Papers by Jean Pascal Zanders
Journal of Strategic Trade Control, 2024
Controlling the development, utilization, or transfer of dual-use technologies underlying non-con... more Controlling the development, utilization, or transfer of dual-use technologies underlying non-conventional weaponry has become a significant issue from a disarmament and non-proliferation perspective. However, evidence suggests that stakeholder communities often lack awareness of technology transfer risks and their responsibilities in preventing or mitigating their consequences.
This article examines the case of the master’s course on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-relevant dual-use technology transfer controls developed within the framework of the European Union- funded Targeted Initiatives on “Export Controls of Dual-Use Materials and Technologies” as part of efforts to address these challenges. The paper outlines the process of developing and implementing this modular course, successfully implemented in several former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Southeast Europe.
Emphasizing the preference for education over more traditional training approaches, the article discusses how the course aims to enhance awareness and foster responsible behavior among stakeholders. In addition to assisting academic institutions in setting up the courses and advancing knowledge among professors, significant effort was invested in engaging decision-makers and various stakeholder communities to broaden the educational initiative’s foundations. Under the organizing theme of building a culture of responsibility, these interactions proved to have significant educational value and contributed to the core ambitions of local ownership and sustainability.
In conclusion, the article argues that sustained educational efforts and collaborative initiatives are essential for addressing challenges posed by dual-use technology transfers and contributing to global security and non- proliferation efforts.
The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges, 2024
The European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium held its 11th Consultative Meetin... more The European Union Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium held its 11th Consultative Meeting in Brussels on 15 and 16 September 2022. Its central theme was the “Topicality of multilateral export control regimes”. On the second day, one of the four breakout sessions addressed the Australia Group, an informal arrangement coordinating technology transfer controls relating to dual-use agents and equipment with potential relevance for developing and producing chemical and biological weapons.
Introducers were Ms Esmée de Bruin (Netherlands), Dr Mónica Chinchilla (Spain) and Ms Élisande Nexon, PharmD (France). I had the honour of moderating the session.
The three speakers have different backgrounds, thus giving the session a distinct multidisciplinary flavour. Ms de Bruin, focusing on the effectiveness of export control regimes in general, approached the Australia Group from economic and international law angles. Dr Chinchilla, an expert in international law, saw in the practice of the Australia Group the emergence of soft law complementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a near-universal global disarmament treaty. Ms Nexon, a Doctor of Pharmacy with expertise in biosecurity and biosafety and arms control and disarmament, addressed challenges to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) posed by the rapid advances in life sciences and biotechnology industries and how the Australia Group can help mitigating possible security risks. Their introductions engaged the approximately twenty session participants in rich discussions.
The present publication by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique is the direct result of this breakout session. The different angles to the analysis of the Australia Group with reference to the BTWC and the CWC revealed interesting viewpoints about how an informal arrangement relates to formal and quasi-universal treaties comprehensively banning two discrete weapon categories. Other export control arrangements are either standalone initiatives (e.g. the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Wassenaar Arrangement) or, in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, linked to a non-proliferation rather than disarmament treaty. One of the central questions that came to the fore was whether to try and achieve greater integration and coordination among the four export control arrangements. If so, how might this intent affect the Australia Group that had adjusted its mission to support both global disarmament treaties? The BTWC and the CWC each have an article on international cooperation, development and scientific and technology exchanges for peaceful purposes. During the 1990s and 2000s, many developing countries came to view the Australia Group’s activities as incompatible with the disarmament objectives.
The chapters in this publication are not the presentations made in September 2022. Instead, the authors reviewed their introductions in light of the discussions. They addressed how the Australia Group blends with the broader practice of responsible trade in dual-use commodities to prevent weapon proliferation while supporting the core disarmament goals of the BTWC and the CWC. The question relates to regime development, which in turn implies how the Australia Group can address challenges to its internal decision-making, future objectives and the ambition of global standard-setting concerning the adaptability of both conventions to emerging issues, on the one hand, and the work and experiences of the other export control arrangements given convergences in security matters, on the other hand.
An introductory chapter sets the stage for this discussion by describing the origin of the Australia Group, how its practices evolved, and how with the end of the Cold War the recasting of weapon control problems in terms of proliferation affected the CWC during the negotiation end game and its early implementation.
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.), The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Paris, April 2024), 54p. (PDF file)
The use of chemical weapons (CW) in the war between Iraq and Iran in 1980-88 revealed that severa... more The use of chemical weapons (CW) in the war between Iraq and Iran in 1980-88 revealed that several countries outside the East-West confrontation had acquired chemical and possibly biological weapons (BW). At the same time, the likelihood of outside military intervention into regional conflicts, such as the 1990-91 Gulf War, increased after the end of the cold war. The realization that expeditionary forces could face an army with chemical or biological weapons heightened international awareness of the dangers of proliferation. The dimension of sub-state proliferation was added to after the first large-scale indiscriminate terrorist attack with CW in the Tokyo underground system in March 1995. Although the issue may appear to be of relatively recent origin, the spread of chemical weapons actually started in World War I and has continued ever since. The Allies, whose chemical industry was generally less developed than that in Imperial Germany, soon began sharing knowledge and expertise on offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare and exchanging production capabilities for certain chemicals. In addition, France and Great Britain supplied other Allies whose territory was occupied, such as Belgium, or who had an insufficiently developed CW production base, such as the United States, with chemical warfare munitions. After World War I most major belligerents scaled back their offensive CW programmes. But it was not the number of states with a chemical capacity, but the size of the CW arsenals that was the chief security concern. A significant imbalance offered the CW possessor the prospect of a swift, decisive victory and therefore contributed to the likelihood of war. For this reason some major powers viewed the sale of chemicals, technology and factories to smaller or less-advanced states as beneficial to their own national security. The transactions involved direct government-to-government dealings. On the eve of World War II many European second-tier powers maintained limited offensive CW programmes and, in doing so, contributed to the continent-wide patchwork of overlapping balances of power. In addition, Italy's use of CW in Abyssinia (1935-36) and the worsening political climate in Europe gave a major impetus to offensive and defensive CW programmes. At no other point in history have so many countries been known to possess chemical weapons. Biological weapons took a little longer to gain credibility. The only experience from the Great War was German sabotage with pathogens against livestock in the United States destined for Europe and the Middle East. Thereafter, a better understanding of disease transmission in the 1920s and 1930s combined with the dramatic experiences of the Spanish Flu epidemic at the end of World War I increased concerns about biological warfare. Based on essentially faulty intelligence and fears of vulnerability, several countries began to look seriously at the feasibility of biological warfare and the suitability of certain pathogens for weaponization. Germany's research and development remained splintered throughout World War II and did not lead to a useful weapon. More concerted efforts in Canada, Great Britain and the United States led to the three countries pooling their resources. However, apart from a limited British capability to retaliate with anthrax against German cattle, the Allies failed to produce an operational offensive biological weapon. The only country with a dedicated long-term offensive BW programme was Japan. Its research and development of agents and dissemination devices began in the early 1930s and lasted until the end of the war. The programme was also based on human experimentation in occupied China. On several occasions Japanese troops released biological warfare agents against Chinese villages and soldiers. Postwar research and production of offensive CBW was continued in the Soviet Union and the USA. The new nerve agents, which the Germans had discovered in the late 1930s while researching pesticides, rekindled their interest in chemical warfare. Most secondary powers, however, gradually abandoned their offensive CBW programmes to concentrate on chemical and biological defence, protection and prophylaxis. The number of countries with offensive CW capabilities thus
African Security Review, 2005
The threat of biological disease has been significantly raised in the public consciousness in the... more The threat of biological disease has been significantly raised in the public consciousness in the past few years. Where previously state-run programmes were the most significant concern, increasingly policy makers are focusing on the threat that access to biological weapons by non-state actors can pose. The establishment and maintenance of effective regimes to prevent the spread of biological weapons requires efforts by different actors at different levels. Civil society organizations can play an important role in mobilising public awareness and increasing knowledge on preventing the spread of biological weapons. The establishment of a specific network to further these aims - the Bioweapons Prevention Project - has given civil society organizations a clear focus and direction for their efforts.
