On November 24th, 2020, Professor John Ferris presented Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History... more On November 24th, 2020, Professor John Ferris presented Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency at the 2020 CASIS West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question and answer period
M.R.D. Foot is arespected elder of the tribe in the study of intelligence, whose personal influen... more M.R.D. Foot is arespected elder of the tribe in the study of intelligence, whose personal influence has been wider than even he knows. He was foredoomed to festschrifte, and this one certainly has attracted a constellation of stars. As a genre, essays in tribute are always problematical-focus is hard to retain, since any scholar so honoured will have written work with wide ramifications, while most aspects of influence must be represented. The best of festschrifte may fairly be called a curate's egg. That problem affects this volume, even though the editor has taken the drastic step of excluding contributions on Michael Foot's greatest monument of scholarship, his work on William Gladstone. This is a book of parts, but good ones, distributed between the three categories of the title. There are miniatures from greater works: Kathleen Burk on A.J.P. Taylor,Ian Kershaw on Adolf Hitler and David Stafford on Churchill and intelligence. The most substantial contributionsunder the category of war are Philip Bell's account of Churchill's policy toward France and the United States in 1943-45,and Peter Lowe's discussion of British relations with the last Shogun, Douglas MacArthur, between 1945-50-both useful pieces of revisionism which should be read by specialists. Beyond this, John Lukacs examines the general topic of historical revisionism on the origins of the Second World War. The material on resistance in Europe and the role of the Special Operations Executive is the most unified in the book, and the most useful. Any specialist in intelligence must read the papers by Ralph White, Mark Seaman and H.R Kedward,which offer critical assessments of the literature and illuminate key issues, such as why people resist or collaborate. There are also contributions from veterans of special operations, for Michael Foot was not just a scholar but also a man of action-as the editor says, a"warrior historian." Christopher Wood's account of the escapades of one SOE officer in Italy during 1945 offers a fascinating insight into the politics of Axis forces in Italy during the last weeks of the war, and shows that truth indeed can be stranger than fiction, while Hugh Verity discusses the infiltration and exfiltration of members of the French resistance by air. Thesection on intelligence includes several useful pieces. E.R.D. Harrison's account of Malcolm Muggeridge's experieces in SIS in Mozambique during 1942-43 is one of the best accounts from primary documents on human intelligence during the Second World War; Chris Andrews correctly and powerfully raises the question of how historians of the Cold War must prepare to make use of the signals intelligence record; while Peter Hennessey raises interesting problems regarding the recent past and the near future of British intelligence. The work is rounded off by a study by Michael Foot's wife, Mirjam Foot. It will remind many of their debts to a scholar and a gentleman.
Over the past decade, the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) has shaped debates abo... more Over the past decade, the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) has shaped debates about military policy in the United States, and every advanced country. This idea assumes information will transform the knowledge available to armed forces, and thus their nature and that of war. Colonel John Warden, USAF planner and strategic theorist, argued, "Information will become a prominent, if not predominant, part of war to the extent that whole wars may well revolve around seizing or manipulating the enemy's datasphere". 1 Faith in that idea is central to American doctrine and policy. Joint Visions 2010 and 2020, which guide strategic policy, predict forces with "dominant battlespace awareness", better knowledge than and a "frictional imbalance" and "decision superiority" over an enemy, and unprecedented flexibility of command: the ability to combine freedom for units with power for the top, and to pursue "parallel, not sequential planning and real-time, not prearranged, decisionmaking". 2 From this basis, American officials have created new concepts about intelligence and command, aiming to fuse matters which once were split into "stovepipes", and new forms of information technology, into systems. These concepts include netcentric warfare (NCW) , the idea that armed forces will adopt flat structures, working in nets on the net, with data processing systems at home serving as staff for the sharp end through reachback; C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; loosely speaking, how armed forces gather, interpret and act on information); and "IO" (Information Operations), the actions of secret agencies.
