Topoi
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09694-2
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
Paul Simard Smith1
· Michael Patrick Lynch2
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract
In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonably be, characterized as deep
disagreements. Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level
deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and
the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of
view. However, in spite of the inability to rationally persuade, we explore how it may nevertheless be possible to rationally
navigate each of these varieties of deep disagreement.
Keywords Deep disagreement · Peer disagreement · Epistemic rationality · Cogency · Incompletely theorized agreement
1 Introduction
Broadly speaking, disagreements are worth calling “deep” to
the extent they are not just deadlocked, but they’ve reached
a point—a depth—where the subject of the disagreement is
fundamental. A disagreement is “epistemic” when it is about
something overtly epistemic in character. For example, when
it is about whether a proposition is justified or an epistemic
principle is true. Deep epistemic disagreements are disagreements with both features.1
Within the existing social epistemic and argumentation
theoretic literature a variety of different kinds of disagreements either have been—or could reasonably be—characterized as deep. That raises the question of whether, and to
what extent, these different kinds of disagreements reflect
disagreement about the nature of deep disagreement or are
instead highlighting importantly different phenomena. In
this paper, we discuss three different kinds of disagreement
characterized by Goldman (2010), Lynch (2010, 2016) and
Fogelin (2005) respectively. We make the case that, within
the context of each of these kinds of disagreement, there is
a breakdown in the prospects of rational persuasion through
the give and take of epistemic reasons. In particular, we
claim that, in each of these forms of disagreement, the prospect of one party offering an argument in support of their
point of view that is epistemically cogent for the other party
is substantially constrained. So, while the various kinds of
disagreements that we consider here are distinct, they are
variations on a common theme. Each kind of disagreement
undermines the prospects of a resolution to the disagreement through an exchange of purely epistemic reasons—
even though the reasons why each disagreement undermines
the prospects of such a resolution varies for each case. It is
this common theme that makes these kinds of disagreements
worth calling deep, highlights their importance and encourages us to find new strategies for navigating them.
* Paul Simard Smith
Paul.Simard.Smith@uregina.ca
Michael Patrick Lynch
mplynch@uconn.edu
1
Department of Philosophy and Classics, University
of Regina, 3737 Wascana Parkway, Regina, SK S4S 0A2,
Canada
2
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut,
U-1054, Storrs, CT 06269-2054, USA
1
Unless we explicitly state otherwise, when we use the expression
‘deep disagreement’ we are referring to deep epistemic disagreements.
13
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P. S. Smith, M. P. Lynch
2 Rational Persuasion
The notion of rational persuasion is vexed, in part because
the notions of rationality and persuasion are vexed. So,
rather than attempting a full account of rational persuasion
here, we pull out certain features of the concept that are
salient for any discussion of deep epistemic disagreement
as we understand it.
In A Theory of Argument Vorobej (2006) develops an
account of rational persuasion that draws on Richard Foley’s
discussion of epistemic rationality (Foley 1987). Foley contrasts the notion of a rationally persuasive argument with
that of a sound argument,
Arguments that are sound—arguments that have true
premises and a truth preserving form—might be of
only little help, since perhaps not every person in
the group would recognize them to be sound. The
same can be said of arguments that are ‘inductively
sound’—arguments that are likely to be truth preserving and that in addition have true premises. But
arguments that merely are believed by all to be sound
(either inductively or deductively) might not be of
much help either, since they might not generate a stable consensus; it might be that if the members of the
group were to reflect for a moment on these arguments,
they would come to believe that they are not sound
arguments after all. What is needed is not so much
arguments that are sound or arguments that are merely
believed by the people involved to be sound. . . . The
idea, more exactly, would be to look for arguments
such that were the people involved to be reflective,
they would think that these arguments are likely to be
truth preserving and in addition they would think that
that there is no good reason to be suspicious of their
premises. (Foley 1987, p. 4)
In other words, sound arguments are not the gold standard for rationally persuasive argument. Nor is it enough to
merely believe the argument is sound.
Broadly stated, rational persuasion, rather than requiring
sound argument, involves an attempt to persuade someone
to do or believe something by offering the addressee evidence that they should recognize as providing a sufficient
basis for belief or action. More exactly, it provides a person
a sufficient basis for belief or action if they are being cautious, reflective and reasoning consistently with their own
principles.
According to Vorobej, some person P should be rationally persuaded to do or believe something just in case the
argument offered in support of the belief or action is cogent
for P. Vorobej contends that “an argument A is cogent for
some person P, within context C, just in case it is rational
13
for P, within C, to be persuaded of the conclusion of A, on
the basis of the evidence cited within A’s premises” (Vorobej
2006, p. 47).2 At the core of Vorobej’s account of rational
persuasion is, thus, the view that an agent recognizes an
argument’s premises as providing adequate grounds to
believe the argument’s conclusion and that there is good
reason to think the premises are true.3 Lynch’s account
of rational persuasion overlaps with Vorobej’s in certain
respects. In describing a conception of rational persuasion
Lynch claims,
You rationally persuade someone on the basis of a reason that would make sense internal to her perspective.
That is, to rationally persuade you of P, it is necessary
that I persuade you on the basis of an irenic reason. A
gives an irenic reason R to B for some P, only if were
B aware of her principles, and reasoned consistently
with them, B would recognize that R is a reason for P.
That is, in order for A to give an irenic reason to B, B
should be able to recognize—even if she in fact does
not—that it is a reason from her standpoint. (Lynch
2016, p. 252)
As mentioned in section I, a variety of different sorts of
disagreements have been characterized as deep within the
social epistemic and argumentation theoretic literatures.
What makes these different disagreements deep? We propose that these different sorts of disagreements are deep
because, within the context of such disagreements, there
is no possibility of rational persuasion—in the sense just
outlined—that draws on epistemic reasons alone.4 In other
words, the participants to the deep disagreement will not
be able to make arguments for their standpoints that are
2
The notion of cogency is widely employed in Critical Thinking
literature and textbooks. For instance, see Blair and Johnson (2006),
Govier (2013) and Maureen Linker (2015, Chap. 5). Vorobej discusses cogency in detail in Vorobej (2006, pp. 49–56).
