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James Dennison

European University Institute, Social and Political Science, Graduate Student

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My main research interests are political participation, elections and European politics. My thesis looks at the causes of individual-level within variance in turnout at national elections. I'm also interested in the new political cleavages and changing party systems of Europe, particularly the growth of UKIP and the Green Party of England and Wales.
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Papers by James Dennison

The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area of Legal Migration. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 2019-01, March 2019

Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) that could be found here. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Eu... more Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) that could be found here. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe offer the views and critical reflections of CEPS researchers and external collaborators on key policy discussions surrounding the construction of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses policy-oriented and interdisciplinary academic studies and comment on the implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies within Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Public attitudes on migration : rethinking how people perceive migration : an analysis of existing opinion polls in the Euro-Mediterranean region

The information and views set out in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily... more The information and views set out in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Public Attitudes to Immigration in the Aftermath of COVID-19

Social Science Research Network, 2021

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected public opinion towards immigration? Long-term evidence in ... more How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected public opinion towards immigration? Long-term evidence in Europe and the United States suggests attitudes to immigration are relatively stable and, in some cases, becoming more favorable with high volatility instead in the perceived importance of the issue. However, theoretically a global pandemic could exacerbate people’s fears of outsiders or that migration may contribute to the disease. By contrast, attitudes could remain stable if their distal drivers prove to be robust enough to withstand the shock of COVID-19, which may instead highlight the disproportional importance of migrant workers. We draw from Eurobarometer data from 2014 to 2020 across 28 European countries, weekly national survey data during the outbreak from the US and individual panel data from the UK and Germany to find little systematic change in immigration preferences and no country-level correlation between the observed changes and the severity of the outbreak. Instead, the perceived importance of immigration has consistently and significantly decreased. These findings suggest that, if COVID-19 is to have an impact on attitudes to migration, it is likely to emerge via longer-term means, such as early-life socialization and value change, rather than reactions to the immediate shock of the pandemic.

Usual Low in an Increasingly Favourable Context

Despite flatlining in terms of poll ratings, membership and exposure between the 2010 General Ele... more Despite flatlining in terms of poll ratings, membership and exposure between the 2010 General Election and the 2014 European Election, the major political events of this period offered the Greens an unprecedented opportunity to appeal to voters. Of particular importance was the entry of the Liberal Democrats into government, which robbed that party of its protest image and exposed an ideological divide between its leadership and supporters. Ed Miliband’s leadership of the Labour Party, which I argue sent an ambiguous message on the two issues of austerity and immigration, and the increasing anti-immigration sentiment in the wider public–culminating in the rise of the populist right party, UKIP–also gave the Greens’ message particular relevance. By 2010 the historically under-performing Greens had already coalesced around a left-wing and more socio-economic, rather than environmental, message. However, the austerity programme of the coalition government gave this message a focal point and accorded the Greens’ protesting image mainstream relevance as it emerged as the best placed party to attract anti-establishment left-wing voters.

Car Crashes, Campaigning and Partial Decline

In this chapter, I analyse the Green Party of England and Wales’ (GPEW) decline in poll ratings f... more In this chapter, I analyse the Green Party of England and Wales’ (GPEW) decline in poll ratings from late January 2014 until the 2015 General Election. I show how, once the Greens were admitted to the television debates, the media’s scrutiny of the party’s leadership and policies intensified abruptly. Soon after, the party’s leadership and competence ratings nosedived as the GPEW was unable to fully make the transition from a minor party, whose primary concerns were internal democracy and ideological conviction, into an established member of the party system, equipped to offer credible and competent leadership and policies to voters under intense media scrutiny. Thereafter, the GPEW adopted a far more risk-averse approach to national campaigning, which centred increasingly on ideology and protest, rather than policies or personality. At the constituency level, the Greens’ campaigning varied broadly, according to both the political context and the ambition of the local party. Overall, the Greens’ campaigning capacity was far greater than ever before, following the Green Surge, but was undermined by inexperience and the first-past-the-post electoral system.

The Rise of the Greens in British Politics

In this chapter, I show how both the Green Party of England and Wales and the Scottish Greens und... more In this chapter, I show how both the Green Party of England and Wales and the Scottish Greens underwent increases in their poll ratings, memberships and national prominence in the year and a half prior to the 2015 General Election. This growth, in England and Wales at least, was proportionately more dramatic than that of any other party and culminated in an unprecedented Green vote share at the General Election as well as the Green Party becoming the third largest party in England and Wales by membership. Moreover, the Greens, at least temporarily, secured a position in the second tier of Britain’s refigured party system. The rapidity of these changes, their lack of historic precedent and their counter-intuitiveness make the rise of the Greens in Britain particularly interesting. I go on to outline the structure of this study, as well as the approaches, data and methods that it uses.

