outright by the Bush administration, the is a significant reference document and proponents of... more outright by the Bush administration, the is a significant reference document and proponents of multilateral arms control are likely to use it as a basis for future discussions and proposals. 4 Definitions, lists, criteria and thresholds The 's mandate required it to consider definitions of terms and objectives 'where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the convention'. 5 Some delegations resisted any definition of key terms contained in the convention, Efforts to achieve a BWC protocol December 1991 Third Review Conference establishes . 1992-94 examines possible verification measures for the . The final report of the group concludes that 'some potential verification measures, including both off-site and on-site measures, could provide information which could be useful for the main objective of the Biological Weapons Convention'. September 1994 A Special Conference of state parties mandates the to draft a legally binding protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve implementation of convention. January 1995 The begins to meet in Geneva under the chairmanship of Hungarian Ambassador Tibor Tóth. Meetings are organised in four substantive areas, assisted by Friends of the Chair: definitions of terms and objective criteria; compliance measures; confidence-building and transparency measures; and effective and full implementation of Article . July 1997 At 7th session of the , Chairman introduces 'Rolling Text' of draft protocol.
This report is an outcome of a project sponsored by the Acronym institute and and funded b... more This report is an outcome of a project sponsored by the Acronym institute and and funded by the W. Alton Jones Foundation. Much of the research was done at the Seventeenth Session of the Ad Hoc Group (22 November-10 December 1999), where I interviewed Ad Hoc Group participants from many delegations. I collected and confirmed data from these interviews on the basis that the information obtained was non-attributable; I am very grateful for the time and patience of those who spoke to me. I would also like to thank warmly the following people for their ongoing support and for their careful reading of drafts of the report:
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (... more The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a ch...
International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to ful... more International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to fulfill its purpose induced the treaty parties to explore the means to promote compliance with the treaty and to detect noncompliance. In September 1995, the Conference on Disarmament hosted a Special Conference to discuss the findings of thead hocgroup of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This article analyzes the work of the Special Conference and the most contentious issues raised there, especially (1) objective criteria for permitted and prohibited activities; (2) the concept of a threshold quantity of agent; (3) technical assistance to States Parties; (4) export controls; (5) the use of a list of agents and toxins for facility declarations; (6) on-site measures to promote compliance; (7) the intrusiveness of these measures; and (8) the protection of sensitive information. Ultimately, the conference d...
The article by Peter Barss is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the investiga... more The article by Peter Barss is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the investigation of the use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons (CBW).1 He constructs detailed procedures to investigate allegations of the use of any of these weapons from the perspective of epidemiology theory. Barss reviews the investigations of the alleged use of toxin weapons (“yellow rain”) in Laos and Cambodia, the use of chemical weapons by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war, and the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against its own Kurdish population. He argues persuasively that these inquiries would have been conducted more effectively if the teams had followed standard procedures for field investigations according to epidemiology theory.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of ... more The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance of the treaty and to grapple with its weaknesses. This was the third such conference convened since the treaty went into force in 1975. The relatively low level of participation in the Third Review Conference was not the result of any protest, but most likely a reflection of disinterest or neglect.
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are diffi... more The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effective” verification and argues that the treaty falls under the definition of adequate verification in the United States. For other countries, however, the lack of verification measures is of greater concern. The article describes measures that should be added to the BWC to detect violations and promote compliance with the treaty. These include improved methods of resolving allegations of noncompliance, increased reporting requirements for activities permitted under the treaty, greater openness in biological research, and inspections of laborato...
Page 1. Commentaries: Chemical/Biological Terrorism The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo: A New Paradig... more Page 1. Commentaries: Chemical/Biological Terrorism The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo: A New Paradigm for Terror? Marie Isabelle Chevrier University of Texas at Dallas, USA Ican remember exactly where I was when I learned ...
Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 2000
Negotiated during the Cold War, the issue of verification and the Biological Weapons Convention (... more Negotiated during the Cold War, the issue of verification and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has a long and intricate history. France, for instance, was unwilling to sign the BWC initially because “it does not include any satisfactory provision for international control” [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1972: 758]. The treaty lacked such provisions because the political conditions did not exist at the time which would have permitted countries to conduct on-site inspections within each other’s borders.
