Analysis of sportsmen's performance in recall or problem-solving task simulated in laboratory sho... more Analysis of sportsmen's performance in recall or problem-solving task simulated in laboratory shows that expert are generally better in recalling material when information is correctly structured, that is to say coherent related to the logic of the sport (see for a review on these experiments). However, we know little about the psychological processes subtending these performances and it is the aim of this presentation to identify the nature of these operations. Rather to study a classical recall task we have used a task of judgement of similarity more appropriated to reproduce some characteristics of the situations found in actual play. Indeed, we hypothesis that in play, when facing a visual play configuration, the player has to activate his or he knowledge base, and then to compare the present situation to the ones stored in long term memory, and finally to chose the more appropriate response to the present situation. The tasks of judgement of similarity used in our experiments share some particularity with this description. The player has to store in his or her working memory a first play configuration and following its disappearance to compare it to another play configuration in order to judge if it is similar or different to the previous one. Another interest of using a task of judgement of similarity is that this task has been widely studied and we have a coherent view of psychological processing subtending this operation . The originality of the study lies in the fact that we have compared the players' performances in the experiments to the simulation of a mathematical model specially developed for this research by . The model is of algebraic type, and it can be interpreted as a neuron-like model given that its basic operations reduce to computing sums of products (i.e. algebraic polynomials), and simple vectorial operations. It comprises three stages: a perceptual encoding stage, whose input is the set of coordinates of players and ball in a low level space generated by image processing, and whose output is a real vector called "access code". Access codes are assumed to vanish rapidly after the source stimulus disappeared. An access code allows for accessing a second stage, called knowledge system, whose output vector, called "post-access code", is the projection of the access code in a vectorial space of features, and then represents what was recognized from the target stimulus. It is assumed that post-access codes vanish much more slowly than access codes, and that the space of post-access codes is the space on which expert functions are learned. The third stage is a decision stage that can compare two post-access codes and provides a same/different judgement in a probabilistic way. One can note that the first stages are not task dependent, while the third stage is the only one that is specifically devoted to comparison tasks. It is assumed that the first two stages correspond to automatic parallel activation subsystems, while the third stage is under control of central processes. Finally, it is assumed that the only basic difference between experts and novices is the content of their respective knowledge systems.
The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under... more The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under a veil of ignorance, where two alternative policy positions-Rawlsian maximin and Harsanyian utilitarianism-are taking into account, are constructed and investigated. The first model is based on a stylized approach of typical psychological features such as risk-aversion and prosocial preferences that likely underlie choices of welfare policies. On the basis of these individual features, choices are made in compliance with laws of social psychology of imitation and influence and the model describes the various temporary modes of self-identification of a social community, including cyclic self-identification, i.e. cycles of successive adoption of the two alternative policies. The second model is presented by means of an autonomous system of ordinary differential equations. A qualitative analysis of this system shows possible ways of explaining social choices under hierarchies based on risk aversion and prosocial preferences.
The Monty-Hall Problem (MHP) has been used to argue against a subjectivist view of Bayesianism in... more The Monty-Hall Problem (MHP) has been used to argue against a subjectivist view of Bayesianism in two ways. First, psychologists have used it to illustrate that people do not revise their degrees of belief in line with experimenters' application of Bayes' rule. Second, philosophers view MHP and its two-player extension (MHP 2) as evidence that probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. Both arguments neglect the Bayesian standpoint, which requires that MHP 2 (studied here) be described in different terms than usually applied and that the initial set of possibilities be stable (i.e., a focusing situation). This article corrects these errors and reasserts the Bayesian standpoint; namely, that the subjective probability of an event is always conditional on a belief reviser's specific current state of knowledge.
The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under... more The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under a veil of ignorance, where two alternative policy positions -Rawlsian maximin and Harsanyian utilitarianism -are taking into account, are constructed and investigated. The first model is based on a stylized approach of typical psychological features such as risk-aversion and prosocial preferences that likely underlie choices of welfare policies. On the basis of these individual features, choices are made in compliance with laws of social psychology of imitation and influence and the model describes the various temporary modes of self-identification of a social community, including cyclic self-identification, i.e. cycles of successive adoption of the two alternative policies. The second model is presented by means of an autonomous system of ordinary differential equations. A qualitative analysis of this system shows possible ways of explaining social choices under hierarchies based on risk aversion and prosocial preferences. differential equations in welfare policies analysis, qualitative analysis of dynamic systems.
