I offer a simple-minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, t... more I offer a simple-minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalisation gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is be required by leading theories on predicates of taste.
We argue that Maclaurin and Dyke's recent critique of non-naturalistic metaphysics suffers from d... more We argue that Maclaurin and Dyke's recent critique of non-naturalistic metaphysics suffers from difficulties analogous to those that caused trouble for earlier positivist critiques of metaphysics. Maclaurin and Dyke say that a theory is naturalistic iff it has observable consequences. Depending on the details of this criterion, either no theory counts as naturalistic or every theory does.
An imperative conditional is a conditional in the imperative mood (by analogy with “indicative co... more An imperative conditional is a conditional in the imperative mood (by analogy with “indicative conditional”, “subjunctive conditional”). What, in general, is the meaning and the illocutionary effect of an imperative conditional? I survey four answers: the answer that imperative conditionals are commands to the effect that an indicative conditional be true; two versions of the answer that imperative conditionals express irreducibly conditional commands; and finally, the answer that imperative conditionals express a kind of hybrid speech act between command and assertion.
Some philosophers have attempted to solve metaphysical problems about vagueness by understanding ... more Some philosophers have attempted to solve metaphysical problems about vagueness by understanding objects with vague boundaries as analogous to fuzzy sets. I formulate such a view and argue that it suffers from a serious lacuna, which I attempt to fill.
I discuss a problem for modal realism raised by John Divers and others. I argue that the problem ... more I discuss a problem for modal realism raised by John Divers and others. I argue that the problem is real enough but that Divers' "advanced modalising" solution is inadquate. The problem can only be solved by 1) holding that modal realism is only contingently true, 2) embracing a kind of Meinongianism about ontological commitment, or 3) abandoning the project of "analysing modality". * Special thanks to Dan Marshall, discussions with whom prompted me to write this paper. A number of the ideas of this paper are derived from that discussion, and it is now hard to recall who came up with what. Thanks also to Ben Caplan, Dana Goswick, Hud Hudson, Ed Mares, my colleagues and students at the University of Otago, and the members of the UC Davis philosophy department modality reading group.
In this paper I consider "cognitivism about imperatives" - the view that sentences in the imperat... more In this paper I consider "cognitivism about imperatives" - the view that sentences in the imperative mood are truth-apt. I argue that this view has a (largely) unrecognised benefit, in that it provides a criterion of validity for arguments containing imperatives. However, this criterion of validity has its own counterexamples, which cast doubt on cognitivism.
introduced new levels of sophistication and complexity in logical syntax and its representation; ... more introduced new levels of sophistication and complexity in logical syntax and its representation; its twodimensional nature has proved a stumbling block for those seeking to understand Frege's ideas and his system. It is, however, merely a form of abstract syntax for a higher-order predicate logic, with proofs represented linearly and formulae two-dimensionally. Our work concerns the development of a Java and XML-based GUI for the interactive construction of formulae (and, in due course, of proofs) of this system, with output in concrete form such as L A T E X. It is intended to make Frege's notation more easily used and understood, and to illustrate XML techniques on a seriously challenging and unusual problem. End users will be Frege scholars; we plan to make the system available in due course as a web-based application either publicly or in association with a publisher.
In this paper, I consider whether tenses, temporal indexicals, and other indexicals are contextua... more In this paper, I consider whether tenses, temporal indexicals, and other indexicals are contextually dependent on the context of assessment (or a-contextual ), rather than, as is usually thought, contextually dependent on the context of utterance ( u-contextual ). I begin by contrasting two possible linguistic norms, governing our use of context sensitive expressions, especially tenses and temporal indexicals (§§2 and 3), and argue that one of these norms would make those expressions u-contextual, while the other would make them a-contextual (§4). I then ask which of these two norms are followed by English speakers (§5). Finally, I argue that the existence of a-contextuality does not in any sense entail 'relativism' about truth (§6).
Here is a puzzle from the Stoic, Chrysippus: There was once a man called Dion, who was unfortunat... more Here is a puzzle from the Stoic, Chrysippus: There was once a man called Dion, who was unfortunate enough to have his foot annihilated. Thereafter, he was known as Theon. Theon is identical to what was left over after Dion's foot was removed. That is, Theon is that part of Dion that does not include his foot. If all this is true, then Theon is a proper part of Dion. That is, he is a part of Dion, but not identical to Dion. But if that's right, then, surprisingly, Dion didn't survive the loss of his foot.{For a recent discussion of this puzzle as it appears (or is said to have appeared) in Chrysippus, see ...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jan 1, 2008
Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson's stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion o... more Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson's stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of location in a container spacetime. Hudson uses this idea to define a number of what we might call modes of extension or ways of being extended. A pertended object is what most people think of as a typical extended object --- it is made up of spatial parts, one part for each region the object pervades. An entended object is an extended simple (or a complex object made up of extended simples). Elsewhere, I've argued that entended objects are conceptually possible; that nothing about the concept of "extended" rules out entention. (More about how this argument works below). Hudson thinks that I did not go far enough. Besides pertended and entended objects, he also sees conceptual room for what he calls spanners and multiply located objects. These last two ways of being extended are even more exotic than extended simples. ...
