Reviewed by Allen Thompson, Oregon State University
Simon James offers an engaging and useful v... more Reviewed by Allen Thompson, Oregon State University
Simon James offers an engaging and useful view about how parts of nature have constitutive value as important, often irreplaceable parts of meaningful wholes. It is a descriptive account of one way that nature can be valuable to human beings, which means contributing to human welfare, as an alternative to the dominant view that nature is valuable to us only as it provides resources useful in the pursuit of human ends. According to James, in addition to being valuable as a means or (as many environmental philosophers will insist) valuable as ends in themselves (i.e., final ends), parts of nature are valuable when they are key features of what we take to be meaningful in the context of a cultural identity that serves as the basis of (or precondition for) of our own self-understanding. Thus, parts of nature can have value to human beings as meaningful parts of a cultural, religious, or spiritual tradition that itself is meaningful because of who we understand ourselves to be.
The Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) has long debated how to define best practices. We ar... more The Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) has long debated how to define best practices. We argue that a principles-first approach offers more flexibility for restoration practitioners than a standards-based approach, is consistent with the developmental stage of restoration, and functions more effectively at a global level. However, the solution is not as simple as arguing that one approach to professional practice is sufficient. Principles and standards can and do operate effectively together, but only if they are coordinated in a transparent and systematic way. Effective professional guidance results when standards anchored by principles function in a way that is contextual and evolving. Without that clear relation to principles, the tendency to promote performance standards may lead to a narrowing of restoration practice and reduction in the potential to resolve very difficult and diverse ecological and environmental challenges. We offer recommendations on how the evolving pr...
Today humanity faces radical global climate change, mass species extinctions, and unprecedented t... more Today humanity faces radical global climate change, mass species extinctions, and unprecedented transformations to both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems across the globe. Environmental ethics is an academic subfield of philosophy concerned with normative and evaluative propositions about the world of nature and, perhaps more generally, the moral fabric of relations between human beings and the world we occupy. This Handbook contains 45 newly commissioned essays written by leading experts and emerging voices and represent some of the best and most contemporary thinking in environmental ethics. The chapters range over a broad variety of issues, concepts, and perspectives that are both central to and characteristic of the field, thus providing an authoritative but accessible account of the history, analysis, and prospect of ideas that are essential to contemporary environmental ethics.
Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to... more Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to nature because we can never have evidence that any part of non-human nature has intrinsic value. We argue that, at best, Svoboda's position leaves us with uncertainty about whether there is intrinsic value in the non-human natural world. This uncertainty, however, together with reason to believe that at least some non-human natural entities would possess intrinsic value if anything does, leaves us in a position to acquire evidence that non-human nature has intrinsic value. We appeal to Michael Huemer's (2013) Probabilistic Reasons Principle to argue that we have direct reasons to not act in ways destructive to non-human nature, even if this reason is defeasible. Hence, if having intrinsic value just is being a source of direct reasons, it also implies that non-human nature has intrinsic value.
Multiple anthropogenic environmental crises present themselves as morally problematic. Views of i... more Multiple anthropogenic environmental crises present themselves as morally problematic. Views of intergenerational ethics typically attempt to give account of to whom we owe obligations, what we owe them, and how we should act to satisfy these obligations. I address what it could mean and what we should do on the assumption that present generations are moral failures vis-a-vis the global environment and thus will deliver to future generations a significantly degraded world they don't deserve.
This chapter is about how a virtue of hope is possible in the face of unfolding, impending, and i... more This chapter is about how a virtue of hope is possible in the face of unfolding, impending, and irreversible anthropogenic global environmental change. A common approach defends the moral value of hope by appeal to its role motivating action to mitigate anthropogenic environmental damage. This makes the moral value of hope largely instrumental and derivative of consequences. I argue that saving historic nature (the ecosystems, biodiversity, and climate conditions characteristic of the Holocene) cannot be the object of the virtuous person's environmental hopes for the Anthropocene because such hopes involve denial. Nonetheless, a disposition to hope well is a virtue, and hopes about life on Earth under new and unstable environmental conditions should not be abandoned. I describe how a virtue of environmental hope for the Anthropocene is possible, but this requires that the objects and even the concept of hope itself be suitably adapted. We should embrace but pass through despair to grieve the loss of significant parts of historic nature, yet we must act as though we can save it. Then we should develop a radical hope akin to courage that human capacities for adaptation and flourishing, along with other systems of life on the planet, are resilient and up to challenges presented by novel and very difficult conditions of an emerging new ecological world order.
published in *Ethics, Policy, & Environment*, 2019
In a critical engagement with the second edition of Paul Thompson's The Spirit of the Soil, I off... more In a critical engagement with the second edition of Paul Thompson's The Spirit of the Soil, I offer two sets of considerations in support of developing his agrarian view of sustainability into a conception of enlightened land stewardship that is capable of serving as a wider conception of environmental ethics for the Anthropocene. First, I argue that paying attention to emergent novel ecosystems in a framework of adaptive ecosystem management across varied landscapes can help recognize and integrate values associated with both production and preservation, thus substantially easing the tension Thompson identifies between them. Second, Thompson's agrarian vision of sustainability in The Spirit of the Soil is unfortunately restricted by an essential connection with the work of growing and consuming food, but in The Agrarian Vision (2010) Thompson offers a much broader and inclusive conception agriculture. I argue that if we adopt his own broader conception of agriculture, then Thompson's arguments favoring the concept of sustainability over a model of global stewardship are significantly compromised.
