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Ana Mauleon

UCLouvain (University of Louvain), CORE, Faculty Member

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I'm a professor of economics with research interests in game theory, network and coalition formation, and industrial organization.
Phone: +32-10-474142
Address: 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

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Queen's University Belfast

Cristina Bicchieri

University of Pennsylvania

University College Cork

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Kansas State University

Kati (Katalin) Prajda

University of Vienna

Victoria University of Wellington

Shabib H . Syed

University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan

Seyed Mosa Tabatabaee

Semnan University

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Papers by Ana Mauleon

von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Theoretical Economics, Sep 1, 2011

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

Trust and manipulation in social networks

Network Science, Feb 11, 2016

We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinion... more We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state.

Contractually Stable Alliances

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Mar 23, 2016

We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity w... more We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity with side payments) will affect the formation of strategic alliances. We find that no alliance structure is contractually stable under the simple majority rule. Once unanimous consent is required, asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances are contractually stable. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. Allowing for side payments to compensate former partners improves efficiency. Finally, we show that different rules of exit may coexist in different alliances in the long run.

Connections Among Farsighted Agents

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Nov 15, 2011

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular... more We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.

Farsightedly stable networks

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Oct 1, 2006

Coalition-Proof Stable Networks

Social Science Research Network, 2020

We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge ... more We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a pro…table group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson's linking game. Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myerson's linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.

Strike Activity an dBertran dvs Cournot Competition

We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly comp... more We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competitive industry. Under two di®erent bargaining structures (¯rm-level vs industry-level), we investigate the e®ects of the degree of product di®erentiation and the type of market competition (Bertrand vs Cournot competition) on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. If the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level, then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product di®erentiation whatever the type of market competition. However, if the wage bargaining takes place at the¯rm-level, then wages and strikes are increasing with the degree of product di®erentiation, and the strike activity is smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.

Market Integration and Strike Activity

Social Science Research Network, 2005

Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers

Social Science Research Network, 2005

Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Mar 1, 2006

Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospi... more Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, May 1, 2017

People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the ... more People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement:

Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction

Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospi... more Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.

Farsightedly Stable Networks

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which network... more We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying (i) and (ii). We show that a non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominating network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set.

Coalition formation among farsighted agents

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, May 1, 2010

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any co... more A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Contractually Stable Networks

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Dec 1, 2008

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition st... more We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency

Coalition Formation Among Farsighted Agents

Social Science Research Network, 2010

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any co... more A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Hospital's Activity-Based Financing System and Manager-Physician Interaction

Social Science Research Network, 2006

Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospi... more Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.

Impact du passage à la tarification à l'activité: une modélisation pour l'hôpital public

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2009

The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system o... more The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system on public hospitals financial equilibrium is analyzed in this paper. To do so, we develop a theoretical model where patients? demand is related to joint decisions made by hospital managers and physicians. The conditions under which the transition is beneficial or detrimental for public hospitals

The Transition to Activity-Based Payment

Revue économique, 2009

The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system o... more The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system on public hospitals financial equilibrium is analyzed in this paper. To do so, we develop a theoretical model where patients’ demand is related to joint decisions made by hospital managers and physicians. The conditions under which the transition is beneficial or detrimental for public hospitals financial state are then defined. Classification JEL: I18, D21

Matching with myopic and farsighted players

Journal of Economic Theory, Nov 1, 2020

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic a... more We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.

von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Theoretical Economics, Sep 1, 2011

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch ge... more Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes. You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

Trust and manipulation in social networks

Network Science, Feb 11, 2016

We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinion... more We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state.

Contractually Stable Alliances

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Mar 23, 2016

We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity w... more We analyze how different rules for exiting an alliance (simple majority, unanimity or unanimity with side payments) will affect the formation of strategic alliances. We find that no alliance structure is contractually stable under the simple majority rule. Once unanimous consent is required, asymmetric alliance structures consisting of two alliances are contractually stable. In addition, the grand alliance which is the efficient structure is stable. Allowing for side payments to compensate former partners improves efficiency. Finally, we show that different rules of exit may coexist in different alliances in the long run.

Connections Among Farsighted Agents

Journal of Public Economic Theory, Nov 15, 2011

We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular... more We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's (Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.

Farsightedly stable networks

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Oct 1, 2006

Coalition-Proof Stable Networks

Social Science Research Network, 2020

We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge ... more We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a pro…table group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is a coarsening of strong stability. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson's linking game. Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myerson's linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.

Strike Activity an dBertran dvs Cournot Competition

We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly comp... more We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized imperfectly competitive industry. Under two di®erent bargaining structures (¯rm-level vs industry-level), we investigate the e®ects of the degree of product di®erentiation and the type of market competition (Bertrand vs Cournot competition) on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. If the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level, then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product di®erentiation whatever the type of market competition. However, if the wage bargaining takes place at the¯rm-level, then wages and strikes are increasing with the degree of product di®erentiation, and the strike activity is smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.

Market Integration and Strike Activity

Social Science Research Network, 2005

Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers

Social Science Research Network, 2005

Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Mar 1, 2006

Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospi... more Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.

Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, May 1, 2017

People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the ... more People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website. • The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review. • The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal. If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement:

Hospital's activity-based financing system and manager-physician interaction

Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospi... more Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.

Farsightedly Stable Networks

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which network... more We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying (i) and (ii). We show that a non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominating network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set.

Coalition formation among farsighted agents

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, May 1, 2010

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any co... more A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Contractually Stable Networks

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Dec 1, 2008

We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition st... more We develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency

Coalition Formation Among Farsighted Agents

Social Science Research Network, 2010

A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any co... more A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.

Hospital's Activity-Based Financing System and Manager-Physician Interaction

Social Science Research Network, 2006

Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospi... more Hospital financing systems determine major decisions made by physicians and managers within hospitals. This paper examines the impact of the transition toward an activity-based reimbursement system that has emerged in most OCDE countries. We consider two initial situations, one for a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis and the other for a public sector under prospective budget and salaried physicians. For the private sector, our model focuses on the type of interaction (simultaneous, sequential or joint decision-making games) that should emerge between agents after the indroduction of the activity-based financing system. In the public sector, the elasticity of the demand to the level of inputs seems to play a more crucial rôle in the transition.

Impact du passage à la tarification à l'activité: une modélisation pour l'hôpital public

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2009

The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system o... more The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system on public hospitals financial equilibrium is analyzed in this paper. To do so, we develop a theoretical model where patients? demand is related to joint decisions made by hospital managers and physicians. The conditions under which the transition is beneficial or detrimental for public hospitals

The Transition to Activity-Based Payment

Revue économique, 2009

The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system o... more The impact of the transition from a global budget payment to an activity-based financing system on public hospitals financial equilibrium is analyzed in this paper. To do so, we develop a theoretical model where patients’ demand is related to joint decisions made by hospital managers and physicians. The conditions under which the transition is beneficial or detrimental for public hospitals financial state are then defined. Classification JEL: I18, D21

Matching with myopic and farsighted players

Journal of Economic Theory, Nov 1, 2020

We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic a... more We study stable sets for marriage problems under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. We introduce the new notion of the myopic-farsighted stable set. For the special cases where all players are myopic and where all players are farsighted, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all men are myopic and the top choice of each man is a farsighted woman, we show that the singleton consisting of the woman-optimal stable matching is a myopic-farsighted stable set. The same result holds when all women are farsighted.