In my , I argued that it is possible to drink any finite amount of alcohol without ever suffering... more In my , I argued that it is possible to drink any finite amount of alcohol without ever suffering a hangover by completing a certain kind of supertask. Assume that a drink causes drunkenness to ensue immediately and to last for a period proportional to the quantity of alcohol consumed; that a hangover begins immediately at the time the drunkenness ends and lasts for the same length of time as the drunkenness; and that at any time during which you are drunk you do not suffer any hangover you might have at that time. Starting at a time at which you are not drunk and not hung over, drink a half pint of beer. Wait until you are just about to get a hangover (30 minutes, say), and then drink a quarter pint. Wait until you are just about to get a hangover again, and then drink an eighth, and so on.... After an hour you have drunk a pint, and you do not have a hangover. Every hangover you incurred happened within the hour you spent drinking; but you were drunk that whole time, so you didn't suffer the hangovers. It seems that the old drunkard's method of a "hair of the dog" can be effective in completely avoiding a hangover....
Supposing that truths require truthmakers, that true propositions are those which correspond to f... more Supposing that truths require truthmakers, that true propositions are those which correspond to facts, is there a distinctive domain of facts that make true the relational truths? Or is it rather that, if we had collected the facts required to make true the other truths, the non-relational ones, that we would then have enough facts to make all truths true?...
"Under what circumstances do things add up to or compose something?" This is what Peter van Inwag... more "Under what circumstances do things add up to or compose something?" This is what Peter van Inwagen calls the Special Composition Question. Everyone, it seems, has a different answer. Van Inwagen's, famously, is "when the activities of those things constitute a life". Other people --- nihilists about composition --- say "never!" Other people --- universalists about composition --- say "always!". Yet other people --- brutalists about composition --- say that there is no answer....
I offer a simple-minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, t... more I offer a simple-minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalisation gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is be required by leading theories on predicates of taste.
We argue that Maclaurin and Dyke's recent critique of non-naturalistic metaphysics suffers from d... more We argue that Maclaurin and Dyke's recent critique of non-naturalistic metaphysics suffers from difficulties analogous to those that caused trouble for earlier positivist critiques of metaphysics. Maclaurin and Dyke say that a theory is naturalistic iff it has observable consequences. Depending on the details of this criterion, either no theory counts as naturalistic or every theory does.
An imperative conditional is a conditional in the imperative mood (by analogy with “indicative co... more An imperative conditional is a conditional in the imperative mood (by analogy with “indicative conditional”, “subjunctive conditional”). What, in general, is the meaning and the illocutionary effect of an imperative conditional? I survey four answers: the answer that imperative conditionals are commands to the effect that an indicative conditional be true; two versions of the answer that imperative conditionals express irreducibly conditional commands; and finally, the answer that imperative conditionals express a kind of hybrid speech act between command and assertion.
Some philosophers have attempted to solve metaphysical problems about vagueness by understanding ... more Some philosophers have attempted to solve metaphysical problems about vagueness by understanding objects with vague boundaries as analogous to fuzzy sets. I formulate such a view and argue that it suffers from a serious lacuna, which I attempt to fill.
I discuss a problem for modal realism raised by John Divers and others. I argue that the problem ... more I discuss a problem for modal realism raised by John Divers and others. I argue that the problem is real enough but that Divers' "advanced modalising" solution is inadquate. The problem can only be solved by 1) holding that modal realism is only contingently true, 2) embracing a kind of Meinongianism about ontological commitment, or 3) abandoning the project of "analysing modality". * Special thanks to Dan Marshall, discussions with whom prompted me to write this paper. A number of the ideas of this paper are derived from that discussion, and it is now hard to recall who came up with what. Thanks also to Ben Caplan, Dana Goswick, Hud Hudson, Ed Mares, my colleagues and students at the University of Otago, and the members of the UC Davis philosophy department modality reading group.