The Garland Bibliographies in Military History with Jacob W. Kipp (1984-) viii Diary of a Disaste... more The Garland Bibliographies in Military History with Jacob W. Kipp (1984-) viii Diary of a Disaster have experienced the excitement of seeing the truth unfold, often in contradiction to statements in memoirs and official histories. In Greece, Lieutenant-General Joannis Metaxakis, Head of the Greek Army History Directorate, was particularly helpful, as were Major-General Konstantinos Kanakaris and other Greek officers. General Kanakaris not only took me on tours in 1979 and 1980 from Athens to Florina, Thessalonika, the Monastir Gap, and Kalamata, so that I could view the ground, but also in 1981 translated the newly released Greek documents so that I could cross-check the British and Greek versions of key meetings. He also checked the manuscript of the book for errors. Dr. Michael Llewellyn Smith was kind enough to show me the old British legation building in Athens in 1980. I must also add my thanks to two participants in the events of 1940-1941, the late Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones and General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, who together with my colleagues on this side of the Atlantic, Alan Wilt of Iowa State University, Edward M. Coffman of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and R.H. Roy of the University of Victoria, read and commented upon the manuscript. To them all I am most grateful. Errors remaining, of course, are my own. "The margin is narrow and the risk is considerable." Eden and Dill to Churchill from Athens,
This chapter examines how conventional power shapes warfare in the contemporary world. It conside... more This chapter examines how conventional power shapes warfare in the contemporary world. It considers the present and emerging state of conventional military power, how conventional forces function in areas such as distant strike and urban warfare, and how their role differs from that of other forms of force, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The chapter first provides a historical background to demonstrate the important role played by conventional power in war before discussing the rise of new world orders in 1945, 1989 and 2001. It then describes states possessing power and hyperpower, along with the revolution in military affairs and how developing countries may trump it through various strategies. It also shows how the distribution of conventional power is changing, noting that Western countries are in decline and new world powers are emerging, especially China and India.
The Partisan War in North-West Russia 1941-44: A Re-Examiniation delineates the extent to which t... more The Partisan War in North-West Russia 1941-44: A Re-Examiniation delineates the extent to which the limited achievements of the Soviet partisan movement in north-west Russia during the first months of the Great Patriotic War can be attributed to inadequacies in the organization, leadership, equipment, and training of the movement.  While this is the position emphasized in Soviet and post-Soveity Russian published works, Alexander hill concludes, on the basis of Soviet archival sources, that although these factors were important, German occupation policies far more effectively inhibited partisan activity in the area than exisiting published material would have us believe. These policies seem only to be have been effective, however, in the context of the German military successes (or rather, perceived successes) at the front. The real and perceived threats posed by pastoral nomadic peoples to the security of sedentary societies and states are well known. Civilized states could,...
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2018
A large literature has emerged on intelligence and war which integrates the topics and techniques... more A large literature has emerged on intelligence and war which integrates the topics and techniques of two disciplines: strategic studies and military history. The literature on intelligence and war is divided into theory and strategy; command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); sources; military estimates in peace; deception; conventional operations; strike; and counter-insurgency and guerilla warfare. Sun Tzu treats intelligence as central to all forms of power politics, and even defines strategy and warfare as “the way of deception.” On the other hand, C3I combines signals and data processing technology, command as thought, process and action, the training of people, and individual and bureaucratic modes of learning. Since 1914, the power of secret sources has risen dramatically in peace and war, revolutionizing the value of intelligence for operations, especially at sea. The strongest area in this study is signals intelligence. Meanwhile, the relationship of intellig...
1. Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence and British Policy Toward Russia and Central Asia, 1874-18... more 1. Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence and British Policy Toward Russia and Central Asia, 1874-1878 2. 'Indulged in all Too Little'?: Vansittart, Intelligence and Appeasement 3. Image and Accident: Intelligence and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1941 4. The British 'Enigma': Britain, Signals Security and Cipher Machines, 1906-1953 5. The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42 6. Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Modern War (with Michael Handel) 7. NCW, C4ISR, IO and RMA: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?
This article examines British assessments of the characteristics and quality of the Japanese Army... more This article examines British assessments of the characteristics and quality of the Japanese Army between 1919-41, and their effect on the British debacle in Asia during 1941-42. It concludes that the estimates made by British observers in Japan and officially accepted by the war office were far more accurate than is usually recognized. Professional British analysts not only understood their enemy but often were sentimental Japanophiles. Their reports are a valuable source on the training, tactics and preparations of the Japanese Army between the wars. This article examines the process of observation, generalization, analysis and synthesis involved in estimation and the intellectual framework and images of Japan which shaped that process. It shows that these assessments were not dominated by racist ideology. Instead, forms of ethnocentrism and ideas of “national character” were the main cause for errors by the professionals, and these errors were not substantial. This article also d...
