Skip to main content

Adam Slavny

Followers

28

Following

47

Co-author

1

Mentions

71

Public Views

Adam is an Reader at the University of Warwick. His primary area of research is the philosophy of tort law. In particular, he is interested in normative theorising about torts and corrective duties in moral philosophy. He works on a number of topics in this area, including theories of harm and compensation, principles governing liability to compensate, the value of reputation in defamation, the wrongness of risking, and the relationship between tort theory and political philosophy. He also maintains a general interest in moral, political and legal philosophy and has worked on topics outside tort theory including the basis of moral equality and the relationship between reasoning and moral permissibility.
Supervisors: Victor Tadros

less

University of Haifa

Gregory Keating

University of Southern California

Victor V. Ramraj

University of Victoria

Stanford University

Liam Kilvington

Dragutin Petrić

Politecnico di Milano

Interests

Uploads

Papers by Adam Slavny

Varieties of Consequentialism and Deontology in Theories of Tort Law

Law and Philosophy, 2024

The Normative Effects of Redressive Practices: What Changes and How

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

When a wrongdoer apologises and is forgiven, the normative situation seems to change. But what ch... more When a wrongdoer apologises and is forgiven, the normative situation seems to change. But what changes, and how? Philosophers writing about apology and forgiveness tend to assume that these practices-we call them redressive practices-bring about a variety of normative changes including undertaking new obligations, cancelling other obligations, and generating reasons to resume normal relations. We argue, to the contrary, that the range of normative changes following redressive practices is much narrower than many assume. The second question asks how normative changes come about. One view, defended by Brandon Warme and Nicolas Cornell, among others, is that forgiveness is a normative power. Christopher Bennett concurs, going a step further by suggesting that apology is also a normative power. We reject these claims, arguing that, rather than effecting normative changes directly, apology and forgiveness convey or instantiate independent facts that themselves create normative change. Instead, we explain the normativity of redressive practices on the grounds that they satisfy our normative interests. Though we lack the kind of control over our normative situation post-wrongdoing that normative powers would confer, this is not a form of control we have reason to value.

Wrongs, Harms, and Compensation

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 23, 2023

The Normative Foundations of Defamatory Meaning

Law and Philosophy, Dec 18, 2017

This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The morali... more This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third-the dual view-can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views. The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory, but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personal defamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached. Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail to acknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The first version of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value of defamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails to recognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views. The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual view.

The Normative Foundations of Defamatory Meaning

Law and Philosophy, 2018

This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The morali... more This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third - the dual view - can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views. The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory, but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personal defamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached. Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail to acknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The first version of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value of defamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails to recognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views. The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual view.

Should Tort Law Demand the Impossible?

This chapter critically examines the moral justification of two settled features of tort law—the ... more This chapter critically examines the moral justification of two settled features of tort law—the objective standard of care and strict liability—insofar as they appear to violate the putative moral stricture “ought-implies-can.” The proposition that duties must be possible of fulfillment (and likewise, compliance with applicable normative reasons) has a pedigree stretching back to Immanuel Kant and is still widely assumed. Thus, this chapter begins by defending this foundational proposition on the grounds that normative reasons must be able to guide conduct. It notes that reasons that fail to comply with ought-implies-can are incapable of guiding conduct. This chapter then confronts arguments on behalf of the objective standard of care in negligence and strict liability, respectively, that purport to show that both doctrines sometimes justifiably violate ought-implies-can.

Directed Reflective Equilibrium: Thought Experiments and How to Use Them

Journal of Moral Philosophy

In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Refle... more In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium. Directed Reflective Equilibrium is based on a taxonomy that distinguishes between a number of different functions of hypothetical cases, including two dimensions that we call representation and elicitation. Like its predecessor, Directed Reflective Equilibrium accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought into equilibrium. However, it also offers guidance about how different types of cases ought to be sequenced to achieve this result. We argue that this ‘directional’ approach improves, in various ways, upon the non-directional approach of traditional Reflective Equilibrium.

Rescuing Basic Equality

by Tom Parr and Adam Slavny

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 2019

In the debate on the basis of moral equality one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must... more In the debate on the basis of moral equality one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.

Benefits, Entitlements and Non-Responsible Threats

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2018

This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non-responsible threa... more This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non-responsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some argue that a non-responsible threata person who threatens another through no fault or choiceis required to bear a greater burden to avert the threat than a bystander. I argue that previous attempts to explain this asymmetry are either incorrect or incomplete, since they either implausibly suggest that agents who do not benefit from their bodily resources, or whose bodily resources primarily benefit third parties, are liable to greater costs than a bystander, or fail to accommodate such cases. Instead, the asymmetry (when it exists) is explained either by virtue of the fact that the non-responsible threat has a beneficiary status with respect to the threatening object, or possesses distributionlimiting entitlements over the threatening object.