International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 2005
Recently, we published a study whose purpose was to identify the levels of processing that underl... more Recently, we published a study whose purpose was to identify the levels of processing that underlie decision making in expert and novice soccer players in simulated game situations (Poplu, Baratgin, Mavromatis, & Ripoll, 2003). The results of this study showed that the levels of processing involved depend on the characteristics of the task. A 3‐Alternative Forced Choice task requires essentially
International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 2003
... It consisted of planning a game sequence composed of three consecutive actions, which, starti... more ... It consisted of planning a game sequence composed of three consecutive actions, which, starting from the position of the player with the ball would permit the team to keep possession of the ball (eg, pass, dribble, and pass) or to score a goal (eg, dribble, pass, and shoot ...
The Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning generalizes binary logic, extending the bina... more The Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning generalizes binary logic, extending the binary concept of consistency to that of coherence, and allowing the study of deductive reasoning from uncertain premises. Studies in judgment and decision making have found that people's probability judgments can fail to be coherent. We investigated people's coherence further for judgments about conjunctions, disjunctions and conditionals, and asked whether their coherence would increase when they were given the explicit task of drawing inferences. Participants gave confidence judgments about a list of separate statements (the statements group) or the statements grouped as explicit inferences (the inferences group). Their responses were generally coherent at above chance levels for all the inferences investigated, regardless of the presence of an explicit inference task. An exception was that they were incoherent in the context known to cause the conjunction fallacy, and remained so even when they were given an explicit inference. The participants were coherent under the assumption that they interpreted the natural language conditional as it is represented in Bayesian accounts of conditional reasoning, but they were incoherent under the assumption that they interpreted the natural language conditional as the material conditional of elementary binary logic. Our results provide further support for the descriptive adequacy of Bayesian reasoning principles in the study of deduction under uncertainty.
ABSTRACT The various experimental studies conducted by psychologists on probabilistic reasoning t... more ABSTRACT The various experimental studies conducted by psychologists on probabilistic reasoning tend to conclude that the human mind is not Bayesian. However this conclusion appears debatable when one tries to shed light on the notion of Bayesian coherence. The main arguments of the literature illustrating the failure of human behaviour to adhere to the Bayesian model are analyzed. Conversely, the ineffectiveness of the studies themselves to fully comprehend what Bayesianism implies is extensively exposed.
A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative con... more A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B, and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B.
The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probabi... more The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating , in which the universe is evolving. In that case the structure of the universe has definitely been transformed and the revision message conveys information on the resulting universe. The second part of the paper presents four experiments based on the Monty Hall puzzle that aim to show that updating is a natural frame for individuals to revise their beliefs.
The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which justifies the underlying... more The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which justifies the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed in the literature by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter and can be easily compared. They rest in two different ways on the 'no news no change' principle asserting that subjective belief only changes in case of new information. But they differ by the cognitive attitude attributed to Sleeping Beauty, who is 'fuzzy-minded' for Elga and 'blank-minded' for Lewis. Moreover, the traditional absent-minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga's solution.
Abstract The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic proba... more Abstract The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe ...
This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the B... more This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (1) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (2) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis' rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes' rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.
This paper describes the global architecture of a simulation environment we have designed to anal... more This paper describes the global architecture of a simulation environment we have designed to analyze team sport strate- gies. We do not introduce original algorithms to solve specific problems but we focus more on their relations with cognitive ones. Our goal is to implement a tool that can help scientists to understand some human behaviors and coaches to prepare specific strategies. We do not only want to produce 3D realis- tic animations but also to integrate symbolic elements related to their way of thinking: this consideration led us to an "Aug- mented Reality" approach in which we try to put together video data, 3D models and symbolic elements. This work is being developed in the frame of a collaboration between two research groups of Marseilles University, one of them working in Computer Graphics and Image Processing, and the other one working in Cognitive Sciences. Applications are devel- oped in the frame of partnerships with professional sport groups.
would also like to thank Gerd Gigerenzer, John Wixted, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpfu... more would also like to thank Gerd Gigerenzer, John Wixted, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful critiques of an earlier version of this manuscript. Special thanks to Dominique Boutet and the students at IUT of Bretigny sur Orge for their participation in the Experiments.
