Hanne Andersen

University of Copenhagen, Section for History and Philosophy of Science, Faculty Member

Followers

385

Following

217

Co-authors

Mentions

482

Public Views

As a historian and philosopher of science situated within a Faculty of Science, I am deeply engaged in making history, philosophy and sociology of science relevant to researchers and educators as well as to academic leaders and policy makers.

I was elected member of the European Academy of Sciences in 2018 and corresponding member of l'Academie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences in 2019.

Research

My primary research focus is on the historical development and structural conditions of 20th and 21st century science, broadly construed. In examining science as it is practiced, I integrate historical and contemporary case studies with analytical tools drawn from general philosophy of science, social epistemology, and research ethics.

I am currently working on two closely related projects. The one is a historical-philosophical analysis of the overarching systemic forces that has promoted or halted scientific progress from the mid-20th century an onwards, how contemporary epistemic goals and values compare to those of the past, and how tensions and imbalances in the systemic forces can create severe challenges for the scientific endeavor. The other is to develop a philosophical account of epistemic sustainability that is thoroughly based on historical as well as contemporary case studies of how changes in scientific practices promote or hinder not only scientific progress per se, but also the regeneration of epistemic skills and competencies across generation as well as the capacity of the scientific community to continuously filter, store and transmit a growing scientific record in posterity. For both projects, an important aim of my research is to provide important input and guidance for ongoing debates in science policy on research organization, research funding, and strategic research planning.

These two current projects build on and synthesize much of my previous historical and philosophical work on interdisciplinarity and expertise, on research integrity, and on academic institutions and scholarly careers.

Research leadership

I have been PI of the research project "Philosophy of Contemporary Science in Practice" which was funded by the Danish Research Council for the Humanities as part of the program for Female Reseach Leaders; co-team leader (together with Team leader Marcel Weber) of Team B: The life sciences in the ESF research network "The Philosophy of Science in a European Persepctive" ; and PI (together with co-PIs Samuel Schindler and Peter Sandøe) of the Danish Research Network for Philosophy of Science (funded by the Danish Research Council for the Humanities from 2011 to 2015).

Institutional leadership

During my career, I have served in a range of leadership positions. An overarching goal for me has to be to increase interactions between history, philosophy and sociology of science as well as between scholars studying science and practicing scientists, science educators and science policy-makers, and to intensify interdisciplinary and international collaboration.

Reflecting this overarching goal, I have served in leadership positions in scholarly societies for history of science, philosophy of science, and the sciences. Currently, I serve as chair of Section L for History and Philosophy of Science in the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and as chair of the Danish National Committee for History and Philosophy of Science. Previously, I have served as EiC of the journal Centaurus - the official journal of the European History of Science Society, and I have served on the steering committees of governing boards of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA). European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) and Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP).

During most of my career, I have also served in various leadership positions at the universities where I have been employed (see CV). In this capacity, I have continuously aimed at using insights from history, philosophy and sociology of science to inform and improve leadership and policy development within the sector of research and higher education. Vice versa, as a scholar working on the structure and development of 20th and 21st century science, I draw on my experience from university leadership and management when conducting comparative studies of science and its institutions as it develops over time and varies across institutions, countries and cultures.

Finally, as a current member of member of the Panel of independent experts to facilitate replies to technical questions from the general public on a long-term solution for radioactive waste in Denmark, and a past member of the Danish Committee on Research Misconduct, I aim at making historical and philosophical reflections on the practice and role of science relevant within the scientific community as well as to the public at large.
Phone: +45 93565245
Address: Section for History and Philosophy of Science, Department of Science Education
Niels Bohr Building, Universitetsparken 5
DK-211 Copenhagen Ø

less

Ian James Kidd

University of Nottingham

Heather Douglas

Michigan State University

Paul Hoyningen-Huene

Leibniz Universität Hannover

Beatrice Jauregui

University of Toronto

Marc Champagne

Kwantlen Polytechnic University

David Seamon

Kansas State University

John Tasioulas

University of Oxford

Theodore Arabatzis

National & Kapodistrian University of Athens

Bart Penders

Maastricht University

Noe Cornago

University of the Basque Country, Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

InterestsView All (14)

Uploads

Books by Hanne Andersen

Empirical philosophy of science

by Hanne Andersen and nancy nersessian

The book examines the emerging approach of using qualitative methods, such as interviews and fiel... more The book examines the emerging approach of using qualitative methods, such as interviews and field observations, in the philosophy of science. Qualitative methods are gaining popularity among philosophers of science as more and more scholars are resorting to empirical work in their study of scientific practices. At the same time, the results produced through empirical work are quite different from those gained through the kind of introspective conceptual analysis more typical of philosophy. This volume explores the benefits and challenges of an empirical philosophy of science and addresses questions such as: What do philosophers gain from empirical work? How can empirical research help to develop philosophical concepts? How do we integrate philosophical frameworks and empirical research? What constraints do we accept when choosing an empirical approach? What constraints does a pronounced theoretical focus impose on empirical work? Nine experts discuss their thoughts and empirical results in the chapters of this book with the aim of providing readers with an answer to these questions.