What’s Wrong with Risk?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account ... more Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v-ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative—The Buck-Passing Account—that withstands both objections.

What's Wrong with Risk?

by Tom Parr and Adam Slavny

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , 2019

Imposing pure risks – risks that do not materialise into harm – is sometimes wrong. The Harm Acco... more Imposing pure risks – risks that do not materialise into harm – is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v-ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative – The Buck-Passing Account – that withstands both objections.

On being wronged and being wrong

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2017

If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we resp... more If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I...

On Being Wronged and Being Wrong

Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2017

If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we resp... more If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I argue that we should accept The Mixed View.

Nonreciprocity and the Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2014

This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding o... more This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding one person liable to compensate another for an injury she has caused is justified if it results from a nonreciprocal risk imposition. I briefly attempt to ascertain the moral underpinning of nonreciprocity, considering the concepts of fairness, standing and causation. Concluding that there is no compelling moral rationale for nonreciprocity, I use case analysis to show that two competing considerations—the extent to which either party could have avoided the risk and the distribution of benefits created by the risky activity—override nonreciprocity. I conclude that we ought to reject the nonreciprocity principle as a moral basis of liability to compensate. The results of the critique are not purely negative, however. In outlining and assessing the relevance of avoidability and benefit distributions, I make some progress towards a new account of liability to compensate for unintentional harm.

Nonreciprocity and the Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2014

This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding o... more This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding one person liable to compensate another for an injury she has caused is justified if it results from a nonreciprocal risk imposition. I briefly attempt to ascertain the moral underpinning of nonreciprocity, considering the concepts of fairness, standing and causation. Concluding that there is no compelling moral rationale for nonreciprocity, I use case analysis to show that two competing considerations—the extent to which either party could have avoided the risk and the distribution of benefits created by the risky activity—override nonreciprocity. I conclude that we ought to reject the nonreciprocity principle as a moral basis of liability to compensate. The results of the critique are not purely negative, however. In outlining and assessing the relevance of avoidability and benefit distributions, I make some progress towards a new account of liability to compensate for unintentional harm.

Big Data Justice: A Case for Regulating the Global Information Commons

The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges political theorists to think about data own... more The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges political theorists to think about data ownership and policy makers to regulate the collection and use of public data. AI producers benefit from free public data for training their systems while retaining the profits. We argue against the view that the use of public data must be free. The proponents of unconstrained use point out that consuming data does not diminish its quality and that information is in ample supply. Therefore, they suggest, publicly available data should be free. We present two objections. First, allowing free data use promotes unwanted inequality. Second, contributors of information did not and could not anticipate that their contribution would be used to train AI systems. Our argument implies that managing the “global information commons” and charging for extensive data use is permissible and desirable. We discuss policy implications and propose a progressive data use tax to counter the inequality arising.

Harmless Discrimination

Legal Theory, 2016

ABSTRACTInBorn Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper ... more ABSTRACTInBorn Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. Theconditions objectionstates that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. Theexplanation objectionstates that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. We argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be outcome-focused. A more promising family of views focuses on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action.

Harmless Discrimination

Legal Theory, 2015

In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert... more In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. The conditions objection states that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The explanation objection states that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. We argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be outcome-focused. A more promising family of views focuses on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action.

Negating and Counterbalancing: A Fundamental Distinction in the Concept of a Corrective Duty

Law and Philosophy, 2014

Alon Harel on How to Deliberate Permissibly

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2015

Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is ... more Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is to harm innocent people. He rejects traditional consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches because of the type of reasoning they both employ. I interpret Harel as making two central objections to this form of reasoning. First, traditional approaches require comparisons to be made about the value of human life. Second, decisions in extreme cases, even if permissible, should not be made under the guidance of rules. I argue that these objections, though prima facie plausible, are on reflection relatively weak, and I offer instead a more moderate argument that vindicates Harel’s general thesis that deliberation is morally relevant. More specifically, I argue that whether one acts on certain conditions affects both the moral permissibility of one’s actions and the duties owed by others.

Varieties of Consequentialism and Deontology in Theories of Tort Law

Law and Philosophy, 2024

The Normative Effects of Redressive Practices: What Changes and How

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

When a wrongdoer apologises and is forgiven, the normative situation seems to change. But what ch... more When a wrongdoer apologises and is forgiven, the normative situation seems to change. But what changes, and how? Philosophers writing about apology and forgiveness tend to assume that these practices-we call them redressive practices-bring about a variety of normative changes including undertaking new obligations, cancelling other obligations, and generating reasons to resume normal relations. We argue, to the contrary, that the range of normative changes following redressive practices is much narrower than many assume. The second question asks how normative changes come about. One view, defended by Brandon Warme and Nicolas Cornell, among others, is that forgiveness is a normative power. Christopher Bennett concurs, going a step further by suggesting that apology is also a normative power. We reject these claims, arguing that, rather than effecting normative changes directly, apology and forgiveness convey or instantiate independent facts that themselves create normative change. Instead, we explain the normativity of redressive practices on the grounds that they satisfy our normative interests. Though we lack the kind of control over our normative situation post-wrongdoing that normative powers would confer, this is not a form of control we have reason to value.