3
As one reviewer points out, there are two possible interpretations of
this ‘recognize’ requirement for rational persuasion. On the one hand,
a strong reading of ‘recognize’ would require that one have good reasons to know, or reasonably believe, that the premises provide enough
support for the conclusion. On the other hand, ‘recognize’ may be
read weakly, requiring that one is in a position to access reasons to
know, or reasonably believe, that there are good reasons supporting
the belief. Weighing in on this issue here, however, is beyond the
scope of the present paper. As far as we can tell, whichever reading is
preferred should be compatible with the positions taken in this paper.
4
Some may wonder whether the characterization of deep disagreement should leave open the possibility that deep disagreements could
be resolved drawing on epistemic reasons. We think not. The reason
is that, if that were the case, there would be a class of deep disagreements that are resolvable drawing on epistemic reasons and a class of
deep disagreements that are not so resolvable. We think it is clearer to
simply say that some disagreements are very intractable and difficult,
without being “deep” and other disagreements are “deep” (in these
sense that they can’t be resolved drawing on epistemic reasons).
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
cogent for the other participants that only draw on epistemic reasons. So, participants to a deep disagreement will
not recognize the reasons that the other participants to the
disagreement offer in support of their conclusions as providing sufficient grounds to believe those conclusions.5 In the
following section, we illustrate how three different sorts of
disagreement considered in the argumentation theoretic and
social epistemic literature share this characteristic.
3 Some Varieties of Deep Epistemic
Disagreement
3.1 Goldman-Style Deep Disagreement
In a 2010 paper titled Epistemic Relativism and the Epistemology of Disagreement Alvin Goldman characterizes the
first kind of disagreement that we discuss here. Goldman’s
discussion of disagreement emerges within the context of the
debate between steadfast and conciliatory views in the epistemology of disagreement. The primary debate in the contemporary literature on “peer disagreement” pivots around
the question of whether disagreement with an epistemic peer
is epistemically significant. In other words, does disagreeing
with an epistemic peer suggest you should adjust your belief
on the matter under dispute?
Two key opposing views on the epistemic significance of
peer disagreement are the conciliationist and the steadfast
views. Conciliationists hold that many beliefs that people
hold on a range of disputed issues need to be substantially
revised (Christensen and Lackey 2013, p. 1). For instance,
on some variants of this view, if an agent learns that someone they believe to be an epistemic peer disagrees with
them, then they are rationally obliged to shift their doxastic attitude in the direction of their peer’s. Conciliationists
regard peer disagreement to be epistemically significant.
Disagreement with an epistemic peer, on this view, is evidence that one should adjust their doxastic attitude towards
their peer’s on the matter under dispute. Proponents of the
steadfast view hold that there is not always an obligation to
change one’s doxastic attitude in virtue of learning that a
peer disagrees with you. According to the steadfast view,
if one agent learns that someone they regard to be an epistemic peer disagrees with them, it does not automatically
provide evidence, in and of itself, that there is a good reason
to revise the relevant doxastic attitude. Perhaps one should
reflect on one’s evidence carefully and it turns out that this
is one of the rare times that one’s peer, or oneself, have
made a mistake. Between these two opposing points of view
5
We will call a cogent argument that draws on epistemic reasons
alone an epistemically cogent argument.
on the epistemology of disagreement there are a variety of
middling positions about the epistemic significance of peer
disagreement (Christensen and Lackey 2013, p. 1).
In Goldman’s discussion of peer disagreement he articulates one way to flesh out a steadfast answer to the problem
of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. Goldman purports to explain a variant of the steadfast approach
he calls objectivity based relativism (OBR). In what sense
is OBR a version of the steadfast approach? On Goldman’s
view the following scenario is possible: two or more agents
hold incompatible doxastic attitudes towards the same
proposition and each of the agents is justified in believing
that their respective doxastic attitudes are justified. Since
both agents are justified in believing their doxastic attitudes
are justified, and these doxastic attitudes are incompatible
with one another, it is reasonable for each of these agents to
remain steadfast in the face of the disagreement. This is the
case even if the person with whom they are disagreeing is
an epistemic peer.
How are such disagreements possible? To answer this
question some background is required. First, consider Goldman’s notion of objective justification.
(Objective justification) Doxastic attitude D towards
proposition p is objectively justified just in case the
objectively right epistemic system (E-system) prescribes that agent S should adopt A towards p in light
of S’s total evidence vis-à-vis p (modified from Goldman 2010, p. 192).
This definition involves the notion of an epistemic system.
Goldman characterizes an epistemic system (or E-system)
as follows,
(Epistemic system) An epistemic system (or E-system)
is “a set of norms, standards, or principles for forming
beliefs and other doxastic states” (Goldman 2010, p.
187).
Note that the definition of objective justification employs
the notion of an objectively right E-system. Whether or not
such a system of epistemic norms exists is a contentious
issue. However, Goldman’s primary point does not require
the existence of an objectively right E-system. Moreover,
Goldman doesn’t argue in support of one particular E-system. Rather, Goldman’s purpose is to show that a reasonable
disagreement might exist at the higher-order level even if it
doesn’t at the lower-order level. That is, even if one assumes
there is just one objectively right E-system, it is possible
for the following situation to arise: one agent is objectively
justified in believing that they are objectively justified in
believing p and the other agent is objectively justified in
believing that they are objectively justified in disbelieving
(or in withholding belief from) p. And that, importantly, is
consistent with it being the case that only one of the agents
13
P. S. Smith, M. P. Lynch
is, in fact, objectively justified in believing (or disbelieving)
that p. That is, both agents might be objectively justified (by
the correct E-system as it were) in believing their lower-level
attitudes are justified (by that system) without it being the
case that both of those attitudes are justified. Supposing that
higher-order justification can contribute to the reasonableness of belief, then it would be reasonable for one agent to
believe p and for the other to believe not-p (or to disbelieve
p) or withhold judgment from p.
