International Relations Theory

An exploration of ASEAN's "lasting peace" and the fallacies of grand theories of international relations. I contend that ASEAN's lack of major war is more down to capitalism rather than community, and that ASEAN is not as secure as it seems.

This paper argues that what it means to be in the midst of a world-historical moment, is to be in a state of anticipation concerning the end of history conceived of as the achievement of justice. It means, on the one hand, to be at a conjuncture that offers the possibility of justice, and, on the other, to be in a state of uncertainty as to its ultimate fulfillment. I proceed by, first, examining the doctrine of the end of history, arguing that world-historical events always appear as a promise to end history, but have to date only punctuated it. Each world-historical event opens up a historical horizon constituting a new world-historical moment, and therefore a new promise for justice and the end of history. Second, I examine the modes of signification by which we attempt to reveal, or have revealed to us, truths about human existence that suggest a path to the end of history. Third, I explore the various ways in which human beings are subjectivated by world-history, along with the varieties of angst and uncertainty that each world-historical moment brings. I conclude with a summation, and some speculative offerings as to the possibility of justice on our horizon.

In the world of finance, experts have spent decades developing complex investment instruments known as Options in order to minimize the scope and impact of risk taken by investors speculating on the market. Such models are highly technical and mathematical in character, which is aptly suited to a quantitative field of Financial Economics. However, many aspects of Options, including their core underlying assumptions, are grounded in inter-temporal philosophical concepts that are analogous to, and suitable for application in, qualitative fields of study, including international strategy and diplomatic relations. This paper argues that Options Theory provides a ready-made set of models and concepts that could be adapted for diplomatic negotiations and strategies in rapidly changing contexts, but that has as yet been under-exploited in the field of international relations and political theory in general. Drawing on the work of Elie Ayache and Robert Meister, I argue that an international political Options theory is not only possible but already exists. I will demonstrate this claim by applying some core tenets of Options Theory to the anticipated negotiations and strategic realignments that the United Kingdom is and will be engaging in as the reality of Brexit approaches its denouement amidst a disintegrating Western Liberal Democratic alliance.

Necropolitics centers on the dark side of biopolitics, but if we are to take seriously Jacques Ranciere’s reassignment of ‘politics’ and ‘police,’ then what is revealed by necropolitical analysis is not simply the capacity to ‘make and let die’, but also the policing of a contingent order sustained by necropolitics. I describe this process as the necropolice-economy, and in this paper demonstrate its contours with reference to the COVID-19 pandemic which, I argue, has revealed the expendability of particular populations under conditions of risk and uncertainty. My analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I present the thesis of necropolice economy, arguing that the capitalist system has historically produced not simply a political economy, but a policed economy that induces a necropolitics of dis- pensability for unproductive or replaceable populations. Second, I develop this thesis by examining the relegation of society in relation to the economy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, I argue that the inability of states to be decisive in the pandemic reveals that the sovereign prerogative to decide on the exception is constrained by capitalist forces. This suggests that the world market is itself a sovereign force, though it is one that remains ever dependent on state violence. To conclude, I ask whether we can channel the trauma of death made visible into processes of memorialization that might catalyze revolutionary action, rather than accelerating the evolution of our necropolice economy into its next capitalist guise—I ask, provocatively, whether an emancipatory necropolitics might yet result from the contemporary moment.

Necropolitics centers on the dark side of biopolitics, but if we are to take seriously Jacques Ranciere’s reassignment of ‘politics’ and ‘police,’ then what is revealed by necropolitical analysis is not simply the capacity to ‘make and let die’, but also the policing of a contingent order sustained by necropolitics. I describe this process as the necropolice-economy, and in this paper demonstrate its contours with reference to the COVID-19 pandemic which, I argue, has revealed the expendability of particular populations under conditions of risk and uncertainty. My analysis proceeds in three parts. First, I present the thesis of necropolice economy, arguing that the capitalist system has historically produced not simply a political economy, but a policed economy that induces a necropolitics of dispensability for unproductive or replaceable populations. Second, I develop this thesis by examining the relegation of society in relation to the economy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Third, ...