The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origi... more The changing relationship between the West and the Soviet Union contributed directly to the origination and unfolding of the Kuwait crisis. The rapidly receding threat from the East also demanded a major review of the Western military posture on the one hand and political consultation between governments and organisations on the other. Not in the least, institutional survival of many structures, both active or in virtual hibernation, was at stake. The second Gulf war caught them unprepared to play a significant role. In 1990, the new Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals had two platforms for consultations between East and West, namely the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Neither contributed significantly to the management of the Kuwait crisis. In fact, that management was - except for the USSR’s specific role - characterised by a US-led division of labour with each Western country participating individually. Even the United Kingdom and France had little choice but to place themselves under American command. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) played an atypical role during the entire crisis. Created specifically to meet military aggression from Communist East Europe, its application of force was territorially limited. NATO-led operations were thus only conceivable in case of Iraqi attacks against Turkey and then only to restore Turkey’s territorial integrity. Nonetheless, divisions assigned to NATO and stationed in Germany participated in the liberation of Kuwait. Always remaining under national control, their transfer to the Gulf, in a sense, compared with Washington’s relocation of troops and equipment to the Vietnam theatre of war more than two decades earlier. Bilateral agreements with NATO partners furthermore enabled the United States to mount air strikes against Iraq from within Europe. By contrast, the smaller European NATO member-states had to coordinate their military contribution within the West European Union (WEU), whose charter did not impose any territorial limitations on interventions. If anything, the Gulf crisis proved that the complexity of consultations among the different, but partially overlapping political and security organisations may constitute a serious handicap should Europe ever be forced to respond decisively to an external security threat.
Nature, May 1, 2001
Scrapped: left, UN weapons inspectors in 1996 destroy the Al-Hakam building in Iraq, which could ... more Scrapped: left, UN weapons inspectors in 1996 destroy the Al-Hakam building in Iraq, which could have been used to produce biological weapons. Above, a decommissioned Russian nuclear submarine in the Arctic base of Severomorsk in 1998.
On 16 March 1990, the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and the Groupe de Recherche et d'I... more On 16 March 1990, the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and the Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix (GRIP) organized the 2nd Annual Conference on Chemical Warfare on the theme: "Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Policy Issues Pending an International Treaty". The crisis over the chemical production plant at Rabta in Libya (1989) pointed to the alarming extent of the problem of chemical weapons proliferation. To curb the transfer of production facilities and raw materials for chemical weapons, export controls are needed on international and national levels. The accent of the Brussels conference was on problems involving the implementation of such control mechanisms. The first part of the present publication analyses the mechanisms behind the Imhausen/Rabta affair and the way in which the government of the Federal Republic of Germany reacted to international pressure. Both in the Federal Republic and in Belgium new export controls have been promulgated since the conference. These developments explain why these proceedings have not been published earlier, as we wanted to include the latest legislative measures. We are extremely grateful to Joachim Badelt of the Berghof-Stiftung in Berlin for writing - at short notice - the second chapter After the Imhausen/Rabta Case late last year. In the second part of this book, which contains the actual proceedings of the conference, the chapter Belgium as a Transiting Country in the Imhausen-Rabta Affair has also been updated.
This cartoon set was produced as part of a project selected by London Metropolitan University for... more This cartoon set was produced as part of a project selected by London Metropolitan University for funding via the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) Strategic Priorities Fund which is part of a wider initiative on Strengthening the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. This cartoon set has also been produced in multiple languages. For more information, see our project website.
International Journal of Infectious Diseases, Oct 1, 2004
Bulletin of peace proposals, 1990
Contemporary Security Policy, May 4, 2015
I have accepted the nuclear winter scenario ever since the possibility was first raised in the mi... more I have accepted the nuclear winter scenario ever since the possibility was first raised in the mid 1980s by eminent scientists like Paul R. Ehrlich, Carl Sagan and many others. They also launched the debate a few years after Luis and Walter Alvarez suggested that a massive meteor strike killed off the dinosaurs some 65 million years ago. This theory contained many elements that were to become central in a nuclear winter scenario. They also launched the debate when the Reagan administration was openly considering limited nuclear warfare. Like Seth Baum I accept that nuclear weapons still occupy a central position in the military doctrine of several nations and that, as a consequence, their removal from military arsenals is not a given. Alternative options to security must therefore be identified and developed. After all, nobody will be served well by an increased risk of non-nuclear war. If armament is about the assimilation of a particular type of technology into military doctrine, then disarmament’s main purpose is to remove it again. Disarmament is the continuation of security policies through alternative, non-prohibited means. These may include diplomacy, alliance politics, security guarantees and reliance on verification tools, but also the replacement of the arms category by other types of non-prohibited weaponry. In an arms control setting, in which levels of armament are managed by mutual consent, reductions can similarly be compensated by armament in other areas. Baum explores the latter track. However, he errs by entertaining options that are unambiguously proscribed under international law His concerns about the future of humanity have led him to consider chemical or biological weapons as deterrence substitutes. The suggestion implies an intellectual acceptance of the prior abrogation of the Biological and Toxin and Chemical Weapons Conventions in order to avoid the (hypothetical) risk of a nuclear winter. This clearly sits awkward with him, but his overwhelming fears for the future of humankind prevent him from rejecting the thought.
Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Oct 1, 2003
Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) bear a moral opprobrium as they are widely viewed as indisc... more Chemical and biological weapons (CBW) bear a moral opprobrium as they are widely viewed as indiscriminate agents of unnecessary suffering. This immorality is often presented as an article of faith. However, the belief system cannot be the sole legal, political and social reality, as otherwise CBW should logically have been banished a long time ago. While there is a long history of legal and social constraints against these weapons, such constraints are never absolute. Three aspects that have affected the application of the norm are: the lack of perceived equality between warring parties, competing legal doctrines, and the impact of technological innovation on norms. Since the social context in which the norms are developed and applied changes continually, it becomes clear that these norms must be continuously redefined in order to remain relevant. The historical analysis also shows that existing international norms have never placed the professional scientists engaging in CBW-related activities in either a moral or an ethical vacuum. Indeed, activities permitted to states under international law and custom have provided ample justification for scientists to work on CBW in support of national security. Until today, national security considerations place a great strain on the global disarmament treaties governing the development, possession and use of CBW.
Journal for peace and nuclear disarmament, Jun 23, 2022
In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional ar... more In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It followed the acceptance of Egypt’s proposal for a new conference by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 December 2018. The new Conference derives its mandate from the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides expanding the original idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) to one that would also cover CBW, it also requires the regional disarmament initiative to be verifiable. This enlarged scope for regional disarmament in the Middle East presents significant challenges for the negotiating parties. While the NWFZ primarily addressed security relationships with Israel, chemical weapons and their past and present use in the Middle East affect other regional fault lines. This article traces how CBW were inserted into the objective of a NWFZ for the Middle East. It then discusses the legal regimes governing CBW, their status in the region and implications for a regional zone exempt from non-conventional weaponry. The demand for effective verification poses multiple challenges because of the processes in the CBW disarmament treaties. The paper finally discusses steps the Conference could consider for building trust and confidence while negotiating the regional treaty framework.
The Nonproliferation Review, Oct 12, 2011
... For reasons first articulated before the BWC was negotiated, devising verification procedures... more ... For reasons first articulated before the BWC was negotiated, devising verification procedures for the bioweapons ban remains a ... 2545, <www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA12-TuckerZilinskas.pdf>; and Margaret Kosal, Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense ...
The Nonproliferation Review, Sep 1, 1996
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Papers by Jean Pascal Zanders
This article examines the case of the master’s course on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-relevant dual-use technology transfer controls developed within the framework of the European Union- funded Targeted Initiatives on “Export Controls of Dual-Use Materials and Technologies” as part of efforts to address these challenges. The paper outlines the process of developing and implementing this modular course, successfully implemented in several former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Southeast Europe.
Emphasizing the preference for education over more traditional training approaches, the article discusses how the course aims to enhance awareness and foster responsible behavior among stakeholders. In addition to assisting academic institutions in setting up the courses and advancing knowledge among professors, significant effort was invested in engaging decision-makers and various stakeholder communities to broaden the educational initiative’s foundations. Under the organizing theme of building a culture of responsibility, these interactions proved to have significant educational value and contributed to the core ambitions of local ownership and sustainability.
In conclusion, the article argues that sustained educational efforts and collaborative initiatives are essential for addressing challenges posed by dual-use technology transfers and contributing to global security and non- proliferation efforts.
Introducers were Ms Esmée de Bruin (Netherlands), Dr Mónica Chinchilla (Spain) and Ms Élisande Nexon, PharmD (France). I had the honour of moderating the session.
The three speakers have different backgrounds, thus giving the session a distinct multidisciplinary flavour. Ms de Bruin, focusing on the effectiveness of export control regimes in general, approached the Australia Group from economic and international law angles. Dr Chinchilla, an expert in international law, saw in the practice of the Australia Group the emergence of soft law complementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a near-universal global disarmament treaty. Ms Nexon, a Doctor of Pharmacy with expertise in biosecurity and biosafety and arms control and disarmament, addressed challenges to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) posed by the rapid advances in life sciences and biotechnology industries and how the Australia Group can help mitigating possible security risks. Their introductions engaged the approximately twenty session participants in rich discussions.