How Niche Parties React to Losing Their Niche: The Cases of the Brexit Party, the Green Party and Change UK

Parliamentary Affairs, Sep 1, 2020

This contribution considers how niche parties react when they lose their niche, using the cases o... more This contribution considers how niche parties react when they lose their niche, using the cases of three parties in the turbulent period prior to the 2019 UK general election: the Brexit Party, the Green Party and Change UK. I overview the background of these parties before showing that each lost its respective policy niches to larger, more established parties. I show that each responded with some combination of directly competing with the mainstream party; electorally cooperating with them or other parties; or diversifying into something distinct from their mainstream analogue. I explain how each party's approach partially explains their 2019 general election result, as well as European Parliament elections result, using British Election Study data. I suggest that this 'compete, cooperate or diversify' approach provides a theoretical framework for understanding how niche parties are likely to react to losing their niche elsewhere. 1. Niche parties in the UK prior to the 2019 UK general election Even though they ultimately received relatively few votes, the pivotal role played by 'niche parties' during the 2017-2019 parliament does much to explain the outcome of the election and the subsequent direction of British politics. Such parties have received various academic definitions, with perhaps the most succinct being that they are 'parties that compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues' (Wagner, 2012, p. 845). There have been a number of attempts in the academic literature to make sense of niche parties. Adams et al. (2006) show that niche parties, first, do not respond to shifts in public opinion by changing their policy positions, whereas mainstream parties do, and, secondly, are electorally punished when moderating their positions, unlike mainstream parties (see also,

How protest voters choose

Party Politics, Mar 28, 2017

If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination... more If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

Why did the UK leave the EU? The state of the science of explaining Brexit

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jan 20, 2023

Explaining why the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) has become something of a cot... more Explaining why the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) has become something of a cottage industry since 2016. Not only was the outcome a notable electoral upset, a constitution rupture for the UK and a clear vote of no confidence for the EU, but the campaign exposed seemingly hitherto hidden forces in society, existential questions for Britain and, arguably, advanced post-industrial democracies elsewhere. Moreover, the UK’s long and difficult relationship with ‘Europe’ and the myriad dramatic political and economic events in the decade prior to the referendum offer observers a large choice of potential causal explanations for why Brexit happened. In this chapter I attempt to critically overview and connect this literature. I argue that there are roughly four categories of explanation for Brexit, each of which includes multiple distinct theoretical contributions.

The Other Insurgency? The Greens and the Election

Parliamentary Affairs, Sep 1, 2015

The Other Insurgency? The Greens and the Election On 24 February 2015, the leader of the Green Pa... more The Other Insurgency? The Greens and the Election On 24 February 2015, the leader of the Green Party of England and Wales, Natalie Bennett, gave a radio interview that was widely condemned by the media as a 'disaster'. 1 After being unable to specify the financial details of her party's housing policy, she described her own performance as 'excruciating' and 'very bad', later apologising for it. 2 The interview even prompted some journalists to call for the Green Party leader's resignation, blaming her for the party's 'bust' in the polls. 3 Yet the interview began by Bennett celebrating the Greens quadrupling their membership since 2010, up to 54,500 and beyond UKIP and the Liberal Democrats. The party had also shot up in the polls in less than nine months, from around 2% to, at one point, 10% under Bennett's leadership. After the successful completion of the first term in Parliament of the highly popular Caroline Lucas-the Greens' sole MP-the party was targeting up to half a dozen Westminster seats as Bennett predicted that politics at this election would 'break wide open'. 4 Ultimately, the Green Party, benefiting both from the downfall of the Liberal Democrats and the apologetic

A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti‐Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe

The Political Quarterly, Nov 27, 2018

In this article, we consider the causes of the increase in voting for anti-immigration parties in... more In this article, we consider the causes of the increase in voting for anti-immigration parties in western Europe in the past decade. We first note that one of the most commonly assumed reasons for this increase is an associated increase in anti-immigration sentiment, which we show is likely to be false. We also outline the major theoretical explanations, which we argue are likely to be incomplete. We then introduce our proposed explanation: these parties have benefitted from a sharp increase in the salience of immigration amongst some voters. We show that there are strong correlations over time between the salience of immigration and the polling of such parties in most western European countries. We argue that aspects of immigration in the last decade have activated pre-existing opposition to immigration amongst a shrinking segment of the populations of western European states.

