This paper explores an often overlooked distinction in distributive theory
and its importance. Th... more This paper explores an often overlooked distinction in distributive theory and its importance. The paper illustrates that there are at least three ways to interpret substantive proposals of how to distribute goods based on what is at stake for different individuals (or their “claims” or “complaints”) and that the interpretation affects what the proposals recommend. It then argues that each of the interpretations is associated with significant problems since they all seem to violate plausible requirements of rationality. A fourth interpretation of how to understand person-based stakes is introduced, but some questions regarding whether this is compatible with distributive theories that appeal to such stakes are raised.
This thesis examines decision-making in value conflicts, and argues in favour of a unified approa... more This thesis examines decision-making in value conflicts, and argues in favour of a unified approach to decision-making which accepts partial success of a plurality of decision-making methods, and uses these as alternative heuristic tools the appropriateness of which is established and guided by interpretative and creative reasoning. This general conclusion is reached via a number of steps. First, an uncontroversial form of prima facie pluralism is accepted as the point of departure. Second, the diversity of value conflicts as well as the variety of different relations that values can have to each other (the degree of comparability) is established. Third, the impact of representations and the importance of the selection of matter for reasoning are illustrated and named the problem with representation. This, fourthly, undermines the possibilities of monistic value theories to dissolve conflicts, but also means that explanatory models of values need to account for both currencies of values and the way in which representations of the world are created. Such types of explanatory models are dubbed explanatory pluralism. Once the problem with representation and the need for explanatory pluralism are settled, it is shown that prevalent approaches to decision-making (including maximizing methods, subsumption under principles, and through Aristotelian approaches that assign importance to judgement) all have some merit, but all fail to account for the complexities surrounding what it is like to make a choice in a value conflict. The only way of dealing with these complexities is by combining a plurality of first order methods so that these can be matched with particular situations with the assistance of interpretative and creative reasoning. A unified approach to decision-making that furthermore accepts the necessity of its procedural nature as well as the dialectical relation between holding a value and making a decision manages best to deal with the identified problems.
This paper introduces incommensurability, its potential relevance to populationlevel bioethics, a... more This paper introduces incommensurability, its potential relevance to populationlevel bioethics, and thecontributions to the special issue. It provides an overview of recent research on incommensurability, outlines somereasons to believe in its possibility and relevance, and presents some problems and opportunities that arise onceone accepts that incommensurability is possible.
This paper argues that accepting incommensurability can be a useful step for developing attractiv... more This paper argues that accepting incommensurability can be a useful step for developing attractive hybrid theories to how to distribute scarce health-related resources. If one provides opportunity for distributive options to be incommensurable with respect to substantive criteria, one can hold on to substantive criteria while also providing room for decision processes to play a significant role. The paper also argues that the strategy of accepting incommensurability is preferable to the strategy of having substantive criteria establish sets of options that are equally, explains why incommensurability gives us reason to go hybrid, and argues that reasons grounded in decision processes have properties that make them appropriate as “tiebreakers” in choice situations characterized by incommensurability.
Nationalism has trumped solidarity, resulting in unnecessary loss of life and inequitable access ... more Nationalism has trumped solidarity, resulting in unnecessary loss of life and inequitable access to vaccines and therapeutics. Existing intellectual property (IP) regimens, trade secrets and data rights, under which pharmaceutical firms operate, have also posed obstacles to increasing manufacturing capacity, and ensuring adequate supply, affordable pricing, and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and other health products in lowincome and middle-income countries. We propose: (1) Implementing alternative incentive and funding mechanisms to develop new scientific innovations to address infectious diseases with pandemic potential; (2) Voluntary and involuntary initiatives to overcome IP barriers including pooling IP, sharing data and vesting licences for resulting products in a globally agreed entity; (3) Transparent and accountable collective procurement to enable equitable distribution; (4) Investments in regionally distributed research and development (R&D) capacity and manufacturing, basic health systems to expand equitable access to essential health technologies, and non-discriminatory national distribution; (5) Commitment to strengthen national (and regional) initiatives in the areas of health system development, health research, drug and vaccine manufacturing and regulatory oversight and (6) Good governance of the pandemic prevention, preparedness and response accord. It is important to articulate principles for deals that include reasonable access conditions and transparency in negotiations. We argue for an equitable, transparent, accountable new global agreement to provide rewards for R&D but only on the condition that pharmaceutical companies share the IP rights necessary to produce and distribute them globally. Moreover, if countries commit to collective procurement and fair pricing of resulting products, we argue that we can greatly improve our ability to prepare for and respond to pandemic threats.