Videnskabsteori for de biologiske fag

by Hanne Andersen and Claus Emmeche

On Kuhn

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Download

Papers by Hanne Andersen

Vedkommende videnskabsteori

Conceptual Development in Interdisciplinary Research

Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice, 2012

Concepts and conceptual change

Synthese, 1990

This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive ... more This paper argues that questions concerning the nature of concepts that are central in cognitive psychology are also important to epistemology and that there is more to conceptual change than mere belief revision. Understanding of epistemic change requires appreciation of the complex ways in which concepts are structured and organized and of how this organization can affect belief revision. Following a brief summary of the psychological functions of concepts and a discussion of some recent accounts of what ...

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolution

Download

Philosophy of Scientific Malpractice

SATS, 2021

This paper presents current work in philosophy of science in practice that focusses on practices ... more This paper presents current work in philosophy of science in practice that focusses on practices that are detrimental to the production of scientific knowledge. The paper argues that philosophy of scientific malpractice both provides an epistemological complement to research ethics in understanding scientific misconduct and questionable research practices, and provides a new approach to how training in responsible conduct of research can be implemented.

Download

Adapting practice-based philosophy of science to teaching of science students

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

The “practice turn” in philosophy of science has strengthened the connections between philosophy ... more The “practice turn” in philosophy of science has strengthened the connections between philosophy and scientific practice. Apart from reinvigorating philosophy of science, this also increases the relevance of philosophical research for science, society, and science education. In this paper, we reflect on our extensive experience with teaching mandatory philosophy of science courses to science students from a range of programs at University of Copenhagen. We highlight some of the lessons we have learned in making philosophy of science “fit for teaching” outside of philosophy circles by taking selected cases from the students’ own field as the starting point. We argue for adapting philosophy of science teaching to particular audiences of science students, and discuss the benefits of drawing on research within science education to inform curriculum and course design. This involves reconsidering teaching resources, assumptions about students, intended learning outcomes, and teaching formats. We also argue that to make philosophy of science relevant and engaging to science students, it is important to consider their potential career trajectories. By anticipating future contexts and situations in which methodological, conceptual, and ethical questions could be relevant, philosophy of science can demonstrate its value in the education of science students.

The role of testimony in mathematics

Synthese

Mathematicians appear to have quite high standards for when they will rely on testimony. Many mat... more Mathematicians appear to have quite high standards for when they will rely on testimony. Many mathematicians require that a number of experts testify that they have checked the proof of a result p before they will rely on p in their own proofs without checking the proof of p. We examine why this is. We argue that for each expert who testifies that she has checked the proof of p and found no errors, the likelihood that the proof contains no substantial errors increases because different experts will validate the proof in different ways depending on their background knowledge and individual preferences. If this is correct, there is much to be gained for a mathematician from requiring that a number of experts have checked the proof of p before she will rely on p in her own proofs without checking the proof of p. In this way a mathematician can protect her own work and the work of others from errors. Our argument thus provides an explanation for mathematicians’ attitude towards relying on testimony.

Women in the History of Philosophy of Science: What We Do and Do Not Know

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2013

bias or blindness? Are women philosophers disproportionately underemployed and thus do not lend s... more bias or blindness? Are women philosophers disproportionately underemployed and thus do not lend sufficient prestige to conference programs? Is gender exclusion an issue at all (i.e., hasn’t that problem been adequately addressed already)? The intention of this forum is not to criticize the organizers of the Feyerabend 2012 conference, who worked to correct the imbalance by adding a special plenary session to the program featuring Carla Fehr andVera Tripodi on “Gender Bias as a Threat to Pluralism” (see http://www2.hu-berlin.de/feyerabend2012/). Rather, the listserv discussion suggests that there remain serious epistemic and ethical concerns surrounding patterns of gender exclusion in the philosophy of science. Indeed, numerous responses online noted that any conference focused on Feyerabend’s philosophy would have to include his fundamental concept of pluralism, which is a theme most fully explored by feminist approaches to the philosophy of science. Thus, the listserv discussion provided an occasion to invite philosophers of science “of the female persuasion” at various stages of their careers to reflect on the status of women in the history of philosophy of science. I thank Hanne Andersen, Noretta Koertge, Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Helen E. Longino, and AmyWuest for generously contributing their interesting and varied reflections to this forum.