Brexit and the perils of 'Europeanised' migration

Routledge eBooks, Apr 19, 2021

Moving beyond short-term public opinion accounts for Brexit this article considers how Britain's ... more Moving beyond short-term public opinion accounts for Brexit this article considers how Britain's historic policy and political dynamics on migration led to the outcome of the EU referendum and how the latter is likely to transform current immigration policies. To do so, we explore historic and theoretical tensions in UK migration policy and politics over the last six decades. We show how these unresolved tensions allowed Eurosceptics to harness negative attitudes to the increasingly salient issue of immigration. We argue that a sufficient proportion of the UK's elite and electorate proved unable and unwilling to subordinate its desire for entirely domestic 'control' over immigration to the EU's right-based regime, let alone see fellow EU citizens in the UK as anything other than immigrants, ultimately giving Leave victory. The referendum process and outcome exposed the debate about free movement and migration to much wider public scrutiny and so raised more profound questions about the future of the British economy and the political model necessary to sustain it. We argue that, with the Brexit negotiations under constant public scrutiny a new, largely immovable parameter was set by the EU referendum result for the medium term that seems likely to lead to a decline in 'Europeanised' migration policy in the UK.

Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in Britain: From Attlee to Brexit

Political Science Quarterly, 2020

How Migrant Resource Centres affect migration decisions: Quasi‐experimental evidence from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Pakistan

International Migration

Several Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) have been set up in South Asia jointly by national govern... more Several Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) have been set up in South Asia jointly by national governments of origin and destination countries. Their objectives include encouragement of potential migrants to seek regular rather than irregular routes and to ensure the safety of those migrating, regardless of status. Of theoretical note, their activities utilise innovative, highly personalised counselling. This article provides quasi‐experimental evidence of the effect of four activities – telephone and online counselling, and college outreach and pre‐departure sessions – on 2215 randomly allocated users of the MRCs' services across six MRCs in four countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Pakistan. The effects are a large reduction in self‐reported likelihood of migrating irregularly, and a strong increase in awareness of safe options and who to contact for assistance whilst migrating. The effects are consistent across activity type and MRC location, although magnitudes vary. The...

Public Opinion and the Politics of Migration

IMISCOE research series, 2022

Identifying and describing attitudes to immigration, let alone explaining them, is not a simple m... more Identifying and describing attitudes to immigration, let alone explaining them, is not a simple matter. First, human attitudes in general are abstract and so any measurement of them is bound to be highly qualified and contingent on theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches. Second, immigration is a broad topic. Attitudes to immigration alone can be divided into attitudes towards immigrants, towards immigration policy, the perceived effects of immigration, or towards how important immigration is as an issue. Each of these can be divided by immigrant group as the most obvious qualifier. In this chapter we follow the political science literature in conceptualising attitudes as "people's orientations toward objects" (Druckman & Lupia, 2000, p. 4). Below, we outline the major scholarly works explaining attitudes to immigration. We also sketch out existing research on the politics of immigration and the effects of attitudes to immigration on democratic politics.

The ultimate causes of Brexit: history, culture, and geography

The ultimate causes of Brexit: history, culture, and geography blogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy... more The ultimate causes of Brexit: history, culture, and geography blogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy/explaining-brexit/ Xenophobia, austerity, and dissatisfaction with politics may have contributed to the Brexit vote. But James Dennison and Noah Carl write that, although a number of concerns may have tipped the balance, Brexit was ultimately decided by more than recent events. Here, they demonstrate how the UK has been the least well-integrated EU member state, and so the closer the EU was moving toward political union, the more likely Brexit was becoming.