How might such a disagreement emerge in practical
terms? According to Goldman, this situation is possible
when agents possess distinct epistemic positions. Epistemic
positions are distinct instantiations of correct schematic
epistemic norms. An instantiation of an epistemic norm can
be modeled by offering different specifications of values for
variables used in the statement of the norm.
To further explain the notion of epistemic position,
consider the example of two distinct educational contexts
discussed in Goldman (2010). One educational context is
within a religious community that is skeptical of evolutionary theory. The other context is within a scientific community in which evolutionary theory is regarded as highly reliable. The thought is that students occupying these distinct
instructional contexts occupy different epistemic positions
relative to certain testimonial norms of the objectively correct E-system.
As Goldman points out, there is wide agreement among
epistemologists that a correct E-system includes some kind
of testimonial norm in which it is reasonable to believe the
testimony of authorities. The exact statement of a correct
testimonial evidence norm is controversial, but there is wide
agreement on a basic schema that involves the principle
that a random speaker, or a recognized authority, should
be believed in the absence of defeating evidence (Goldman
2010, p. 197). Thus, schematically a testimonial norm may
look something like the following,
(T-norm) For agent A, and recognized authority R, if
R says that p, then A should ceteris paribus believe p.6
Doubtless this statement of the testimonial norm is open
to criticism and requires qualifications, but (T-norm) serves
to illustrate the point that distinct epistemic positions can
generate distinct instantiations of some schematic epistemic norms. Plausibly, teachers who are acknowledged by
a community as having the authority to teach are recognized authorities. It is reasonable for students to believe what
their teachers tell them. Thus, the student in the religious
instructional context occupies a different epistemic position
than the student in the scientific instructional context. The
6
This norm is modified for present purposes from the statement of a
testimonial norm found in Goldman (2010, p. 197).
13
recognized authorities, relative to the distinct epistemic positions, make conflicting claims on, for instance, the reliability
of evolutionary theory, or on the origin of species. Thus,
distinct values assigned to the A and R variables in (T-norm)
generate distinct instantiations of (T-norm).
Given this example, a natural question is whether agents
who occupy these distinct epistemic positions are genuine
epistemic peers? We think it is not implausible that students
operating within these distinct epistemic positions could
possess the sort of evidential and inferential symmetry
required for epistemic peerhood. However, honing in on a
different example than the one Goldman considers may serve
to more clearly illustrate how this sort of disagreement could
emerge among epistemic peers.
Consider the norm governing beliefs grounded in deductive reasoning. Again, the exact formulation of this norm is
controversial. However, it is highly plausible that some such
norm would be part of the correct E-system. One formulation of such a norm would be as follows,
(D-norm) If S holds a reasonable belief that p, and S
competently deduces, in accordance with an admissible logic L, from p that q, while retaining her knowledge that p, then (epistemically) S should believe that
q.7
7
There are a few things that should be noted about D-norm. First,
D-norm is a modification of Pritchard’s (2016, p. 13) formulation of
a closure principle. Of course, a closure principle is different from
a norm governing belief formation based on competent deductions.
Closure principles are supposed to capture the thought that “knowledge” is closed under known entailments. Norms governing belief
formation tell us what doxastic attitudes are reasonable under which
circumstances. Pritchard formulates a closure principle that holds
that, if the antecedent of (D-Norm) is true, then S knows that p. This
is different than what D-norm says. According to D-norm, the truth
of its antecedent implies that S should believe that p. The purpose of
D-norm is not to make any kind of commitment on the discussions
on closure in the epistemology literature. Rather, the purpose is to
merely express the plausible thought that, if one knows a proposition
p and correctly deduces another proposition q from p, while maintaining knowledge that p, then there is some epistemic obligation
to believe that q. The second thing to note about D-norm is that we
qualify the obligation as an epistemic obligation. The reason for this
qualification is that it is conceivable that there may be practical reasons not to believe q. Perhaps belief in q is psychologically uncomfortable for some reason or other and, thus, there is at least some
practical reason not to believe that p. Finally, the third point that I
want to note about D-norm is that it specifically employs the notion
of an ‘admissible logic’ as opposed to just a ‘logic.’ There are several
proposals for characterizing which logics are among the set of admissible, or correct, logics (Shapiro 2014, Chap. 2; Beall and Restall
2006; DeVidi 2010; Kouri Kissel 2018; Simard Smith forthcoming).
While the details of this issue are beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth noting that, plausibly, a norm that specifies what is
reasonable to believe about a proposition p that one has competently
deduced from other beliefs, should restrict its attention to competent
deductions that accord with correct, or admissible, logics.
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
Imagine one exceptional graduate student learns logic
from Brouwer, an ardent advocate of the view that intuitionistic logic is the one true logic, and another exceptional
graduate student learns logic from Timothy Williamson, an
ardent advocate of the view that classical logic is the one
true logic. Both graduate students engage in extensive discussion and deliberation with their supervisors. Their understanding of several problems in philosophy and mathematics
are shaped by their experiences learning from these master
logicians. Over time, they each become highly convinced of
their supervisors’ respective views and see things largely in
line with their respective supervisors. They both understand
the arguments for and against the correctness of classical and
intuitionistic logic. However, Brouwer’s student thinks that,
for instance, excluded middle and double negation-elimination are not generally valid and Williamson’s student thinks
that these classical principles are valid. Both graduate students believe one another to have reasonable responses to all
the other’s arguments and can draw on a range of literature
and respected authorities that agree with them. Plausibly
Brouwer’s student is in a different epistemic position with
respect to D-norm than Williamson’s student. In the former
case, competent deductions do not generally involve inferring in accordance with DNE, for instance, and in the latter case they do. So, different instantiations of D-norm are
generated by these logicians’ distinct epistemic positions.