This chapter examines how — and the extent to which — conventional military power influences the ... more This chapter examines how — and the extent to which — conventional military power influences the contemporary world, whether by fighting wars or by backing policy in peace. It first reviews the history of how power affects warfare before discussing the emergence of new world orders in 1945, 1989, and 2001, noting that since 1945, the power of conventional force has been limited by weapons of mass destruction and guerrilla warfare. It then considers how conventional forces function in areas ranging from distant strike to urban warfare, and compares their role to that of other forms of force such as WMDs and terrorism. It also analyses the conventional strength of states in the world, along with trends in its development and distribution.
This is a golden age for military history. Fifty years ago, the discipline had strength in offici... more This is a golden age for military history. Fifty years ago, the discipline had strength in official agencies and the popular market, but stood in an academic ghetto. Soon, it became even less fashionable. Many academics still view it as suspect. These experiences have made military historians defensive and afraid of marginalization, yet in fact their status has risen sharply. They retain their professional audience, rank among the largest components of popular history, and have bolstered their academic base. There are more military historians today than ever before, and more good ones. The field consists not of one international literature, but of several national ones, isolated from each other in striking ways. None the less, it is as multi-archival, multilinguistic and comparative as any other form of history. Though neither its practitioners nor detractors like to use the phrase, military history is politically correct. Its works are mature in theory and practice. New areas of the field, such as airpower history, have been born and older ones, like naval history, reborn. The discipline is a loose coalition of sub-disciplines, primarily national (eg. Russian) and thematic (eg. war and society) in nature, all bound by a focus on power, strategy, armed forces and war, on ideas about these matters and the human experience with them. This focus is like that of international and diplomatic history, international relations and strategic studies. Compared to these sister fields, military history focuses more on how force is embodied and exercised. These links enrich military history, as do those to policy makers. Many military historians work in service academies or for official agencies in which historical understanding guides the formulation of policy. The influence cuts both ways; since
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Sep 17, 2012
recommend policy on them. How was the Internet evolving? What was the nature of cyber security an... more recommend policy on them. How was the Internet evolving? What was the nature of cyber security and insecurity, and which actors figured in it? What was the proper relationship between agencies of the state, firms and movements, of society and individuals, in these issues? How should Canada seek to shape this environment, and through what steps in public policy? How should firms, the law and individuals respond to these developments? This collection includes the revised papers presented to the conference, and a thematic introduction. The discussion among 100 academics, business people, systems managers, computer security personnel, lawyers, civil servants, intelligence and military and police officers, and students, occurred under
The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 2010
This article discusses signals intelligence in war and power politics. Signals intelligence is th... more This article discusses signals intelligence in war and power politics. Signals intelligence is the most secretive and significant source of intelligence. It has many parts such as: the elint (electronic intelligence) which derives information from assessing electronic emissions and the communication intelligence which derives information from reading encrypted messages. Signal intelligence is relevant as it is highly reliable. Aside from its reliability, like other forms of intelligence, signal intelligence aids in the proper execution of policies, aids developing military tactics, and influences diplomatic bargaining. In this article, discussions include: the emergence of signals intelligence; open diplomacy and diplomatic codebreaking; Ultra and Enigma signals intelligence and the industrialization of signals intelligence through the introduction of computers that specializes in cryptology.
Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain, 2012
This chapter addresses power, especially a struggle over it, in the Asia-Pacific region. Power in... more This chapter addresses power, especially a struggle over it, in the Asia-Pacific region. Power in Asia was diffuse, scattered between regions, which largely were self-contained. The balance between Britain and Japan first shifted in the 1880s. The First World War changed the balance between Britain and Japan as much as everything which had occurred in the past twenty years. Japan failed to master or to reconfigure the Asia-Pacific system; it sought to redefine it through force but that force, pre-eminently resting on maritime strength, was not meant to support a wider economic system. By 1945, the United States had gained control of the Asia-Pacific and chose to maintain the system, backed by the strength of junior partners, Britain and Japan, once again in a quasi colonial status, though soon becoming one of its dominant economies. Keywords:Asia-Pacific Region; Britain; First World War; Japan; United States
On November 24th, 2020, Professor John Ferris presented Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History... more On November 24th, 2020, Professor John Ferris presented Behind the Enigma: The Authorized History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency at the 2020 CASIS West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question and answer period
M.R.D. Foot is arespected elder of the tribe in the study of intelligence, whose personal influen... more M.R.D. Foot is arespected elder of the tribe in the study of intelligence, whose personal influence has been wider than even he knows. He was foredoomed to festschrifte, and this one certainly has attracted a constellation of stars. As a genre, essays in tribute are always problematical-focus is hard to retain, since any scholar so honoured will have written work with wide ramifications, while most aspects of influence must be represented. The best of festschrifte may fairly be called a curate's egg. That problem affects this volume, even though the editor has taken the drastic step of excluding contributions on Michael Foot's greatest monument of scholarship, his work on William Gladstone. This is a book of parts, but good ones, distributed between the three categories of the title. There are miniatures from greater works: Kathleen Burk on A.J.P. Taylor,Ian Kershaw on Adolf Hitler and David Stafford on Churchill and intelligence. The most substantial contributionsunder the category of war are Philip Bell's account of Churchill's policy toward France and the United States in 1943-45,and Peter Lowe's discussion of British relations with the last Shogun, Douglas MacArthur, between 1945-50-both useful pieces of revisionism which should be read by specialists. Beyond this, John Lukacs examines the general topic of historical revisionism on the origins of the Second World War. The material on resistance in Europe and the role of the Special Operations Executive is the most unified in the book, and the most useful. Any specialist in intelligence must read the papers by Ralph White, Mark Seaman and H.R Kedward,which offer critical assessments of the literature and illuminate key issues, such as why people resist or collaborate. There are also contributions from veterans of special operations, for Michael Foot was not just a scholar but also a man of action-as the editor says, a"warrior historian." Christopher Wood's account of the escapades of one SOE officer in Italy during 1945 offers a fascinating insight into the politics of Axis forces in Italy during the last weeks of the war, and shows that truth indeed can be stranger than fiction, while Hugh Verity discusses the infiltration and exfiltration of members of the French resistance by air. Thesection on intelligence includes several useful pieces. E.R.D. Harrison's account of Malcolm Muggeridge's experieces in SIS in Mozambique during 1942-43 is one of the best accounts from primary documents on human intelligence during the Second World War; Chris Andrews correctly and powerfully raises the question of how historians of the Cold War must prepare to make use of the signals intelligence record; while Peter Hennessey raises interesting problems regarding the recent past and the near future of British intelligence. The work is rounded off by a study by Michael Foot's wife, Mirjam Foot. It will remind many of their debts to a scholar and a gentleman.
Over the past decade, the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) has shaped debates abo... more Over the past decade, the idea of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) has shaped debates about military policy in the United States, and every advanced country. This idea assumes information will transform the knowledge available to armed forces, and thus their nature and that of war. Colonel John Warden, USAF planner and strategic theorist, argued, "Information will become a prominent, if not predominant, part of war to the extent that whole wars may well revolve around seizing or manipulating the enemy's datasphere". 1 Faith in that idea is central to American doctrine and policy. Joint Visions 2010 and 2020, which guide strategic policy, predict forces with "dominant battlespace awareness", better knowledge than and a "frictional imbalance" and "decision superiority" over an enemy, and unprecedented flexibility of command: the ability to combine freedom for units with power for the top, and to pursue "parallel, not sequential planning and real-time, not prearranged, decisionmaking". 2 From this basis, American officials have created new concepts about intelligence and command, aiming to fuse matters which once were split into "stovepipes", and new forms of information technology, into systems. These concepts include netcentric warfare (NCW) , the idea that armed forces will adopt flat structures, working in nets on the net, with data processing systems at home serving as staff for the sharp end through reachback; C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; loosely speaking, how armed forces gather, interpret and act on information); and "IO" (Information Operations), the actions of secret agencies.
