Papers by Paul Pfleiderer
Revista De Economia Institucional, Mar 12, 2014
CAMALEONES: EL MAL USO DE MODELOS TEÓRICOS EN FINANZAS Y ECONOMÍA Un ingeniero, un físico y un ec... more CAMALEONES: EL MAL USO DE MODELOS TEÓRICOS EN FINANZAS Y ECONOMÍA Un ingeniero, un físico y un economista naufragan en una isla desierta sin nada que comer. Encuentran una caja de madera que contiene latas de sopa y los tres proponen cómo abrirlas. Ingeniero: Subamos a ese árbol y lancemos las latas contra las rocas. Físico: Calentemos en el fuego cada lata hasta que el aumento de la presión interna la abra. Economista: Supongamos que tenemos un abrelatas.
Review of Financial Studies, 1988
The Journal of Portfolio Management, 1985
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The Journal of Portfolio Management, 2016
Abstract: In this Preface, we offer some analysis of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and its impli... more Abstract: In this Preface, we offer some analysis of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and its implications for financial industry reform and research. We primarily focus on issues relating to transparency and the measurement of risk and how these are affected by management ...
... large shareholders (including pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, and other investors) ... more ... large shareholders (including pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, and other investors) hold a substantial and increasing fraction of shares in public companies in the United States, most large shareholders play a limited role in overt forms of shareholder activism such as ...
Review of Financial Studies, 1988
The Review of Financial Studies / Spring, 1988 one period after it is observed, informed traders ... more The Review of Financial Studies / Spring, 1988 one period after it is observed, informed traders only need to determine their trade in the period in which they are informed. Issues related to the timing of informed trading, which are important in Kyle (1985), do not arise here. We ...
We examine the pervasive view that "equity is expensive," which leads to claims that hi... more We examine the pervasive view that "equity is expensive," which leads to claims that high capital requirements are costly and would affect credit markets adversely. We find that arguments made to support this view are either fallacious, irrelevant, or very weak. For example, the return on equity contains a risk premium that must go down if banks have more equity.
American Economic Review, Feb 1, 1988
... W. Diamond, University of Chicago and Yale University; Boyan Jovanovic, New York University; ... more ... W. Diamond, University of Chicago and Yale University; Boyan Jovanovic, New York University; Richard Rogerson, University of Rochester and Southern Illinois University. *Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. We thank Doug Diamond and ...
Page 1. The Role of Country and Industry Effects in Explaining Global Stock Returns* Terry Marsh ... more Page 1. The Role of Country and Industry Effects in Explaining Global Stock Returns* Terry Marsh UC Berkeley Walter A. Haas School of Business Berkeley, CA 94720-1900 Paul Pfleiderer Stanford University Graduate School of Business Stanford, CA 94305 ...
... A good example is the so-called weekend effect, first documented by French (1980) and Gibbons... more ... A good example is the so-called weekend effect, first documented by French (1980) and Gibbons ... Intraday and Day-of-tbe-Week Mean Effects will have been crossed on the floor and ... both to each other and across periods, discretionary liquidity traders are equally happy to trade ...
Journal of Political Economy, 1994
We develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecti... more We develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Alloca-tions of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitor-ing, risk-...
... We are grateful to John Crawford, Peter DeMarzo, Vic Fleischer, Martin Hellwig, Jennifer Huan... more ... We are grateful to John Crawford, Peter DeMarzo, Vic Fleischer, Martin Hellwig, Jennifer Huang, Dirk Jenter, Doron Levit, Nadya Malenko, Steve Ross, Chester Spatt, Jeff Zwiebel and seminar participants at Stanford, LSE, NYU, New York Federal Reserve Bank, University of ...
Int Econ Rev, 2004
We analyze a model where an altruistic, but possibly overconfident sender broadcasts one of a fin... more We analyze a model where an altruistic, but possibly overconfident sender broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but multiple equilibria may arise, and asymmetric equilibria might be more informative than the symmetric equilibrium even if the prior is symmetric. Although overconfidence on the part of the sender reduces informativeness in some cases, it may also eliminate less informative equilibria and lead to better information transmission. Overconfidence can also improve the informativeness of the message when broadcasting is costly. *
Journal of Political Economy, Feb 1, 1983
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Papers by Paul Pfleiderer