserts that phenomena do not arise as inherent existents. Nagarjuna does not deny mere existence. This seems to be a sticking point. I am not disputing that this is what Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü may say, but I certainly dispute that this is an accurate depiction of all Madhyamika views. It is quite clear that other Madhyamakas disagree with this assertion. Likewise, I do not know (and have not yet been given evidence) if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü reached this conclusion, and if so, how he did. What I know for sure is that there are plenty of Madhyamikas who dispute it - most notably Tsongkhapa and his followers. What I believe is completely undisputed is that Nagarjuna asserts: "Whatever is dependently co-arisen / That is explained to be emptiness." For the Lede, we should avoid using distinctions which are unshared position.

It occurs to me that this is a more subtle point - that what we agree is refuted is (the Svatantrika position of) an assertion of a conventional existence of intrinsic nature. However, mere, or conventional existence / aka nominal existence remains necessary for us to avoid conflating dependant origination with the imaginary (such as horns of hares, hairs on a tortoise shell etc.)

I am genuinely curious here - if Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü actually does interpret Nagarjuna as denying mere existence how does he distinguish between objects that are real (eg. the four noble truths - the denial of which would make him a non-buddhist) and those which are purely imaginary (such as the aforementioned hare-horn or, in a more contemporary setting, hobbits)? (20040302 (talk) 16:20, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Since existence is one of the 4 extremes, of course Madhayamaka refutes existence. Nagarjuna devotes an entire chapter to this, no matter what translation you use. But you seem to think refuting existence means claiming nonexistence, when thats not the case at all. CO2Northeast (talk) 16:22, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

What? Where does Tsongkhapa deny the 4 extremes? What are you talking about? CO2Northeast (talk) 16:49, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I do not claim that Tsongkapa denies using the Catuskoti.

The four extremes are to do with inherent existence, not mere existence. Tsongkhapa states (Lam-Rim-Chen-Mo, Snow Lion, Vol 3. p156) Question: "If these things cannot withstand rational analysis, then how is it possible for something to exist where reason has refuted it?" Reply: "You are mistakenly conflating the inability to withstand rational analysis with invalidation by reason. Many who have made this error claim that production and such exist even though rational analysis of reality refutes them. This is reckless chatter, so we do not agree. To ask whether something can withstand rational analysis is to ask whether it is found by a line of reasoning that analyses reality. Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. So this (Catuskoti) is seeking to discover whether forms and so forth have an intrinsic nature that is produced, ceases, and so forth. [...] It is not that this line of reasoning searches for mere production and cessation. [...] The fact that this line of reasoning does not find them does not entail that it refutes them. Rather, reason refutes something that - if it did exist - would have to be established by reason, but which reason does not establish. Conventional consciousnesses establish the production and cessation of forms etc. though such forms and such exist, reasoning consciousness does not establish them. [...] For example, a visual consciousness does not find sounds, but this does not refute them. If production and so forth existed essentially - i.e.. were established in final reality, then reason would have to find them because it accurately analyses whether forms and such have essentially existing production and cessation. Since such analysis does not find production and so forth, it refutes production, cessation and so forth that exist essentially.

Candrakirti's says the following: (all taken from the aforementioned commentary on Aryadeva's 400 verses) Incorrect position: Aryadeva means that compounded phenomena lack production because this analysis (Catuskoti) refutes all forms of production. Reply: In that case, the production of compounded phenomena would not be like a magician's illusion. Rather we would make it understood using examples such as the son of a barren woman (horn of a hare, etc). Wary of the absurd implication that dependent-arisings would not exist, we avoid such comparisons. Instead we compare the production of things to a magician's illusion and so forth, examples that do not contradict dependent-arising. Objection: If eyes and such do not exist, then how can the sensory faculties of organs such as the eye be considered things that result from karma? Reply: Would we refute that it is the nature of these to result from Karma? Objection: Since you are demonstrating (via Catuskoti) the refutation of eyes and such, how could you not refute that? Reply:Because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. We refute here that things exist essentially; we do not refute that eyes and such are products and are dependently arisen results of karma. Therefore, they exist. Hence, when eyes and such are explained only as results of karma, they do exist.