Marie Isabelle Chevrier is Associate Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at... more Marie Isabelle Chevrier is Associate Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. She was the Associate Director of the Harvard/Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare, Armaments, and Arms Limitation at The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1997-1998. Iris Hunger is a Ph.D. candidate at the Technical University, Darmstadt, Germany. She currently works part-time as a professional assistant to the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BTWC in Geneva.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1993
The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined.... more The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined. A country's decision to acquire such weapons is analyzed by means of matrix analysis, separating the effects of three parameters: The offensive capability of the aggressor, the retaliatory capability of the target, and the military purpose(s) to which the weapons would be applied. The research identifies those circumstances wherein BTW are most likely to be used. The findings have implications for the type of arms control regime that should be implemented to minimize the probability that these weapons will be used, and to control their proliferation. Specifically, the author makes recommendations concerning proposals to promote compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 2011
The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an o... more The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an opportunity to modernize the treaty to better address the challenges of the 21st century. The key to this modernization is to redesign the treaty's Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), the only formal mechanism for increasing transparency and demonstrating compliance with the treaty, to address changes in the global scientific, health, and security environments since the end of the Cold War. The scope of the CBMs should be expanded beyond state-run biological warfare programs to encompass a broader array of threats to global security, such as biological terrorism, laboratory accidents, dual-use research, and disease pandemics. Modernizing the CBM mechanism to take into account these new risks would extend the transparency-enhancing benefits of CBMs to a range of new and important topics, such as biosafety, laboratory biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight; make the CBMs and the treaty itself more relevant to the concerns and priorities of more states; and build on progress made during the recent series of intersessional meetings. To accomplish this, the CBMs need to be revised to shift their focus from hardware, the dual-use capabilities relevant to the treaty, to software, the political and legal institutions that govern the development and use of these capabilities. A more modern CBM mechanism should encourage greater participation in the confidence-building process, improve international cooperation against the full spectrum of biological risks, and promote the goal of universal membership in the treaty.
outright by the Bush administration, the is a significant reference document and proponents of... more outright by the Bush administration, the is a significant reference document and proponents of multilateral arms control are likely to use it as a basis for future discussions and proposals. 4 Definitions, lists, criteria and thresholds The 's mandate required it to consider definitions of terms and objectives 'where relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the convention'. 5 Some delegations resisted any definition of key terms contained in the convention, Efforts to achieve a BWC protocol December 1991 Third Review Conference establishes . 1992-94 examines possible verification measures for the . The final report of the group concludes that 'some potential verification measures, including both off-site and on-site measures, could provide information which could be useful for the main objective of the Biological Weapons Convention'. September 1994 A Special Conference of state parties mandates the to draft a legally binding protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve implementation of convention. January 1995 The begins to meet in Geneva under the chairmanship of Hungarian Ambassador Tibor Tóth. Meetings are organised in four substantive areas, assisted by Friends of the Chair: definitions of terms and objective criteria; compliance measures; confidence-building and transparency measures; and effective and full implementation of Article . July 1997 At 7th session of the , Chairman introduces 'Rolling Text' of draft protocol.
This report is an outcome of a project sponsored by the Acronym institute and and funded b... more This report is an outcome of a project sponsored by the Acronym institute and and funded by the W. Alton Jones Foundation. Much of the research was done at the Seventeenth Session of the Ad Hoc Group (22 November-10 December 1999), where I interviewed Ad Hoc Group participants from many delegations. I collected and confirmed data from these interviews on the basis that the information obtained was non-attributable; I am very grateful for the time and patience of those who spoke to me. I would also like to thank warmly the following people for their ongoing support and for their careful reading of drafts of the report:
The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (... more The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a ch...
International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to ful... more International concern with the ability of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to fulfill its purpose induced the treaty parties to explore the means to promote compliance with the treaty and to detect noncompliance. In September 1995, the Conference on Disarmament hosted a Special Conference to discuss the findings of thead hocgroup of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This article analyzes the work of the Special Conference and the most contentious issues raised there, especially (1) objective criteria for permitted and prohibited activities; (2) the concept of a threshold quantity of agent; (3) technical assistance to States Parties; (4) export controls; (5) the use of a list of agents and toxins for facility declarations; (6) on-site measures to promote compliance; (7) the intrusiveness of these measures; and (8) the protection of sensitive information. Ultimately, the conference d...
