This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It ha... more This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2003
Perhaps the most important and also the most criticized concept in Gadamer' s philosophical h... more Perhaps the most important and also the most criticized concept in Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics is the concept of tradition (Uberlieferung). In Truth and Method, Gadamer introduces the concept in relation to the problem of understanding as this problem is presented in the second part of the book, namely, as the problem of understanding in the historical human sciences. Gadamer does not in fact expressly introduce the concept (and thereby explicitly define the concept) but simply inserts it into the discussion as if it needed no explanation or explicit definition. Taken from the context of his discussion, tradition appears to be simply the past in its natural relation to historical consciousness. As such it is what one always stands within and is thereby not equivalent to the past as recorded history, which constitutes the object of historical research. As itself a kind of collected assembly of events that in its assembly is capable of being carried forward, tradition is that wherein the past is not that which is bygonedispersed like smoke by the winds of time-but the "still available.'' 1 The importance of the concept for Gadamer is then underscored by the fact that he continues to employ the concept beyond the question of history as such. Hermeneutical experience in general, he tells us, is concerned with tradition.2 In this broader context 'tradition' denotes what one could call the a priori of the already in experience in general. That is to say, what is to be understood in hermeneutic experience is a traditionary object, an object that is constituted in advance by having-been and comes to appearance (understanding) only insofar as its having-been is carried overOberlieferung as the transmission of meaning. Criticism of Gadamer's concept of tradition was not slow in coming, beginning soon after the publication of Truth and Method, with the most serious criticism coming from Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Habermas' criticism, which initiated an exchange between Habermas and Gadamer during the 1960s,3 centered on the lack of sufficient critical reflection in this position in which tradition was at the center. Where Gadamer argues that there can be a legitimate connection between authority and tradition (Tradition) and that the interpreter cannot step outside tradition, Habermas claims that its internal movement was insufficient for providing the emancipatory reflection necessary to overcome the ideological distortions of social life. To Habermas' credit he never misunderstands the concept of tradition as Gadamer employs it. The issue for the early Habermas is not that philosophical hermeneutics amounts to a conservative
<jats:p>In the field of contemporary literary studies, the French essayist and cultural cri... more <jats:p>In the field of contemporary literary studies, the French essayist and cultural critic Roland Barthes cannot be easily classified. His early work on language and culture was strongly influenced by the intellectual currents of existentialism and Marxism that were dominant in French intellectual life in the mid-twentieth century. Gradually his work turned more to semiology (a general theory of signs), which had a close association with the structuralist tradition in literary criticism. In his later work, Barthes wrote more as a post-structuralist than as a structuralist in an attempt to define the nature and authority of a text. Throughout his writings Barthes rejected the 'naturalist' view of language, which takes the sign as a representation of reality. He maintained that language is a dynamic activity that dramatically affects literary and cultural practices.</jats:p>
This paper provides a critical analysis of Heidegger's brief remarks in his "Letter on H... more This paper provides a critical analysis of Heidegger's brief remarks in his "Letter on Humanism" in which he links ethics to ethos and ultimately to our relation to time and history. Central to this analysis is the phrase of Heraclitus, ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn, from which Heidegger claims that human living (ethos) is inseparable from the event of appropriation (Ereignis) which generates our historical destiny. Through further analysis that draws from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, it is shown just how Heraclitus's phrase can be interpreted differently and thus presents us with an idea of human destiny that serves to qualify Heidegger's claim.
Beyond the ordinariness of experience in daily life there are times when we encounter an experien... more Beyond the ordinariness of experience in daily life there are times when we encounter an experience for which words seem inadequate to express and communicate the experience. The focus of my remarks for the first paper will explore this situation of the potential limits of language for understanding experience. The question of these limits depends on an analysis of just what takes place in experience and (the hermeneutic experience of) language. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory for an answer to the question, I will show just how experience and language are interrelated, and, as a result, I will show how the dynamic of language formation expands to accommodate what appears to be inaccessible and inexpressible, while allowing experience to sustain its own richness.
