The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private s... more The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployedinitially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization gives time-worn procedures a second life. The inclination for institutional bricolage is a deeply rooted hallmark of innovation in Chinese statecraft.
Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources... more Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources sparingly, explicitly defining administrative priorities for county-level jurisdictions. Supported by primary evidence from the Qing dynasty , this article investigates where exactly the empire placed its priorities, what their effect was, and how rational the system was. The empire's priorities were the product of manmade spatial organization, defying macro-regional center-periphery divides, patterns debated in past issues of this journal. Moreover, even when priorities were biased, outdated, and manipulated, they had tangible effects on local state presence, creating distinct bureaucratic spheres: the many non-prioritized routine counties tended to have smaller governments with more first-time magistrates, whereas priority counties typically had bigger governments led by magistrates who were chosen in a deliberative yet corruptible process. The construction and uses of the empire's mental map demonstrates the merits and vicissitudes accompanying the still ongoing Chinese practice of differentiated local government. S TATE-BUILDERS SEEK HOMOGENEITY OF institutions, ideology, and ritual to foster the state's cohesion and empower central authority. Yet clearly, a state that is uniformly powerful throughout a homogenous realm is a utopian ideal. Thus, a central challenge for state-builders is to construct standards that reduce complexity and allow the state to deal with diversity (Scott 1998, 2). Chinese state-builders, ruling over or aspiring to rule over a vast and diverse territory ever since the emergence of a unified state in 221 BCE, were well acquainted with the challenges of standardization. Behind a thin veneer of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, they tolerated a wide array of local beliefs and customs (Sutton 2007, 7). Problems of creating uniform standards to accommodate diversity were particularly tangible in the imperial bureaucracy. This article analyzes how the great variety of local challenges factored into administrative strategies under the Qing (1644-1911), China's last dynasty and one of its longest-lasting. Unable to cover the realm with a uniform blanket of government, Emperor Yongzheng (1722-35) developed an intricate and formal system to prioritize some local jurisdictions over others, attaching combinations of four post designations to all county-level jurisdictions. Despite incentives for institutional corruption and inertia built into the system, the ability to differentiate local government in a rational way was a powerful instrument in the toolbox of
Political parties are pivotal institutions, in democratic and authoritarian contexts alike. Almos... more Political parties are pivotal institutions, in democratic and authoritarian contexts alike. Almost all seventy-one nondemocracies, in 2015 governing 44 percent of the world population, have parties. In most of these countries at least one party is tightly controlled by the ruling clique, such as United Russia, the United Malays National Organization, and Turkey's Justice and Development Party. 1 In contrast to other autocratic arrangements, such as military dictatorship and personalistic rule, partybased authoritarianism has proven itself effective in governing modernizing societies and mitigating democratization pressures. 2 But how do parties contribute to effective authoritarian rule? And what are the origins of effective regime parties? The first question calls for a study of contemporary autocratic governance. The second question takes us back to history. The literature provides answers to both questions, but incomplete ones. The case of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is the focus of this book, promises to change the way we think about the functions and origins of effective authoritarian regime parties. This book demonstrates that an authoritarian regime party can provide the organizational infrastructure that allows a state to project authority throughout its realm. By implication, the book explains why authoritarian regimes are usually more effective in some parts of their territories than in others: The uneven presence of rank-and-file party members makes an important difference for policy implementation on the ground. The CCP's rank and file empowers the state at the local level, precisely because the overwhelming majority of party members is not in bureaucratic positions, but works outside the government. Chapter 2 develops a new theory of authoritarian regime parties, after which the following two chapters test
Abstract: Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand... more Abstract: Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand creeping erosion over long stretches of political calm? (Thelen, 2004) To shed new light on these fundamental questions about institutional change, my paper investigates the regionally uneven power base of the CCP, which continues to carry the imprint of military events 1937 to 1949. Following the call for better methodological tools to study political institutions in time (Pierson, 2004), my paper formulates a model of party growth, builds on economic approaches • Step 1: Basic Party Growth Model Consider a jurisdiction at time t with M t party members. The number of new party members is a function of the number of existing members F (M t ). Assume that in each period a constant fraction x of the membership dies, is purged or otherwise exits the party. The growth dynamics can be written Equation 1 is identical to a classical economic growth model with convergence. Thus, I follow macroe...
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private s... more The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployed – initially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization give...
Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources... more Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources sparingly, explicitly defining administrative priorities for county-level jurisdictions. Supported by primary evidence from the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), this article investigates where exactly the empire placed its priorities, what their effect was, and how rational the system was. The empire's priorities were the product of manmade spatial organization, defying macro-regional center-periphery divides, patterns debated in past issues of this journal. Moreover, even when priorities were biased, outdated, and manipulated, they had tangible effects on local state presence, creating distinct bureaucratic spheres: the many non-prioritized routine counties tended to have smaller governments with more first-time magistrates, whereas priority counties typically had bigger governments led by magistrates who were chosen in a deliberative yet corruptible process. The construction and uses of ...
Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand creeping ... more Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand creeping erosion over long stretches of political calm? (Thelen, 2004) To shed new light on these fundamental ques- tions about institutional change, my paper investigates the regionally uneven power base of the CCP, which continues to carry the imprint of military events 1937 to 1949. Following the call for better methodological tools to study political institutions in time(Pierson, 2004), my paper formulates a model of party growth, builds on economic approaches (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992) to test dynamic characteristics of this model, and es- timates the rate of convergence in party membership, away from initial historical patterns.
In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ectiv... more In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ective organization of a ruling party. Today, China stands out as a successful party-based authoritarian regime. In contrast to conventional approaches, which emphasize the role of authoritarian parties in controlling elite conflict and electoral-legislative processes, this dissertation demonstrates that the party makes the regime strong at the local level. Thanks to the party, the Chinese government has a strong grip of local societies across its large realm. Since China has “crimson areas”, where the party is more present, and “pink areas”, where the party is less present, the Chinese case is ideally suited for a subnational comparative analysis of party-based authoritarianism. Subnational analysis, with its strong focus on geography, demonstrates that the party is doing much more than distributing patronage, and that as a result the state is most resilient, best at extracting taxes, and mo...
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2016
This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive po... more This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive power. To exercise power over the expanse of their realm, governments need an infrastructure to access even more peripheral communities. But as rulers overcome the problems of distance, they discover the challenges of proximity, because locals influence state agents and undermine state autonomy. Studying the uneven reach of Chinese local governments within their jurisdictions, we demonstrate that micro-variation of extraction in rural China, including monetary and non-monetary levies, provides a rare window onto the micro-geography of power. Physical distance still obstructs extractive power projection into extremely remote places, but physical proximity has become a greater constraint for the exercise of power. Local governments are pressured by their immediate neighborhood, at the expense of less fortunate citizens, who live at intermediate distances: still within the reach of the state, but already too far away to turn the state to their favor. The effect of organizational distance, which in China is mediated primarily through the Communist Party, is similarly dualistic: Party networks alleviate asymmetric information problems, which hamper rural taxation around the world, but party networks are sustained by patronage and therefore jeopardize state autonomy.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private s... more The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployedinitially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization gives time-worn procedures a second life. The inclination for institutional bricolage is a deeply rooted hallmark of innovation in Chinese statecraft.
Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources... more Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources sparingly, explicitly defining administrative priorities for county-level jurisdictions. Supported by primary evidence from the Qing dynasty , this article investigates where exactly the empire placed its priorities, what their effect was, and how rational the system was. The empire's priorities were the product of manmade spatial organization, defying macro-regional center-periphery divides, patterns debated in past issues of this journal. Moreover, even when priorities were biased, outdated, and manipulated, they had tangible effects on local state presence, creating distinct bureaucratic spheres: the many non-prioritized routine counties tended to have smaller governments with more first-time magistrates, whereas priority counties typically had bigger governments led by magistrates who were chosen in a deliberative yet corruptible process. The construction and uses of the empire's mental map demonstrates the merits and vicissitudes accompanying the still ongoing Chinese practice of differentiated local government. S TATE-BUILDERS SEEK HOMOGENEITY OF institutions, ideology, and ritual to foster the state's cohesion and empower central authority. Yet clearly, a state that is uniformly powerful throughout a homogenous realm is a utopian ideal. Thus, a central challenge for state-builders is to construct standards that reduce complexity and allow the state to deal with diversity (Scott 1998, 2). Chinese state-builders, ruling over or aspiring to rule over a vast and diverse territory ever since the emergence of a unified state in 221 BCE, were well acquainted with the challenges of standardization. Behind a thin veneer of orthodoxy and orthopraxy, they tolerated a wide array of local beliefs and customs (Sutton 2007, 7). Problems of creating uniform standards to accommodate diversity were particularly tangible in the imperial bureaucracy. This article analyzes how the great variety of local challenges factored into administrative strategies under the Qing (1644-1911), China's last dynasty and one of its longest-lasting. Unable to cover the realm with a uniform blanket of government, Emperor Yongzheng (1722-35) developed an intricate and formal system to prioritize some local jurisdictions over others, attaching combinations of four post designations to all county-level jurisdictions. Despite incentives for institutional corruption and inertia built into the system, the ability to differentiate local government in a rational way was a powerful instrument in the toolbox of