This paper argues that cost-effectiveness analysis in the healthcare sector introduces a discrimi... more This paper argues that cost-effectiveness analysis in the healthcare sector introduces a discrimination risk that has thus far been underappreciated and outlines some approaches one can take toward this. It is argued that appropriate standards used in cost-effectiveness analysis in the healthcare sector fail to always fully determine an optimal option, which entails that cost-effectiveness analysis often leaves decision makers with large sets of permissible options. Larger sets of permissible options increase the role of decision makers’ biases, whims and prejudices, which means that the discrimination risk increases. Two ways of mitigating this are identified: tinkering with standards used in the cost-effectiveness analysis and outlining anti-discrimination guidelines for decision makers.
How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as... more How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as the other? Much recent literature on comparability problems focuses on what the appropriate explanation of the phenomenon is. Is it due to vagueness or the possibility of non-conventional comparative relations such as parity? This paper argues that the discussions on how to best explain comparability problems has reached an impasse at which it is hard to make any progress. To advance the discussion we suggest a new classification of comparability problems that focuses on the problems they cause for practical reasoning.
This paper presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteri... more This paper presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteria (e.g. prioritarianism, religious freedom) fail to fully determine what to do. The paper outlines different explanations of why independent criteria sometimes fail to fully determine what to do and illustrates how they can still be used to eliminate ineligible alternatives, but it is argued that the independent criteria cannot ground a reasonable social choice in these situations. To complement independent criteria when they fail to fully determine what to do, it is suggested that society must engage in public deliberation by way of generating new reasons that can determine how to rank the alternatives. It is suggested that the approach to social choice presented in the paper reveals a way of accepting the relevance of independent criteria for social choice without letting go of the idea that the attitudes of affected parties matter.
This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that at least partially focus on well-being lev... more This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that at least partially focus on well-being levels at certain times come in conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism as well as pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices hold that benefits matter more the worse off the beneficiary is at the time when they receive it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and certain pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.
This paper shows that introducing the positive comparative relation parity only helps one block s... more This paper shows that introducing the positive comparative relation parity only helps one block so-called "Spectrum Arguments" in order to avoid their unsavory implications if one specifies parity in a specific way with respect to its persistence. The paper illustrates how parity must both admit of persistency and be weakly non-persistent for parity to block Spectrum Arguments, and identifies some consequences of that discovery for the general debate on Spectrum Arguments, value theory and comparability problems.
How should scarce health-related resources be allocated? This paper argues that values that apply... more How should scarce health-related resources be allocated? This paper argues that values that apply to these decisions fail to always fully determine what we should do. Health maximization and allocation-according-to-need are suggested as two values that should be part of a general theory of how to allocate health-related resources. The "small improvement argument" is used to argue that it is implausible that one alternative is always better, worse or equal to another alternative with respect to these values. Approaches that rely on these values are thus incomplete. To deal with this, it is suggested that we ought to use incomplete theories in a two-step process. Such a process first discards ineligible alternatives, and, second, uses reasons grounded in collective commitments to identify a unique, best alternative in the remaining set.
This paper addresses how to think about the permissibility of introducing deadweight costs (so-ca... more This paper addresses how to think about the permissibility of introducing deadweight costs (so-called "ordeals") on candidate recipients of goods in order to attain better outcomes. The paper introduces some distinctions between different kinds value dimensions that should be taken into account when such judgments are made and draws from the literature on comparisons across different value dimensions in order to canvas what sort of situations one might arguably face when evaluating ordeals. In light of the distinctions drawn and the possibilities canvassed, the paper proceeds to outline what circumstances indicate that one is in which of the possible situations.
A notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory,... more A notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory, and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be generally called nondeterminacy. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that ‘better than’ is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, i.e. impermissible according to standard rational choice criteria.
This paper presents an approach to how to make rational choices in face of cluelessness, focusing... more This paper presents an approach to how to make rational choices in face of cluelessness, focusing on effective altruism. First, it is illustrated how effective altruism faces the challenge of cluelessness, which implies a particular kind of incompleteness which in the paper is called practical incompleteness. Second, it is argued that this is not a reason for proponents of effective altruists to become skeptics, but rather that they ought to adjust their views and accept that these are only able to partially determine what they ought to do. Third, a decision method that can be used together with incomplete normative views such as effective altruism is presented. Fourth, the fact that certain decision rules in combination with incomplete principles entail that dominated sequences of choices are considered rational is highlighted and it is suggested that one plausible approach to avoid this problem is to provide space for agent-centered reasons.
Normative criteria for evaluations of economic and social outcomes are often formulated in terms ... more Normative criteria for evaluations of economic and social outcomes are often formulated in terms of social welfare functions which are essentially and importantly non-satiable. However, there are good reasons to consider certain normative criteria and many policy objectives to be capped, i.e. bounded, and thus satiable provided sufficient resources are made available for their satisfaction. Inspired by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke class of indicators, this paper uses an interdisciplinary approach to develop a model for assessing outcomes in terms of capped objectives based on an understanding of individual shortfalls from the objective, denoted needs. We present an indicator to measure need satisfaction in a population of individuals with heterogeneous needs and highlight an aggregation problem under scarcity. For such situations, we develop three ways in which the indicator can be weighted that reflect respectively concerns over the frequency, depth and severity of the need shortfalls and show that normative evaluations based on these weighting schemes can conflict, yielding mutually inconsistent outcome rankings. The indicator can be adapted to measure a wide variety of phenomena, e.g. health needs, education shortfalls, deprivation, etc., and it is suited for targeting exercises and other policy implementations. In particular, it allows for exogenous weighting schemes, i.e. weights that can incorporate non-shortfall characteristics relevant for the evaluation, e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, etc. The indicator thus enables new ways for researchers to promote and study satiable objectives in a wide variety of contexts relevant to economic and social policy, e.g. human development programs, poverty reduction, healthcare policies, etc.
This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor... more This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reasons to accept normative standpoints that entail a non-transitive better than relation are compelling enough, we ought to revise our decision method rather than the normative standpoints. The paper introduces the most common argument in favor of non-transitive better than relations. It then illustrates that there are different ways to reconceptualize rational choice so that rational choice is possible also when the relevant better than relation is non-transitive. Perennial problems in population ethics give us some reason to believe that sometimes the most relevant better than relation is not transitive (cf. Parfit 1984; Rachels 1998; Temkin 1987, 2012). This has led some to believe that the all-things-considered better than relation is not transitive (cf. Temkin 1987, 2012). Others reject the relevance of non-transitive better than relations and take it to be a conceptual truth that the all-things-considered better than relation is transitive (cf. Broome 2004). One reason to reject better than relations that are non-transitive is that a transitive better than relation seems required for rational choice to be possible. It has been claimed that views that entail Philosophia https://doi.