So, we can see from both Candrakirti and Tsonkhapa that the Madhyamikas do not refute existence. Likewise, they do not assert that the Catuskoti refute existence - and indeed explicitly state that the Catuskoti are to be used to search for intrinsic nature. Moreover, Candrakirti asserts existence - as long as we are talking about existence arising from dependent-arising. (20040302 (talk) 17:06, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Tsongkhapa claims that inherent existence=existence, and also claims that when sentient beings look at an object they see only inherent existence, not mere existence. CO2Northeast (talk) 17:10, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I would like you to substantiate your claim regarding what you say Tsongkhapa states. How do you respond to the substantial material (from both Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti) I have provided which supports that Madhyamakas do not deny conventional existence, but they deny inherent existence / essential existence, and likewise that the Catuskoti cannot refute conventional existence, but is used in order to refute essential existence. On the last citation, Candrakirti explicitly states "Therefore, they exist". (20040302 (talk) 17:16, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Did you add the various "Catuskoti" you have in parantheses to the original quote?CO2Northeast (talk) 17:19, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Indeed, I did - but I can substantiate that this is exactly what they are talking about. There is no doubt whatsoever that the analysis both Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti are talking about is the Catuskoti. If you wish, I can provide evidence right now - meanwhile, I am waiting for specific references for your assertions -especially the notion that Tsongkhapa equates existence to essential existence. Maybe you are referring to where he mentions that in some Sutras the word 'inherent' or 'essential' is missing from the original texts, because it is 'obvious by context' - and where he goes on to say, 'but we should be more careful and should distinguish the two' ? (20040302 (talk))

Direct relation of the Catuskoti to this text is found in the same text, on page 156 of the translation. (It is called tetralemma by the translators) A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. (20040302 (talk) 17:28, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

If you admittedley add your wrong views to the quote, how does that help? I think that was pretty deceitful there, but I did not fall for it. Thank you for also quoting the proper tetralemma for me. "things exist, things do not exist." CO2Northeast (talk) 17:35, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

No they are not talking about the Catuskoti. They are talking about the subtle object of negation, like I said on my first comment on this page. CO2Northeast (talk) 17:36, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Is that it? — Preceding unsigned comment added by CO2Northeast (talk • contribs) 18:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

There is no deceit. The title of the section in the original text is A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. The entire chapter "Rational Analysis" of the translation is concerned with the catuskoti. There is no mistake here. Tsongkhapa and Candrakirti do not talk about subtle objects of negation in this context. They are talking about the fact that the tetralemma is not a refutation of conventional phenomena. (20040302 (talk) 18:05, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

You are trying to drag me into a Tibetan debate. Its very clear the two main extremes are, based on your quote "things exist, things do not exist."CO2Northeast (talk) 18:09, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Actually it says the refutation of the tetralemmea is NOT a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. Please read more carefully. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:13, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I have the book is front of me now. The whole tetralemma chapter is chapter 15. You are quoting chapter 12. You stated that chapter 12, the one which you are quoting from, deals with the tetralemma, but it doesn't. You left off part of your quote, again in a deceitful manner. Here is the whole quote "A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena (Chapter 15). Chapter 15 is not the "Rational Analysis" chapter, which is chapter 12. I am seeking admin action. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:23, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I am really gratified that you are reading the book. I am glad that you are citing the whole quote. Likewise, you are right that chapter 15 discusses the issue in detail. As do chapters 12 through 14. And as you point out, the refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. Therefore, they exist conventionally. Things exist. (20040302 (talk) 18:44, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Bullshit. You said "There is no deceit. The title of the section in the original text is A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena. The entire chapter "Rational Analysis" of the translation is concerned with the catuskoti. There is no mistake here." NONE OF THIS IS TRUE. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:58, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I would ask you to remain civil. It occurs to me that you may find the later sentence easier to interpret: (Page 185) c "You cannot eradicate conventional phenomena by refuting them through investigating whether they are produced in one of the four alternative ways. And at the top of P186 "we assert mere production [...] we do not assert real production." On the same page "these opponents go wrong by not distinguishing 'no intrinsic production' from 'no production'. and on page 188: "Thinking that they are not produced intrinsically, I said that all phenomena are not produced". The business of the qualification of 'ultimately' (which I referred to earlier) is then addressed. There really is no doubt. The rational analysis that is being talked about is indeed the tetralemma of Madhyamaka, although the case may be made more generally. Clearly we have some basic disagreement. Maybe a third opinion would help? (20040302 (talk) 19:02, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Its not a disagreement. What is the real subtitle of chapter 12? Simple question. You said it was one thing, but it isn't. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:03, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Also you modified the quotes extensively up above. That is another new issue I am bringing up now. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:04, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

The rational analysis of chapter 12 is not the tetralemma in anyway, shape or form. You saying otherwise is simply deceit or illiteracy. The tetralemma is exclusively in chapter 15, and only a smart part of chapter 15 at that. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:19, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Tetralemma starts on page 189, which is the second part of chapter 15. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:22, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