Real-World Trends, Public Issue Salience, and Electoral Results in Europe

Social Science Research Network, 2022

Europe has experienced several marked, cross-national trends in electoral results in the 21st cen... more Europe has experienced several marked, cross-national trends in electoral results in the 21st century, which scholars have explained using social structure and challenger party entrepreneurship. We propose a third theoretical explanation: (1) electoral outcomes have resulted from marked changes in what issues Europeans perceive as the most important affecting their countries; and (2) the latter have been determined by "real-world" societal developments, in addition to a changing party system issue agenda. We use panel data across 28 European countries to show that the public issue salience of three issues-unemployment, immigration, and the environment-explains variation in the results of the conservative, social democrat, liberal, radical right, radical left, and green party families in line with theoretical expectations, while the party system issue agenda has weaker effects. We also show that the public salience of these issues is rooted in unemployment rates, immigration rates and temperature anomalies, and party agenda-setting; and that the party system issue agenda follows public issue salience but not our societal trends. We validate our mechanism at the individual-level across 28 European countries and again using panel data. Our findings have implications for our understanding of the agency of parties, the permanency of recent electoral changes, and how voters reconcile their social and political worlds.

The Radical Right in the United Kingdom

Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 5, 2018

This chapter examines the evolution of the extreme and radical right in the United Kingdom, provi... more This chapter examines the evolution of the extreme and radical right in the United Kingdom, providing an overview of its historical, organizational, and electoral development. In contrast to the experience of several other Western democracies, the repeated failures of extreme and radical right parties in Britain led academics to point to “British exceptionalism,” or to portray this case as the “ugly duckling” in the wider family of Europe’s extreme right. However, between 2010 and 2016, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) scored a string of impressive successes, finishing ahead of the mainstream parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections, then winning nearly 13 percent of the popular vote in the 2015 general election. The final section considers the role of UKIP in the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership and what the future is likely to hold for the radical right in Britain.

European attitudes to refugees after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

West European Politics, Jul 13, 2023

When Do Populist Radical Right Parties Succeed? Salience, Stigma, and the Case of the End of Iberian ‘Exceptionalism’

Social Science Research Network, 2019

This study offers an explanatory model for variation in electoral results for 'populist radical r... more This study offers an explanatory model for variation in electoral results for 'populist radical right' parties in Europe over time and across countries. We build on and fuse previous explanations to offer a theoretical model that combines supply-and demand-side explanations. We argue that such parties succeed when they are able to avoid the stigma of extremism by initially catering to an unsatiated demand of right-wing voters on a 'less controversial', highly salient issue. With their relatively minor place in the party system confirmed and equipped with a 'reputation shield' that extremist parties do not enjoy, they are able to refocus on more controversial, other highly salient issues, typically immigration, potentially leading to greater potential mobilisation. We use the case of the Spanish party Vox, as well as the erstwhile, anomalous lack of success for similar parties across Portugal and Spain, to test our framework. We show that both the historic lack of populist radical right party success across Iberia, the relative greater success in the rest of western Europe and the recent rise of Vox can be explained neatly by this framework of salience, stigma and supply.

The Cost of Non-Europe in the Area of Legal Migration. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 2019-01, March 2019

Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) that could be found here. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Eu... more Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) that could be found here. CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe offer the views and critical reflections of CEPS researchers and external collaborators on key policy discussions surrounding the construction of the EU's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses policy-oriented and interdisciplinary academic studies and comment on the implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies within Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Public attitudes on migration : rethinking how people perceive migration : an analysis of existing opinion polls in the Euro-Mediterranean region

The information and views set out in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily... more The information and views set out in this study are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Public Attitudes to Immigration in the Aftermath of COVID-19

Social Science Research Network, 2021

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected public opinion towards immigration? Long-term evidence in ... more How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected public opinion towards immigration? Long-term evidence in Europe and the United States suggests attitudes to immigration are relatively stable and, in some cases, becoming more favorable with high volatility instead in the perceived importance of the issue. However, theoretically a global pandemic could exacerbate people’s fears of outsiders or that migration may contribute to the disease. By contrast, attitudes could remain stable if their distal drivers prove to be robust enough to withstand the shock of COVID-19, which may instead highlight the disproportional importance of migrant workers. We draw from Eurobarometer data from 2014 to 2020 across 28 European countries, weekly national survey data during the outbreak from the US and individual panel data from the UK and Germany to find little systematic change in immigration preferences and no country-level correlation between the observed changes and the severity of the outbreak. Instead, the perceived importance of immigration has consistently and significantly decreased. These findings suggest that, if COVID-19 is to have an impact on attitudes to migration, it is likely to emerge via longer-term means, such as early-life socialization and value change, rather than reactions to the immediate shock of the pandemic.