This article explores venture capital (VC) as a means and process of accumulating future social necessity. It explores the mechanisms of growth that make VC-backed firms distinct. I argue that a distinctive feature of surplus value capture through VC is valorization via socially necessary contracted space-time, a corrective to Marx's theorization of socially necessary labor time, which appears incomplete in the context of VC. First, extending Marx's general formula for capital, I develop a general formula for VC, demonstrating how the VC investment upends traditional theories of capitalist accumulation. Second, I argue that VC invests in firms seeking to capture 'human capital' resources and uncapitalized market 'space' (noncapitalist social logics of exchange) with the aim of achieving 'product-market fit'. Third, I demonstrate how time and space are contracted under the VC process as a value capture (VC) mechanism relating to future social necessity. VC is, I argue, about accumulating today what we will all need to be consuming tomorrow, just to keep up with social norms. Finally, I explore how the valorization of crisis (VC) demonstrates the accumulation of future social necessity in practice. I conclude with thoughts concerning the possibility of alternatives beyond the overdetermined rapacity of 'VC'.

This paper seeks to situate the practices of diplomatic representation and dialogue within a wider framework of responses to international crisis and attempts at ordering international politics, using the case study of Kosovo after the NATO intervention in 1999 until the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in 2008. A theoretical framework for the study of Western diplomacy and practices of maintaining international society has been proposed by the English School (ES) of International Relations, which sees diplomacy as a primary, if not the ‘master-institution,’ of international society (Wight, 1978: 113). International society, in turn, is conceived as a community of states within the wider states system that share a certain culture and common interests, as well as norms and values like a preference for negotiated solutions over war. In this context, I regard the diplomatic responses to the inter-ethnic struggle in Kosovo as a useful case study into the workings of diplomacy in terms of English School understandings of maintaining international society. Beginning from the reading of diplomatic activity as governed by the art of the possible, I seek to understand how the international diplomatic corps as a ‘epistemic community’ strove to impose order on the periphery of European international society, defined by protection of minorities, respect for the rule of law, and mutual respect in international relations (Cross, 2007). This ‘reading’ of crisis diplomacy in the context of the Kosovo conflict derives from an English School concern with legitimation of international law at the boundaries of activist legal reform, as well as the perspective of the role of standards of ‘civilisation’ in international relations (Gong, 1984).

This paper seeks to address the tension between Britain's role as an outsider in the European integration process and its pro-enlargement policy with regard to the Western Balkans. Coloured by its liberal interventionist involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Yugoslavia in 1995 and 1999 (eds Daddow & Gaskarth 2011), Britain has attempted to cover its bases by pursuing inclusive enlargement while demanding adherence to standards of liberal democracy, the rule of law and respect for ethnic minorities. Nonetheless, Britain remains affected by the deep divide between its domestic elite and public opinion with regard to European enlargement and integration, and also faces accusations of pursuing enlargement as a way of weakening the Euro- pean project (Herranz-Surralles 2012; Chatham House 2012). Using identity- based and discursive analysis of Britain's foreign policy, this paper argues that British policy toward the Western Balkans has been part and parcel of attempts to control the enlargement process while isolating Britain from further integration into the EU. Importantly, Britain is as involved as Germany and France in empire-building in the candidate states (Zielonka 2006; ed. Parker 2008; Subotic 2011).

Presented at "The New Perspectives for Western Balkans" panel at CDRSI's Academic Conference „Western Balkans After 2013 Enlargement – Escape From Limbo? “ October 31 – November 03, 2013, Kopaonik, Serbia

In a context of the perpetually shifting lines of division between East and West in Europe, defining what is ‘really’ Europe and what is outside of it is a perennial project to making Europe – Morozov and Rumelili argue that Europe is externally constituted by differentiating itself from what is seen as its periphery, most often Turkey and Russia. The 1990s scholarship on this looks at how the projects of inventing Eastern Europe (Wolff) or imagining the Balkans (Todorova) rely on essentializing certain traits as ‘Balkan’ in order to draw conceptual and geographic boundaries between there and the rest of Europe, and are necessary to shoring up a certain definition of Europe itself. In this sense, EU enlargement/integration remains a project in dividing East from West, and defining itself through what it is not; it rests on determining outsiders from insiders, even within its own boundaries. In this way, the EU Copenhagen criteria and rules of accession function as new standards of civilization; states must be civilized into the European Community. This standard also serves as a moving target which disciplines state behavior while reinscribing their peripheral location and identity. With Croatia’s accession to the EU—what Jelena Subotic argues was a successful case of ‘identity convergence’ with Europe (contrasted to Serbia’s ‘identity divergence’)—the new border alters the actual and imaginary topography and limits of the ‘Balkans’. This raises the questions – can the Balkans ever fully become Europe without vacating their own categorization as such? Can Europe accept Balkan states and still remain ‘Europe’? After 2013 enlargement, where can we locate the Balkans?