I will continue with this tomorrow. Right now, I have other commitments. However, I find it hard to understand how you do not appear to agree that the tetralemma is an important means of rational analysis for the Madhyamikas. I am surprised, and will think further upon it. Meanwhile, if you have the time, I would appreciate you finding the sources to back the claims you have made above. I apologise if you feel that I have misrepresented Candrakirti or Tsongkhapa - I have studied these texts alongside many scholars for several decades, and I am working very hard not to misrepresent them. I will consider in your claims in more detail. It would be of great assistance if you can demonstrate with specific texts just what the issue with existence and the Catuskoti is that you feel is currently misrepresented or misapplied in the article. (20040302 (talk) 19:27, 29 January 2012 (UTC))

Of course I find the tetralemma important. It is you who takes the opposite position, editing it out of the article. Nice try to flip our positions. The fact that you actually tried to flip our respective positions, is something which admins need to take a look at. Regarding sources, read your own book starting on page 189, which is the second part of chapter 15. LOL User:CO2Northeast|CO2Northeast]] (talk) 19:42, 29 January 2012 (UTC)

Continuation - Rational Analysis, Catuskoti, and mere existence.

Before we continue with this technical discussion, I would like to point out that I believe that there is indeed a dispute between us, which I would consider to be fairly called a basic disagreement. There is clearly no established consensus WP:CON yet between us, and again I suggest that we find a means to resolve this, such as a third opinion WP:3O.

I trust that we share the common belief that the use of the word 'tetralemma' is a directly recognisable translation/synonym of 'catuskoti'. I am also glad that we can share the text - and that we both accept the text as a WP:RS regarding the position of the Madhyamaka.

My understanding of your position is that you are stating that the Madhyamikas use the catuskoti to dispute conventional existence. Is that correct?

One of the statements from the book which we both recognise is ""A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena ". However, we both appear to read this in a different manner. My understanding of the sentence is this (I paraphrase) "A refutation developed through the tetralemma is not legitimate for conventional phenomena". Hence my consternation.

As you suggested, I am reading from page 189 - the discussion of the tetralemma. First of all, I find no mention of the 'subtle object of negation' that you repeatedly have asserted. The section that I am reading is titled A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena.

Qualm: The Madhyamaka text refute all four parts of the tetralemma– a thing or intrinsic nature (1)exists [...], and (4) neither exists nor does not exist. Reason refutes everything, as there are no phenomena that are not included among these four. Reply: As indicated earlier "thing" has two meanings. (note 383 indicates that 'earlier' is referring to 597.16: page 145, para 2) Between these two, we refute the assertion that things essentially exist in terms of both truths; however at the conventional level we do not refute things that can perform functions. [...] Thus you should understand that all methods for refuting the tetralemma are like this, involving some qualifier such as 'essentially'. Suppose you refute the tetralemma without affixing any such qualification. You refute the position that things exist and you refute the position that things do not exist;

Continuing, on page 190, I read: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence.

Likewise, as mentioned above, Candrakirti's commentary on The Four Hundred Stanzas (13.11) says: ...because our analysis is intent upon seeking intrinsic nature. makes it clear to me that the analysis of Madhyamikas is intent on seeking intrinsic nature.

I am still waiting from you for Madhyamaka sources that disclose a 'subtle object of negation', or an assertion that the Catuskoti is used to dispute conventional existence. (20040302 (talk) 10:08, 30 January 2012 (UTC))

Like I have said before, you are confusing the 4 extremes with the 2 truths and the 2 objects of negation. Do you agree that the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither? If so the argument is concluded. CO2Northeast (talk) 15:37, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Madhyamaka accepts conventional existence. This is the 2 truths. I already said this in my second comment on the page. For example a pea pod will become a pea plant, and not a maple tree. But this has nothing to do with the 4 extremes. CO2Northeast (talk) 15:49, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

What are the 4 extremes?

What are the 4 extremes? Simple question. CO2Northeast (talk) 15:42, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

For the Madhyamika, the four extremes are the extremes of inherent existence, inherent non-existence, inherent 'existence and non-existence' and inherent 'neither existence nor non-existence'. The reason why I am explicitly mentioning that this is to do with inherent existence is due to the cite above: p190: Here in the Fundamental Treatise, "empty" and "non-empty" refer to being empty and not empty of intrinsic nature, and they are used in this way throughout the entire text, from beginning to end. For me, this is clear evidence that Madhyamikas do not use the tetralemma to dispute conventional existence. Moreover, A refutation of all four parts of the tetralemma– things exist, things do not exist, and so forth- is not a legitimate critique of conventional phenomena indicates clearly that the tetralemma is not to be used as a refutation of conventional phenomena.

