Professeur de Philosophie à l'Université de Nantes. Métaphysique, philosophie de l'action, philosophie de la religion, histoire de la philosophie médiévale.
"Preface" 1. Peter Simons (University of Leeds): "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theo... more "Preface" 1. Peter Simons (University of Leeds): "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of Intentionality (Natural or Otherwise)" Ancient Theories 2. Victor Caston (University of California at Davis): "Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on the Problem of Intentionality" 3. Richard Sorabji (King's College, London): "Aristotle on Sensory Processes. A Reply to Myles Burnyeat" 4. Christof Rapp (Universitat Tubingen): "Intentionalitat und phantasia bei Aristoteles" 5. Hermann Weidemann (Universitat Munster): "War Aristoteles ein Reprasentationalist?" 6. Richard Sorabji (King's College, London): "Why the Neoplatonists Did not Have Intentional Objects of Intellection" 7. Dominic O'Meara (Universite de Fribourg): "Why the Neoplatonists Had Intentional Objects" Medieval Theories 8. Myles Burnyeat (University of Oxford): "Aquinas on 'Spiritual Change' in Perception" 9. Dorothea Frede (Universitat Hamburg): "Aquinas on phantasia" 10. Claude Panaccio (Universite du Quebec a Trois-Rivieres): "Aquinas on Intellectual Representation" 11. Dominik Perler (Universitat Basel): "What Are Intentional Objects? A Controversy among Early Scotists" 12. Richard Gaskin (University of Sussex, Brighton): "Ockham on Mental Language, Connotation, and the Inherence Regress" 13. Joel Biard (Universite de Tours): "Intention et presence: la notion de presentialitas au XIVe siecle" 14. Elizabeth Karger (Paris, CNRS): "Adam Wodeham on the Intentionality of Cognitions" 15. Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado, Boulder): "Intentionality and Final Causes" 16. Cyrille Michon (Universite de Paris IV): "Intentional Thoughts and Proto-Thoughts" Index
From her first writings up to Intention and later, Elizabeth Anscombe was concerned with the doct... more From her first writings up to Intention and later, Elizabeth Anscombe was concerned with the doctrine of double effect (DDE), which relies on the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences of an action. The doctrine is linked to a precise account of intention and to an overall anti-consequentialist account of morality which fits well with Anscombe’s philosophy. At the same time she regularly warns us against abuses of the doctrine and is aware that a special difficulty arises from what is now called the ‘closeness problem’ (P. Foot). After presenting the doctrine and the problem, the chapter deals with the accusation of inconsistency between Anscombe’s account of the DDE and her analysis of action in Intention (J. Finnis), and argues that she has made room for a distinction between two scopes of intention—broad and narrow—which can ground moral differences, and thus reshape the debate over the DDE.
I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one... more I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one has let happen, only if one could have avoided it, by omitting or by performing a certain action. I limit my argument to the consequences of actions and omissions (vs actions and omissions themselves), and to the conditional ability of avoiding the consequences by an alternative behaviour (vs the absolute ability to behave otherwise). Even within those limits, the argument challenges the Causal Conception of Moral Responsibility and the strategy mounted by Frankfurt against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. It is a step in favor of the idea that the ability to do otherwise (free will) is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
The affective view of faith, as opposed to the doxastic or cognitive view, giving more importance... more The affective view of faith, as opposed to the doxastic or cognitive view, giving more importance to goodwill than to belief content, has received much support in recent philosophy of religion, including from Richard Swinburne. Swinburne's concept of faith is no less rational than his concept of religious belief, but its rationality is that of an action or of a practically oriented attitude, aiming at the goals of religion, compatible with religious disbelief (belief that the religious content one has faith in is probably false) and even with atheism. I argue that this paradoxical stance, which hardly squares with the Christian tradition, can be avoided, while keeping to an affective view of faith, if we give more weight to the idea that faith is first an answer given to a telling, on the basis of personal trust of the hearer in the authority of the teller – a personal account as opposed to a propositional account of faith.
La « theorie des deux noms», qui assigne la meme fonction semantique au sujet et au predicat, est... more La « theorie des deux noms», qui assigne la meme fonction semantique au sujet et au predicat, est souvent consideree comme caracteristique de l'analyse occamiste de la predication, et du nominalisme en general. On l'oppose a la doctrine de l'asymetrie du sujet et du predicat, telle qu'elle a ete formulee par Frege, et qui parait caracteristique d'une forme de realisme, ainsi qu'en temoignent Frege lui-meme et les versions prefregeennes de cette doctrine chez les Medievaux, comme Thomas d'Aquin. L'examen des analyses de la predication de Thomas d'Aquin et de Guillaume d'Occam montre que le second, comme le premier, a soutenu une forme d'asymetrie semantique. Les options ontologiques ne determinent pas, sur ce point, leur philosophie du langage.
Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 2013
Partant de l’etiquette forgee par John Haldane, l’auteur distingue quatre formes de thomismes ana... more Partant de l’etiquette forgee par John Haldane, l’auteur distingue quatre formes de thomismes analytiques ou de lectures de Thomas d’Aquin qu’on peut qualifier d’analytiques, les evaluant diversement, et les rapportant a des objets differents. Il soutient egalement que l’entreprise est legitime, voire naturelle, car la philosophie analytique est la scolastique de notre temps.
Intention is silent about the problem of free will. But one is allowed to look for some lights on... more Intention is silent about the problem of free will. But one is allowed to look for some lights on it in Anscombe’s analysis of practical reasoning, since a free action, as she argues in different papers, is undetermined. The distinction between causes and reasons of an intentional action is not sufficient to defend its freedom, since it can be argued that reasons determine the action of a rational agent, or the decision, being indifferent to reasons (and causes), would be a lucky one. Anscombe’s conception of the defeasibility of practical reasoning leads me to show that a free choice involves not only the choice of the means but also a ranking of the end that has no contrastive reasons for it, without being irrational and
The university teaching of theology, which was historically considered as the highest discipline,... more The university teaching of theology, which was historically considered as the highest discipline, is often times deemed a problem. It seems that one of the principal causes of this state of affairs is the conflict, conceived by some thinkers, between reason and authority. Pope Benedict XVI offers both a diagnosis and a remedy to the «crisis of university» by developing the idea of «extended rationality». Through this idea, secular universities could, without compromising its demand of rationality, provide room for theology, even though it does not adopt the way theology is imparted in confessional universities.
"Preface" 1. Peter Simons (University of Leeds): "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theo... more "Preface" 1. Peter Simons (University of Leeds): "Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of Intentionality (Natural or Otherwise)" Ancient Theories 2. Victor Caston (University of California at Davis): "Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on the Problem of Intentionality" 3. Richard Sorabji (King's College, London): "Aristotle on Sensory Processes. A Reply to Myles Burnyeat" 4. Christof Rapp (Universitat Tubingen): "Intentionalitat und phantasia bei Aristoteles" 5. Hermann Weidemann (Universitat Munster): "War Aristoteles ein Reprasentationalist?" 6. Richard Sorabji (King's College, London): "Why the Neoplatonists Did not Have Intentional Objects of Intellection" 7. Dominic O'Meara (Universite de Fribourg): "Why the Neoplatonists Had Intentional Objects" Medieval Theories 8. Myles Burnyeat (University of Oxford): "Aquinas on 'Spiritual Change' in Perception" 9. Dorothea Frede (Universitat Hamburg): "Aquinas on phantasia" 10. Claude Panaccio (Universite du Quebec a Trois-Rivieres): "Aquinas on Intellectual Representation" 11. Dominik Perler (Universitat Basel): "What Are Intentional Objects? A Controversy among Early Scotists" 12. Richard Gaskin (University of Sussex, Brighton): "Ockham on Mental Language, Connotation, and the Inherence Regress" 13. Joel Biard (Universite de Tours): "Intention et presence: la notion de presentialitas au XIVe siecle" 14. Elizabeth Karger (Paris, CNRS): "Adam Wodeham on the Intentionality of Cognitions" 15. Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado, Boulder): "Intentionality and Final Causes" 16. Cyrille Michon (Universite de Paris IV): "Intentional Thoughts and Proto-Thoughts" Index
From her first writings up to Intention and later, Elizabeth Anscombe was concerned with the doct... more From her first writings up to Intention and later, Elizabeth Anscombe was concerned with the doctrine of double effect (DDE), which relies on the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences of an action. The doctrine is linked to a precise account of intention and to an overall anti-consequentialist account of morality which fits well with Anscombe’s philosophy. At the same time she regularly warns us against abuses of the doctrine and is aware that a special difficulty arises from what is now called the ‘closeness problem’ (P. Foot). After presenting the doctrine and the problem, the chapter deals with the accusation of inconsistency between Anscombe’s account of the DDE and her analysis of action in Intention (J. Finnis), and argues that she has made room for a distinction between two scopes of intention—broad and narrow—which can ground moral differences, and thus reshape the debate over the DDE.
I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one... more I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one has let happen, only if one could have avoided it, by omitting or by performing a certain action. I limit my argument to the consequences of actions and omissions (vs actions and omissions themselves), and to the conditional ability of avoiding the consequences by an alternative behaviour (vs the absolute ability to behave otherwise). Even within those limits, the argument challenges the Causal Conception of Moral Responsibility and the strategy mounted by Frankfurt against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. It is a step in favor of the idea that the ability to do otherwise (free will) is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
The affective view of faith, as opposed to the doxastic or cognitive view, giving more importance... more The affective view of faith, as opposed to the doxastic or cognitive view, giving more importance to goodwill than to belief content, has received much support in recent philosophy of religion, including from Richard Swinburne. Swinburne's concept of faith is no less rational than his concept of religious belief, but its rationality is that of an action or of a practically oriented attitude, aiming at the goals of religion, compatible with religious disbelief (belief that the religious content one has faith in is probably false) and even with atheism. I argue that this paradoxical stance, which hardly squares with the Christian tradition, can be avoided, while keeping to an affective view of faith, if we give more weight to the idea that faith is first an answer given to a telling, on the basis of personal trust of the hearer in the authority of the teller – a personal account as opposed to a propositional account of faith.
