Enprizonigo

Enprizonigo (el prizono, el la latina prensio, aresto, el prehendere, prendere, "kapti") en juro estas la specifa stato esti fizike enprizonigita aŭ enmetita en institucia malliberejo kia estas prizono.^[1] Tribunaloj de Usono, kiel la Usona Suprema Tribunalo, agnoskis, ke la minimuma periodo en nedeterminita kondamno kiu estu aprobita de tribunalo estas la oficiala tempolimo de enprizonigo.^[2]^[3] Alivorte, ajna "stratotempo" (ekz., procestempo, provizora libereco, aŭ kontrolata libereco) kiu estas ordonita de tribunalo kiel parto de la defendanta puno ne konstituas okazon de enprizonigo.^[4]

Mallibereja puno aŭ mallibereja kondamno estas la decido de tribunalo kiu rezultas en malliberigo de kondamnito.

Notoj

↑ Vidu ekzemple 22 U.S.C. § 2714(e)(4); United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In ordinary usage, 'imprisonment' generally means physical confinement."); Commonwealth v. Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Pa. 1991) ("Conahan voluntarily committed himself to inpatient custodial alcohol rehabilitation, which he successfully completed after devoting ninety-five continuous days towards overcoming his disease. We find that his successful completion of this custodial inpatient rehabilitation, which took place in three hospitals, falls within the common meaning of 'imprisonment'.")
↑ United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Shaya v. Holder, 586 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen using Michigan indeterminate sentences as the predicate for classifying someone as an 'aggravated felon', the term must be measured by the sentence actually served or the minimum sentence given, whichever is greater, as this better incorporates the judge's discretion and determinations than the statutory maximum term.").
↑ "Removal Defense Implications of United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019)" (PDF). Washington Defender Association. 13a de Februaro, 2019. Alirita en 5a de Julio 2021.
↑ United States v. Parsons, No. 15-2055, at p.10 (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 2016) (unpublished); United States v. Rodriguez-Bernal, 783 F.3d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (regarding "street time"); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, No. 361 C.D. 2016 (Commonwealth Court of Pa. June 12, 2018) (regarding "street time"); United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We hold that the term 'imprisonment' ... does not include parole.... A person who is on parole, although subject to some restraints on liberty, is not 'imprisoned' in the sense in which the term is usually used. For example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revocation hearing that the outcome was 'imprisonment,' the parolee would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned to parole.") (citations omitted); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, 409 A.2d 843, 846-47 (Pa. 1979) ("To attempt to equate a parole status with that of custody is to ignore reality."); accord Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

Bibliotekoj

[1] Vidu ekzemple 22 U.S.C. § 2714(e)(4); United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("In ordinary usage, 'imprisonment' generally means physical confinement."); Commonwealth v. Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Pa. 1991) ("Conahan voluntarily committed himself to inpatient custodial alcohol rehabilitation, which he successfully completed after devoting ninety-five continuous days towards overcoming his disease. We find that his successful completion of this custodial inpatient rehabilitation, which took place in three hospitals, falls within the common meaning of 'imprisonment'.")

[2] United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Shaya v. Holder, 586 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen using Michigan indeterminate sentences as the predicate for classifying someone as an 'aggravated felon', the term must be measured by the sentence actually served or the minimum sentence given, whichever is greater, as this better incorporates the judge's discretion and determinations than the statutory maximum term.").

[3] "Removal Defense Implications of United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2019)" (PDF). Washington Defender Association. 13a de Februaro, 2019. Alirita en 5a de Julio 2021.

[4] United States v. Parsons, No. 15-2055, at p.10 (3d Cir. Nov. 10, 2016) (unpublished); United States v. Rodriguez-Bernal, 783 F.3d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (regarding "street time"); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, No. 361 C.D. 2016 (Commonwealth Court of Pa. June 12, 2018) (regarding "street time"); United States v. Pray, 373 F.3d 358, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("We hold that the term 'imprisonment' ... does not include parole.... A person who is on parole, although subject to some restraints on liberty, is not 'imprisoned' in the sense in which the term is usually used. For example, if a parolee were informed at the end of a parole revocation hearing that the outcome was 'imprisonment,' the parolee would not think that this meant that he was going to be returned to parole.") (citations omitted); Young v. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole, 409 A.2d 843, 846-47 (Pa. 1979) ("To attempt to equate a parole status with that of custody is to ignore reality."); accord Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).

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