Each of these distinct positions offers a different value for
the L variable in D-norm. In the case of Brouwer’s student,
the value of the L variable is intuitionistic logic. In the case
of Williamson’s student, it is classical logic. For Brower’s
student, logic alone does not provide a basis for rationally
believing claims supported by some classically valid inference principles. This is the case even if the premises of such
inferences are known to be true. However, for Williamson’s
student any classically valid inference would provide rational
grounds for believing the conclusion, presuming the premises are known to be true. In fact, for Williamson’s student,
it would be unreasonable not to believe the conclusion given
that the antecedent conditions on D-norm were satisfied.
So, presuming that norms similar to (T-norm) and
(D-norm) are part of the objectively right E-system, the
different epistemic positions occupied by different agents
renders it prima facie reasonable for one agent to believe
a proposition that it is reasonable for the other agent to
withhold belief from (presuming there is no other evidence
with respect to the proposition in question). Even though
we are working with one and only one correct system of
E-norms, one person is justified in believing that it is justified to believe a proposition that the other person is justified in believing that it is justified to disbelieve (or withhold
belief from).
There are, of course, a variety of issues raised by Goldman’s account. For our purposes, however, two are salient.
The first is that while Goldman motivates his account by
way of the problem of peer disagreement, it can also be
understood as involving an explicitly epistemic disagreement as defined above. The peer disagreement concerns
the question of whether the epistemic peers involved can
or cannot continue to reasonably disagree over the belief
that p given the total relevant evidence. But note that, e.g.
Goldman’s account suggests that the agents involved in an
OBR scenario disagree not just about whether p, but also
about whether they are both justified in believing that p. This
disagreement is properly epistemic in our sense, since it concerns whether a belief has a given epistemic property, that
of having objective justification. Secondly, it is important
to highlight that it is unclear how OBR type argumentative
discussions could result in one agent rationally persuading
the other of their point of view by drawing on epistemic
reasons alone. For their ability to make epistemically cogent
arguments to the other about the subject matter in question
will be hampered by the different instantiations of the relevant epistemic principles. The reason their ability to make
epistemically cogent arguments is hampered is because the
different parties to the disagreement interpret the relevant
epistemic principles in different ways. When one party draws
on the relevant epistemic principles it will not rationally persuade the other of the same conclusion. For example, consider two agents who occupy slightly different perceptual
positions (plausibly an aspect of their epistemic position)
such that one perceives a particular patch of a tomato as
red and another perceives the same patch of the tomato as
orange. Further suppose that both employ the epistemic principle, “presuming normal conditions, one should believe that
something is the color it appears to be.” Any attempt for one
of the participants to persuade the other about the patch’s
color by drawing on this principle would not produce an
argument that is epistemically cogent for the other.
Note that, given all we have said here, it is possible, in
some circumstances, for one or other of the participants in
an argumentation to change their mind, perhaps due to other
sorts of reasons or factors. Other factors could, for example,
result in one party adjusting their epistemic position with
respect to (T-norm). Such an adjustment could shift who
is regarded as an appropriate authority on the issue under
consideration. However, holding the epistemic positions of
the parties to the disagreement fixed, rational persuasion that
draws on epistemic reasons alone seems unlikely. This is the
case because, in considering the (T-norm) example at least,
a key component of each epistemic position involves who
is appropriately recognized as an authority on the origin of
species. Making changes to these features of the party’s epistemic position changes key features of Goldman’s example.
Thus, so long as these features are held fixed—that is, so
long as their epistemic position is held fixed—it is not clear
13
P. S. Smith, M. P. Lynch
what reasons could be leveled that would result in rational
persuasion using epistemic reasons alone.
For these reasons we characterize Goldman-style disagreement as a variant of deep epistemic disagreement. Goldman-style disagreement may be regarded as a level-1 deep
disagreement. We call it level-1 deep disagreement because
it is a sub-norm disagreement. The disagreement is “subnorm” in the sense that it does not require any disagreement over E-norms. Rather, it can emerge from a scenario
in which the parties to the disagreement are in complete
agreement over the correct E-system, but disagree because
of their different epistemic positions.
One line of objection to understanding Goldman-style
disagreements as deep disagreements is that it, some may
claim, results in an over inclusive account of deep disagreements. Why? The thought underlying this objection is that it
may be possible to have a Goldman-style deep disagreement
that is relatively confined, and does not involve the parties
disagreeing over a large class of domains. Consider again
the dispute about the color of the patch on the tomato. If the
agents with varying perceptual perspectives with respect to
the tomato’s color came to engage in a discussion about its
color, they would disagree about the claim that the tomato
is red. One of the agents might argue as follows, “Look!
The tomato appears red.” The other agent might then reply
by saying, “it certainly does not, it is clearly orange.” However, as explained earlier, the agents, in this circumstance,
would be hampered in their capacity to provide epistemically
cogent arguments that would persuade one another that the
tomato is red or orange respectively. Similarly, some constructive mathematicians may disagree with classical mathematicians as to the set of valid inferences. This means that
some arguments that the classical mathematician regards
as proofs, the constructive mathematician may not (or, at
least—depending on the flavor of the constructivist—may
regard the classical proof as less informative). In spite of
this, both mathematicians may also be anarcho-syndicalists,
Libertarians about free will, panpsychists and agree on many
other subjects. So, deep disagreements need not extend to
a wide variety of domains. Their core feature is an inability
to persuade through epistemically cogent arguments. Therefore, in our view, including these kinds of disagreements in
the class of deep disagreements is not over-inclusive, but
the proper result.8
8
The feature a disagreement possesses when it extends to a wide
variety of domains is most probably breadth rather than depth. Some
disagreements with wide breadth may be deep and others not.