The article by Peter Barss is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the investiga... more The article by Peter Barss is a valuable contribution to the existing literature on the investigation of the use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons (CBW).1 He constructs detailed procedures to investigate allegations of the use of any of these weapons from the perspective of epidemiology theory. Barss reviews the investigations of the alleged use of toxin weapons (“yellow rain”) in Laos and Cambodia, the use of chemical weapons by both sides in the Iran-Iraq war, and the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against its own Kurdish population. He argues persuasively that these inquiries would have been conducted more effectively if the teams had followed standard procedures for field investigations according to epidemiology theory.
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of ... more The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 bans the development and possession of biological and toxin weapons. Yet the threat that a country may acquire and use biological and toxin weapons (BTW) persists—not all nations are party to the treaty, and doubts remain about the compliance of countries who are. Seventy of the 118 nations who are parties to the treaty met in Geneva from September 9 to 27, 1991, to review the performance of the treaty and to grapple with its weaknesses. This was the third such conference convened since the treaty went into force in 1975. The relatively low level of participation in the Third Review Conference was not the result of any protest, but most likely a reflection of disinterest or neglect.
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are diffi... more The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is widely regarded as a treaty whose provisions are difficult to verify because of the paucity of measures to verify compliance within the treaty framework and the nature of the weapons themselves. Advances in biotechnology and their effect on the perceived military utility of biological weapons have focused international attention on this issue. This article examines the concepts of “adequate” and “effective” verification and argues that the treaty falls under the definition of adequate verification in the United States. For other countries, however, the lack of verification measures is of greater concern. The article describes measures that should be added to the BWC to detect violations and promote compliance with the treaty. These include improved methods of resolving allegations of noncompliance, increased reporting requirements for activities permitted under the treaty, greater openness in biological research, and inspections of laborato...
Page 1. Commentaries: Chemical/Biological Terrorism The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo: A New Paradig... more Page 1. Commentaries: Chemical/Biological Terrorism The Aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo: A New Paradigm for Terror? Marie Isabelle Chevrier University of Texas at Dallas, USA Ican remember exactly where I was when I learned ...
Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 2000
Negotiated during the Cold War, the issue of verification and the Biological Weapons Convention (... more Negotiated during the Cold War, the issue of verification and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has a long and intricate history. France, for instance, was unwilling to sign the BWC initially because “it does not include any satisfactory provision for international control” [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1972: 758]. The treaty lacked such provisions because the political conditions did not exist at the time which would have permitted countries to conduct on-site inspections within each other’s borders.
Marie Isabelle Chevrier is Associate Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at... more Marie Isabelle Chevrier is Associate Professor of Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. She was the Associate Director of the Harvard/Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Warfare, Armaments, and Arms Limitation at The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1997-1998. Iris Hunger is a Ph.D. candidate at the Technical University, Darmstadt, Germany. She currently works part-time as a professional assistant to the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the BTWC in Geneva.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1993
The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined.... more The arguments for and against the acquisition of biological and toxin weapons (BTW) are examined. A country's decision to acquire such weapons is analyzed by means of matrix analysis, separating the effects of three parameters: The offensive capability of the aggressor, the retaliatory capability of the target, and the military purpose(s) to which the weapons would be applied. The research identifies those circumstances wherein BTW are most likely to be used. The findings have implications for the type of arms control regime that should be implemented to minimize the probability that these weapons will be used, and to control their proliferation. Specifically, the author makes recommendations concerning proposals to promote compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 2011
The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an o... more The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an opportunity to modernize the treaty to better address the challenges of the 21st century. The key to this modernization is to redesign the treaty's Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), the only formal mechanism for increasing transparency and demonstrating compliance with the treaty, to address changes in the global scientific, health, and security environments since the end of the Cold War. The scope of the CBMs should be expanded beyond state-run biological warfare programs to encompass a broader array of threats to global security, such as biological terrorism, laboratory accidents, dual-use research, and disease pandemics. Modernizing the CBM mechanism to take into account these new risks would extend the transparency-enhancing benefits of CBMs to a range of new and important topics, such as biosafety, laboratory biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight; make the CBMs and the treaty itself more relevant to the concerns and priorities of more states; and build on progress made during the recent series of intersessional meetings. To accomplish this, the CBMs need to be revised to shift their focus from hardware, the dual-use capabilities relevant to the treaty, to software, the political and legal institutions that govern the development and use of these capabilities. A more modern CBM mechanism should encourage greater participation in the confidence-building process, improve international cooperation against the full spectrum of biological risks, and promote the goal of universal membership in the treaty.
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