It is widely accepted that we must adapt to climate change. But we sit on the edge of the radical... more It is widely accepted that we must adapt to climate change. But we sit on the edge of the radical, unprecedented and rapid, anthropogenic environmental changes that are driven by many factors in addition to GHG emissions. In this way, we occupy a unique and precarious position in the history of our species. Many basic conditions of life on Earth are changing at an alarming rate and thus we should begin to transform and broaden our thinking about adaptation. The conceptual history of climate adaptation intersects with conceptions of human development and sustainability, which provides a framework for adaptation in how we think about human flourishing and, subsequently, what it is to be human in the Anthropocene. If sustainability is about maintaining human welfare across generations but we acknowledge that climate change may undercut our ability to deliver as much and as good total or natural capital to subsequent generations, we have a residual duty to otherwise positively affect the welfare of future generations. A subjective, preference-based conception of human welfare is compared to an objective, capabilities-based approach and, while some adaptive preferences are unavoidable, embracing an objective theory of human flourishing provides a superior approach for meeting the residual duty we have to future generations by beginning the process of adapting our conception of human natural goodness, or what it is to be a good human being.
Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2010), pp. 43-59. * Reprinted in Virtue Ethics and the Environment, Sandler and Cafaro, eds. (Springer, 2010) , 2010
Reviewed by Allen Thompson, Oregon State University
Simon James offers an engaging and useful v... more Reviewed by Allen Thompson, Oregon State University
Simon James offers an engaging and useful view about how parts of nature have constitutive value as important, often irreplaceable parts of meaningful wholes. It is a descriptive account of one way that nature can be valuable to human beings, which means contributing to human welfare, as an alternative to the dominant view that nature is valuable to us only as it provides resources useful in the pursuit of human ends. According to James, in addition to being valuable as a means or (as many environmental philosophers will insist) valuable as ends in themselves (i.e., final ends), parts of nature are valuable when they are key features of what we take to be meaningful in the context of a cultural identity that serves as the basis of (or precondition for) of our own self-understanding. Thus, parts of nature can have value to human beings as meaningful parts of a cultural, religious, or spiritual tradition that itself is meaningful because of who we understand ourselves to be.
The Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) has long debated how to define best practices. We ar... more The Society for Ecological Restoration (SER) has long debated how to define best practices. We argue that a principles-first approach offers more flexibility for restoration practitioners than a standards-based approach, is consistent with the developmental stage of restoration, and functions more effectively at a global level. However, the solution is not as simple as arguing that one approach to professional practice is sufficient. Principles and standards can and do operate effectively together, but only if they are coordinated in a transparent and systematic way. Effective professional guidance results when standards anchored by principles function in a way that is contextual and evolving. Without that clear relation to principles, the tendency to promote performance standards may lead to a narrowing of restoration practice and reduction in the potential to resolve very difficult and diverse ecological and environmental challenges. We offer recommendations on how the evolving pr...
Today humanity faces radical global climate change, mass species extinctions, and unprecedented t... more Today humanity faces radical global climate change, mass species extinctions, and unprecedented transformations to both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems across the globe. Environmental ethics is an academic subfield of philosophy concerned with normative and evaluative propositions about the world of nature and, perhaps more generally, the moral fabric of relations between human beings and the world we occupy. This Handbook contains 45 newly commissioned essays written by leading experts and emerging voices and represent some of the best and most contemporary thinking in environmental ethics. The chapters range over a broad variety of issues, concepts, and perspectives that are both central to and characteristic of the field, thus providing an authoritative but accessible account of the history, analysis, and prospect of ideas that are essential to contemporary environmental ethics.
Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to... more Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to nature because we can never have evidence that any part of non-human nature has intrinsic value. We argue that, at best, Svoboda's position leaves us with uncertainty about whether there is intrinsic value in the non-human natural world. This uncertainty, however, together with reason to believe that at least some non-human natural entities would possess intrinsic value if anything does, leaves us in a position to acquire evidence that non-human nature has intrinsic value. We appeal to Michael Huemer's (2013) Probabilistic Reasons Principle to argue that we have direct reasons to not act in ways destructive to non-human nature, even if this reason is defeasible. Hence, if having intrinsic value just is being a source of direct reasons, it also implies that non-human nature has intrinsic value.
Multiple anthropogenic environmental crises present themselves as morally problematic. Views of i... more Multiple anthropogenic environmental crises present themselves as morally problematic. Views of intergenerational ethics typically attempt to give account of to whom we owe obligations, what we owe them, and how we should act to satisfy these obligations. I address what it could mean and what we should do on the assumption that present generations are moral failures vis-a-vis the global environment and thus will deliver to future generations a significantly degraded world they don't deserve.