Usual Low in an Increasingly Favourable Context

Despite flatlining in terms of poll ratings, membership and exposure between the 2010 General Ele... more Despite flatlining in terms of poll ratings, membership and exposure between the 2010 General Election and the 2014 European Election, the major political events of this period offered the Greens an unprecedented opportunity to appeal to voters. Of particular importance was the entry of the Liberal Democrats into government, which robbed that party of its protest image and exposed an ideological divide between its leadership and supporters. Ed Miliband’s leadership of the Labour Party, which I argue sent an ambiguous message on the two issues of austerity and immigration, and the increasing anti-immigration sentiment in the wider public–culminating in the rise of the populist right party, UKIP–also gave the Greens’ message particular relevance. By 2010 the historically under-performing Greens had already coalesced around a left-wing and more socio-economic, rather than environmental, message. However, the austerity programme of the coalition government gave this message a focal point and accorded the Greens’ protesting image mainstream relevance as it emerged as the best placed party to attract anti-establishment left-wing voters.

Car Crashes, Campaigning and Partial Decline

In this chapter, I analyse the Green Party of England and Wales’ (GPEW) decline in poll ratings f... more In this chapter, I analyse the Green Party of England and Wales’ (GPEW) decline in poll ratings from late January 2014 until the 2015 General Election. I show how, once the Greens were admitted to the television debates, the media’s scrutiny of the party’s leadership and policies intensified abruptly. Soon after, the party’s leadership and competence ratings nosedived as the GPEW was unable to fully make the transition from a minor party, whose primary concerns were internal democracy and ideological conviction, into an established member of the party system, equipped to offer credible and competent leadership and policies to voters under intense media scrutiny. Thereafter, the GPEW adopted a far more risk-averse approach to national campaigning, which centred increasingly on ideology and protest, rather than policies or personality. At the constituency level, the Greens’ campaigning varied broadly, according to both the political context and the ambition of the local party. Overall, the Greens’ campaigning capacity was far greater than ever before, following the Green Surge, but was undermined by inexperience and the first-past-the-post electoral system.

The Rise of the Greens in British Politics

In this chapter, I show how both the Green Party of England and Wales and the Scottish Greens und... more In this chapter, I show how both the Green Party of England and Wales and the Scottish Greens underwent increases in their poll ratings, memberships and national prominence in the year and a half prior to the 2015 General Election. This growth, in England and Wales at least, was proportionately more dramatic than that of any other party and culminated in an unprecedented Green vote share at the General Election as well as the Green Party becoming the third largest party in England and Wales by membership. Moreover, the Greens, at least temporarily, secured a position in the second tier of Britain’s refigured party system. The rapidity of these changes, their lack of historic precedent and their counter-intuitiveness make the rise of the Greens in Britain particularly interesting. I go on to outline the structure of this study, as well as the approaches, data and methods that it uses.

How Niche Parties React to Losing Their Niche: The Cases of the Brexit Party, the Green Party and Change UK

Parliamentary Affairs, Sep 1, 2020

This contribution considers how niche parties react when they lose their niche, using the cases o... more This contribution considers how niche parties react when they lose their niche, using the cases of three parties in the turbulent period prior to the 2019 UK general election: the Brexit Party, the Green Party and Change UK. I overview the background of these parties before showing that each lost its respective policy niches to larger, more established parties. I show that each responded with some combination of directly competing with the mainstream party; electorally cooperating with them or other parties; or diversifying into something distinct from their mainstream analogue. I explain how each party's approach partially explains their 2019 general election result, as well as European Parliament elections result, using British Election Study data. I suggest that this 'compete, cooperate or diversify' approach provides a theoretical framework for understanding how niche parties are likely to react to losing their niche elsewhere. 1. Niche parties in the UK prior to the 2019 UK general election Even though they ultimately received relatively few votes, the pivotal role played by 'niche parties' during the 2017-2019 parliament does much to explain the outcome of the election and the subsequent direction of British politics. Such parties have received various academic definitions, with perhaps the most succinct being that they are 'parties that compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues' (Wagner, 2012, p. 845). There have been a number of attempts in the academic literature to make sense of niche parties. Adams et al. (2006) show that niche parties, first, do not respond to shifts in public opinion by changing their policy positions, whereas mainstream parties do, and, secondly, are electorally punished when moderating their positions, unlike mainstream parties (see also,

How protest voters choose

Party Politics, Mar 28, 2017

If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination... more If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.