The contention is this: You wrote Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to perish I disagree with this sentence, unless we gloss it to be explicit that it is inherent existence that we are talking about, and inherent perishing. Madhyamikas accept conventional existents and conventional perishing. I am far more happy with the following sentence: Nagarjuna reasons that dependently originated phenomena do not arise as inherent existents in the first place, thereby removing claims that there are existents available to inherently perish. (20040302 (talk) 16:39, 30 January 2012 (UTC))

I am still waiting for a Madhyamaka source that explicitly describes the two objects of negation. Most especially using the language 'coarse object of negation' and 'subtle object of negation'. (20040302 (talk) 16:41, 30 January 2012 (UTC))

Hahahaha. No. The four extremes are exactly what your source says. And what Wikipedia says here. And I am not claiming anything about the objects of negation in the article. CO2Northeast (talk) 18:36, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

CO2Northeast: Some of your comments on this talk page are not in keeping with WP:CIV and WP:NPA: For example: Referring to another editor's comment as "bullshit" and calling them "deceitful" are not in keeping with these WP behavioral policies. Would you be able to stick to content, not the contributor? Also, I have restored the previous article content (prior to the above dispute) please leave the article alone until the discussion is concluded here. Edit waring will be sanctioned. Sunray (talk) 19:25, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

CO2Northeast, the citation at Catuskoti maybe somwhat correct for the Ch'an/Zen lineage of Nagarjuna, who do not recognise Candrakirti, however, there is a strong opposition to academic rigour in the Zen tradition, whereas the Himalayan tradition that follows Candrakirti - and this include Tsongkhapa do not accept that the Catuskoti is a valid method for refuting conventional phenomena, including conventional existence. Therefore, we cannot accept that the Madhyamikas refute conventional existence. I am rather dismayed that you haven't actually read Chapters 12-15 of the text that we share, otherwise we would not be continuing this dispute. The Catuskoti analysis is a major feature of the Madhyamaka analytical approach - and Tsongkhapa writes extensively on (1) how the Catuskoti does not dispute conventional existence, (2) how it would defeat the Madhyamaka if it did, (3) how it is solely intended to be used to refute inherent existence. Meanwhile you still haven't produced any evidence for your assertions regarding 'two objects of negation'. I have family commitments this evening, but I will continue this discussion tomorrow morning. (20040302 (talk) 19:36, 30 January 2012 (UTC))

Again, I never claimed any of these things you bring up. My sole claim is that the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither. Your source says it, and wikipedia says it. Its really that simple. CO2Northeast (talk) 19:38, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

I really have to get to my family, and I will deal with this tomorrow. Here: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk%3AMadhyamaka&diff=474047291&oldid=474009470 is where you mentioned objects of negation. I do not dispute the catuskoti - of course I do not. What I do reject is that they are eligible to be used for the refutation of conventional phenomena, as has been pointed out by Tsongkhapa. Because the Catuskoti cannot be used to refute conventional phenomena, the Madhyamaka do not deny existence. They deny inherent existence. (20040302 (talk) 19:51, 30 January 2012 (UTC))

Not in the article. I am not claiming anything about the objects of negation in the artice, and never have. I yield all claims to that. CO2Northeast (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 19:53, 30 January 2012 (UTC).

I'm not clear exactly what is in dispute. Would each of you be able to describe, briefly, your point of view on this matter? Sunray (talk) 20:21, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

The only thing that is in dispute, besides the new dubious tags just put up, is what the 4 extremes are....which is not really controversial at all. I completely with my whole heart accept conventional existence like 20040302 does. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:23, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Sunray, what are the 4 extremes?

Just settle the argument. I say the 4 extremes are existence, nonexistence, both and neither. What are the 4 extremes Sunray?CO2Northeast (talk) 19:46, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

I'm unclear what is in dispute here. Sunray (talk) 20:31, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

What are the 4 extremes of Madhyamaka? And if you can provide a source, that would be best. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:34, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

It seems to me that you are in dispute over the interpretation of a source. Am I right about that? Sunray (talk) 20:43, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Not at all. I have the source and can quote it verbatim. Would you like that? It is not a matter of interpretation in the slightest. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:45, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Or you can find another source. It doesn't matter to me in the least. All sources agree with what the 4 extremes are. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:48, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

You have said that the four extremes are: Being; Non-being; Both being and non-being; Neither being and non-being. Is that in dispute? Sunray (talk) 20:50, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Yes that is in dispute very clearly if you look above. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:53, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

It would be good to get 20040302's take on what the dispute is all about. Let's wait until he returns. Sunray (talk) 20:56, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

But that doesn't have to stop you from stating what the 4 extremes are. Thats is just factual information, not a matter of argument. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:58, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

New Dubious tags

I guess someone is bringing up new issues. Very well. If you look at Jay Garfield's translation of the MMK, on page 220 it says "Essence by definition is eternal and independent". Nagarjuna is equating svabhāva with bhāva in this portion of chapter 15. CO2Northeast (talk) 20:18, 30 January 2012 (UTC)

Please no partisan Tibetan material

Please no partisan Tibetan material. Thank you. CO2Northeast (talk) 22:12, 30 January 2012 (UTC)