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Actions: clarify doc for untrusted checkout #20204

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Merged
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Aug 11, 2025
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Actions: clarify doc for untrusted checkout #20204

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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutCritical.md
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## Overview

GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.

## Recommendation

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:

- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
- run: |
npm install
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm build

- uses: completely/fakeaction@v2
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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutHigh.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
## Overview

GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.

## Recommendation

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:

- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
- run: |
npm install
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm build

- uses: completely/fakeaction@v2
Expand Down
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions actions/ql/src/Security/CWE-829/UntrustedCheckoutMedium.md
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
## Overview

GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed in a privileged job.
GitHub workflows can be triggered through various repository events, including incoming pull requests (PRs) or comments on Issues/PRs. A potentially dangerous misuse of the triggers such as `pull_request_target` or `issue_comment` followed by an explicit checkout of untrusted code (Pull Request HEAD) may lead to repository compromise if untrusted code gets executed (e.g., due to a modified build script) in a privileged job.

## Recommendation

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:

- uses: actions/setup-node@v1
- run: |
npm install
npm install # scripts in package.json from PR would be executed here
npm build

- uses: completely/fakeaction@v2
Expand Down