Political parties are pivotal institutions, in democratic and authoritarian contexts alike. Almos... more Political parties are pivotal institutions, in democratic and authoritarian contexts alike. Almost all seventy-one nondemocracies, in 2015 governing 44 percent of the world population, have parties. In most of these countries at least one party is tightly controlled by the ruling clique, such as United Russia, the United Malays National Organization, and Turkey's Justice and Development Party. 1 In contrast to other autocratic arrangements, such as military dictatorship and personalistic rule, partybased authoritarianism has proven itself effective in governing modernizing societies and mitigating democratization pressures. 2 But how do parties contribute to effective authoritarian rule? And what are the origins of effective regime parties? The first question calls for a study of contemporary autocratic governance. The second question takes us back to history. The literature provides answers to both questions, but incomplete ones. The case of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is the focus of this book, promises to change the way we think about the functions and origins of effective authoritarian regime parties. This book demonstrates that an authoritarian regime party can provide the organizational infrastructure that allows a state to project authority throughout its realm. By implication, the book explains why authoritarian regimes are usually more effective in some parts of their territories than in others: The uneven presence of rank-and-file party members makes an important difference for policy implementation on the ground. The CCP's rank and file empowers the state at the local level, precisely because the overwhelming majority of party members is not in bureaucratic positions, but works outside the government. Chapter 2 develops a new theory of authoritarian regime parties, after which the following two chapters test
Abstract: Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand... more Abstract: Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand creeping erosion over long stretches of political calm? (Thelen, 2004) To shed new light on these fundamental questions about institutional change, my paper investigates the regionally uneven power base of the CCP, which continues to carry the imprint of military events 1937 to 1949. Following the call for better methodological tools to study political institutions in time (Pierson, 2004), my paper formulates a model of party growth, builds on economic approaches • Step 1: Basic Party Growth Model Consider a jurisdiction at time t with M t party members. The number of new party members is a function of the number of existing members F (M t ). Assume that in each period a constant fraction x of the membership dies, is purged or otherwise exits the party. The growth dynamics can be written Equation 1 is identical to a classical economic growth model with convergence. Thus, I follow macroe...
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private s... more The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployed – initially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization give...
Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources... more Ruling large expanses of terrain, imperial Chinese state-builders deployed bureaucratic resources sparingly, explicitly defining administrative priorities for county-level jurisdictions. Supported by primary evidence from the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), this article investigates where exactly the empire placed its priorities, what their effect was, and how rational the system was. The empire's priorities were the product of manmade spatial organization, defying macro-regional center-periphery divides, patterns debated in past issues of this journal. Moreover, even when priorities were biased, outdated, and manipulated, they had tangible effects on local state presence, creating distinct bureaucratic spheres: the many non-prioritized routine counties tended to have smaller governments with more first-time magistrates, whereas priority counties typically had bigger governments led by magistrates who were chosen in a deliberative yet corruptible process. The construction and uses of ...
Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand creeping ... more Do institutional legacies survive episodes of political upheaval? Do legacies withstand creeping erosion over long stretches of political calm? (Thelen, 2004) To shed new light on these fundamental ques- tions about institutional change, my paper investigates the regionally uneven power base of the CCP, which continues to carry the imprint of military events 1937 to 1949. Following the call for better methodological tools to study political institutions in time(Pierson, 2004), my paper formulates a model of party growth, builds on economic approaches (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992) to test dynamic characteristics of this model, and es- timates the rate of convergence in party membership, away from initial historical patterns.
In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ectiv... more In a large number of non-democratic countries, the power of the government rests upon the e↵ective organization of a ruling party. Today, China stands out as a successful party-based authoritarian regime. In contrast to conventional approaches, which emphasize the role of authoritarian parties in controlling elite conflict and electoral-legislative processes, this dissertation demonstrates that the party makes the regime strong at the local level. Thanks to the party, the Chinese government has a strong grip of local societies across its large realm. Since China has “crimson areas”, where the party is more present, and “pink areas”, where the party is less present, the Chinese case is ideally suited for a subnational comparative analysis of party-based authoritarianism. Subnational analysis, with its strong focus on geography, demonstrates that the party is doing much more than distributing patronage, and that as a result the state is most resilient, best at extracting taxes, and mo...
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2016
This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive po... more This article argues that geography is essential to explain subnational variation in extractive power. To exercise power over the expanse of their realm, governments need an infrastructure to access even more peripheral communities. But as rulers overcome the problems of distance, they discover the challenges of proximity, because locals influence state agents and undermine state autonomy. Studying the uneven reach of Chinese local governments within their jurisdictions, we demonstrate that micro-variation of extraction in rural China, including monetary and non-monetary levies, provides a rare window onto the micro-geography of power. Physical distance still obstructs extractive power projection into extremely remote places, but physical proximity has become a greater constraint for the exercise of power. Local governments are pressured by their immediate neighborhood, at the expense of less fortunate citizens, who live at intermediate distances: still within the reach of the state, but already too far away to turn the state to their favor. The effect of organizational distance, which in China is mediated primarily through the Communist Party, is similarly dualistic: Party networks alleviate asymmetric information problems, which hamper rural taxation around the world, but party networks are sustained by patronage and therefore jeopardize state autonomy.
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