Why did the UK leave the EU? The state of the science of explaining Brexit

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jan 20, 2023

Explaining why the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) has become something of a cot... more Explaining why the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) has become something of a cottage industry since 2016. Not only was the outcome a notable electoral upset, a constitution rupture for the UK and a clear vote of no confidence for the EU, but the campaign exposed seemingly hitherto hidden forces in society, existential questions for Britain and, arguably, advanced post-industrial democracies elsewhere. Moreover, the UK’s long and difficult relationship with ‘Europe’ and the myriad dramatic political and economic events in the decade prior to the referendum offer observers a large choice of potential causal explanations for why Brexit happened. In this chapter I attempt to critically overview and connect this literature. I argue that there are roughly four categories of explanation for Brexit, each of which includes multiple distinct theoretical contributions.

The Other Insurgency? The Greens and the Election

Parliamentary Affairs, Sep 1, 2015

The Other Insurgency? The Greens and the Election On 24 February 2015, the leader of the Green Pa... more The Other Insurgency? The Greens and the Election On 24 February 2015, the leader of the Green Party of England and Wales, Natalie Bennett, gave a radio interview that was widely condemned by the media as a 'disaster'. 1 After being unable to specify the financial details of her party's housing policy, she described her own performance as 'excruciating' and 'very bad', later apologising for it. 2 The interview even prompted some journalists to call for the Green Party leader's resignation, blaming her for the party's 'bust' in the polls. 3 Yet the interview began by Bennett celebrating the Greens quadrupling their membership since 2010, up to 54,500 and beyond UKIP and the Liberal Democrats. The party had also shot up in the polls in less than nine months, from around 2% to, at one point, 10% under Bennett's leadership. After the successful completion of the first term in Parliament of the highly popular Caroline Lucas-the Greens' sole MP-the party was targeting up to half a dozen Westminster seats as Bennett predicted that politics at this election would 'break wide open'. 4 Ultimately, the Green Party, benefiting both from the downfall of the Liberal Democrats and the apologetic

A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti‐Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe

The Political Quarterly, Nov 27, 2018

In this article, we consider the causes of the increase in voting for anti-immigration parties in... more In this article, we consider the causes of the increase in voting for anti-immigration parties in western Europe in the past decade. We first note that one of the most commonly assumed reasons for this increase is an associated increase in anti-immigration sentiment, which we show is likely to be false. We also outline the major theoretical explanations, which we argue are likely to be incomplete. We then introduce our proposed explanation: these parties have benefitted from a sharp increase in the salience of immigration amongst some voters. We show that there are strong correlations over time between the salience of immigration and the polling of such parties in most western European countries. We argue that aspects of immigration in the last decade have activated pre-existing opposition to immigration amongst a shrinking segment of the populations of western European states.

Brexit and the perils of 'Europeanised' migration

Routledge eBooks, Apr 19, 2021

Moving beyond short-term public opinion accounts for Brexit this article considers how Britain's ... more Moving beyond short-term public opinion accounts for Brexit this article considers how Britain's historic policy and political dynamics on migration led to the outcome of the EU referendum and how the latter is likely to transform current immigration policies. To do so, we explore historic and theoretical tensions in UK migration policy and politics over the last six decades. We show how these unresolved tensions allowed Eurosceptics to harness negative attitudes to the increasingly salient issue of immigration. We argue that a sufficient proportion of the UK's elite and electorate proved unable and unwilling to subordinate its desire for entirely domestic 'control' over immigration to the EU's right-based regime, let alone see fellow EU citizens in the UK as anything other than immigrants, ultimately giving Leave victory. The referendum process and outcome exposed the debate about free movement and migration to much wider public scrutiny and so raised more profound questions about the future of the British economy and the political model necessary to sustain it. We argue that, with the Brexit negotiations under constant public scrutiny a new, largely immovable parameter was set by the EU referendum result for the medium term that seems likely to lead to a decline in 'Europeanised' migration policy in the UK.

Europe and the Decline of Social Democracy in Britain: From Attlee to Brexit

Political Science Quarterly, 2020

How Migrant Resource Centres affect migration decisions: Quasi‐experimental evidence from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Pakistan

International Migration

Several Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) have been set up in South Asia jointly by national govern... more Several Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) have been set up in South Asia jointly by national governments of origin and destination countries. Their objectives include encouragement of potential migrants to seek regular rather than irregular routes and to ensure the safety of those migrating, regardless of status. Of theoretical note, their activities utilise innovative, highly personalised counselling. This article provides quasi‐experimental evidence of the effect of four activities – telephone and online counselling, and college outreach and pre‐departure sessions – on 2215 randomly allocated users of the MRCs' services across six MRCs in four countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq and Pakistan. The effects are a large reduction in self‐reported likelihood of migrating irregularly, and a strong increase in awareness of safe options and who to contact for assistance whilst migrating. The effects are consistent across activity type and MRC location, although magnitudes vary. The...