This paper analyzes approaches to non-determinacy (e.g. incommensurability, indeterminacy, parity... more This paper analyzes approaches to non-determinacy (e.g. incommensurability, indeterminacy, parity) that suggest that one can make justified choices when primary criteria fail to fully determine a best alternative by introducing a secondary criterion. It is shown that these approaches (in the paper called 'two-step models') risk violating Basic Contraction Consistency. Some ways of adjusting two-step models in order to protect against this are addressed, and it is suggested that proponents of two-step models should adopt formal conditions which qualify what counts as a permissible secondary criterion that resemble supervaluationist conditions that qualify what counts as admissible precisifications of vague terms. There are many reasons to believe that criteria available for use to guide choice sometimes fail to fully determine what one ought to do. Consider someone who is committed to investing their money ethically and use this criterion to evaluate and choose between investment options. Is investing in green energy more ethical than investing in projects that mitigate poverty? The first alternative contributes to combatting climate change and might improve the living conditions for a large number of people in the future. The second alternative benefits impoverished 1 I am indebted for helpful suggestions and criticism to
This paper explores an often overlooked distinction in distributive theory
and its importance. Th... more This paper explores an often overlooked distinction in distributive theory and its importance. The paper illustrates that there are at least three ways to interpret substantive proposals of how to distribute goods based on what is at stake for different individuals (or their “claims” or “complaints”) and that the interpretation affects what the proposals recommend. It then argues that each of the interpretations is associated with significant problems since they all seem to violate plausible requirements of rationality. A fourth interpretation of how to understand person-based stakes is introduced, but some questions regarding whether this is compatible with distributive theories that appeal to such stakes are raised.
This thesis examines decision-making in value conflicts, and argues in favour of a unified approa... more This thesis examines decision-making in value conflicts, and argues in favour of a unified approach to decision-making which accepts partial success of a plurality of decision-making methods, and uses these as alternative heuristic tools the appropriateness of which is established and guided by interpretative and creative reasoning. This general conclusion is reached via a number of steps. First, an uncontroversial form of prima facie pluralism is accepted as the point of departure. Second, the diversity of value conflicts as well as the variety of different relations that values can have to each other (the degree of comparability) is established. Third, the impact of representations and the importance of the selection of matter for reasoning are illustrated and named the problem with representation. This, fourthly, undermines the possibilities of monistic value theories to dissolve conflicts, but also means that explanatory models of values need to account for both currencies of values and the way in which representations of the world are created. Such types of explanatory models are dubbed explanatory pluralism. Once the problem with representation and the need for explanatory pluralism are settled, it is shown that prevalent approaches to decision-making (including maximizing methods, subsumption under principles, and through Aristotelian approaches that assign importance to judgement) all have some merit, but all fail to account for the complexities surrounding what it is like to make a choice in a value conflict. The only way of dealing with these complexities is by combining a plurality of first order methods so that these can be matched with particular situations with the assistance of interpretative and creative reasoning. A unified approach to decision-making that furthermore accepts the necessity of its procedural nature as well as the dialectical relation between holding a value and making a decision manages best to deal with the identified problems.
This paper introduces incommensurability, its potential relevance to populationlevel bioethics, a... more This paper introduces incommensurability, its potential relevance to populationlevel bioethics, and thecontributions to the special issue. It provides an overview of recent research on incommensurability, outlines somereasons to believe in its possibility and relevance, and presents some problems and opportunities that arise onceone accepts that incommensurability is possible.
This paper argues that accepting incommensurability can be a useful step for developing attractiv... more This paper argues that accepting incommensurability can be a useful step for developing attractive hybrid theories to how to distribute scarce health-related resources. If one provides opportunity for distributive options to be incommensurable with respect to substantive criteria, one can hold on to substantive criteria while also providing room for decision processes to play a significant role. The paper also argues that the strategy of accepting incommensurability is preferable to the strategy of having substantive criteria establish sets of options that are equally, explains why incommensurability gives us reason to go hybrid, and argues that reasons grounded in decision processes have properties that make them appropriate as “tiebreakers” in choice situations characterized by incommensurability.