13
3.2 Lynch-Style Deep Disagreement
How do we determine what reasons justify an epistemic
principle, like (T-norm) or (D-norm), as being a member
of the objectively right E-system? As noted, Goldman does
not problematize this issue. Instead, Goldman presumes
one correct system of E-norms. From there he proceeds to
explain how, even in the presence of an objectively right
E-system, reasonable disagreement among epistemic peers
could occur. However, presumably an important outstanding
issue is what sorts of considerations would justify regarding
some E-norm as a member of the correct system of E-norms.
While Goldman doesn’t address this problem, Lynch
(2010, 2012, 2016) does. In particular, Lynch raises the issue
of how an epistemic principle can be justified for someone
that is skeptical of the correctness of that principle. So,
while one form disagreement emerges because distinct epistemic positions generate distinct instantiations of principles,
another form of disagreement emerges because of skepticism over some epistemic principle. Since there is not an
agreement as to the correct epistemic principles, this sort of
disagreement is not an instance of sub-norm disagreement.
In certain cases, uncontroversial principles can be drawn
upon to resolve differences of opinion over correct principles. For example, suppose two hunters disagree over
whether certain features of a track indicate that the track was
left by a coyote or by a domestic dog. One hunter follows
the principle of inferring that these features are characteristic of a dog track, the other that they are characteristic of
a coyote track. However, both agree that a respected elder
hunter knows about such matters, so they consult the elder’s
opinion to settle their disagreement. In this case, a disagreement about one epistemic principle—whether the relevant
characteristics indicate a dog or coyote track—is settled
by using a more fundamental epistemic principle that both
hunters agree with—that the elder hunter knows about such
matters and her opinion can be counted on.
In the preceding example, the principle that the elder’s
testimony is reliable on these matters is not controversial.
Application of this norm settles the dispute. However, occasionally a disagreement occurs that turns on the application
of what Lynch calls a fundamental epistemic source principle (FESP). A FESP is type of epistemic principle that does
not only indicate that a certain source of evidence is reliable.
According to Lynch, a FESP “is a principle such that it can’t
be shown to be true without employing the source that the
relevant principle endorses as reliable” (Lynch 2016, p. 250).
Unlike the disagreement over the footprints just considered,
a disagreement that turns on a FESP cannot be resolved by
appealing to a more fundamental epistemic principle.
Common examples of FESPs discussed in the philosophy
literature are the principle that induction is reliable or that
observation is reliable. David Hume famously established
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
that it is not possible to show that induction is reliable without using induction itself. In arguing for a FESP “we hit
bedrock,” we encounter a point at which we can’t muster
epistemic reasons that would rationally persuade a person
doubtful of the reliability of the FESP in the first place.
Lynch explicitly calls disagreements that turn on conflicting FESPs deep disagreements. Lynch claims that these
disagreements are deep because it is not possible to provide
epistemic reasons that the skeptic of the principle would
recognize as reasons for or against the principle in question. Why is this not a possibility? The reason is that the
FESP that one person accepts the other doesn’t. FESPs, by
definition, need to employ the source of evidence that they
claim is reliable in a justification of the FESP. Thus, a person
who doesn’t accept some FESP won’t regard its source of
evidence as reliable. And, as a result, they won’t recognize
the reasons that might be given in favor of the FESP’s truth
as rationally persuasive. Therefore, a person who does not
accept some FESP won’t find any argument for the FESP
epistemically cogent. That is to say, no argument for the
FESP that draws on epistemic reasons alone could be rationally persuasive to such a skeptic. After all, the skeptic would
not recognize the premise that invoked the source in question
as providing credible reasons to think that the principle in
question was true. Such arguments would not provide sufficient reason to endorse the principle, and thus would not
be rationally persuasive to the skeptic.
We call this sort of deep disagreement level-2 deep disagreements, or principle-based deep disagreements. These
disagreements occur above the sub-principle level since
there is not agreement over a correct E-system. Nevertheless,
when these disagreements involve fundamental epistemic
principles, they cannot be resolved through one party rationally persuading the other party on the basis of epistemic
reasons alone.
3.2.1 Objections and Replies to the Level‑1/Level‑2 Deep
Disagreement Distinction
As discussed above, the primary difference between subprinciple (level-1) and principle-level (level-2) deep disagreement is the cause of these two different kinds of disagreement.9 The latter form of disagreement emerges because
9
Someone may reasonably form the impression that talk of ‘levels’
of deep disagreement is meant to refer to the degree of depth of the
deep disagreement. Perhaps the thought goes that a level-2 deep disagreement is of a deeper of depth than a level-1 deep disagreement.
We have no intention to talk of grades of depth among deep disagreements here. For our purposes each variant of disagreement is equally
deep, so to speak, since they are all resistant to resolution through a
give and take of reasons. The explanation of the depth may vary from
one case to the next. However, that need not entail that different levels
are of different degrees of depth.
of disputes over correct epistemic principles. The former
turns on variations in epistemic positions.
There is an important concern that someone might raise
with this distinction that we will now consider. To articulate
this concern requires some reflection on the way epistemic
principles, or epistemic norms, were characterized earlier
in this paper. Implicitly, we understood epistemic principles
as being schematic in the sense that they contain “slots,”
so to speak. These “slots” take different values supplied by
the agent’s epistemic position. So, for instance, the “credible expert” slot in (T-norm) can take different values, and
have different extensions, given distinct epistemic positions.
Call this the schematic conception of epistemic principles.
However, someone may prefer a characterization of epistemic principles in which concepts involved in the statement
of the principle have a fixed extension. In other words, the
principle is such that the extension of any concept employed
within the epistemic principle is fixed and doesn’t vary with
variations in epistemic position. For instance, relative to
one context the epistemic principle would render evolutionary biologists as credible experts. In the other context,
religious authorities could be credible experts. This view
about epistemic principle regards, what we earlier characterized as different instantiations of (T-norm), as distinct
epistemic principles all together. According to this understanding of epistemic principles, there is not really agreement over (T-norm) among those who come from different
educational backgrounds. Rather, these agents are reasoning in accordance with distinct epistemic principles. Call
this the non-schematic conception of epistemic principles.