Wrongs, Harms, and Compensation

Oxford University Press eBooks, Aug 23, 2023

The Normative Foundations of Defamatory Meaning

Law and Philosophy, Dec 18, 2017

This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The morali... more This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third-the dual view-can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views. The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory, but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personal defamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached. Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail to acknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The first version of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value of defamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails to recognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views. The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual view.

The Normative Foundations of Defamatory Meaning

Law and Philosophy, 2018

This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The morali... more This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third - the dual view - can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views. The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory, but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personal defamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached. Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail to acknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The first version of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value of defamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails to recognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views. The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual view.

Should Tort Law Demand the Impossible?

This chapter critically examines the moral justification of two settled features of tort law—the ... more This chapter critically examines the moral justification of two settled features of tort law—the objective standard of care and strict liability—insofar as they appear to violate the putative moral stricture “ought-implies-can.” The proposition that duties must be possible of fulfillment (and likewise, compliance with applicable normative reasons) has a pedigree stretching back to Immanuel Kant and is still widely assumed. Thus, this chapter begins by defending this foundational proposition on the grounds that normative reasons must be able to guide conduct. It notes that reasons that fail to comply with ought-implies-can are incapable of guiding conduct. This chapter then confronts arguments on behalf of the objective standard of care in negligence and strict liability, respectively, that purport to show that both doctrines sometimes justifiably violate ought-implies-can.

Directed Reflective Equilibrium: Thought Experiments and How to Use Them

Journal of Moral Philosophy

In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Refle... more In this paper we develop a new methodology for normative theorising, which we call Directed Reflective Equilibrium. Directed Reflective Equilibrium is based on a taxonomy that distinguishes between a number of different functions of hypothetical cases, including two dimensions that we call representation and elicitation. Like its predecessor, Directed Reflective Equilibrium accepts that neither intuitions nor basic principles are immune to revision and that our commitments on various levels of philosophical enquiry should be brought into equilibrium. However, it also offers guidance about how different types of cases ought to be sequenced to achieve this result. We argue that this ‘directional’ approach improves, in various ways, upon the non-directional approach of traditional Reflective Equilibrium.

Rescuing Basic Equality

by Tom Parr and Adam Slavny

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 2019

In the debate on the basis of moral equality one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must... more In the debate on the basis of moral equality one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all accounts that ground equality in the possession of some psychological capacity (Psychological Capacity Accounts). This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.

Benefits, Entitlements and Non-Responsible Threats

Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2018

This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non-responsible threa... more This article offers an explanation for the proposed moral asymmetry between non-responsible threats and innocent bystanders. Some argue that a non-responsible threata person who threatens another through no fault or choiceis required to bear a greater burden to avert the threat than a bystander. I argue that previous attempts to explain this asymmetry are either incorrect or incomplete, since they either implausibly suggest that agents who do not benefit from their bodily resources, or whose bodily resources primarily benefit third parties, are liable to greater costs than a bystander, or fail to accommodate such cases. Instead, the asymmetry (when it exists) is explained either by virtue of the fact that the non-responsible threat has a beneficiary status with respect to the threatening object, or possesses distributionlimiting entitlements over the threatening object.

What’s Wrong with Risk?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 2019

Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account ... more Imposing pure risks—risks that do not materialise into harm—is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v-ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative—The Buck-Passing Account—that withstands both objections.

What's Wrong with Risk?

by Tom Parr and Adam Slavny

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , 2019

Imposing pure risks – risks that do not materialise into harm – is sometimes wrong. The Harm Acco... more Imposing pure risks – risks that do not materialise into harm – is sometimes wrong. The Harm Account explains this wrongness by claiming that pure risks are harms. By contrast, The Autonomy Account claims that pure risks impede autonomy. We develop two objections to these influential accounts. The Separation Objection proceeds from the observation that, if it is wrong to v then it is sometimes wrong to risk v-ing. The intuitive plausibility of this claim does not depend on any account of the facts that ground moral wrongness. This suggests a close relationship between the factors that make an act wrong and the factors that make risking that act wrong, which both accounts fail to recognise. The Determinism Objection holds that both accounts fail to explain the wrongness of pure risks in a deterministic world. We then develop an alternative – The Buck-Passing Account – that withstands both objections.