Nationalism has trumped solidarity, resulting in unnecessary loss of life and inequitable access ... more Nationalism has trumped solidarity, resulting in unnecessary loss of life and inequitable access to vaccines and therapeutics. Existing intellectual property (IP) regimens, trade secrets and data rights, under which pharmaceutical firms operate, have also posed obstacles to increasing manufacturing capacity, and ensuring adequate supply, affordable pricing, and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and other health products in lowincome and middle-income countries. We propose: (1) Implementing alternative incentive and funding mechanisms to develop new scientific innovations to address infectious diseases with pandemic potential; (2) Voluntary and involuntary initiatives to overcome IP barriers including pooling IP, sharing data and vesting licences for resulting products in a globally agreed entity; (3) Transparent and accountable collective procurement to enable equitable distribution; (4) Investments in regionally distributed research and development (R&D) capacity and manufacturing, basic health systems to expand equitable access to essential health technologies, and non-discriminatory national distribution; (5) Commitment to strengthen national (and regional) initiatives in the areas of health system development, health research, drug and vaccine manufacturing and regulatory oversight and (6) Good governance of the pandemic prevention, preparedness and response accord. It is important to articulate principles for deals that include reasonable access conditions and transparency in negotiations. We argue for an equitable, transparent, accountable new global agreement to provide rewards for R&D but only on the condition that pharmaceutical companies share the IP rights necessary to produce and distribute them globally. Moreover, if countries commit to collective procurement and fair pricing of resulting products, we argue that we can greatly improve our ability to prepare for and respond to pandemic threats.
This paper argues that cost-effectiveness analysis in the healthcare sector introduces a discrimi... more This paper argues that cost-effectiveness analysis in the healthcare sector introduces a discrimination risk that has thus far been underappreciated and outlines some approaches one can take toward this. It is argued that appropriate standards used in cost-effectiveness analysis in the healthcare sector fail to always fully determine an optimal option, which entails that cost-effectiveness analysis often leaves decision makers with large sets of permissible options. Larger sets of permissible options increase the role of decision makers’ biases, whims and prejudices, which means that the discrimination risk increases. Two ways of mitigating this are identified: tinkering with standards used in the cost-effectiveness analysis and outlining anti-discrimination guidelines for decision makers.
How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as... more How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as the other? Much recent literature on comparability problems focuses on what the appropriate explanation of the phenomenon is. Is it due to vagueness or the possibility of non-conventional comparative relations such as parity? This paper argues that the discussions on how to best explain comparability problems has reached an impasse at which it is hard to make any progress. To advance the discussion we suggest a new classification of comparability problems that focuses on the problems they cause for practical reasoning.
This paper presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteri... more This paper presents an approach to how to make reasonable social choices when independent criteria (e.g. prioritarianism, religious freedom) fail to fully determine what to do. The paper outlines different explanations of why independent criteria sometimes fail to fully determine what to do and illustrates how they can still be used to eliminate ineligible alternatives, but it is argued that the independent criteria cannot ground a reasonable social choice in these situations. To complement independent criteria when they fail to fully determine what to do, it is suggested that society must engage in public deliberation by way of generating new reasons that can determine how to rank the alternatives. It is suggested that the approach to social choice presented in the paper reveals a way of accepting the relevance of independent criteria for social choice without letting go of the idea that the attitudes of affected parties matter.
This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that at least partially focus on well-being lev... more This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that at least partially focus on well-being levels at certain times come in conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism as well as pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices hold that benefits matter more the worse off the beneficiary is at the time when they receive it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and certain pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.
This paper shows that introducing the positive comparative relation parity only helps one block s... more This paper shows that introducing the positive comparative relation parity only helps one block so-called "Spectrum Arguments" in order to avoid their unsavory implications if one specifies parity in a specific way with respect to its persistence. The paper illustrates how parity must both admit of persistency and be weakly non-persistent for parity to block Spectrum Arguments, and identifies some consequences of that discovery for the general debate on Spectrum Arguments, value theory and comparability problems.
How should scarce health-related resources be allocated? This paper argues that values that apply... more How should scarce health-related resources be allocated? This paper argues that values that apply to these decisions fail to always fully determine what we should do. Health maximization and allocation-according-to-need are suggested as two values that should be part of a general theory of how to allocate health-related resources. The "small improvement argument" is used to argue that it is implausible that one alternative is always better, worse or equal to another alternative with respect to these values. Approaches that rely on these values are thus incomplete. To deal with this, it is suggested that we ought to use incomplete theories in a two-step process. Such a process first discards ineligible alternatives, and, second, uses reasons grounded in collective commitments to identify a unique, best alternative in the remaining set.