The Garland Bibliographies in Military History with Jacob W. Kipp (1984-) viii Diary of a Disaste... more The Garland Bibliographies in Military History with Jacob W. Kipp (1984-) viii Diary of a Disaster have experienced the excitement of seeing the truth unfold, often in contradiction to statements in memoirs and official histories. In Greece, Lieutenant-General Joannis Metaxakis, Head of the Greek Army History Directorate, was particularly helpful, as were Major-General Konstantinos Kanakaris and other Greek officers. General Kanakaris not only took me on tours in 1979 and 1980 from Athens to Florina, Thessalonika, the Monastir Gap, and Kalamata, so that I could view the ground, but also in 1981 translated the newly released Greek documents so that I could cross-check the British and Greek versions of key meetings. He also checked the manuscript of the book for errors. Dr. Michael Llewellyn Smith was kind enough to show me the old British legation building in Athens in 1980. I must also add my thanks to two participants in the events of 1940-1941, the late Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones and General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, who together with my colleagues on this side of the Atlantic, Alan Wilt of Iowa State University, Edward M. Coffman of the University of Wisconsin at Madison, and R.H. Roy of the University of Victoria, read and commented upon the manuscript. To them all I am most grateful. Errors remaining, of course, are my own. "The margin is narrow and the risk is considerable." Eden and Dill to Churchill from Athens,
This chapter examines how conventional power shapes warfare in the contemporary world. It conside... more This chapter examines how conventional power shapes warfare in the contemporary world. It considers the present and emerging state of conventional military power, how conventional forces function in areas such as distant strike and urban warfare, and how their role differs from that of other forms of force, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The chapter first provides a historical background to demonstrate the important role played by conventional power in war before discussing the rise of new world orders in 1945, 1989 and 2001. It then describes states possessing power and hyperpower, along with the revolution in military affairs and how developing countries may trump it through various strategies. It also shows how the distribution of conventional power is changing, noting that Western countries are in decline and new world powers are emerging, especially China and India.
The Partisan War in North-West Russia 1941-44: A Re-Examiniation delineates the extent to which t... more The Partisan War in North-West Russia 1941-44: A Re-Examiniation delineates the extent to which the limited achievements of the Soviet partisan movement in north-west Russia during the first months of the Great Patriotic War can be attributed to inadequacies in the organization, leadership, equipment, and training of the movement.  While this is the position emphasized in Soviet and post-Soveity Russian published works, Alexander hill concludes, on the basis of Soviet archival sources, that although these factors were important, German occupation policies far more effectively inhibited partisan activity in the area than exisiting published material would have us believe. These policies seem only to be have been effective, however, in the context of the German military successes (or rather, perceived successes) at the front. The real and perceived threats posed by pastoral nomadic peoples to the security of sedentary societies and states are well known. Civilized states could,...
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2018
A large literature has emerged on intelligence and war which integrates the topics and techniques... more A large literature has emerged on intelligence and war which integrates the topics and techniques of two disciplines: strategic studies and military history. The literature on intelligence and war is divided into theory and strategy; command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); sources; military estimates in peace; deception; conventional operations; strike; and counter-insurgency and guerilla warfare. Sun Tzu treats intelligence as central to all forms of power politics, and even defines strategy and warfare as “the way of deception.” On the other hand, C3I combines signals and data processing technology, command as thought, process and action, the training of people, and individual and bureaucratic modes of learning. Since 1914, the power of secret sources has risen dramatically in peace and war, revolutionizing the value of intelligence for operations, especially at sea. The strongest area in this study is signals intelligence. Meanwhile, the relationship of intellig...
1. Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence and British Policy Toward Russia and Central Asia, 1874-18... more 1. Lord Salisbury, Secret Intelligence and British Policy Toward Russia and Central Asia, 1874-1878 2. 'Indulged in all Too Little'?: Vansittart, Intelligence and Appeasement 3. Image and Accident: Intelligence and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1941 4. The British 'Enigma': Britain, Signals Security and Cipher Machines, 1906-1953 5. The British Army, Signals and Security in the Desert Campaign, 1940-42 6. Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Modern War (with Michael Handel) 7. NCW, C4ISR, IO and RMA: Towards a Revolution in Military Intelligence?
This article examines British assessments of the characteristics and quality of the Japanese Army... more This article examines British assessments of the characteristics and quality of the Japanese Army between 1919-41, and their effect on the British debacle in Asia during 1941-42. It concludes that the estimates made by British observers in Japan and officially accepted by the war office were far more accurate than is usually recognized. Professional British analysts not only understood their enemy but often were sentimental Japanophiles. Their reports are a valuable source on the training, tactics and preparations of the Japanese Army between the wars. This article examines the process of observation, generalization, analysis and synthesis involved in estimation and the intellectual framework and images of Japan which shaped that process. It shows that these assessments were not dominated by racist ideology. Instead, forms of ethnocentrism and ideas of “national character” were the main cause for errors by the professionals, and these errors were not substantial. This article also d...