In this paper I consider "cognitivism about imperatives" - the view that sentences in the imperat... more In this paper I consider "cognitivism about imperatives" - the view that sentences in the imperative mood are truth-apt. I argue that this view has a (largely) unrecognised benefit, in that it provides a criterion of validity for arguments containing imperatives. However, this criterion of validity has its own counterexamples, which cast doubt on cognitivism.
introduced new levels of sophistication and complexity in logical syntax and its representation; ... more introduced new levels of sophistication and complexity in logical syntax and its representation; its twodimensional nature has proved a stumbling block for those seeking to understand Frege's ideas and his system. It is, however, merely a form of abstract syntax for a higher-order predicate logic, with proofs represented linearly and formulae two-dimensionally. Our work concerns the development of a Java and XML-based GUI for the interactive construction of formulae (and, in due course, of proofs) of this system, with output in concrete form such as L A T E X. It is intended to make Frege's notation more easily used and understood, and to illustrate XML techniques on a seriously challenging and unusual problem. End users will be Frege scholars; we plan to make the system available in due course as a web-based application either publicly or in association with a publisher.
In this paper, I consider whether tenses, temporal indexicals, and other indexicals are contextua... more In this paper, I consider whether tenses, temporal indexicals, and other indexicals are contextually dependent on the context of assessment (or a-contextual ), rather than, as is usually thought, contextually dependent on the context of utterance ( u-contextual ). I begin by contrasting two possible linguistic norms, governing our use of context sensitive expressions, especially tenses and temporal indexicals (§§2 and 3), and argue that one of these norms would make those expressions u-contextual, while the other would make them a-contextual (§4). I then ask which of these two norms are followed by English speakers (§5). Finally, I argue that the existence of a-contextuality does not in any sense entail 'relativism' about truth (§6).
Here is a puzzle from the Stoic, Chrysippus: There was once a man called Dion, who was unfortunat... more Here is a puzzle from the Stoic, Chrysippus: There was once a man called Dion, who was unfortunate enough to have his foot annihilated. Thereafter, he was known as Theon. Theon is identical to what was left over after Dion's foot was removed. That is, Theon is that part of Dion that does not include his foot. If all this is true, then Theon is a proper part of Dion. That is, he is a part of Dion, but not identical to Dion. But if that's right, then, surprisingly, Dion didn't survive the loss of his foot.{For a recent discussion of this puzzle as it appears (or is said to have appeared) in Chrysippus, see ...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jan 1, 2008
Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson's stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion o... more Chapter 4 of Hud Hudson's stimulating book The metaphysics of hyperspace contains an discussion of the notion of location in a container spacetime. Hudson uses this idea to define a number of what we might call modes of extension or ways of being extended. A pertended object is what most people think of as a typical extended object --- it is made up of spatial parts, one part for each region the object pervades. An entended object is an extended simple (or a complex object made up of extended simples). Elsewhere, I've argued that entended objects are conceptually possible; that nothing about the concept of "extended" rules out entention. (More about how this argument works below). Hudson thinks that I did not go far enough. Besides pertended and entended objects, he also sees conceptual room for what he calls spanners and multiply located objects. These last two ways of being extended are even more exotic than extended simples. ...
In my , I argued that it is possible to drink any finite amount of alcohol without ever suffering... more In my , I argued that it is possible to drink any finite amount of alcohol without ever suffering a hangover by completing a certain kind of supertask. Assume that a drink causes drunkenness to ensue immediately and to last for a period proportional to the quantity of alcohol consumed; that a hangover begins immediately at the time the drunkenness ends and lasts for the same length of time as the drunkenness; and that at any time during which you are drunk you do not suffer any hangover you might have at that time. Starting at a time at which you are not drunk and not hung over, drink a half pint of beer. Wait until you are just about to get a hangover (30 minutes, say), and then drink a quarter pint. Wait until you are just about to get a hangover again, and then drink an eighth, and so on.... After an hour you have drunk a pint, and you do not have a hangover. Every hangover you incurred happened within the hour you spent drinking; but you were drunk that whole time, so you didn't suffer the hangovers. It seems that the old drunkard's method of a "hair of the dog" can be effective in completely avoiding a hangover....
Supposing that truths require truthmakers, that true propositions are those which correspond to f... more Supposing that truths require truthmakers, that true propositions are those which correspond to facts, is there a distinctive domain of facts that make true the relational truths? Or is it rather that, if we had collected the facts required to make true the other truths, the non-relational ones, that we would then have enough facts to make all truths true?...
"Under what circumstances do things add up to or compose something?" This is what Peter van Inwag... more "Under what circumstances do things add up to or compose something?" This is what Peter van Inwagen calls the Special Composition Question. Everyone, it seems, has a different answer. Van Inwagen's, famously, is "when the activities of those things constitute a life". Other people --- nihilists about composition --- say "never!" Other people --- universalists about composition --- say "always!". Yet other people --- brutalists about composition --- say that there is no answer....
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