The present publication by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique is the direct result of this breakout session. The different angles to the analysis of the Australia Group with reference to the BTWC and the CWC revealed interesting viewpoints about how an informal arrangement relates to formal and quasi-universal treaties comprehensively banning two discrete weapon categories. Other export control arrangements are either standalone initiatives (e.g. the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Wassenaar Arrangement) or, in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, linked to a non-proliferation rather than disarmament treaty. One of the central questions that came to the fore was whether to try and achieve greater integration and coordination among the four export control arrangements. If so, how might this intent affect the Australia Group that had adjusted its mission to support both global disarmament treaties? The BTWC and the CWC each have an article on international cooperation, development and scientific and technology exchanges for peaceful purposes. During the 1990s and 2000s, many developing countries came to view the Australia Group’s activities as incompatible with the disarmament objectives.
The chapters in this publication are not the presentations made in September 2022. Instead, the authors reviewed their introductions in light of the discussions. They addressed how the Australia Group blends with the broader practice of responsible trade in dual-use commodities to prevent weapon proliferation while supporting the core disarmament goals of the BTWC and the CWC. The question relates to regime development, which in turn implies how the Australia Group can address challenges to its internal decision-making, future objectives and the ambition of global standard-setting concerning the adaptability of both conventions to emerging issues, on the one hand, and the work and experiences of the other export control arrangements given convergences in security matters, on the other hand.
An introductory chapter sets the stage for this discussion by describing the origin of the Australia Group, how its practices evolved, and how with the end of the Cold War the recasting of weapon control problems in terms of proliferation affected the CWC during the negotiation end game and its early implementation.
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.), The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Paris, April 2024), 54p. (PDF file)
This article examines the case of the master’s course on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-relevant dual-use technology transfer controls developed within the framework of the European Union- funded Targeted Initiatives on “Export Controls of Dual-Use Materials and Technologies” as part of efforts to address these challenges. The paper outlines the process of developing and implementing this modular course, successfully implemented in several former Soviet republics in Central Asia and Southeast Europe.
Emphasizing the preference for education over more traditional training approaches, the article discusses how the course aims to enhance awareness and foster responsible behavior among stakeholders. In addition to assisting academic institutions in setting up the courses and advancing knowledge among professors, significant effort was invested in engaging decision-makers and various stakeholder communities to broaden the educational initiative’s foundations. Under the organizing theme of building a culture of responsibility, these interactions proved to have significant educational value and contributed to the core ambitions of local ownership and sustainability.
In conclusion, the article argues that sustained educational efforts and collaborative initiatives are essential for addressing challenges posed by dual-use technology transfers and contributing to global security and non- proliferation efforts.
Introducers were Ms Esmée de Bruin (Netherlands), Dr Mónica Chinchilla (Spain) and Ms Élisande Nexon, PharmD (France). I had the honour of moderating the session.
The three speakers have different backgrounds, thus giving the session a distinct multidisciplinary flavour. Ms de Bruin, focusing on the effectiveness of export control regimes in general, approached the Australia Group from economic and international law angles. Dr Chinchilla, an expert in international law, saw in the practice of the Australia Group the emergence of soft law complementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a near-universal global disarmament treaty. Ms Nexon, a Doctor of Pharmacy with expertise in biosecurity and biosafety and arms control and disarmament, addressed challenges to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) posed by the rapid advances in life sciences and biotechnology industries and how the Australia Group can help mitigating possible security risks. Their introductions engaged the approximately twenty session participants in rich discussions.
The present publication by the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique is the direct result of this breakout session. The different angles to the analysis of the Australia Group with reference to the BTWC and the CWC revealed interesting viewpoints about how an informal arrangement relates to formal and quasi-universal treaties comprehensively banning two discrete weapon categories. Other export control arrangements are either standalone initiatives (e.g. the Missile Technology Control Regime or the Wassenaar Arrangement) or, in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, linked to a non-proliferation rather than disarmament treaty. One of the central questions that came to the fore was whether to try and achieve greater integration and coordination among the four export control arrangements. If so, how might this intent affect the Australia Group that had adjusted its mission to support both global disarmament treaties? The BTWC and the CWC each have an article on international cooperation, development and scientific and technology exchanges for peaceful purposes. During the 1990s and 2000s, many developing countries came to view the Australia Group’s activities as incompatible with the disarmament objectives.
The chapters in this publication are not the presentations made in September 2022. Instead, the authors reviewed their introductions in light of the discussions. They addressed how the Australia Group blends with the broader practice of responsible trade in dual-use commodities to prevent weapon proliferation while supporting the core disarmament goals of the BTWC and the CWC. The question relates to regime development, which in turn implies how the Australia Group can address challenges to its internal decision-making, future objectives and the ambition of global standard-setting concerning the adaptability of both conventions to emerging issues, on the one hand, and the work and experiences of the other export control arrangements given convergences in security matters, on the other hand.