This chapter is about how a virtue of hope is possible in the face of unfolding, impending, and i... more This chapter is about how a virtue of hope is possible in the face of unfolding, impending, and irreversible anthropogenic global environmental change. A common approach defends the moral value of hope by appeal to its role motivating action to mitigate anthropogenic environmental damage. This makes the moral value of hope largely instrumental and derivative of consequences. I argue that saving historic nature (the ecosystems, biodiversity, and climate conditions characteristic of the Holocene) cannot be the object of the virtuous person's environmental hopes for the Anthropocene because such hopes involve denial. Nonetheless, a disposition to hope well is a virtue, and hopes about life on Earth under new and unstable environmental conditions should not be abandoned. I describe how a virtue of environmental hope for the Anthropocene is possible, but this requires that the objects and even the concept of hope itself be suitably adapted. We should embrace but pass through despair to grieve the loss of significant parts of historic nature, yet we must act as though we can save it. Then we should develop a radical hope akin to courage that human capacities for adaptation and flourishing, along with other systems of life on the planet, are resilient and up to challenges presented by novel and very difficult conditions of an emerging new ecological world order.
published in *Ethics, Policy, & Environment*, 2019
In a critical engagement with the second edition of Paul Thompson's The Spirit of the Soil, I off... more In a critical engagement with the second edition of Paul Thompson's The Spirit of the Soil, I offer two sets of considerations in support of developing his agrarian view of sustainability into a conception of enlightened land stewardship that is capable of serving as a wider conception of environmental ethics for the Anthropocene. First, I argue that paying attention to emergent novel ecosystems in a framework of adaptive ecosystem management across varied landscapes can help recognize and integrate values associated with both production and preservation, thus substantially easing the tension Thompson identifies between them. Second, Thompson's agrarian vision of sustainability in The Spirit of the Soil is unfortunately restricted by an essential connection with the work of growing and consuming food, but in The Agrarian Vision (2010) Thompson offers a much broader and inclusive conception agriculture. I argue that if we adopt his own broader conception of agriculture, then Thompson's arguments favoring the concept of sustainability over a model of global stewardship are significantly compromised.
It is widely accepted that we must adapt to climate change. But we sit on the edge of the radical... more It is widely accepted that we must adapt to climate change. But we sit on the edge of the radical, unprecedented and rapid, anthropogenic environmental changes that are driven by many factors in addition to GHG emissions. In this way, we occupy a unique and precarious position in the history of our species. Many basic conditions of life on Earth are changing at an alarming rate and thus we should begin to transform and broaden our thinking about adaptation. The conceptual history of climate adaptation intersects with conceptions of human development and sustainability, which provides a framework for adaptation in how we think about human flourishing and, subsequently, what it is to be human in the Anthropocene. If sustainability is about maintaining human welfare across generations but we acknowledge that climate change may undercut our ability to deliver as much and as good total or natural capital to subsequent generations, we have a residual duty to otherwise positively affect the welfare of future generations. A subjective, preference-based conception of human welfare is compared to an objective, capabilities-based approach and, while some adaptive preferences are unavoidable, embracing an objective theory of human flourishing provides a superior approach for meeting the residual duty we have to future generations by beginning the process of adapting our conception of human natural goodness, or what it is to be a good human being.
Journal of Agricultural & Environmental Ethics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2010), pp. 43-59. * Reprinted in Virtue Ethics and the Environment, Sandler and Cafaro, eds. (Springer, 2010) , 2010
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Simon James offers an engaging and useful view about how parts of nature have constitutive value as important, often irreplaceable parts of meaningful wholes. It is a descriptive account of one way that nature can be valuable to human beings, which means contributing to human welfare, as an alternative to the dominant view that nature is valuable to us only as it provides resources useful in the pursuit of human ends. According to James, in addition to being valuable as a means or (as many environmental philosophers will insist) valuable as ends in themselves (i.e., final ends), parts of nature are valuable when they are key features of what we take to be meaningful in the context of a cultural identity that serves as the basis of (or precondition for) of our own self-understanding. Thus, parts of nature can have value to human beings as meaningful parts of a cultural, religious, or spiritual tradition that itself is meaningful because of who we understand ourselves to be.
Simon James offers an engaging and useful view about how parts of nature have constitutive value as important, often irreplaceable parts of meaningful wholes. It is a descriptive account of one way that nature can be valuable to human beings, which means contributing to human welfare, as an alternative to the dominant view that nature is valuable to us only as it provides resources useful in the pursuit of human ends. According to James, in addition to being valuable as a means or (as many environmental philosophers will insist) valuable as ends in themselves (i.e., final ends), parts of nature are valuable when they are key features of what we take to be meaningful in the context of a cultural identity that serves as the basis of (or precondition for) of our own self-understanding. Thus, parts of nature can have value to human beings as meaningful parts of a cultural, religious, or spiritual tradition that itself is meaningful because of who we understand ourselves to be.