Papers Published by Scott M Williams
Journal of Analytic Theology, 2022
For decades some Christian theologians, and some philosophers of religion, have labored at distin... more For decades some Christian theologians, and some philosophers of religion, have labored at distinguishing Social Trinitarianism and non-Social Trinitarianism. Many have revised their models of the Trinity in light of counter-arguments or counter-evidence. For Christian theologians, or philosophers of religion, what counts as a good counter-argument or counter-evidence may (but need not) depend on specific respected theological authorities. Recently, some focus has been paid to what is called Conciliar Trinitarianism, which is the name for whatever is endorsed by, or rejected by, the first seven ecumenical councils regarding the Trinity. For those who respect these ecumenical councils as authoritative (to some extent), it would be useful to get a clearer understanding of Conciliar Trinitarianism in order to assist in evaluating contemporary models of the Trinity. In what follows I argue that the Sixth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople III, in 680-681ce) made important contributions and clarifications to Conciliar Trinitarianism. Surprisingly, there is no secondary literature regarding these contributions and clarifications. After having made the historical case, I discuss the implications of Constantinople III for (i) our understanding of the place of the Pseudo-Athanasian creed in Trinitarian speculation, (ii) standard narratives about the division between Greek and Latin Trinitarian theology, and (iii) some contemporary models of the Trinity.
Faith and Philosophy, 2022
The disagreement between William Hasker and myself includes discussion of Gregory of Nyssa's Trin... more The disagreement between William Hasker and myself includes discussion of Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian theology, the relevance of Conciliar Trinitarianism for evaluating models of the Trinity, and the defensibility of my Latin Social model of the Trinity. I respond to Hasker's recent objections regarding all three areas. I contest Hasker's interpretation of Gregory and argue that Gregory is indeed a "one-power" theorist. I make historical connections between Gregory's Trinitarian theology and Pope Agatho's "one-power" statements that were endorsed by the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680-681ce); and I make explicit the Sixth Ecumenical Council's interest in the general issue of how 'ousia' and 'hypostasis' pertain to the Trinity and the Incarnation. Lastly, I defend and develop the Latin Social model in response to Hasker's five objections. In light of my findings in the Sixth Council, I retire the name 'Latin Social Trinity' for my model and replace it with a name more apt for my model, that is, the 'Conciliar Social Trinity.'
Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous... more Marilyn Adams rightly pointed out that there are many kinds of evil, some of which are horrendous. I claim that one species of horrendous evil is what I call horrendous-difference disabilities. I distinguish two subspecies of horrendous-difference disabilities based in part on the temporal relation between one’s rational moral wishing for a certain human function F and its being thwarted by intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Next, I offer a theodicy for each subspecies of horrendous-difference disability. Although I appeal to some claims made by Marilyn Adams for this theodicy, I reject one particular claim. I deny that one must be aware that one participates in a horrendous evil when the horrific event occurs. To develop this point and its relevance for a theodicy for horrendous-difference disabilities, I engage with Andrew Chignell’s work on infant suffering. In doing so, I show that what partly motivates the claim is a time-bias, i.e., near-bias. By rejecting this time-bias, I show how it is possible, given post-mortem life, for persons with profound cognitive disabilities to participate in horrendous evils and how these might be defeated by God.
In recent analytic literature on the Trinity we have seen a variety of "social" models of the Tri... more In recent analytic literature on the Trinity we have seen a variety of "social" models of the Trinity. By contrast there are few "non-social" models. One prominent "non-social" view is Brian Leftow's "Latin Trinity." I argue that the name of Leftow's model is not sufficiently descriptive in light of diverse models within Latin speaking theology. Next, I develop a new "non-social" model that is inspired by Richard of St. Victor's description of a person in conjunction with my appropriating insights about indexicals from David Kaplan and John Perry. I point out that the copula in tokens of statements like, "I am the Father," is an ambiguous term and when used by a certain divine person a different proposition is affirmed. Central to this model is the claim that the copula bears the "is of identity" and the "is of numerical sameness without identity." Further, I show that Leftow's model employs two concepts of "person," a Lockean one and a Boethian one, and mine employs Richard of St. Victor's. I describe Leftow's model as a "hard non-social" model and mine as a "soft non-social" model that is nearer to some social models. I conclude that Leftow's model is not the lone candidate among "non- social" models and that the variety of "non-social" models has yet to be exhausted.
