Klaus Gärtner
Klaus Gärtner studied Philosophy at the University of Regensburg. He obtained his PhD at the Instituto da Filosofia da NOVA (Universidade Nova de Lisboa). Currently, he is a Researcher at the Departamento de História e Filosofia das Ciências and member of the Centro de Filosofia das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa in the Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa. He is also a founding member of the Lisbon Mind and Reasoning Group. His research interests include Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology and Metaphysics.
Phone: + (351) 217 500 365
Address: Centro de Filosofia das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa (CFCUL)
Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa
Campo Grande, Edifício C4, 3º Piso, Sala 4.3.24
1749-016 Lisboa, Portugal
Phone: + (351) 217 500 365
Address: Centro de Filosofia das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa (CFCUL)
Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa
Campo Grande, Edifício C4, 3º Piso, Sala 4.3.24
1749-016 Lisboa, Portugal
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Drafts by Klaus Gärtner
(Please see the full CFP attached)
We especially encourage researchers who are women and/or from underrepresented minorities or social classes to submit.
Please send your contributions to hipolito.ines@gmail.com.
Deadline: 31st of January, 2018
Papers by Klaus Gärtner
In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework.
(Please see the full CFP attached)
We especially encourage researchers who are women and/or from underrepresented minorities or social classes to submit.
Please send your contributions to hipolito.ines@gmail.com.
Deadline: 31st of January, 2018
In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework.