Plamen Tonchev
While I'm Head of Asia Unit at the Athens-based think-tank Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER), I am more of a practitioner than a typical academic. I happen to travel quite a bit across Eurasia - from Brussels to Beijing, from Murmansk to Manila and from Tokyo to Tehran. In-between missions, I put things on paper and tell people what I've seen - or what I make of what I've seen. My predilection is trying to connect the dots between politics and economics.
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Papers by Plamen Tonchev
- Politics is not only about rational considerations and cold-blooded calculus - to a large extent, psychology needs to be factored in as well. It would be expedient to gauge the psychological underpinnings and implications of self-image, too.
- Relations between the PRC and Taiwan are routinely seen as an equation based on an extremely complex, but fundamentally rational, strategic calculus through a double prism: (A) Beijing’s national integration vision and pursuit to absorb Taiwan; and (B) the great power competition between China and the U.S. However, there may well be an additional - and less rational - layer of factors that relates to the way the PRC and Taiwan view
themselves and make their choices.
- The dominance of economic arguments, military concerns and geopolitical imperatives risks downplaying key societal features on both sides of the Taiwan strait. These attributes are not mere footnotes in the debate about the state of the global economy or the narrative of great power competition - the psychological dimension is also part of the overall equation around the dispute over the status of Taiwan.
the first Pakistanis and Filipinos appeared in the 1970s, to be followed by Indians, Chinese, Bangladeshis, etc. These migrants tend to come from specific regions in their countries of origin, thus bringing in specific social and cultural features, which
remain largely unknown in Greece.
Developing soft power has been a pillar of Chinese foreign policy since 2007 and remains a stated goal of China’s long-term policy orientation to 2035. The country-level analysis from the report identifies three prominent Chinese approaches to developing soft power in Europe:
- promoting Chinese language and culture;
- shaping China’s image through the media;
- and using the secondary soft-power effects of economic prowess.
Recently, and over the last year in particular, China has become more assertive in attempting to shape its image by expanding its toolkit, particularly to enhance its political messaging. This includes the systematic use of social media.
These are some of the questions that this paper aspires to answer.
How popular is the Chinese language that is taught at Confucius Institutes and Classrooms across Southeast Europe? And what’s the story behind the compulsory teaching of the Chinese language at a Romanian private school – is this an exception or could it be a harbinger? Are Serbia and Montenegro likely to follow suit? How many Chinese scholarships are allocated annually to Albania and North Macedonia? Indeed, are many youngsters in Southeast Europe eager to study in China and pursue a professional career there?
Does cultural diplomacy play a part in the projection of China’s soft power? Why do nine out of ten Greeks favour cultural ties with China? Does a superhero from a children’s comic book bring China and Bulgaria closer together? How popular are Chinese movies in Southeast Europe and can they emulate the stunning success of South Korea’s Oscar-winner ‘Parasite’?
Last but not least, why is China more readily accepted in the Balkans than in other parts of Europe? How is China projecting its soft power, which appears to be interwoven with the Asian giant’s economic statecraft and, at the same time, expectations in Southeast Europe for Chinese investment? How does China’s soft power impact the EU prospects of the Western Balkans?
The decade-long socio-economic and political turmoil in the country has clearly weakened the commitment of Greece to
core European Union (EU) values. In addition, Greece’s stance vis-à-vis China is conditioned by two more key factors:
an expectation that the Asian giant will help the country’s economy to stand on its own feet once again; and a deliberate
choice by the current government to demonstrate to its western partners and creditors that Greece has a powerful ally as an
alternative to the EU. Values play only a limited role, if any, in this gambit.
compresa, si è finora sviluppato attorno all’idea che l’espansione dell’influenza di Pechino sia da imputare alla crescita dei suoi investimenti nella regione. Nonostante ci sia del vero in questa narrazione, va precisato come si tratti di una spiegazione parziale, che potrebbe distogliere l’attenzione da motivazioni ben più complesse e capaci di consentire una migliore comprensione della situazione attuale. Si tratta di logiche che hanno meno a che fare con le risorse finanziarie mobilitate dalla Cina nel Mediterraneo e più con le emozioni e le
percezioni che la Cina suscita nell’opinione pubblica e nella vita politica locale.