If the non-schematic conception is correct, then the disagreements discussed earlier that revolved around (T-norm)
or (D-norm) are ultimately analyzed in terms of principle
level disagreement rather than sub-principle level disagreement. The core of this concern is whether the level-1/level-2
distinction can be sustained across different conceptions of
the level of generality at which epistemic principles are best
conceptualized.10 If epistemic principles are best conceptualized non-schematically, then the level-1/level-2 distinction
cannot be sustained.
In order to reply to this concern, we contend that there are
explanatory advantages associated with the schematic conception of epistemic principles. What are these advantages?
Within certain argumentative exchanges arguers are likely to
locate their difference of opinion as rooted in a difference in
epistemic position (or some similar concept), while in others
they are likely to locate their difference as rooted in a difference over epistemic principles themselves. For instance, the
latter kind of understanding of the disagreement is likely to
10
Many thanks for an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on these
objections on the level-1/level-2 distinction.
13
P. S. Smith, M. P. Lynch
emerge among the participants to a dispute in which there is
a strong agreement over (T-norm), but differences emerging
over who should qualify as a credible expert based on coming from different communities (i.e. a secular community or
a evangelical Christian community, for example). If all deep
disagreements are disputes over epistemic principles, then
arguers would be mistaken when they judge themselves to
agree over principles, but disagree in their interpretation due
to coming from different backgrounds or past experiences.
There is at least a prima facie value in an account of deep
disagreement that takes this argumentative behavior at face
value.
However, in response to this reply, it is worth acknowledging the possibility arguers could be wrong in regarding themselves as agreeing over principles, but as differing
because of their epistemic positioning. However, the burden
of proof, in our view, rests with those who would regard this
natural argumentative behavior as inherently misguided. The
non-schematic account of epistemic principles requires all
deep disagreements to be at the principle level. Thus, arguers
who understand themselves to agree over epistemic principles but disagree due to worldview, background beliefs or
being from different communities would be mistaken as to
the nature of their disagreement on the non-schematic view.
The account developed here takes it at face value that arguers are right in circumstances in which they locate the cause
of the disagreement in divergent epistemic positions, rather
than in a difference of opinion over epistemic principles.
3.3 Fogelin-Style Deep Disagreement
In a paper titled The Logic of Deep Disagreement, Robert
Fogelin also characterized a type of disagreement as “deep.”
According to Fogelin, normal disagreements occur within
a framework of shared background beliefs. These shared
background beliefs include facts relevant to the issue under
dispute and about what sort of inferences and standards of
argument evaluation are adequate (Fogelin 2005, p. 6). For
example, do the participants assume classical inferences are
valid? Is inference to the best explanation an acceptable mode
of inference? If so, what determines whether one explanation
is better than another? Do the participants share beliefs about
what the basic facts are with respect to the dispute at hand?
Typically arguments occur in situations where the participants have a wide range of agreement on the basic facts and
the standards of good reasoning. Deep disagreements occur,
according to Fogelin, when there is an absence of relevant
shared background beliefs (Godden and Brenner 2010, p. 43)
and a clash of, so-called, “framework propositions” (Fogelin
2005, p. 8). If we don’t agree on the facts, or about how to
reason well about them, then the facts to which I appeal,
and the reasons I provide, are not likely to be registered as
persuasive to you.
13
At first glance, Fogelin’s account seems similar to
Lynch’s. And in some ways it is; but there is a significant
difference between the kind of disagreement that Fogelin has
in mind and the other two kinds we’ve discussed.
For the purposes of illustrating these similarities and
differences, it will help to step out of the epistemological
realm for a moment and consider Fogelin’s example of an
analogous deep moral disagreement over whether abortion
is morally permissible. In such a disagreement, it is plausible that the parties share some basic moral principles in
common. For instance, the parties could agree about the
intrinsic value, or sanctity, of human life. However, according to Fogelin, in spite of this agreement, in many cases the
disagreement cannot be resolved by appeal to facts or by
appeal to moral principles (Fogelin 2005, p. 8). Fogelin says,
One diagnosis of the situation is tempting. What I have
called deep disagreements are generated by conflicts
between framework propositions. They remain recalcitrant to adjudication because the sources of the disagreement—the framework propositions—are allowed
to lie in the background, working at a distance. The
way to put the debate on a rational basis is to surface
these background propositions and then discuss them
directly. (Fogelin 2005, p. 8)
If we assume, as seems likely, that Fogelin would draw a
similar lesson in the case of epistemic disagreement, then
FESPs are another example of the sort of thing that Fogelin
means by “framework propositions.”11 And, if we consider
an analogous diagnosis for deep epistemic disagreement to
the diagnosis Fogelin entertains for the moral case, then we
can assume he would think that some deep disagreements
pivot on a dispute over specific FESPs. To that extent, a
Fogelin-style account of deep epistemic disagreement would
seem very similar to Lynch-style deep disagreement. However, Fogelin is clear that he is unsatisfied with this account
of deep disagreement. According to Fogelin, it is unclear
that the disagreement is best understood as pivoting around
specific framework propositions. Fogelin explains,
On the one side someone will hold that at conception...
an immortal soul enters the fertilized egg and with
this, personhood is attained. Why should one believe
anything like this? Well, this is part of a wider tradition, grounded in revelation, and sustained and deepened by faith. When we inquire into the root of deep
disagreement, we do not simply find isolated propositions... but instead a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles
of acting and thinking). (Fogelin 2005, p. 9)
11
Christopher Ranalli also discusses this point in his “What is Deep
Disagreement” (Ranalli 2018).
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
Fogelin-style deep disagreements do not turn on the truth
of specific framework propositions. These disagreements
involve clashes among overarching frameworks themselves.