Demarcating misconduct from misinterpretations and mistakes

Within recent years, scientific misconduct has become an increasingly important topic. Spectacula... more Within recent years, scientific misconduct has become an increasingly important topic. Spectacular cases have been extensively covered in the news media, such as the cases of the Korean stem cell researcher Hwang, the German nanoscientist Schön, or the Norwegian cancer researcher Sudbø. In Science's latest annual "breakthrough of the year" report from December 2006, the descriptions of the year's hottest breakthroughs were accompanied by a similar description of "the breakdown of the year: scientific fraud". But scientific fraud is by no means a new phenomenon. However, until the 1980es it remained the standard view of science that it was a self-correcting system in which fraud would soon be discovered and corrected. This view of science as selfcorrecting changed in the 1980s after a series of spectacular cases had reached the public media. The so-called "Summerlin case" in which the dermatologist William T. Summerlin from the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Institute had faked transplantation results by darkening skin patches on a white mouse with a black felt-tip pen was vividly described to the public in the 1976 monograph The Patchwork Mouse (Hixon 1976). By the same token, the monograph Betrayers of the Truth (1982) written by the two science journalists William Broad and Nicholas Wade partly on the basis of the articles they had written for Science and for New Scientist on various misconduct cases also attracted attention.

Download

The Early History of the Protein-only Hypothesis: Scientific Change and Multidisciplinary Research

Infectious Processes, 2004

In 1997, the American neurologist and biochemist Stanley B. Prusiner received the Nobel Prize in ... more In 1997, the American neurologist and biochemist Stanley B. Prusiner received the Nobel Prize in medicine for his discovery of ‘prions’ - a new biological principle of infection. Preceding this discovery lies a complicated history of the research on a number of neurodegenerative diseases, including the sheep disease scrapie. During the 1960s, research on scrapie revealed that the infectious agent had very unusual characteristics, and a variety of hypotheses regarding the principle of scrapie infection were advanced. However, not until the 1980s did a single hypothesis, Prusiner’s prion hypothesis — which is basically a protein-only hypothesis1 — succeed in attracting the attention of the majority of the scientific community. Interestingly, protein-only hypotheses had been advanced as early as the mid-1960s but without receiving any notable support from other scientists than those who had advanced them.

Nomic concepts, frames, and conceptual change : Experiment and Conceptual Change

Philosophy of Science, 2000

Dans la section experimentation et changement conceptuel du 60 e congres de l'Association de ... more Dans la section experimentation et changement conceptuel du 60 e congres de l'Association de Philosophie des Sciences, l'A. etudie l'approche de la science cognitive et la theorie des concepts nomiques developpees par T. Kuhn dans le cadre de la theorie de la representation des situations problematiques.

History and Philosophy of Modern Epidemiology

Epidemiological studies of chronic diseases began around the mid-20th century. Contrary to the in... more Epidemiological studies of chronic diseases began around the mid-20th century. Contrary to the infectious disease epidemiology which had prevailed at the beginning of the 20th century and which had focused on single agents causing individual diseases, the chronic disease epidemiology which emerged at the end of Word War II was a much more complex enterprise that investigated a multiplicity of risk factors for each disease. Involved in the development of chronic disease epidemi-ology were therefore fundamental discussions on the notion of causality, especially the question when causal inferences could be justified. In this paper, I shall analyze the implicit normativity of these de-bates. First, I shall give a brief overview of the historical background on which chronic disease epi-demiology emerged and describe how the pioneer studies on smoking and lung cancer became icon of the major challenge that the emerging chronic disease epidemiology was facing: the impossibility of proving that statistical associations reflected causal relations. Next, I shall describe how the develop-ment from the monocausal enterprise of infectious disease epidemiology to the multicausal enterprise of chronic disease epidemiology gave rise to intense discussions of the possible criteria by which to establish causal relationships between a given factor and a particular disease. I shall show how the necessary and sufficient conditions expressed in the so-called Henle-Koch criteria that had proved useful for the 19th century investigations of infectious diseases remained an ideal, although clearly an unobtainable one. Thus, I shall show how 20th century chronic disease epidemiologists on the one hand were searching for a new set of general principles which would provide a logical framework for their investigations, but on the other hand admitted that they would have to accept something more "pragmatic". I shall analyze the various positions in this debate, arguing that the implacability of the debate was due to unrecognized normative issues. I shall argue that many insisted on a distinction between science and application that was untenable, but that due to this distinction the values in-volved in deciding whether or not to act on the basis of a hypothesis were rarely explicitly discussed and the decision therefore continued to appear as a matter of taste rather than the result of a cogent normative analysis.