On being wronged and being wrong

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2017

If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we resp... more If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I...

On Being Wronged and Being Wrong

Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2017

If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we resp... more If D commits a wrong against V, D typically incurs a corrective duty to V. But how should we respond if V has false beliefs about whether she is harmed by D’s wrong? There are two types of cases we must consider: (1) those in which V is not harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is (2) those in which V is harmed but she mistakenly believes that she is not. I canvass three views: The Objective View, The Subjective View and The Mixed View. The Objective View holds that V’s claim depends on the correct account of harm, rather than her false beliefs, and so D has a duty to offer damages to V in (2) but not in (1) in order to compensate her. The Subjective View holds that, for broadly anti-perfectionist reasons, V’s claim depends on her sincere beliefs, even if they are mistaken, and so D has a duty to compensate V in (1) but not in (2). The Mixed View holds that we should defer to her beliefs in (1) but not in (2), so D has a duty to compensate her in both cases. In this article, I argue that we should accept The Mixed View.

Nonreciprocity and the Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2014

This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding o... more This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding one person liable to compensate another for an injury she has caused is justified if it results from a nonreciprocal risk imposition. I briefly attempt to ascertain the moral underpinning of nonreciprocity, considering the concepts of fairness, standing and causation. Concluding that there is no compelling moral rationale for nonreciprocity, I use case analysis to show that two competing considerations—the extent to which either party could have avoided the risk and the distribution of benefits created by the risky activity—override nonreciprocity. I conclude that we ought to reject the nonreciprocity principle as a moral basis of liability to compensate. The results of the critique are not purely negative, however. In outlining and assessing the relevance of avoidability and benefit distributions, I make some progress towards a new account of liability to compensate for unintentional harm.

Nonreciprocity and the Moral Basis of Liability to Compensate

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2014

This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding o... more This article offers a normative critique of the view, proposed by George Fletcher, that holding one person liable to compensate another for an injury she has caused is justified if it results from a nonreciprocal risk imposition. I briefly attempt to ascertain the moral underpinning of nonreciprocity, considering the concepts of fairness, standing and causation. Concluding that there is no compelling moral rationale for nonreciprocity, I use case analysis to show that two competing considerations—the extent to which either party could have avoided the risk and the distribution of benefits created by the risky activity—override nonreciprocity. I conclude that we ought to reject the nonreciprocity principle as a moral basis of liability to compensate. The results of the critique are not purely negative, however. In outlining and assessing the relevance of avoidability and benefit distributions, I make some progress towards a new account of liability to compensate for unintentional harm.

Big Data Justice: A Case for Regulating the Global Information Commons

The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges political theorists to think about data own... more The advent of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges political theorists to think about data ownership and policy makers to regulate the collection and use of public data. AI producers benefit from free public data for training their systems while retaining the profits. We argue against the view that the use of public data must be free. The proponents of unconstrained use point out that consuming data does not diminish its quality and that information is in ample supply. Therefore, they suggest, publicly available data should be free. We present two objections. First, allowing free data use promotes unwanted inequality. Second, contributors of information did not and could not anticipate that their contribution would be used to train AI systems. Our argument implies that managing the “global information commons” and charging for extensive data use is permissible and desirable. We discuss policy implications and propose a progressive data use tax to counter the inequality arising.

Harmless Discrimination

Legal Theory, 2016

ABSTRACTInBorn Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper ... more ABSTRACTInBorn Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. Theconditions objectionstates that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. Theexplanation objectionstates that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. We argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be outcome-focused. A more promising family of views focuses on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action.

Harmless Discrimination

Legal Theory, 2015

In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert... more In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. The conditions objection states that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The explanation objection states that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of discriminatory acts. We argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be outcome-focused. A more promising family of views focuses on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action.

Negating and Counterbalancing: A Fundamental Distinction in the Concept of a Corrective Duty

Law and Philosophy, 2014

Alon Harel on How to Deliberate Permissibly

Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2015

Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is ... more Alon Harel defines extreme cases as those in which the only way to avert a destructive threat is to harm innocent people. He rejects traditional consequentialist and non-consequentialist approaches because of the type of reasoning they both employ. I interpret Harel as making two central objections to this form of reasoning. First, traditional approaches require comparisons to be made about the value of human life. Second, decisions in extreme cases, even if permissible, should not be made under the guidance of rules. I argue that these objections, though prima facie plausible, are on reflection relatively weak, and I offer instead a more moderate argument that vindicates Harel’s general thesis that deliberation is morally relevant. More specifically, I argue that whether one acts on certain conditions affects both the moral permissibility of one’s actions and the duties owed by others.