Analysis of sportsmen's performance in recall or problem-solving task simulated in laboratory sho... more Analysis of sportsmen's performance in recall or problem-solving task simulated in laboratory shows that expert are generally better in recalling material when information is correctly structured, that is to say coherent related to the logic of the sport (see for a review on these experiments). However, we know little about the psychological processes subtending these performances and it is the aim of this presentation to identify the nature of these operations. Rather to study a classical recall task we have used a task of judgement of similarity more appropriated to reproduce some characteristics of the situations found in actual play. Indeed, we hypothesis that in play, when facing a visual play configuration, the player has to activate his or he knowledge base, and then to compare the present situation to the ones stored in long term memory, and finally to chose the more appropriate response to the present situation. The tasks of judgement of similarity used in our experiments share some particularity with this description. The player has to store in his or her working memory a first play configuration and following its disappearance to compare it to another play configuration in order to judge if it is similar or different to the previous one. Another interest of using a task of judgement of similarity is that this task has been widely studied and we have a coherent view of psychological processing subtending this operation . The originality of the study lies in the fact that we have compared the players' performances in the experiments to the simulation of a mathematical model specially developed for this research by . The model is of algebraic type, and it can be interpreted as a neuron-like model given that its basic operations reduce to computing sums of products (i.e. algebraic polynomials), and simple vectorial operations. It comprises three stages: a perceptual encoding stage, whose input is the set of coordinates of players and ball in a low level space generated by image processing, and whose output is a real vector called "access code". Access codes are assumed to vanish rapidly after the source stimulus disappeared. An access code allows for accessing a second stage, called knowledge system, whose output vector, called "post-access code", is the projection of the access code in a vectorial space of features, and then represents what was recognized from the target stimulus. It is assumed that post-access codes vanish much more slowly than access codes, and that the space of post-access codes is the space on which expert functions are learned. The third stage is a decision stage that can compare two post-access codes and provides a same/different judgement in a probabilistic way. One can note that the first stages are not task dependent, while the third stage is the only one that is specifically devoted to comparison tasks. It is assumed that the first two stages correspond to automatic parallel activation subsystems, while the third stage is under control of central processes. Finally, it is assumed that the only basic difference between experts and novices is the content of their respective knowledge systems.
The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under... more The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under a veil of ignorance, where two alternative policy positions-Rawlsian maximin and Harsanyian utilitarianism-are taking into account, are constructed and investigated. The first model is based on a stylized approach of typical psychological features such as risk-aversion and prosocial preferences that likely underlie choices of welfare policies. On the basis of these individual features, choices are made in compliance with laws of social psychology of imitation and influence and the model describes the various temporary modes of self-identification of a social community, including cyclic self-identification, i.e. cycles of successive adoption of the two alternative policies. The second model is presented by means of an autonomous system of ordinary differential equations. A qualitative analysis of this system shows possible ways of explaining social choices under hierarchies based on risk aversion and prosocial preferences.
The Monty-Hall Problem (MHP) has been used to argue against a subjectivist view of Bayesianism in... more The Monty-Hall Problem (MHP) has been used to argue against a subjectivist view of Bayesianism in two ways. First, psychologists have used it to illustrate that people do not revise their degrees of belief in line with experimenters' application of Bayes' rule. Second, philosophers view MHP and its two-player extension (MHP 2) as evidence that probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. Both arguments neglect the Bayesian standpoint, which requires that MHP 2 (studied here) be described in different terms than usually applied and that the initial set of possibilities be stable (i.e., a focusing situation). This article corrects these errors and reasserts the Bayesian standpoint; namely, that the subjective probability of an event is always conditional on a belief reviser's specific current state of knowledge.
The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under... more The conceptual and mathematical models of a social community behavior in a choice situation under a veil of ignorance, where two alternative policy positions -Rawlsian maximin and Harsanyian utilitarianism -are taking into account, are constructed and investigated. The first model is based on a stylized approach of typical psychological features such as risk-aversion and prosocial preferences that likely underlie choices of welfare policies. On the basis of these individual features, choices are made in compliance with laws of social psychology of imitation and influence and the model describes the various temporary modes of self-identification of a social community, including cyclic self-identification, i.e. cycles of successive adoption of the two alternative policies. The second model is presented by means of an autonomous system of ordinary differential equations. A qualitative analysis of this system shows possible ways of explaining social choices under hierarchies based on risk aversion and prosocial preferences. differential equations in welfare policies analysis, qualitative analysis of dynamic systems.