Public Opinion and the Politics of Migration

IMISCOE research series, 2022

Identifying and describing attitudes to immigration, let alone explaining them, is not a simple m... more Identifying and describing attitudes to immigration, let alone explaining them, is not a simple matter. First, human attitudes in general are abstract and so any measurement of them is bound to be highly qualified and contingent on theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches. Second, immigration is a broad topic. Attitudes to immigration alone can be divided into attitudes towards immigrants, towards immigration policy, the perceived effects of immigration, or towards how important immigration is as an issue. Each of these can be divided by immigrant group as the most obvious qualifier. In this chapter we follow the political science literature in conceptualising attitudes as "people's orientations toward objects" (Druckman & Lupia, 2000, p. 4). Below, we outline the major scholarly works explaining attitudes to immigration. We also sketch out existing research on the politics of immigration and the effects of attitudes to immigration on democratic politics.

The ultimate causes of Brexit: history, culture, and geography

The ultimate causes of Brexit: history, culture, and geography blogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy... more The ultimate causes of Brexit: history, culture, and geography blogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy/explaining-brexit/ Xenophobia, austerity, and dissatisfaction with politics may have contributed to the Brexit vote. But James Dennison and Noah Carl write that, although a number of concerns may have tipped the balance, Brexit was ultimately decided by more than recent events. Here, they demonstrate how the UK has been the least well-integrated EU member state, and so the closer the EU was moving toward political union, the more likely Brexit was becoming.

Real-World Trends, Public Issue Salience, and Electoral Results in Europe

Social Science Research Network, 2022

Europe has experienced several marked, cross-national trends in electoral results in the 21st cen... more Europe has experienced several marked, cross-national trends in electoral results in the 21st century, which scholars have explained using social structure and challenger party entrepreneurship. We propose a third theoretical explanation: (1) electoral outcomes have resulted from marked changes in what issues Europeans perceive as the most important affecting their countries; and (2) the latter have been determined by "real-world" societal developments, in addition to a changing party system issue agenda. We use panel data across 28 European countries to show that the public issue salience of three issues-unemployment, immigration, and the environment-explains variation in the results of the conservative, social democrat, liberal, radical right, radical left, and green party families in line with theoretical expectations, while the party system issue agenda has weaker effects. We also show that the public salience of these issues is rooted in unemployment rates, immigration rates and temperature anomalies, and party agenda-setting; and that the party system issue agenda follows public issue salience but not our societal trends. We validate our mechanism at the individual-level across 28 European countries and again using panel data. Our findings have implications for our understanding of the agency of parties, the permanency of recent electoral changes, and how voters reconcile their social and political worlds.

The Radical Right in the United Kingdom

Oxford University Press eBooks, Feb 5, 2018

This chapter examines the evolution of the extreme and radical right in the United Kingdom, provi... more This chapter examines the evolution of the extreme and radical right in the United Kingdom, providing an overview of its historical, organizational, and electoral development. In contrast to the experience of several other Western democracies, the repeated failures of extreme and radical right parties in Britain led academics to point to “British exceptionalism,” or to portray this case as the “ugly duckling” in the wider family of Europe’s extreme right. However, between 2010 and 2016, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) scored a string of impressive successes, finishing ahead of the mainstream parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections, then winning nearly 13 percent of the popular vote in the 2015 general election. The final section considers the role of UKIP in the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on European Union membership and what the future is likely to hold for the radical right in Britain.