And these frameworks, Fogelin suggests, are frameworks
of understanding. As such, they determine not only what
people believe, but how they understand the terms they use
to communicate those beliefs. Hence a deep disagreement,
in Fogelin’s sense, involves a disagreement not just over the
truth of a principle or principles but in how to understand
the relevant principles. Put differently, a disagreement is
deep on Fogelin’s characterization when the dispute’s participants possess radically different conceptual frameworks,
resulting in divergent and conflicting views as to what the
facts are, and about how to properly evaluate the evidence
pertaining to the issue under dispute. But while these consequences mean that the argument can’t be settled by appeal
to cogent epistemic considerations, the dispute is informed
and animated by different conceptual frameworks—that is,
by different traditions, conventions and overarching modes
of interpreting and understanding reality, society, politics,
morality and knowledge.12
Thus, Fogelin-style disagreement is a level above principle-level deep disagreement. It occurs at the level of conflicting conceptual frameworks and as a result, over how to
understand networks of claims, not (just) over the truth of
a specific epistemic principle, or even a set of specific epistemic principles. Thus, Fogelin-style deep disagreement can
also be called level-3 deep disagreement, or framework-level
deep disagreement.13
12
There is considerable discussion within the literature on framework propositions as to whether these are the kind of propositions
to which agents should be understood as adopting the propositional
attitude of belief. Some have argued that one can only adopt the attitude of commitment towards framework propositions. See Prichard
(2015), for example. In order to clarify, our point here is that Fogelin
style disagreement is not best modeled, or conceptualized, in terms
of conviction or belief towards a specified set of discrete propositions
or principles. Rather, it operates at a different level. Certainly people
who find themselves in such a disagreement may identify various particular framework propositions, facts or epistemic principles to which
they would hold contrary convictions. However, the disagreement
pivots around clashing frameworks or conflicting worldviews rather
than propositions or principles, as Fogelin himself argues (Fogelin
2005, pp. 8–9). We develop this point further, with more discussion
and an example shortly.
13
It is worth noting that Lynch is not committed to deep disagreement turning on one framework proposition, or one epistemic principle. While Lynch’s (2010, 2016) discussions of deep disagreement
present deep disagreements in terms of disputes over specific FESPs,
given what he says it is conceivable that deep disagreement could be
nested and involve several epistemic principles. Note, however, that
it is still possible that agent’s may share an epistemic position, in the
sense characterized above, and disagree over several epistemic principles. Disagreements that emerge at the level of frameworks will vary
both with respect to several epistemic principles and with respect to
epistemic position.
To drive home this distinction, consider how this contrasts with Lynch-style disagreements. According to Lynch,
unless there is a common basis for shared meaning among
the parties to the dispute, it’s not clear that there is a genuine disagreement as opposed to a difference in meaning.
While it is unclear how much agreement (or lack thereof)
is required for a Fogelin-style deep disagreement to occur,
in a Lynch-style deep disagreement, the disputants must, at
least, possess shared epistemic goals and a similar understanding of the FESP under dispute (Lynch 2010, p. 265).
For instance, a skeptic and a proponent of the principle that
induction is reliable must at least have a similar grasp of the
meaning of such a principle in order to disagree over the
principle’s reliability. Thus, one reason to think that Fogelin
and Lynch have something different in mind is the different
ways that the two emphasize a shared background understanding among the parties to the disagreement. In Lynch’s
case, it is crucial that there is a shared meaning over the
key propositions and principles involved, whereas Fogelin
tends to emphasize the lack of shared meaning in contexts
of deep disagreement. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that a
Lynch-style deep disagreement could occur between those
who share overarching conceptual frameworks in Fogelin’s
sense. Arguably, for instance, this is the sort of dispute that
occurs when two empiricist philosophers, with similar educational and cultural backgrounds, have an argument on the
reliability of some inductive principle.
Similar points distinguish Fogelin-style deep disagreement from Goldman-style deep disagreement. Goldmanstyle disagreements concern epistemic position—that is,
how to interpret or assign constants to the variables in
norm schemata. Fogelin-style deep disagreements may
involve this as well—since differences with respect to
epistemic position may be part of conflicting frameworks.
But a Fogelin-style disagreement is not just over how to
make assignments for variables in a shared schemata, but
over how to understand the non-varying elements of the
schema too—that is, over networks of concepts such as, e.g.
“belief,” “reason,” or “evidence.” In other words, Fogelinstyle disagreement concerns how to even understand what
lurks in the background of other, less holistic, kinds of deep
disagreement.
To state the differences between these three kinds of
disagreement sharply; Lynch-style disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles, Goldmanstyle disagreements are disagreements about how to assign
content to schematic epistemic principles and Fogelin-style
disagreements are holistic disagreements in meaning not
truth, they are disagreements over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts
compose.
It is also clearly the case that within Fogelin-style
deep disagreements the prospect of one party rationally
13
P. S. Smith, M. P. Lynch
persuading the other through epistemic reasons is undercut.
Indeed, Fogelin takes this a step further, claiming that his
notion of deep disagreement undercuts the very possibility
of argument all together. Fogelin stresses that he is not just
endorsing,
The weak claim that in such contexts arguments cannot
be settled. It is the stronger claim that the conditions
for arguing do not exist. The language of the argument
may persist, but it becomes pointless since it makes an
appeal to something that does not exist: a shared background of beliefs and preferences. (Fogelin 2005, p. 9)
It is worth noting that Seigel (2013) and Patterson (2013)
have expressed doubts as to whether there are genuine cases
of Fogelin-style deep disagreement. One thought is that
Fogelin-style disagreements are not genuine disagreements
at all. Rather, they are merely disagreements in meaning.
We agree Fogelin-style disagreements involve disagreements in meaning, although, for familiar Quinean reasons,
we are suspicious about whether there is anything “mere”
about such disagreements. Moreover, when disagreements in
meaning are holistic enough, as Fogelin-style disagreements
purport to be, they will have the consequence the parties
won’t be able to appeal to epistemically cogent reasons in
order to persuade one another. That in turn ensures that they
count as deep in the sense of the term we’ve articulated.