This paper addresses how to think about the permissibility of introducing deadweight costs (so-ca... more This paper addresses how to think about the permissibility of introducing deadweight costs (so-called "ordeals") on candidate recipients of goods in order to attain better outcomes. The paper introduces some distinctions between different kinds value dimensions that should be taken into account when such judgments are made and draws from the literature on comparisons across different value dimensions in order to canvas what sort of situations one might arguably face when evaluating ordeals. In light of the distinctions drawn and the possibilities canvassed, the paper proceeds to outline what circumstances indicate that one is in which of the possible situations.
A notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory,... more A notorious problem that has recently received increased attention in axiology, normative theory, and population ethics is the apparent ubiquity of what can be generally called nondeterminacy. This paper illustrates how nondeterminacy can spawn cyclical rankings. So, accepting that practical reasons can admit of nondeterminacy challenges the widely held idea that ‘better than’ is transitive. As a result, standard approaches to rational choice under nondeterminacy fail to be action-guiding, since in some situations all options are dominated, i.e. impermissible according to standard rational choice criteria.
This paper presents an approach to how to make rational choices in face of cluelessness, focusing... more This paper presents an approach to how to make rational choices in face of cluelessness, focusing on effective altruism. First, it is illustrated how effective altruism faces the challenge of cluelessness, which implies a particular kind of incompleteness which in the paper is called practical incompleteness. Second, it is argued that this is not a reason for proponents of effective altruists to become skeptics, but rather that they ought to adjust their views and accept that these are only able to partially determine what they ought to do. Third, a decision method that can be used together with incomplete normative views such as effective altruism is presented. Fourth, the fact that certain decision rules in combination with incomplete principles entail that dominated sequences of choices are considered rational is highlighted and it is suggested that one plausible approach to avoid this problem is to provide space for agent-centered reasons.
Normative criteria for evaluations of economic and social outcomes are often formulated in terms ... more Normative criteria for evaluations of economic and social outcomes are often formulated in terms of social welfare functions which are essentially and importantly non-satiable. However, there are good reasons to consider certain normative criteria and many policy objectives to be capped, i.e. bounded, and thus satiable provided sufficient resources are made available for their satisfaction. Inspired by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke class of indicators, this paper uses an interdisciplinary approach to develop a model for assessing outcomes in terms of capped objectives based on an understanding of individual shortfalls from the objective, denoted needs. We present an indicator to measure need satisfaction in a population of individuals with heterogeneous needs and highlight an aggregation problem under scarcity. For such situations, we develop three ways in which the indicator can be weighted that reflect respectively concerns over the frequency, depth and severity of the need shortfalls and show that normative evaluations based on these weighting schemes can conflict, yielding mutually inconsistent outcome rankings. The indicator can be adapted to measure a wide variety of phenomena, e.g. health needs, education shortfalls, deprivation, etc., and it is suited for targeting exercises and other policy implementations. In particular, it allows for exogenous weighting schemes, i.e. weights that can incorporate non-shortfall characteristics relevant for the evaluation, e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, etc. The indicator thus enables new ways for researchers to promote and study satiable objectives in a wide variety of contexts relevant to economic and social policy, e.g. human development programs, poverty reduction, healthcare policies, etc.
This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor... more This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reasons to accept normative standpoints that entail a non-transitive better than relation are compelling enough, we ought to revise our decision method rather than the normative standpoints. The paper introduces the most common argument in favor of non-transitive better than relations. It then illustrates that there are different ways to reconceptualize rational choice so that rational choice is possible also when the relevant better than relation is non-transitive. Perennial problems in population ethics give us some reason to believe that sometimes the most relevant better than relation is not transitive (cf. Parfit 1984; Rachels 1998; Temkin 1987, 2012). This has led some to believe that the all-things-considered better than relation is not transitive (cf. Temkin 1987, 2012). Others reject the relevance of non-transitive better than relations and take it to be a conceptual truth that the all-things-considered better than relation is transitive (cf. Broome 2004). One reason to reject better than relations that are non-transitive is that a transitive better than relation seems required for rational choice to be possible. It has been claimed that views that entail Philosophia https://doi.
