Papers by Vivil Valvik Haraldsen
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic, 2022
For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. Few will dispute ... more For Plato, philosophy depends on, or is perhaps even identical with, dialectic. Few will dispute this claim, but there is little agreement as to what Platonic dialectic is. According to a now prevailing view it is a method for inquiry the conception of which changed so radically for Plato that it "had a strong tendency ... to mean ‘the ideal method’, whatever that may be" (Richard Robinson). Most studies of Platonic dialectic accordingly focus on only one aspect of this method that allegedly characterizes one specific period in Plato’s development. This volume offers fresh perspectives on Platonic dialectic. Its 13 chapters present a comprehensive picture of this crucial aspect of Plato’s philosophy and seek to clarify what Plato takes to be proper dialectical procedures. They examine the ways in which these procedures are related to each other and other aspects of his philosophy, such as ethics, psychology, and metaphysics. Collectively, the chapters challenge the now prevailing understanding of Plato’s ideal of method. New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in Plato, ancient philosophy, philosophical method, and the history of logic. Table of Contents Introduction Jens Kristian Larsen, Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, and Justin Vlasits 1. Socrates’ Dialectical use of Hypothesis Hayden Ausland 2. The Dialectician and the Statesman in Plato’s Euthydemus Emily Austin 3. Dialectic in Plato’s Parmenides: The Schooling of Young Socrates Francisco Gonzalez 4. Dialectic as a paradigm in the Republic: On the role of reason in the just life Vivil Valvik Haraldsen 5. Elenchus and the Method of Division in the Sophist Cristina Ionescu 6. Using Examples in Philosophical Inquiry: Plato’s Statesman 277d1-278e2 and 285c4-286b2 Jens Kristian Larsen 7. Examples in the Meno Peter D. Larsen 8. Between Variety and Unity. How to deal with Plato´s Dialectic Walter Mesch 9. Dialectic and the Ability to Orient Ourselves: Republic V-VII Vasilis Politis 10. Another Platonic Method: Four genealogical myths about human nature and their philosophical contribution in Plato Catherine Rowett 11. Dialectic in Plato's Sophist: The relation between the question ‘What is being?’ and the question ‘What is there?’ Pauline Sabrier 12. Dialectic as Philosophical Divination in Plato’s Phaedrus Marilena Vlad 13. Plato on the Varieties of Knowledge Justin Vlasits
New Perspectives on Platonic Dialectic
Plato’s Protagoras, 2016
In Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry, eds. Vigd... more In Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry, eds. Vigdis Songe-Møller and Olof Pettersson, Springer Philosophy Studies Series This article is concerned with the famous passage towards the end of the Protagoras often referred to as the argument against the possibility of akrasia (Prot. 351b3-358d4). Here Socrates sets out a hedonistic position according to which all human motivation is ultimately reducible to pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and on this basis he argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. I consider the function of the hedonistic position and trace how it is repeatedly emphasized that Socrates’ argument against the weakness of will as well as his argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life has the hedonistic thesis as a premise, and that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many. I further argue that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ views, and that, in contrast to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The arguments rather function as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself, and Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue thereby aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is.
Platon - Værk og virkning, 2016
Kapittel 11 i *Platon - Værk og virkning*, red. Jakob Leth Fink og Jens Kristian Larsen (Københav... more Kapittel 11 i *Platon - Værk og virkning*, red. Jakob Leth Fink og Jens Kristian Larsen (København: Gyldendal 2016). Oversatt fra norsk av Jens Kristian Larsen.
Agora, 2018
Frihet er neppe det første man forbinder med den bystaten Sokrates og samtalepartnerne hans beskr... more Frihet er neppe det første man forbinder med den bystaten Sokrates og samtalepartnerne hans beskriver fra bok 2 til bok 7 i Platons Staten. Denne bystaten har snarere gitt Platon et rykte som fortaler for et autoritaert og totalitaert regime, hvor den styrende klasses kontroll ikke begrenser seg til å gjelde hva innbyggerne gjør, men også omfatter hva de tenker, føler og begjaerer, gjennom programmet for paideia, 1 oppdragelse og utdannelse, som skisseres i dialogen.
Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life , 2018
My introduction to *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life*, ,... more My introduction to *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life*, , eds. Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Olof Pettersson, and Oda E. Wiese Tvedt, published by Lexington Books, 2018.
Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates: Defending the Philosophical Life, 2018
Chapter 11 in *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates - Defending the Philosophical Life*, eds. ... more Chapter 11 in *Readings of Plato's Apology of Socrates - Defending the Philosophical Life*, eds. Vivil Valvik Haraldsen, Olof Pettersson and Oda E. Wiese Tvedt, Lexington Books 2018.
The chapter takes issue with a common view of Socrates’ philosophic practice. The Apology contains one of the rare instances in the Platonic corpus where we find Socrates describing his practice of questioning, and not only a depiction of him performing it. In this chapter I ask whether this description fits well with a widespread way of understanding this practice according to which Socratic conversation is a method (now standardly termed “the elenchus”, from the Greek noun elenchos) for discovering truth by refutation of false beliefs – a method, moreover, regarded as embedded in the position termed Socratic intellectualism. I show that the use of the term elenchos and its cognates in the Apology does not support the view that they are used to refer to Socrates’ questioning as a method of refutation. I then proceed to point out descriptions Socrates gives of the ways in which we are motivated to act and the ways in which opinions are formed and changed that do not fit with the intellectualist position. In the last section, an alternative interpretation of the benefit of Socratic conversation is offered, which seeks to illuminate what is involved in the philosophical, examined life Socrates advocates.
Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry, 2017
In Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry, eds. Vigdis Songe... more In Plato's Protagoras: Essays on the Confrontation of Philosophy and Sophistry, eds. Vigdis Songe-Møller and Olof Pettersson, Springer Philosophy Studies Series
This article is concerned with the famous passage towards the end of the Protagoras often referred to as the argument against the possibility of akrasia (Prot. 351b3-358d4). Here Socrates sets out a hedonistic position according to which all human motivation is ultimately reducible to pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and on this basis he argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. I consider the function of the hedonistic position and trace how it is repeatedly emphasized that Socrates’ argument against the weakness of will as well as his argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life has the hedonistic thesis as a premise, and that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many. I further argue that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ views, and that, in contrast to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The arguments rather function as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself, and Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue thereby aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is.
Spørsmålet denne presentasjonen tar utgangspunkt i er hva det gode ved dialektisk innsikt er. Sna... more Spørsmålet denne presentasjonen tar utgangspunkt i er hva det gode ved dialektisk innsikt er. Snarere enn å forsøke å gi et fyllestgjørende svar på spørsmålet, vil jeg stille noen videre spørsmål og fremsette noen refleksjoner angående den rolle visdom, sophia, og dialektisk innsikt synes å spille i Platons Staten.
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Papers by Vivil Valvik Haraldsen
The chapter takes issue with a common view of Socrates’ philosophic practice. The Apology contains one of the rare instances in the Platonic corpus where we find Socrates describing his practice of questioning, and not only a depiction of him performing it. In this chapter I ask whether this description fits well with a widespread way of understanding this practice according to which Socratic conversation is a method (now standardly termed “the elenchus”, from the Greek noun elenchos) for discovering truth by refutation of false beliefs – a method, moreover, regarded as embedded in the position termed Socratic intellectualism. I show that the use of the term elenchos and its cognates in the Apology does not support the view that they are used to refer to Socrates’ questioning as a method of refutation. I then proceed to point out descriptions Socrates gives of the ways in which we are motivated to act and the ways in which opinions are formed and changed that do not fit with the intellectualist position. In the last section, an alternative interpretation of the benefit of Socratic conversation is offered, which seeks to illuminate what is involved in the philosophical, examined life Socrates advocates.
This article is concerned with the famous passage towards the end of the Protagoras often referred to as the argument against the possibility of akrasia (Prot. 351b3-358d4). Here Socrates sets out a hedonistic position according to which all human motivation is ultimately reducible to pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and on this basis he argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. I consider the function of the hedonistic position and trace how it is repeatedly emphasized that Socrates’ argument against the weakness of will as well as his argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life has the hedonistic thesis as a premise, and that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many. I further argue that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ views, and that, in contrast to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The arguments rather function as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself, and Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue thereby aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is.
The chapter takes issue with a common view of Socrates’ philosophic practice. The Apology contains one of the rare instances in the Platonic corpus where we find Socrates describing his practice of questioning, and not only a depiction of him performing it. In this chapter I ask whether this description fits well with a widespread way of understanding this practice according to which Socratic conversation is a method (now standardly termed “the elenchus”, from the Greek noun elenchos) for discovering truth by refutation of false beliefs – a method, moreover, regarded as embedded in the position termed Socratic intellectualism. I show that the use of the term elenchos and its cognates in the Apology does not support the view that they are used to refer to Socrates’ questioning as a method of refutation. I then proceed to point out descriptions Socrates gives of the ways in which we are motivated to act and the ways in which opinions are formed and changed that do not fit with the intellectualist position. In the last section, an alternative interpretation of the benefit of Socratic conversation is offered, which seeks to illuminate what is involved in the philosophical, examined life Socrates advocates.
This article is concerned with the famous passage towards the end of the Protagoras often referred to as the argument against the possibility of akrasia (Prot. 351b3-358d4). Here Socrates sets out a hedonistic position according to which all human motivation is ultimately reducible to pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and on this basis he argues against the possibility of being overcome by pleasure. I consider the function of the hedonistic position and trace how it is repeatedly emphasized that Socrates’ argument against the weakness of will as well as his argument that an art of measurement will be the salvation of our life has the hedonistic thesis as a premise, and that this premise is accepted by Protagoras on behalf of the many. I further argue that these arguments are not plausibly read as supporting Socrates’ views, and that, in contrast to what is commonly assumed, Socrates is not denying the possibility of akrasia or of being overcome by pleasure. The arguments rather function as a reductio ad absurdum of the hedonistic thesis itself, and Socrates’ conversation with Protagoras in this part of the dialogue thereby aims at exposing the position of the sophist as both untenable and laughable: The art of measuring pleasure and pain is neither a virtue nor does it involve the knowledge needed to discover what the good is.