Editorial Activities by Lloyd Humberstone
Books by Lloyd Humberstone
A collection of papers from Paul Hertz to Dov Gabbay - through Tarski, Gödel, Kripke - giving a g... more A collection of papers from Paul Hertz to Dov Gabbay - through Tarski, Gödel, Kripke - giving a general perspective about logical systems. These papers discuss questions such as the relativity and nature of logic, present tools such as consequence operators and combinations of logics, prove theorems such as translations between logics, investigate the domain of validity and application of fundamental results such as compactness and completeness. Each of these papers is presented by a specialist explaining its context, import and influence.
Papers by Lloyd Humberstone
The Philosophical Quarterly, Apr 1, 1991
The structure of ought-statements mirrored in the syntax of traditional deontic logic is bipartit... more The structure of ought-statements mirrored in the syntax of traditional deontic logic is bipartite. There is an obligation operator,'', read'it ought to be that', and then there is a sentence, A, say, which describes the way things would have to be for the obligation in ...
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Jun 1, 2006
This paper assembles examples and considerations bearing on such questions as the following. Are ... more This paper assembles examples and considerations bearing on such questions as the following. Are statements to the effect that someone is too young (for instance) or that someone is old enough always to be understood in terms of someone's being too young or too old for such-and-such—for example, for them to join a particular organization? And when a ‘such-and-such’ has been specified, is it always at least tacitly modal in force—in the case just given, too young or old enough to be able to join the organization? These questions are explored by means of a critical examination of the (affirmative) answers given to them by Eric Nelson in a 1980 paper on the subject, with part of the intention being to rescue Nelson's thoughtful discussion from the oblivion into which it appears to have fallen, judging by more recent contributions on the subject by semanticists.
Theoria, Jan 6, 2023
After some generalities about connections between functions and relations in Sections 1 and 2 rec... more After some generalities about connections between functions and relations in Sections 1 and 2 recalls the possibility of taking the semantic values of ‐ary Boolean connectives as ‐ary relations among truth‐values rather than as ‐ary truth functions. Section 3, the bulk of the paper, looks at correlates of these truth‐value relations as applied to formulas, and explores in a preliminary way how their properties are related to the properties of “logical relations” among formulas such as equivalence, implication (entailment) and contrariety (logical incompatibility), concentrating for illustrative purposes on binary logical relations such as those just listed. To avoid an excess of footnotes, some points have been deferred to an Appendix as “Longer Notes”.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Feb 1, 1991
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Mar 1, 1991
Analysis, Oct 1, 1971
T is widely thought that statements of the form'X ought to Y'imply, entail or presuppos... more T is widely thought that statements of the form'X ought to Y'imply, entail or presuppose statements of the form'X can Y', and that similarly, for the negative case,'X ought not to Y'implies, entails or presupposes that X can refrain from, avoid or stop Y-ing. This I take to ...
Logic Journal of the IGPL, Oct 18, 2022
This discussion explores the possibility of distinguishing a tighter notion of contrariety eviden... more This discussion explores the possibility of distinguishing a tighter notion of contrariety evident in the Square of Opposition, especially in its modal incarnations, than as that binary relation holding statements that cannot both be true, with or without the added rider ‘though can both be false’. More than one theorist has voiced the intuition that the paradigmatic contraries of the traditional Square are related in some such tighter way—involving the specific role played by negation in contrasting them—that distinguishes them from other pairs of incompatible statements constructed from the same conceptual materials. Prominent among examples, these other nonstandard pairs are the ‘new contraries’ presented by Robert Blanché’s hexagon(s) of opposition. With special, though not exclusive, attention to these cases, we investigate whether contrariety in the distinguished sense can be captured by adding to the incompatibility condition the further demand that the pair of statements concerned can be represented as the results of applying some sentence operator to the content in its scope, for one of the pair, and, for the other, the application of that same operator to the negation of that content. For one of the two cases, a Blanché case, of nonstandard contrariety singled out for attention, the question of whether such a representation is available is settled at the end of Section 4, and then in a more satisfying way in Section 5, though for the other case, noticed by Peter Simons, the question remains open, after some tentative discussion in one subsection, 6.2, of an Appendix (Section 6).
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1986
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Jan 8, 2009
Birkhäuser-Verlag eBooks, Dec 2, 2005
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sep 1, 1982
A.N. Prior once showed that on certain apparently reasonable assumptions, a thesis sometimes asso... more A.N. Prior once showed that on certain apparently reasonable assumptions, a thesis sometimes associated with the name of Hume to the effect that no set of factual statements can ever entail an evaluative statement (call this principle ‘H’), is quite untenable. We assume only that there is at least one statement of each kind, and that the negation of a factual statement (evaluative statement) is factual (evaluative, respectively) — a principle we may call ‘N'. Now consider the disjunction F V E of some factual with some evaluative statement. Since the disjunction is entailed by F, a factual statement, it must, if principle H is correct, be classified as factual. But by N, ∽ F is also factual, and this together with F V E entails E, thus violating H since E was exhypothesi an evaluative statement.
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Apr 1, 2009
Synthese, Aug 1, 1996
Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discu... more Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of
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Books by Lloyd Humberstone
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http://www.springer.com/birkhauser/mathematics/journal/11787
latest issue
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