Over the past year the EU has made important steps to strengthen collective security and address ... more Over the past year the EU has made important steps to strengthen collective security and address its two more pressing challenges. On the one hand, European countries need a broader -and thus more expensive and complex -portfolio of capabilities to address the newer and wider set of threats they are confronted with. On the other hand, different technological trends are undermining the leadership in weapons manufacturing European countries have long enjoyed.
In May 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence published its White Paper for International
Security... more In May 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence published its White Paper for International Security and Defence. In this article, Andrea Gilli, Alessandro R Ungaro and Alessandro Marrone examine the important domestic changes outlined in the document, including those made to the policy-making processes and the internal discussion about strategic issues. The document restricts Italy’s focus to the Euro-Mediterranean region but sees a more active role for its armed forces – if and when necessary. European co-operation is also prioritised, especially with regards to military technology and procurement. It also puts forward reform of the defence ministry aimed at shaping an integrated approach and promotes further jointness, starting from the strengthening of the Joint Operational Command that will take responsibility for any future military operation.
We thank Michael Horowitz for his response to our article, “The Spread of Military Innovations: A... more We thank Michael Horowitz for his response to our article, “The Spread of Military Innovations: Adoption Capacity Theory, Tactical Incentive and the Case of Suicide Terrorism.”[2] We are glad for Horowitz’s close reading of our work, and for the several insightful and constructive comments that he has offered. Such comments significantly contribute to the academic debate on the diffusion of military innovations and should drive further research in the field. However, Horowitz’s response to our article fails to address the problems we originally raised. As a result, the conclusions we reached in our article are still valid: because of the problems in Horowitz’s research design, we cannot conclude that the variation in organizational constraints across terrorist groups explains the variation in adoption and non-adoption of suicide bombing.
What explains the adoption of military innovations? In this article,
we assess the empirical val... more What explains the adoption of military innovations? In this article,
we assess the empirical validity of adoption capacity theory
by reconsidering one methodologically important case analyzed
by Michael Horowitz: the diffusion of suicide terrorism. We show
that, when addressing problems in Horowitz’s research design, the
case of suicide terrorism fails to support adoption capacity theory.
We argue that, in order to account for the diffusion of this
innovation, one needs to take into consideration the tactical incentives
to overcome technologically superior enemies. The results
of our quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that terrorist
groups fighting against very powerful states in terms of conventional
capabilities are more likely to employ suicide attacks than
those fighting against poorly equipped ones. Our findings are important
because they provide systematic evidence in support of Kalyvas
and S`anchez-Cuenca’s argument that suicide terrorism is driven
by tactical considerations and because they provide confidence in
the external validity of Berman and Laitin’s hardness of targets
hypothesis. Our results also question Lyall and Wilson’s finding
that highly mechanized armies are inherently inadequate to win
counterinsurgency operations. The superior conventional capabilities
of a counterinsurgency army might in fact make traditional
insurgent tactics ineffective and thus give insurgents an incentive
to adopt suicide attacks.
Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare – a first step ... more Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare – a first step towards the robotics age – will promote instability and conflict at the international level. This view is consistent with the widely shared assumption among International Relations scholars that military hardware spreads easily, especially in the age of globalization and real-time communications. In this article, we question this consensus. Drawing from the literature in management, we advance a new theory of diffusion of military innovations and test its two underlying causal mechanisms. First, we argue that designing, developing and manufacturing advanced weapon systems require laboratories, testing and production facilities, as well as know-how and experience that cannot be easily borrowed from other fields. Second, we argue that the adoption of military innovations require both organizational and infrastructural support. We test our two claims on three types of combat-effective drones: loitering attack munitions (LAMs), intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance drones (ISR) and unmanned combat autonomous vehicles (UCAVs). We find that even wealthy, advanced and militarily capable countries such as the US, the UK, Germany and France have struggled to produce or adopt such platforms. We conclude that concerns about the diffusion of drone warfare appear significantly exaggerated as do claims that globalization redistributes military power at the global level. More generally, our analysis sheds light on how the interaction between platform and adoption challenges affects the rate and speed of diffusion of different military innovations.