Preventive diplomacy, or the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, has been one of the foundations of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Asia and beyond and stands as an expression of a rule-based international order. Moreover, in its key strategic documents, including the recently released Global Strategy, the EU has highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy, as reflected in the proposed ‘integrated approach’ to conflicts and crises.
- Politics is not only about rational considerations and cold-blooded calculus - to a large extent, psychology needs to be factored in as well. It would be expedient to gauge the psychological underpinnings and implications of self-image, too.
- Relations between the PRC and Taiwan are routinely seen as an equation based on an extremely complex, but fundamentally rational, strategic calculus through a double prism: (A) Beijing’s national integration vision and pursuit to absorb Taiwan; and (B) the great power competition between China and the U.S. However, there may well be an additional - and less rational - layer of factors that relates to the way the PRC and Taiwan view
themselves and make their choices.
- The dominance of economic arguments, military concerns and geopolitical imperatives risks downplaying key societal features on both sides of the Taiwan strait. These attributes are not mere footnotes in the debate about the state of the global economy or the narrative of great power competition - the psychological dimension is also part of the overall equation around the dispute over the status of Taiwan.
the first Pakistanis and Filipinos appeared in the 1970s, to be followed by Indians, Chinese, Bangladeshis, etc. These migrants tend to come from specific regions in their countries of origin, thus bringing in specific social and cultural features, which
remain largely unknown in Greece.
Developing soft power has been a pillar of Chinese foreign policy since 2007 and remains a stated goal of China’s long-term policy orientation to 2035. The country-level analysis from the report identifies three prominent Chinese approaches to developing soft power in Europe:
- promoting Chinese language and culture;
- shaping China’s image through the media;
- and using the secondary soft-power effects of economic prowess.
Recently, and over the last year in particular, China has become more assertive in attempting to shape its image by expanding its toolkit, particularly to enhance its political messaging. This includes the systematic use of social media.
These are some of the questions that this paper aspires to answer.
How popular is the Chinese language that is taught at Confucius Institutes and Classrooms across Southeast Europe? And what’s the story behind the compulsory teaching of the Chinese language at a Romanian private school – is this an exception or could it be a harbinger? Are Serbia and Montenegro likely to follow suit? How many Chinese scholarships are allocated annually to Albania and North Macedonia? Indeed, are many youngsters in Southeast Europe eager to study in China and pursue a professional career there?
Does cultural diplomacy play a part in the projection of China’s soft power? Why do nine out of ten Greeks favour cultural ties with China? Does a superhero from a children’s comic book bring China and Bulgaria closer together? How popular are Chinese movies in Southeast Europe and can they emulate the stunning success of South Korea’s Oscar-winner ‘Parasite’?
Last but not least, why is China more readily accepted in the Balkans than in other parts of Europe? How is China projecting its soft power, which appears to be interwoven with the Asian giant’s economic statecraft and, at the same time, expectations in Southeast Europe for Chinese investment? How does China’s soft power impact the EU prospects of the Western Balkans?
The decade-long socio-economic and political turmoil in the country has clearly weakened the commitment of Greece to
core European Union (EU) values. In addition, Greece’s stance vis-à-vis China is conditioned by two more key factors:
an expectation that the Asian giant will help the country’s economy to stand on its own feet once again; and a deliberate
choice by the current government to demonstrate to its western partners and creditors that Greece has a powerful ally as an
alternative to the EU. Values play only a limited role, if any, in this gambit.
compresa, si è finora sviluppato attorno all’idea che l’espansione dell’influenza di Pechino sia da imputare alla crescita dei suoi investimenti nella regione. Nonostante ci sia del vero in questa narrazione, va precisato come si tratti di una spiegazione parziale, che potrebbe distogliere l’attenzione da motivazioni ben più complesse e capaci di consentire una migliore comprensione della situazione attuale. Si tratta di logiche che hanno meno a che fare con le risorse finanziarie mobilitate dalla Cina nel Mediterraneo e più con le emozioni e le
percezioni che la Cina suscita nell’opinione pubblica e nella vita politica locale.
Preventive diplomacy, or the resolution of disputes by peaceful means, has been one of the foundations of the EU’s foreign and security policy in Asia and beyond and stands as an expression of a rule-based international order. Moreover, in its key strategic documents, including the recently released Global Strategy, the EU has highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy, as reflected in the proposed ‘integrated approach’ to conflicts and crises.