This paper analyzes approaches to non-determinacy (e.g. incommensurability, indeterminacy, parity... more This paper analyzes approaches to non-determinacy (e.g. incommensurability, indeterminacy, parity) that suggest that one can make justified choices when primary criteria fail to fully determine a best alternative by introducing a secondary criterion. It is shown that these approaches (in the paper called 'two-step models') risk violating Basic Contraction Consistency. Some ways of adjusting two-step models in order to protect against this are addressed, and it is suggested that proponents of two-step models should adopt formal conditions which qualify what counts as a permissible secondary criterion that resemble supervaluationist conditions that qualify what counts as admissible precisifications of vague terms. There are many reasons to believe that criteria available for use to guide choice sometimes fail to fully determine what one ought to do. Consider someone who is committed to investing their money ethically and use this criterion to evaluate and choose between investment options. Is investing in green energy more ethical than investing in projects that mitigate poverty? The first alternative contributes to combatting climate change and might improve the living conditions for a large number of people in the future. The second alternative benefits impoverished 1 I am indebted for helpful suggestions and criticism to
This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods... more This paper introduces a condition for rational choice that states that accepting decision methods and normative theories that sometimes entail that the act of choosing a maximal alternative renders this alternative non-maximal is irrational. The paper illustrates how certain distributive theories that ascribe importance to what the status quo is violate this condition and argues that they thereby should be rejected.
In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐ conve... more In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐ conventional comparative relations (e.g., " parity, " " imprecise equality, " " incommensurability ") cannot exist. Broome's argument has faced a lot of scrutiny and a certain type of counterexample has been used to undermine it. Most of the counterexamples focus on the Collapsing Principle which plays a central role in Broome's argument. In this article we will take a closer look at the most common type of counterexample and propose how to adjust the Collapsing Principle in order to avoid objections based on these counterexamples. We argue that a weaker version of the Collapsing Principle is not susceptible to the classical counterexamples. Furthermore, after an explorative discussion about the intuitions behind the original principle, we show that this weaker formulation is at least as intuitive as the principle suggested by Broome.
In: What About the Family? Practices of Responsibility in Care (Edited by Hilde Lindemann, Janice McLaughlin, and Marian A. Verkerk), 2019
Standard models of person- and family-centeredness tell us little about how to involve family mem... more Standard models of person- and family-centeredness tell us little about how to involve family members in care similar to that of diabetes. Typically, the models focus on trying to engage and educate patients and their family to decide among and implement ready-made options, often in a hospital setting. These models are thus poorly equipped to address problems where, like diabetes, the illness requires large portions of self-care and life-style adjustment by patients with vulnerable decision-capacities in a mostly outpatient context. We have elsewhere proposed an alternative approach more attuned to such circumstances, aiming less for rational decision-making in consultation meetings, and more at empowering patients' long-term capacities to manage their condition domestically. This “counselling, self-care, adherence (CSA) approach” offers a look at the role that family can play to improve these types of care. We will illustrate how family members can assist in the care of teenagers with diabetes, but that there are also serious risks actualized by such involvement. In particular, we will highlight ethical complications that arise when the role of a family member is changed from “parent” to “care provider.”
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Books by Anders Herlitz
and its importance. The paper illustrates that there are at least three ways
to interpret substantive proposals of how to distribute goods based on what
is at stake for different individuals (or their “claims” or “complaints”) and
that the interpretation affects what the proposals recommend. It then
argues that each of the interpretations is associated with significant
problems since they all seem to violate plausible requirements of
rationality. A fourth interpretation of how to understand person-based
stakes is introduced, but some questions regarding whether this is
compatible with distributive theories that appeal to such stakes are raised.
Papers by Anders Herlitz
and its importance. The paper illustrates that there are at least three ways
to interpret substantive proposals of how to distribute goods based on what
is at stake for different individuals (or their “claims” or “complaints”) and
that the interpretation affects what the proposals recommend. It then
argues that each of the interpretations is associated with significant
problems since they all seem to violate plausible requirements of
rationality. A fourth interpretation of how to understand person-based
stakes is introduced, but some questions regarding whether this is
compatible with distributive theories that appeal to such stakes are raised.