The emergence of unmanned vehicles has dramatically reshaped intelligence and warfare over the pa... more The emergence of unmanned vehicles has dramatically reshaped intelligence and warfare over the past two decades. This is particularly clear in the air domain where the so-called drones have come to prominence as major force multipliers: at relatively affordable costs, they can deliver powerful surveillance capabilities, thus enhancing military planners' and political decision-makers' situation awareness and intelligence, as well as reducing troops' presence on the ground for both combat and non-combat missions. Moreover, over the next few decades, combat drones will reshape -if not completely revolutionise -air warfare thanks to superior aerodynamic, ground-attack and swarming capabilities, whatever one may think about their ethical implications.
Over the past year the EU has made important steps to strengthen collective security and address ... more Over the past year the EU has made important steps to strengthen collective security and address its two more pressing challenges. On the one hand, European countries need a broader -and thus more expensive and complex -portfolio of capabilities to address the newer and wider set of threats they are confronted with. On the other hand, different technological trends are undermining the leadership in weapons manufacturing European countries have long enjoyed.
In May 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence published its White Paper for International
Security... more In May 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence published its White Paper for International Security and Defence. In this article, Andrea Gilli, Alessandro R Ungaro and Alessandro Marrone examine the important domestic changes outlined in the document, including those made to the policy-making processes and the internal discussion about strategic issues. The document restricts Italy’s focus to the Euro-Mediterranean region but sees a more active role for its armed forces – if and when necessary. European co-operation is also prioritised, especially with regards to military technology and procurement. It also puts forward reform of the defence ministry aimed at shaping an integrated approach and promotes further jointness, starting from the strengthening of the Joint Operational Command that will take responsibility for any future military operation.
We thank Michael Horowitz for his response to our article, “The Spread of Military Innovations: A... more We thank Michael Horowitz for his response to our article, “The Spread of Military Innovations: Adoption Capacity Theory, Tactical Incentive and the Case of Suicide Terrorism.”[2] We are glad for Horowitz’s close reading of our work, and for the several insightful and constructive comments that he has offered. Such comments significantly contribute to the academic debate on the diffusion of military innovations and should drive further research in the field. However, Horowitz’s response to our article fails to address the problems we originally raised. As a result, the conclusions we reached in our article are still valid: because of the problems in Horowitz’s research design, we cannot conclude that the variation in organizational constraints across terrorist groups explains the variation in adoption and non-adoption of suicide bombing.
What explains the adoption of military innovations? In this article,
we assess the empirical val... more What explains the adoption of military innovations? In this article,
we assess the empirical validity of adoption capacity theory
by reconsidering one methodologically important case analyzed
by Michael Horowitz: the diffusion of suicide terrorism. We show
that, when addressing problems in Horowitz’s research design, the
case of suicide terrorism fails to support adoption capacity theory.
We argue that, in order to account for the diffusion of this
innovation, one needs to take into consideration the tactical incentives
to overcome technologically superior enemies. The results
of our quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that terrorist
groups fighting against very powerful states in terms of conventional
capabilities are more likely to employ suicide attacks than
those fighting against poorly equipped ones. Our findings are important
because they provide systematic evidence in support of Kalyvas
and S`anchez-Cuenca’s argument that suicide terrorism is driven
by tactical considerations and because they provide confidence in
the external validity of Berman and Laitin’s hardness of targets
hypothesis. Our results also question Lyall and Wilson’s finding
that highly mechanized armies are inherently inadequate to win
counterinsurgency operations. The superior conventional capabilities
of a counterinsurgency army might in fact make traditional
insurgent tactics ineffective and thus give insurgents an incentive
to adopt suicide attacks.
Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare – a first step ... more Many scholars and policy-makers are concerned that the emergence of drone warfare – a first step towards the robotics age – will promote instability and conflict at the international level. This view is consistent with the widely shared assumption among International Relations scholars that military hardware spreads easily, especially in the age of globalization and real-time communications. In this article, we question this consensus. Drawing from the literature in management, we advance a new theory of diffusion of military innovations and test its two underlying causal mechanisms. First, we argue that designing, developing and manufacturing advanced weapon systems require laboratories, testing and production facilities, as well as know-how and experience that cannot be easily borrowed from other fields. Second, we argue that the adoption of military innovations require both organizational and infrastructural support. We test our two claims on three types of combat-effective drones: loitering attack munitions (LAMs), intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance drones (ISR) and unmanned combat autonomous vehicles (UCAVs). We find that even wealthy, advanced and militarily capable countries such as the US, the UK, Germany and France have struggled to produce or adopt such platforms. We conclude that concerns about the diffusion of drone warfare appear significantly exaggerated as do claims that globalization redistributes military power at the global level. More generally, our analysis sheds light on how the interaction between platform and adoption challenges affects the rate and speed of diffusion of different military innovations.
