History Department

This work would never have been completed without the help and support of the following to whom I owe a dept of gratitude. My foremost thanks to the Almighty God who has generously given me life, health, strength, courage and determination. My special thanks to Prof. Robert Harris, my first supervisor before his retirement from the University of Hull in 2004. Prof. Harris, we may not have parted on a good note but your special interest in my academic progress and your admonition will always be remembered for the significant direction they gave me and this work. Dr. Jose Magone, your help can never be overemphasized. My very thanks to you for your patience, understanding and the significant guide you gave. You showed an understanding into the problems and difficulties that the African student in Europe with all his endeavours faces. You are a great figure. Charles Asiedu, you are worth a friend indeed. You stood by me in my darkest hour. I will never forget you for that needed role you played in my life. Finally, to Katie and Suzzie of the Graduate School, your kindness, sincerity and above all your professional qualities are deeply appreciated. To Mr John Tettegah, Prof. Nii Noi Dowuona and Nana Ampong Ofosu, all of who interestedly and willingly featured on my interview, my special thanks to you for your time and all the advice I received of you 12 Le Vine op.cit 12 kleptocracy is defined in this context as a political system run by criminals and rogues whose activities are unconstrained by anything other than a threat to their interest. See for example Rose

Women are one of Ghana's hidden growth resources. Yet, Ghanaian women have been marginalized from the developmental discourse by a succession of hegemonic political administrations. At best, Ghanaian women were said to have a quiet activism, although each epoch had its own character of struggle. Bringing together history, gender and development, this article examines the historical trajectory of female agency in postcolonial Ghana. It argues that through the historisation of women's activism, Ghanaian women's agency and advocacy towards women's rights and gender equality concerns rose from the era of quiet activism characterised by women's groups whose operations hardly questioned women's social status to contestation with the state epitomized by the creation of The Women's Manifesto for Ghana in 2004 which played a critical role in women's collective organisation and served as a key pathway of empowerment.

After twenty years the third-wave of democratization took place in Africa, democratic regressions have proven a common outcome. Causes are well rooted in the key actors’ attitudes towards the rules of the electoral competition. Stabilization of power reflects the institutional- ization of authority, which increases to the extent that political elites are able to ensure legitimacy through their conducts. Prior experiences and professional paths are thus crucial, since their heritage contributes to model preferences of present political actors. Ghana and Benin were both successful in establishing working multiparty institutions across the 1990s. On the basis of an analysis of political personnel, I argue these countries were capable to install a viable multiparty competition by virtue of the ‘institutionally-oriented’ strategies that political elites deployed across the transition. The return of ‘certain’ former politi- cians, and political parties, shaped the politics reducing the uncertainty of competition, factor that has reinforced the institutionalization of power.

In the early nineties the African continent witnessed an extraordinary wave of democratization. The resulting debate highlighted the decentralization as an effective strategy to bring about democracy,
tackling issues such as inclusiveness, local development and inter-ethnic divisions. Following this perspective, Mali has been widely viewed as a relatively successful case of democracy in a low-income
country. In March 1991, the military regime of Moussa Traoré was overturned following extensive public protests, and a new democratic constitution was promulgated in early 1992. Since then and until March 2012, the country had undergone regular elections, and at least one president, Alpha Konaré, peacefully left office after serving two terms. The coup d'état of March 2012 overthrew Amadou Toumani Touré and raised doubts about the effectiveness of decentralization in achieving the objectives. Although the compromise of 1992 has ensured a solid framework to the functioning of democratic procedures, it didn't succeeded to include the Tuareg minority within the national political arena. As the observation of political system will show, the main reason is based on the weakness of local elites, powered by two sets of factors. First, the State's withdrawal from the Northern regions didn't help to consolidate the power over distance and facilitated the emergence of war's entrepreneurs. Secondly, the persisting ineffectiveness of development policies have exacerbated the tensions up to the break-up of March 2012.

After twenty years the third-wave of democratization took place in Africa, democratic regressions have proven a common outcome. Causes are well rooted in the key actors’ attitudes towards the rules of the electoral competition. Stabilization of power reflects the institutional- ization of authority, which increases to the extent that political elites are able to ensure legitimacy through their conducts. Prior experiences and professional paths are thus crucial, since their heritage contributes to model preferences of present political actors. Ghana and Benin were both successful in establishing working multiparty institutions across the 1990s. On the basis of an analysis of political personnel, I argue these countries were capable to install a viable multiparty competition by virtue of the ‘institutionally-oriented’ strategies that political elites deployed across the transition. The return of ‘certain’ former politi- cians, and political parties, shaped the politics reducing the uncertainty of competition, factor that has reinforced the institutionalization of power.

After twenty years the third-wave of democratization took place in Africa, democratic regressions have proven a common outcome. Causes are well rooted in the key actors’ attitudes towards the rules of the elec- toral competition. Stabilization of power reflects the institutionalization of authority, which increases to the extent that political elites are able to ensure legitimacy through their conducts. Prior experiences and pro- fessional paths are thus crucial, since their heritage contributes to model preferences of present political actors. Ghana and Benin were both suc- cessful in establishing working multiparty institutions across the 1990s. On the basis of an analysis of political personnel, I argue these countries were capable to install a viable multiparty competition by virtue of the ‘institutionally-oriented’ strategies that political elites deployed across the transition. The return of ‘certain’ former politicians, and political parties, shaped the politics reducing the uncertainty of competition, factor that has reinforced the institutionalization of power.