I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory ... more I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent’s general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity. A real relation (relatio) is numer- ically the same thing (res) as its absolute (non-relative) foundation, without being identical to its foundation. This not only holds for creaturely real relations but also for the divine persons’ distinguishing real relations. A divine person who is constituted by a real relation (relatio) and the divine essence is numerically the same thing (res) as the divine essence without being identical to it. Further, I compare Mark Henninger’s and Jos Decorte’s interpretations of Henry’s general theory of real relations and show that Henninger’s is to be preferred and how it is consistent with my interpretation. I argue that the difficulty with Decorte’s interpretation stems, in part, from his misrepresentation of Henry’s Trinitarian theology. Subsequently, I fill in some missing pieces to Decorte’s presentation of Henry’s Trinitarian theology, and this in turn shows why Henninger’s interpretation in conjunction with mine is to be preferred.
There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psy... more There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psychological account of the Father’s intellectual generation of the Word. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, in their own ways, follow the first route; John Duns Scotus follows the second. Aquinas, Henry, and Scotus’s psychological accounts entail different theological opinions. For example, Aquinas (but neither Henry nor Scotus) thinks that the Father needs the Word to know the divine essence. If we compare the theological views entailed by their psychologies we find a trajectory from Aquinas, through Henry, and ending with Scotus. This theological trajectory falsifies a judgment that every Augustinian psychology of the divine persons amounts to a pre-Nicene functional Trinitarianism. This study makes clear how one’s awareness of the theological views entailed by these psychologies enables one to assess more thoroughly psychological accounts of the identity and distinction of the divine persons.
Papers by Scott M Williams
Recherches De Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales, 2012
I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent's general theory ... more I argue that there is a hitherto unrecognized connection between Henry of Ghent's general theory of real relations and his Trinitarian theology, namely the notion of numerical sameness without identity. A real relation (relatio) is numerically the same thing (res) as its absolute (non-relative) foundation, without being identical to its foundation. This not only holds for creaturely real relations but also for the divine persons' distinguishing real relations. A divine person who is constituted by a real relation (relatio) and the divine essence is numerically the same thing (res) as the divine essence without being identical to it. Further, I compare Mark Henninger's and Jos Decorte's interpretations of Henry's general theory of real relations and show that Henninger's is to be preferred and how it is consistent with my interpretation. I argue that the difficulty with Decorte's interpretation stems, in part, from his misrepresentation of Henry's Trinitarian theology. Subsequently, I fill in some missing pieces to Decorte's presentation of Henry's Trinitarian theology, and this in turn shows why Henninger's interpretation in conjunction with mine is to be preferred.
Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales, 2010
There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psy... more There are two general routes that Augustine suggests in De Trinitate, XV, 14-16, 23-25, for a psychological account of the Father's intellectual generation of the Word. Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, in their own ways, follow the first route; John Duns Scotus follows the second. Aquinas, Henry, and Scotus's psychological accounts entail different theological opinions. For example, Aquinas (but neither Henry nor Scotus) thinks that the Father needs the Word to know the divine essence. If we compare the theological views entailed by their psychologies we find a trajectory from Aquinas, through Henry, and ending with Scotus. This theological trajectory falsifies a judgment that every Augustinian psychology of the divine persons amounts to a pre-Nicene functional Trinitarianism. This study makes clear how one's awareness of the theological views entailed by these psychologies enables one to assess more thoroughly psychological accounts of the identity and distinction of the divine persons.
Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been limited both b... more Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been limited both by: (1) a narrow focus on the apparent inconsistency of the doctrine and (2) little regard for the historical context in which the doctrine developed. This special issue represents an effort to overcome these limitations in two ways. First, following Timothy Pawl's definition of "Conciliar Christology," we define "Conciliar Trinitarianism" as the conjunction of claims about the Trinity in the first seven Ecumenical Councils. Rather than speculative attempts at reconciling, say, sentences taken from the Athanasian Creed, or the common parlance of contemporary, Western Christians, the papers in this issue all address specifically Conciliar Trinitarianism. Second, the special issue brings together both analytic philosophers and patristics scholars in a format in which, in several cases, a scholar from one field responds to a scholar from another. We hope that this will help to jump-start some further conversations between scholars in analytic philosophy and in patristics, as we believe both fields can benefit from a deeper mutual engagement in the study of Conciliar Trinitarianism. Three papers happen to address the issue of whether, when conciliar texts speak generically of "God" they are referring to the Father (as in the Creedal phrase, "I believe in One God, the Father, Almighty…"), or to the Trinity as a whole. Declan O'Byrne ("On the Economic Focus of Conciliar Trinitarianism") argues that, although Conciliar Trinitarianism affirms the consubstantiality of the Father and Son, and the full divinity of the Spirit, it identifies the One God with the Father, not the Trinity. To that extent, certain modern manuals of theology mischaracterize Conciliar Trinitarianism. He also argues conciliar texts are not concerned with the
TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology, 2020
Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been limited both b... more Much recent work in analytic theology concerned with Trinitarian doctrine has been limited both by: (1) a narrow focus on the apparent inconsistency of the doctrine and (2) little regard for the historical context in which the doctrine developed. This special issue represents an effort to overcome these limitations in two ways. First, following Timothy Pawl's definition of "Conciliar Christology," we define "Conciliar Trinitarianism" as the conjunction of claims about the Trinity in the first seven Ecumenical Councils. Rather than speculative attempts at reconciling, say, sentences taken from the Athanasian Creed, or the common parlance of contemporary, Western Christians, the papers in this issue all address specifically Conciliar Trinitarianism. Second, the special issue brings together both analytic philosophers and patristics scholars in a format in which, in several cases, a scholar from one field responds to a scholar from another. We hope that this will help to jump-start some further conversations between scholars in analytic philosophy and in patristics, as we believe both fields can benefit from a deeper mutual engagement in the study of Conciliar Trinitarianism. Three papers happen to address the issue of whether, when conciliar texts speak generically of "God" they are referring to the Father (as in the Creedal phrase, "I believe in One God, the Father, Almighty…"), or to the Trinity as a whole. Declan O'Byrne ("On the Economic Focus of Conciliar Trinitarianism") argues that, although Conciliar Trinitarianism affirms the consubstantiality of the Father and Son, and the full divinity of the Spirit, it identifies the One God with the Father, not the Trinity. To that extent, certain modern manuals of theology mischaracterize Conciliar Trinitarianism. He also argues conciliar texts are not concerned with the
There has been long-standing disagreement over Henry of Ghent's account of what individuates a co... more There has been long-standing disagreement over Henry of Ghent's account of what individuates a common nature (e.g., human nature). Brown and Pickave claim that Henry's principle of individuation is actual existence; but in a later paper Pickave changes his interpretation in suggesting that it is absolute subsistence. By looking at non-incarnation texts and incarnation texts I show that Henry's principle of individuation is absolute subsistence, and not actual existence. I also look at Richard Cross's analysis of Henry's metaphysics of the Incarnation because in this context Cross claim that Henry says that actual existence and subsistence are the same. If Cross were right, then it would be wrong to claim, as I do, that Henry's principle of individuation is absolute subsistence and not actual existence. I analyze the relevant texts and contend that my interpretation is more likely than Cross's interpretation. There are two lessons learned through this close study of non-incarnation texts and incarnation texts having to do with individuation. First, Henry distinguishes what individuates a common nature and what numbers a common nature. Second, Henry distinguishes individuation and numeration of a common nature in order to make room for the possibility of the incarnation. This reveals that Henry's theological commitment to the possibility of the Incarnation partly guides his philosophical account of the principle of individuation.