International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 2005
Recently, we published a study whose purpose was to identify the levels of processing that underl... more Recently, we published a study whose purpose was to identify the levels of processing that underlie decision making in expert and novice soccer players in simulated game situations (Poplu, Baratgin, Mavromatis, & Ripoll, 2003). The results of this study showed that the levels of processing involved depend on the characteristics of the task. A 3‐Alternative Forced Choice task requires essentially
International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 2003
... It consisted of planning a game sequence composed of three consecutive actions, which, starti... more ... It consisted of planning a game sequence composed of three consecutive actions, which, starting from the position of the player with the ball would permit the team to keep possession of the ball (eg, pass, dribble, and pass) or to score a goal (eg, dribble, pass, and shoot ...
The Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning generalizes binary logic, extending the bina... more The Bayesian approach to the psychology of reasoning generalizes binary logic, extending the binary concept of consistency to that of coherence, and allowing the study of deductive reasoning from uncertain premises. Studies in judgment and decision making have found that people's probability judgments can fail to be coherent. We investigated people's coherence further for judgments about conjunctions, disjunctions and conditionals, and asked whether their coherence would increase when they were given the explicit task of drawing inferences. Participants gave confidence judgments about a list of separate statements (the statements group) or the statements grouped as explicit inferences (the inferences group). Their responses were generally coherent at above chance levels for all the inferences investigated, regardless of the presence of an explicit inference task. An exception was that they were incoherent in the context known to cause the conjunction fallacy, and remained so even when they were given an explicit inference. The participants were coherent under the assumption that they interpreted the natural language conditional as it is represented in Bayesian accounts of conditional reasoning, but they were incoherent under the assumption that they interpreted the natural language conditional as the material conditional of elementary binary logic. Our results provide further support for the descriptive adequacy of Bayesian reasoning principles in the study of deduction under uncertainty.
ABSTRACT The various experimental studies conducted by psychologists on probabilistic reasoning t... more ABSTRACT The various experimental studies conducted by psychologists on probabilistic reasoning tend to conclude that the human mind is not Bayesian. However this conclusion appears debatable when one tries to shed light on the notion of Bayesian coherence. The main arguments of the literature illustrating the failure of human behaviour to adhere to the Bayesian model are analyzed. Conversely, the ineffectiveness of the studies themselves to fully comprehend what Bayesianism implies is extensively exposed.
A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative con... more A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B, and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B.
The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probabi... more The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating , in which the universe is evolving. In that case the structure of the universe has definitely been transformed and the revision message conveys information on the resulting universe. The second part of the paper presents four experiments based on the Monty Hall puzzle that aim to show that updating is a natural frame for individuals to revise their beliefs.
The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which justifies the underlying... more The Sleeping Beauty problem is presented in a formalized framework which justifies the underlying probability structure. The two rival solutions proposed in the literature by Elga and Lewis differ by a single parameter and can be easily compared. They rest in two different ways on the 'no news no change' principle asserting that subjective belief only changes in case of new information. But they differ by the cognitive attitude attributed to Sleeping Beauty, who is 'fuzzy-minded' for Elga and 'blank-minded' for Lewis. Moreover, the traditional absent-minded driver problem is reinterpreted in this framework and sustains Elga's solution.
Abstract The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic proba... more Abstract The Bayesian model is used in psychology as the reference for the study of dynamic probability judgment. The main limit induced by this model is that it confines the study of revision of degrees of belief to the sole situations of revision in which the universe ...
This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the B... more This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: an epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (1) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (2) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis' rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes' rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties.
This paper describes the global architecture of a simulation environment we have designed to anal... more This paper describes the global architecture of a simulation environment we have designed to analyze team sport strate- gies. We do not introduce original algorithms to solve specific problems but we focus more on their relations with cognitive ones. Our goal is to implement a tool that can help scientists to understand some human behaviors and coaches to prepare specific strategies. We do not only want to produce 3D realis- tic animations but also to integrate symbolic elements related to their way of thinking: this consideration led us to an "Aug- mented Reality" approach in which we try to put together video data, 3D models and symbolic elements. This work is being developed in the frame of a collaboration between two research groups of Marseilles University, one of them working in Computer Graphics and Image Processing, and the other one working in Cognitive Sciences. Applications are devel- oped in the frame of partnerships with professional sport groups.
would also like to thank Gerd Gigerenzer, John Wixted, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpfu... more would also like to thank Gerd Gigerenzer, John Wixted, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful critiques of an earlier version of this manuscript. Special thanks to Dominique Boutet and the students at IUT of Bretigny sur Orge for their participation in the Experiments.
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