European attitudes to refugees after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

West European Politics, Jul 13, 2023

When Do Populist Radical Right Parties Succeed? Salience, Stigma, and the Case of the End of Iberian ‘Exceptionalism’

Social Science Research Network, 2019

This study offers an explanatory model for variation in electoral results for 'populist radical r... more This study offers an explanatory model for variation in electoral results for 'populist radical right' parties in Europe over time and across countries. We build on and fuse previous explanations to offer a theoretical model that combines supply-and demand-side explanations. We argue that such parties succeed when they are able to avoid the stigma of extremism by initially catering to an unsatiated demand of right-wing voters on a 'less controversial', highly salient issue. With their relatively minor place in the party system confirmed and equipped with a 'reputation shield' that extremist parties do not enjoy, they are able to refocus on more controversial, other highly salient issues, typically immigration, potentially leading to greater potential mobilisation. We use the case of the Spanish party Vox, as well as the erstwhile, anomalous lack of success for similar parties across Portugal and Spain, to test our framework. We show that both the historic lack of populist radical right party success across Iberia, the relative greater success in the rest of western Europe and the recent rise of Vox can be explained neatly by this framework of salience, stigma and supply.

EUROPEAN, BUT NOT EUROPEAN ENOUGH: AN EXPLANATION FOR BREXIT

by James Dennison and Geoffrey Evans

In this article, we argue that most of the existing explanations for Brexit are unsatisfactory be... more In this article, we argue that most of the existing explanations for Brexit are unsatisfactory because they fail to answer two critical questions: ‘Why was it that the UK voted to leave rather than any other member state?’; and‘Why did the UK vote to Leave in 2016rather than at any point in the past?’ We then outline our explanation for Brexit. The UK has long been one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU, and the reason why is that Britons have a comparatively weak sense of European identity. Since the early 1990s, Britons’ Euroscepticism has been amplified by four key developments: the ERM crisis; the increasing extent of European integration; the Eurozone debt crisis; and mass immigration from Eastern Europe.

AN EXPLANATION FOR BREXIT

by James Dennison, Noah Carl, and Geoffrey Evans

Since the United Kingdom’s referendum on European Union membership, a number of explanations have... more Since the United Kingdom’s referendum on European Union membership, a number of explanations have been put forward for the vote to leave. In this article, we argue that none of them provides a satisfactory account. We then outline an alternative explanation. The UK has long been one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU, and the reason why is that Britons have a weaker sense of European identity––an identity which is rooted in specific aspects of the country’s history. Since the early 1990s, Britons’ Euroscepticism has been amplified by four key developments: the ERM crisis; the increasing pace of European integration; the Eurozone debt crisis; and immigration from Eastern Europe. Our explanation answers two critical questions: ‘Why did the UK that voted to leave, rather than any other member state?’; and, ‘Why did the UK vote to Leave in 2016, rather than at any point in the past?’

EUROPEAN BUT NOT EUROPEAN ENOUGH: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT

by James Dennison and Geoffrey Evans

On 23 June the United Kingdom held a referendum to gauge public support for continued British mem... more On 23 June the United Kingdom held a referendum to gauge public support for continued British membership of the European Union with a majority voting in favour of 'Leave'. The causes of 'Brexit' have garnered significant attention from academics and commentators, with many explanations focusing on issues of sovereignty, immigration, fiscal austerity, xenophobia and imperial nostalgia, while others have looked to socio-demographic divides based on age, class and the 'winners and losers of globalisation'. We argue that these explanations fail to answer the key aggregate-level questions of why Britain voted to leave now, rather than at any other time, and why Britain, rather than any other member state, voted to leave. We account for Brexit by showing that Britain was always more Eurosceptic than other member states due, ultimately, to historical reasons that today manifest themselves in uniquely weak micro-level integration and that this tension became increasingly apparent as European integration deepened. We then show how post-2004 immigration mobilised the British working and lower middle class, whose consistent Euroscepticism had, until the referendum, been silenced by the UK's pre-2010 party system's consensus on membership. We end by considering the potential ramifications of the referendum for the future of the UK and the EU.

The Greens in British Politics Protest, Anti-Austerity and the Divided Left

This book explains how the Greens went from obscurity to England’s third largest party in just on... more This book explains how the Greens went from obscurity to England’s third largest party in just one year, quadrupling their vote share and securing their place in Britain’s refigured party system on the way. Sophisticated quantitative analyses of the Greens’ voters and members as well as interviews with all of the leading party insiders are used to explain how internal dynamics, changing political opportunities and a forgotten portion of the electorate resulted in an unprecedented ‘Green Surge’ that defied decades of British party membership decline and a lack of historic far left electoral success in the UK. Not only does James Dennison untangle a fascinating political case study but he also shines a light on how technological, attitudinal and demographic changes are reshaping politics and forcing us to question many of our previous assumptions about political parties and how voters choose.