In the course of his writings from the Phenomenology of Perception to his working notes of 1961, ... more In the course of his writings from the Phenomenology of Perception to his working notes of 1961, one could justifiably say that Merleau-Ponty was concerned with the theme of language.’ Of course one does not find this concern expressed by a systematic development of the theme. In fact, it would appear that quite the opposite is true: the work on language in The Prose of the World, for example, is abandoned for a yet to be thought more encompassing work on truth, or — to look at the same matter from a different perspective — an account of communication in literary experience is replaced by an account of the structure of being in which language now receives its determination. Nevertheless, one can still detect within the horizon of the theme a certain continuity, especially from 1947 on.’ Already in the lecture course on Language and Communication given at the University of Lyon in 1947, Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that the question of language is not about fixed structures, as if language functions merely as a technique for deciphering ready-made significations. The question of language, in other words, is not captured by a scientistic linguistics, for it fails to take into consideration what language is for a speaking subject. In The Prose of the World, written in the early 1950s, Merleau-Ponty extends this critique, pointing directly at those who would attempt to find in language a field of pure signification. The field of pure signification stands outside experience and the sphere of expression, and thus stands outside the real foundation of language found in the order of speaking. For Merleau-Ponty language arises in the order of speaking as such in which we “rediscover the concrete universality of a given language, which can be different from itself without openly denying itself.”3 No matter what other turns in thought occur for Merleau-Ponty on the question of language, he never abandons this essential insight. The question of language remains for Merleau-Ponty a question of what I want to call the vibrancy of speaking.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It ha... more This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2003
Perhaps the most important and also the most criticized concept in Gadamer' s philosophical h... more Perhaps the most important and also the most criticized concept in Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics is the concept of tradition (Uberlieferung). In Truth and Method, Gadamer introduces the concept in relation to the problem of understanding as this problem is presented in the second part of the book, namely, as the problem of understanding in the historical human sciences. Gadamer does not in fact expressly introduce the concept (and thereby explicitly define the concept) but simply inserts it into the discussion as if it needed no explanation or explicit definition. Taken from the context of his discussion, tradition appears to be simply the past in its natural relation to historical consciousness. As such it is what one always stands within and is thereby not equivalent to the past as recorded history, which constitutes the object of historical research. As itself a kind of collected assembly of events that in its assembly is capable of being carried forward, tradition is that wherein the past is not that which is bygonedispersed like smoke by the winds of time-but the "still available.'' 1 The importance of the concept for Gadamer is then underscored by the fact that he continues to employ the concept beyond the question of history as such. Hermeneutical experience in general, he tells us, is concerned with tradition.2 In this broader context 'tradition' denotes what one could call the a priori of the already in experience in general. That is to say, what is to be understood in hermeneutic experience is a traditionary object, an object that is constituted in advance by having-been and comes to appearance (understanding) only insofar as its having-been is carried overOberlieferung as the transmission of meaning. Criticism of Gadamer's concept of tradition was not slow in coming, beginning soon after the publication of Truth and Method, with the most serious criticism coming from Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Habermas' criticism, which initiated an exchange between Habermas and Gadamer during the 1960s,3 centered on the lack of sufficient critical reflection in this position in which tradition was at the center. Where Gadamer argues that there can be a legitimate connection between authority and tradition (Tradition) and that the interpreter cannot step outside tradition, Habermas claims that its internal movement was insufficient for providing the emancipatory reflection necessary to overcome the ideological distortions of social life. To Habermas' credit he never misunderstands the concept of tradition as Gadamer employs it. The issue for the early Habermas is not that philosophical hermeneutics amounts to a conservative
<jats:p>In the field of contemporary literary studies, the French essayist and cultural cri... more <jats:p>In the field of contemporary literary studies, the French essayist and cultural critic Roland Barthes cannot be easily classified. His early work on language and culture was strongly influenced by the intellectual currents of existentialism and Marxism that were dominant in French intellectual life in the mid-twentieth century. Gradually his work turned more to semiology (a general theory of signs), which had a close association with the structuralist tradition in literary criticism. In his later work, Barthes wrote more as a post-structuralist than as a structuralist in an attempt to define the nature and authority of a text. Throughout his writings Barthes rejected the 'naturalist' view of language, which takes the sign as a representation of reality. He maintained that language is a dynamic activity that dramatically affects literary and cultural practices.</jats:p>
This paper provides a critical analysis of Heidegger's brief remarks in his "Letter on H... more This paper provides a critical analysis of Heidegger's brief remarks in his "Letter on Humanism" in which he links ethics to ethos and ultimately to our relation to time and history. Central to this analysis is the phrase of Heraclitus, ēthos anthrōpōi daimōn, from which Heidegger claims that human living (ethos) is inseparable from the event of appropriation (Ereignis) which generates our historical destiny. Through further analysis that draws from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and Giorgio Agamben, it is shown just how Heraclitus's phrase can be interpreted differently and thus presents us with an idea of human destiny that serves to qualify Heidegger's claim.
Beyond the ordinariness of experience in daily life there are times when we encounter an experien... more Beyond the ordinariness of experience in daily life there are times when we encounter an experience for which words seem inadequate to express and communicate the experience. The focus of my remarks for the first paper will explore this situation of the potential limits of language for understanding experience. The question of these limits depends on an analysis of just what takes place in experience and (the hermeneutic experience of) language. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic theory for an answer to the question, I will show just how experience and language are interrelated, and, as a result, I will show how the dynamic of language formation expands to accommodate what appears to be inaccessible and inexpressible, while allowing experience to sustain its own richness.
In the course of his writings from the Phenomenology of Perception to his working notes of 1961, ... more In the course of his writings from the Phenomenology of Perception to his working notes of 1961, one could justifiably say that Merleau-Ponty was concerned with the theme of language.’ Of course one does not find this concern expressed by a systematic development of the theme. In fact, it would appear that quite the opposite is true: the work on language in The Prose of the World, for example, is abandoned for a yet to be thought more encompassing work on truth, or — to look at the same matter from a different perspective — an account of communication in literary experience is replaced by an account of the structure of being in which language now receives its determination. Nevertheless, one can still detect within the horizon of the theme a certain continuity, especially from 1947 on.’ Already in the lecture course on Language and Communication given at the University of Lyon in 1947, Merleau-Ponty makes it clear that the question of language is not about fixed structures, as if language functions merely as a technique for deciphering ready-made significations. The question of language, in other words, is not captured by a scientistic linguistics, for it fails to take into consideration what language is for a speaking subject. In The Prose of the World, written in the early 1950s, Merleau-Ponty extends this critique, pointing directly at those who would attempt to find in language a field of pure signification. The field of pure signification stands outside experience and the sphere of expression, and thus stands outside the real foundation of language found in the order of speaking. For Merleau-Ponty language arises in the order of speaking as such in which we “rediscover the concrete universality of a given language, which can be different from itself without openly denying itself.”3 No matter what other turns in thought occur for Merleau-Ponty on the question of language, he never abandons this essential insight. The question of language remains for Merleau-Ponty a question of what I want to call the vibrancy of speaking.
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