This chapter examines how — and the extent to which — conventional military power influences the ... more This chapter examines how — and the extent to which — conventional military power influences the contemporary world, whether by fighting wars or by backing policy in peace. It first reviews the history of how power affects warfare before discussing the emergence of new world orders in 1945, 1989, and 2001, noting that since 1945, the power of conventional force has been limited by weapons of mass destruction and guerrilla warfare. It then considers how conventional forces function in areas ranging from distant strike to urban warfare, and compares their role to that of other forms of force such as WMDs and terrorism. It also analyses the conventional strength of states in the world, along with trends in its development and distribution.
This is a golden age for military history. Fifty years ago, the discipline had strength in offici... more This is a golden age for military history. Fifty years ago, the discipline had strength in official agencies and the popular market, but stood in an academic ghetto. Soon, it became even less fashionable. Many academics still view it as suspect. These experiences have made military historians defensive and afraid of marginalization, yet in fact their status has risen sharply. They retain their professional audience, rank among the largest components of popular history, and have bolstered their academic base. There are more military historians today than ever before, and more good ones. The field consists not of one international literature, but of several national ones, isolated from each other in striking ways. None the less, it is as multi-archival, multilinguistic and comparative as any other form of history. Though neither its practitioners nor detractors like to use the phrase, military history is politically correct. Its works are mature in theory and practice. New areas of the field, such as airpower history, have been born and older ones, like naval history, reborn. The discipline is a loose coalition of sub-disciplines, primarily national (eg. Russian) and thematic (eg. war and society) in nature, all bound by a focus on power, strategy, armed forces and war, on ideas about these matters and the human experience with them. This focus is like that of international and diplomatic history, international relations and strategic studies. Compared to these sister fields, military history focuses more on how force is embodied and exercised. These links enrich military history, as do those to policy makers. Many military historians work in service academies or for official agencies in which historical understanding guides the formulation of policy. The influence cuts both ways; since
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Sep 17, 2012
recommend policy on them. How was the Internet evolving? What was the nature of cyber security an... more recommend policy on them. How was the Internet evolving? What was the nature of cyber security and insecurity, and which actors figured in it? What was the proper relationship between agencies of the state, firms and movements, of society and individuals, in these issues? How should Canada seek to shape this environment, and through what steps in public policy? How should firms, the law and individuals respond to these developments? This collection includes the revised papers presented to the conference, and a thematic introduction. The discussion among 100 academics, business people, systems managers, computer security personnel, lawyers, civil servants, intelligence and military and police officers, and students, occurred under
The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 2010
This article discusses signals intelligence in war and power politics. Signals intelligence is th... more This article discusses signals intelligence in war and power politics. Signals intelligence is the most secretive and significant source of intelligence. It has many parts such as: the elint (electronic intelligence) which derives information from assessing electronic emissions and the communication intelligence which derives information from reading encrypted messages. Signal intelligence is relevant as it is highly reliable. Aside from its reliability, like other forms of intelligence, signal intelligence aids in the proper execution of policies, aids developing military tactics, and influences diplomatic bargaining. In this article, discussions include: the emergence of signals intelligence; open diplomacy and diplomatic codebreaking; Ultra and Enigma signals intelligence and the industrialization of signals intelligence through the introduction of computers that specializes in cryptology.
Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain, 2012
This chapter addresses power, especially a struggle over it, in the Asia-Pacific region. Power in... more This chapter addresses power, especially a struggle over it, in the Asia-Pacific region. Power in Asia was diffuse, scattered between regions, which largely were self-contained. The balance between Britain and Japan first shifted in the 1880s. The First World War changed the balance between Britain and Japan as much as everything which had occurred in the past twenty years. Japan failed to master or to reconfigure the Asia-Pacific system; it sought to redefine it through force but that force, pre-eminently resting on maritime strength, was not meant to support a wider economic system. By 1945, the United States had gained control of the Asia-Pacific and chose to maintain the system, backed by the strength of junior partners, Britain and Japan, once again in a quasi colonial status, though soon becoming one of its dominant economies. Keywords:Asia-Pacific Region; Britain; First World War; Japan; United States
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Papers by John Ferris