The emergence of unmanned vehicles has dramatically reshaped intelligence and warfare over the pa... more The emergence of unmanned vehicles has dramatically reshaped intelligence and warfare over the past two decades. This is particularly clear in the air domain where the so-called drones have come to prominence as major force multipliers: at relatively affordable costs, they can deliver powerful surveillance capabilities, thus enhancing military planners' and political decision-makers' situation awareness and intelligence, as well as reducing troops' presence on the ground for both combat and non-combat missions. Moreover, over the next few decades, combat drones will reshape -if not completely revolutionise -air warfare thanks to superior aerodynamic, ground-attack and swarming capabilities, whatever one may think about their ethical implications.
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Papers by Andrea Gilli
Security and Defence. In this article, Andrea Gilli, Alessandro R Ungaro and Alessandro
Marrone examine the important domestic changes outlined in the document, including
those made to the policy-making processes and the internal discussion about strategic
issues. The document restricts Italy’s focus to the Euro-Mediterranean region but sees a
more active role for its armed forces – if and when necessary. European co-operation is
also prioritised, especially with regards to military technology and procurement. It also
puts forward reform of the defence ministry aimed at shaping an integrated approach
and promotes further jointness, starting from the strengthening of the Joint Operational
Command that will take responsibility for any future military operation.
we assess the empirical validity of adoption capacity theory
by reconsidering one methodologically important case analyzed
by Michael Horowitz: the diffusion of suicide terrorism. We show
that, when addressing problems in Horowitz’s research design, the
case of suicide terrorism fails to support adoption capacity theory.
We argue that, in order to account for the diffusion of this
innovation, one needs to take into consideration the tactical incentives
to overcome technologically superior enemies. The results
of our quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that terrorist
groups fighting against very powerful states in terms of conventional
capabilities are more likely to employ suicide attacks than
those fighting against poorly equipped ones. Our findings are important
because they provide systematic evidence in support of Kalyvas
and S`anchez-Cuenca’s argument that suicide terrorism is driven
by tactical considerations and because they provide confidence in
the external validity of Berman and Laitin’s hardness of targets
hypothesis. Our results also question Lyall and Wilson’s finding
that highly mechanized armies are inherently inadequate to win
counterinsurgency operations. The superior conventional capabilities
of a counterinsurgency army might in fact make traditional
insurgent tactics ineffective and thus give insurgents an incentive
to adopt suicide attacks.
Booklets by Andrea Gilli
Security and Defence. In this article, Andrea Gilli, Alessandro R Ungaro and Alessandro
Marrone examine the important domestic changes outlined in the document, including
those made to the policy-making processes and the internal discussion about strategic
issues. The document restricts Italy’s focus to the Euro-Mediterranean region but sees a
more active role for its armed forces – if and when necessary. European co-operation is
also prioritised, especially with regards to military technology and procurement. It also
puts forward reform of the defence ministry aimed at shaping an integrated approach
and promotes further jointness, starting from the strengthening of the Joint Operational
Command that will take responsibility for any future military operation.
we assess the empirical validity of adoption capacity theory
by reconsidering one methodologically important case analyzed
by Michael Horowitz: the diffusion of suicide terrorism. We show
that, when addressing problems in Horowitz’s research design, the
case of suicide terrorism fails to support adoption capacity theory.
We argue that, in order to account for the diffusion of this
innovation, one needs to take into consideration the tactical incentives
to overcome technologically superior enemies. The results
of our quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that terrorist
groups fighting against very powerful states in terms of conventional
capabilities are more likely to employ suicide attacks than
those fighting against poorly equipped ones. Our findings are important
because they provide systematic evidence in support of Kalyvas
and S`anchez-Cuenca’s argument that suicide terrorism is driven
by tactical considerations and because they provide confidence in
the external validity of Berman and Laitin’s hardness of targets
hypothesis. Our results also question Lyall and Wilson’s finding
that highly mechanized armies are inherently inadequate to win
counterinsurgency operations. The superior conventional capabilities
of a counterinsurgency army might in fact make traditional
insurgent tactics ineffective and thus give insurgents an incentive
to adopt suicide attacks.