Essay Review: The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Journal For the History of Astronomy, 2009

Conceptual Development and Dynamic Realism

Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2013

This paper focuses on Thomas S. Kuhn's work on taxonomic concepts and how it relates to empir... more This paper focuses on Thomas S. Kuhn's work on taxonomic concepts and how it relates to empirical work from the cognitive sciences on categorization and conceptual development. I shall first review the basic features of Kuhn's family resemblance account and compare to work from the cognitive sciences. I shall then show how Kuhn's account can be extended to cover the development of new taxonomies in science, and I shall illustrate by a detailed case study that Kuhn himself mentioned only briefly in his own work, namely the discovery of X-rays and radioactivity.

Science, Technology and Society Studies - Scandinavian Perspectives

Kvalitative metoder i sundhedsvidenskaberne

Bibliotek for laeger

Empirical philosophy of science

by Hanne Andersen and nancy nersessian

Videnskabsteori for de biologiske fag

by Hanne Andersen and Claus Emmeche

On Kuhn

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Download

Vedkommende videnskabsteori

Conceptual Development in Interdisciplinary Research

Scientific Concepts and Investigative Practice, 2012

Concepts and conceptual change

Synthese, 1990

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolution

Download

Philosophy of Scientific Malpractice

SATS, 2021

Download

Adapting practice-based philosophy of science to teaching of science students

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

The role of testimony in mathematics

Synthese

Women in the History of Philosophy of Science: What We Do and Do Not Know

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 2013

Demarcating misconduct from misinterpretations and mistakes

Download

The Early History of the Protein-only Hypothesis: Scientific Change and Multidisciplinary Research

Infectious Processes, 2004

Nomic concepts, frames, and conceptual change : Experiment and Conceptual Change

Philosophy of Science, 2000

History and Philosophy of Modern Epidemiology

Essay Review: The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Journal For the History of Astronomy, 2009

Conceptual Development and Dynamic Realism

Studia Philosophica Estonica, 2013

Science, Technology and Society Studies - Scandinavian Perspectives

Kvalitative metoder i sundhedsvidenskaberne

Bibliotek for laeger

Epistemic dependence in contemporary science: Practices and malpractices

Philosophy of science has had little focus on malpractices in science such as intentional fraud o... more Philosophy of science has had little focus on malpractices in science such as intentional fraud or gross negligence. Complementing the ethical literature on intentional deceit, this paper will focus on the epistemological issues of scientific misconduct. I shall start from the premise that collaborating scientists very often need to trust their collaborators, and I shall argue that this calls for procedures for calibrating trust and distrust during the research process. Based on an examination of some recent misconduct cases I shall argue that the uneasiness sometimes expressed with respect to collaborators responsibility can be resolved by distinguishing between scientists’ moral and epistemic character.

The Influence Of Kant's Philosophy On The Young H. C. Ørsted

Hans Christian Ørsted And The Romantic Legacy In Science, 2007

ABSTRACT In attempting to answer the question why it was H. C. Ørsted (1777–1851) who discovered ... more ABSTRACT In attempting to answer the question why it was H. C. Ørsted (1777–1851) who discovered electromagnetism, historians of science have discussed whether Ørsted was influenced by Schelling’s Naturphilosophie or rather by Kant’s philosophy. Thus, R. C. Stauffer and L. P. Williams have seen Ørsted’s discovery of electromagnetism as closely related to the influence which J. W. F. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie had exerted on Ørsted prior to the discovery; the main point being that Ørsted did not perceive of electricity, heat, light, and magnetism as imponderable, corpuscular fluids but as forces of a common origin.

Kuhn's Theory of Concepts

by Hanne Andersen and Peter Barker

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2006

New Challenges to Philosophy of Science

by Hanne Andersen and Thomas Uebel

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein.

Download

Hanne Andersen

Uploads

Books by Hanne Andersen

Papers by Hanne Andersen

Log In