An introductory chapter sets the stage for this discussion by describing the origin of the Australia Group, how its practices evolved, and how with the end of the Cold War the recasting of weapon control problems in terms of proliferation affected the CWC during the negotiation end game and its early implementation.
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.), The Australia Group and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical and biological weapons – Ongoing challenges, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Paris, April 2024), 54p. (PDF file)
From the perspective of the armament dynamic, the threat of terrorism with infectious disease appears much lower. Breaking down the development and acquisition process into its constituent steps contributes to the realisation that an error made at one stage will be carried over to the next stage and accumulates with any previous errors. This helps to explain why all major BW acquisition attempts by terrorist entities have so far ended in failure. A second explanation resides in the question terrorists must ask themselves: what marginal benefits may BW offer over other weaponry in pursuing their objectives? Given the risks, complexities, and uncertainties about the outcome, they may conclude that any potential gains may not be worth the while.
However, reassuring such a conclusion might be, the possibility of a major incident can never be excluded. Knowledge about the armament process and its different stages offers multiple opportunities to increase the barriers to terrorist or criminal acquisition of BW. In addition, many of those counterterrorism measures will also contribute to the reduction of risks related to accidental release of harmful pathogens.
NATO countered the military threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons during the Cold War. Soon after the terrorist strikes against New York and Washington in September 2001 and the mail-delivered anthrax spores shortly thereafter, it took the steps to address the possibility of terrorism with CBRN agents. Since then, it has gradually expanded the institutions and procedures to build capacities to defend and protect against such agents and provide assistance in case of a major terrorist threat or incident, or disaster involving CBRN materials in a member state or one of the partner countries. The pandemic spread of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome - Corona Virus 2 (SARS-COV-2) and its worldwide social and economic disruption has renewed concerns within the political and military structures of the Alliance about possible state or non-state actor interest in BW. The outbreak has also demonstrated NATO’s capacity to respond to requests by members and partner countries for emergency assistance.
This chapter looks at the contribution of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), a global disarmament treaty, and associated actions by the international community to the prevention of terrorism with BW. Because states party to the BTWC have the obligation to transpose the treaty prohibitions into domestic legislation and regulations, they play the primary role in the prevention of terrorism with BW.
As all NATO members are also parties to the BTWC, the chapter considers how NATO’s strategy of deterrence and defence against terrorism with BW, and its support and assistance programmes correspond with the BTWC obligations and policies agreed by the parties to the convention. Besides the provisions outlining the core prohibitions, this chapter will consider two articles in depth, namely Article IV on transposing the international obligations into domestic laws and regulations, and Article VII on emergency assistance if a state party faces a threat in consequence of a treaty violation, including a BW attack.
Countering Terrorism (GP CT Vol.2).” This project launched in 2020 to address current
issues and research in the field of counterterrorism. Within this scope, the GP CT Vol.2
is the latest initiative aimed at practical solutions to counter-terrorism policy problems
with innovative best practices proven in the field.
This project, in cooperation with TOBB University of Economics and Technology,
was published by terrorism experts, academics, and practitioners. The aim of this project
is to provide critical thinking in the field of CT, an inherently sensitive subject, and
to create an interactive platform of expertise on effective methods, strategies, national
responses and alternative models.
As stated in NATO 2030 document, Allies agreed to step up NATO efforts to build
the capacity of alliance partners in areas like CT. Each of NATO’s member stability is
significantly vital for alliance security. Previous experiences reveal that prevention is
always a better option when we compare with intervention. Recent conflicts in Ukraine
with Russia once again emphasized the emergency of this issue.
In this context, COE-DAT organized a series of workshops, which increased
information sharing and demonstrated progressive research on current issues in the fight
against terrorism, including Terrorism Experts Conference 2021. This project, which
emerged because of this hard work, aimed to develop and synchronize CT policies at
the national level, but also to provide for future studies and research. Without a doubt,
these practices will not work in all environments, as terrorism varies by region and
circumstances. However, COE-DAT submits that these can be used as an inspiration in
the development of effective counter-terrorism policies and efforts.
COE-DAT believes that this book will be an inspiration and lead up to more “good
practices” combining the conceptual and operational aspects of counter-terrorism in the
coming years. COE-DAT is committed that this series will continue to be updated in
future endeavors