La « theorie des deux noms», qui assigne la meme fonction semantique au sujet et au predicat, est... more La « theorie des deux noms», qui assigne la meme fonction semantique au sujet et au predicat, est souvent consideree comme caracteristique de l'analyse occamiste de la predication, et du nominalisme en general. On l'oppose a la doctrine de l'asymetrie du sujet et du predicat, telle qu'elle a ete formulee par Frege, et qui parait caracteristique d'une forme de realisme, ainsi qu'en temoignent Frege lui-meme et les versions prefregeennes de cette doctrine chez les Medievaux, comme Thomas d'Aquin. L'examen des analyses de la predication de Thomas d'Aquin et de Guillaume d'Occam montre que le second, comme le premier, a soutenu une forme d'asymetrie semantique. Les options ontologiques ne determinent pas, sur ce point, leur philosophie du langage.
Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 2013
Partant de l’etiquette forgee par John Haldane, l’auteur distingue quatre formes de thomismes ana... more Partant de l’etiquette forgee par John Haldane, l’auteur distingue quatre formes de thomismes analytiques ou de lectures de Thomas d’Aquin qu’on peut qualifier d’analytiques, les evaluant diversement, et les rapportant a des objets differents. Il soutient egalement que l’entreprise est legitime, voire naturelle, car la philosophie analytique est la scolastique de notre temps.
Intention is silent about the problem of free will. But one is allowed to look for some lights on... more Intention is silent about the problem of free will. But one is allowed to look for some lights on it in Anscombe’s analysis of practical reasoning, since a free action, as she argues in different papers, is undetermined. The distinction between causes and reasons of an intentional action is not sufficient to defend its freedom, since it can be argued that reasons determine the action of a rational agent, or the decision, being indifferent to reasons (and causes), would be a lucky one. Anscombe’s conception of the defeasibility of practical reasoning leads me to show that a free choice involves not only the choice of the means but also a ranking of the end that has no contrastive reasons for it, without being irrational and
The university teaching of theology, which was historically considered as the highest discipline,... more The university teaching of theology, which was historically considered as the highest discipline, is often times deemed a problem. It seems that one of the principal causes of this state of affairs is the conflict, conceived by some thinkers, between reason and authority. Pope Benedict XVI offers both a diagnosis and a remedy to the «crisis of university» by developing the idea of «extended rationality». Through this idea, secular universities could, without compromising its demand of rationality, provide room for theology, even though it does not adopt the way theology is imparted in confessional universities.
J. Biard, Le Langage mental du Moyen Age à l'Age classique, Peeters, 2009
Claude Panaccio a défendu dans plusieurs études une lecture des textes de Thomas d'Aquin sur la c... more Claude Panaccio a défendu dans plusieurs études une lecture des textes de Thomas d'Aquin sur la connaissance intellectuelle, qui en est en même temps une critique : elle consiste à soutenir que pour Thomas, la connaissance intellectuelle des choses est indirecte, et passe par l'intermédiaire d'entités représentatives, produites par l'intellect. Panaccio s'oppose à de nombreux thomistes traditionnels, mais aussi à des interprétations récentes. C'est donc un débat déjà tenu à diverses reprises. Mais avec un peu de recul, et en me limitant à la discussion des analyses de Panaccio, je voudrais essayer d'aboutir à une vision commune, et de vider la querelle, du moins en ce qui concerne la lecture de Thomas. Car il me semble que le désaccord véritable est de nature plus strictement philosophique.
I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one... more I argue that one can be responsible for a certain state of affairs, one has brought about, or one has let happen, only if one could have avoided it, by omitting or by performing a certain action. I limit my argument to the consequences of actions and omissions (vs actions and omissions themselves), and to the conditional ability of avoiding the consequences by an alternative behaviour (vs the absolute ability to behave otherwise). Even within those limits, the argument challenges the Causal Conception of Moral Responsibility and the strategy mounted by Frankfurt against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. It is a step in favor of the idea that the ability to do otherwise (free will) is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of... more From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium (which for Aquinas is free will specifically as the power to choose among alternatives) to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus the ability to do otherwise, although the ability to do otherwise applies differently to praise and blame. His argument against intellectual determinism is not straightforward, but we construct it by analogy to his arguments against other deterministic threats (e.g., the one posed by divine foreknowledge). The non-determinism of the intellect's causality with respect to the will results from his claims that practical reasoning is defeasible and that the reasons for actions are not contrastive reasons.
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Papers by Cyrille MICHON