Books by Scott M Williams
The Trinity (Cambridge Elements, The Problems of God), 2024
Link to the book: https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/trinity/4366511E56DD1A4EC29A2E2E1685CA1... more Link to the book: https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/trinity/4366511E56DD1A4EC29A2E2E1685CA14
The doctrine of the Trinity, proclaimed by Christians through the Nicene-Constantinople creed, is foundational to traditional Christian belief and worship of God. But is this doctrine logically coherent? How can there be three divine persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), each is God, and yet there is only one God? This is a fundamental question for philosophers, but theologians have additional questions. This Element addresses philosophical and theological issues concerning the Trinity: Hermeneutical and Logical problems, Personal Pronouns, Monarchy, Equality, the Filioque debate, Real Relations, Unity of Action, Self-Knowledge in the Trinity, and Simplicity. Based on my recent rediscovery of the sixth ecumenical council's (Constantinople III) clarifications of Trinitarian doctrine, this Element introduces Conciliar Trinitarianism and shows how it responds to the issues, including a resolution to the fundamental logical question. It also compares Conciliar Trinitarianism with Miaphysite, neo-Sabellian, Social, and other models of the Trinity.
Drafts by Scott M Williams
This is my response to William Hasker's article "Can A Latin Trinity Be Social? Response to Scott... more This is my response to William Hasker's article "Can A Latin Trinity Be Social? Response to Scott M. Williams," Faith and Philosophy 35.3 (2018) 356-366.
Pro-Nicene Trinitarian theologies take it as a desideratum there there is unity of action between... more Pro-Nicene Trinitarian theologies take it as a desideratum there there is unity of action between the divine persons. I develop a model of the Trinity that shows how there is no possible conflict between the divine persons. Also, I argue that Brian Leftow's "Latin Trinity," which is a non-social model, and William Hasker's Social Trinity, do not sufficiently show how there is no possible conflict between the divine persons.
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Papers Published by Scott M Williams
Papers by Scott M Williams
Books by Scott M Williams
The doctrine of the Trinity, proclaimed by Christians through the Nicene-Constantinople creed, is foundational to traditional Christian belief and worship of God. But is this doctrine logically coherent? How can there be three divine persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), each is God, and yet there is only one God? This is a fundamental question for philosophers, but theologians have additional questions. This Element addresses philosophical and theological issues concerning the Trinity: Hermeneutical and Logical problems, Personal Pronouns, Monarchy, Equality, the Filioque debate, Real Relations, Unity of Action, Self-Knowledge in the Trinity, and Simplicity. Based on my recent rediscovery of the sixth ecumenical council's (Constantinople III) clarifications of Trinitarian doctrine, this Element introduces Conciliar Trinitarianism and shows how it responds to the issues, including a resolution to the fundamental logical question. It also compares Conciliar Trinitarianism with Miaphysite, neo-Sabellian, Social, and other models of the Trinity.
Drafts by Scott M Williams
The doctrine of the Trinity, proclaimed by Christians through the Nicene-Constantinople creed, is foundational to traditional Christian belief and worship of God. But is this doctrine logically coherent? How can there be three divine persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), each is God, and yet there is only one God? This is a fundamental question for philosophers, but theologians have additional questions. This Element addresses philosophical and theological issues concerning the Trinity: Hermeneutical and Logical problems, Personal Pronouns, Monarchy, Equality, the Filioque debate, Real Relations, Unity of Action, Self-Knowledge in the Trinity, and Simplicity. Based on my recent rediscovery of the sixth ecumenical council's (Constantinople III) clarifications of Trinitarian doctrine, this Element introduces Conciliar Trinitarianism and shows how it responds to the issues, including a resolution to the fundamental logical question. It also compares Conciliar Trinitarianism with Miaphysite, neo-Sabellian, Social, and other models of the Trinity.