That said, answering the larger question of whether there
are any genuine Fogelin-style deep disagreements is not our
purpose here. But we do note one promising thing about
them should they exist—it may be possible that these disputes could move to a more normal setting once the participants pin down the meaning of key terms involved in the dispute. At that point there may be no issue in the participants
offering epistemically cogent arguments to the other. That’s
an optimistic thought, and one that informs the speculative
point with which we’ll conclude the paper.
4 Rationally Navigating Deep Disagreement
As we have seen, in each of the varieties of deep disagreement considered, it is not possible for the parties to the
dispute to rationally persuade one another by only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view.
Why? The reason is that the epistemic reasons that one
party to the dispute should recognize as offering sufficient
support for their standpoint should be not recognized by
the other party to the dispute as offering sufficient support for that standpoint. One response to this situation is to
“throw your hands up” and abandon the prospect of fruitful
argumentation.
However, various approaches have been proposed for
rationally navigating, if not resolving, these kinds of difficult
13
disputes.14 Someone may wonder whether the tripartite distinction between three “levels” of deep disagreement means
that the solutions that have been proposed could only apply
to one kind of disagreement. We think not. At least one
strategy may be applicable to any of the varieties of deep
disagreement considered here.
The strategy we have in mind is articulated in Case
Sunstein’s (2018) discussion of “incompletely theorized
agreements” in his Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict.
Incompletely theorized agreements occur, “when people
agree on something important, even though they disagree
on a lot” (Sunstein 2018, p. xi). Even in the midst of disagreement motivated by differences in epistemic position,
FESPs and overarching conceptual frameworks, there may
be some claims, and some principles, to which the parties to
the dispute can agree. For instance, two parties disagreeing
over which of two fundamental epistemic principles is true
may agree on other epistemic principles; two parties disagreeing over how to assign for the variables in a schematic
E-norm may nonetheless share other E-norms or a common
understanding of their non-variable terms. And parties with
distinct epistemic conceptual frameworks may still find that
those frameworks partly overlap. Of course, some elements
of all of the above may be involved in the messy details of
actual cases, as when two parties adopt completely different
understandings of evolutionary theory and on the virtues of
scientific experts on that subject but still appear to agree, in
some general sense, that both religious and scientific perspectives are worthwhile teaching in schools.15 The specifics
of how, and to what extent, these different perspectives are
taught is left unspecified and not fully theorized.
One way to flesh this suggestion out is to claim that the
concepts employed in propositions like,
S: Scientific perspectives should be taught in schools
And,
14
For discussion of proposals for resolving deep disagreements see
Lugg (1986), Campolo (2005), Feldman (2005), Godden and Brenner (2010), Sunstein (2018). As well, Lynch (2010, 2016) discusses
an approach to resolving deep disagreement he calls the “epistemic
method game.” Very roughly the idea is that agents who are unaware
of their “social and educational position” and also unaware of what
principles are reliable—are behind an epistemic veil of ignorance so
to speak—would agree to principles that are accessible to anyone,
open to public revision and non-secret (Lynch 2016). For some interesting discussion and criticisms of Lynch’s solution to deep disagreement see Kappel (2012).
15
Note there could be quite a divergence here. For example, one
party to the dispute may understand “religious perspectives should be
taught in schools” as part of academic religious studies programing
so students learn about the history, beliefs and practices associated
with a variety of different religious and spiritual traditions, including problematic episodes within a given religion’s history. The other
may understand this statement to include teaching intelligent design
or young earth creationism, or views along those lines.
Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement
R: Religious perspectives should be taught in schools
are “open-textured” (Waismann 1945) “unsettled” (Shapiro
2014) or “fluid” (Lynch 1998). Concepts like “religious,”
“scientific perspectives” and “taught” are usefully vague in a
particular way. That is, while all applications of the concept
may share certain minimal characteristics, it is possible to
enrich or further specify those concepts in distinct and nonoverlapping ways. If so, then there may be room for decision
makers to unpack and argue for specific interpretations of
these principles in such a way that they can endorse both
principles—precisely because they’ve enriched the content
of the relevant concepts in distinct ways. The practice of
how the principle gets acted on evolves in order to address
the needs of teachers, students and communities over time,
thereby impacting which principles they take as true, which
assignments they make to shared schematic norms, and the
entire shape of their conceptual framework. In this way, it is
similar to legal rules that are interpreted, conceptualized and
implemented by judicial-decision making bodies over time
to address the needs emerging from unique contexts, and
which in turn impact the broader legal frameworks employed
by jurists.
Through identifying some point of agreement and drawing on those points to construct a framework for acting on
the points of agreement, new practices emerge that enable
deeply disagreeing parties to collectively navigate their different views in order to address pressing social needs that
emerge when people with diverse perspectives live together.
To reiterate, this does not mean that agreement over the contested issue emerges. For what constitutes agreement is now
itself be a complex matter (see, e.g. Lynch 1998; Shapiro
2014). Relative to their distinct specifications of the relevant
concepts, they neither agree nor disagree—they are talking
past one another. Relative to the shared overlapping content
of the concepts, however, their disagreement persists. And
these two facts suggest that there is conceptual and political
space for the parties to emphasize, and work from, common
understanding rather than differences.
The above suggestion is speculative, of course. But it has
proven to be surprisingly durable in accounts of disagreement in metaphysics (Lynch 1998) and the philosophy of
logic (Shapiro 2014). Moreover, note that the possibility of
applying this approach to rationally navigating deep disagreement can be employed if the disagreement is at the level
of epistemic principles, or whether it emerges because of
differences in epistemic position or framework. In each case,
the idea is to look to principles that the parties can agree to
and work from the varying principles, positions or frameworks to interpret those principles over time.
It is also worth sounding a cautionary note, and not being
overly optimistic. In many circumstances people may form
an incompletely theorized agreement, but go on to stack the
deck. One way that the deck can be stacked is by assigning
people to interpret and enforce the agreement so as to favor
one side of the issue. This kind of stacking of the deck can
occur, for example, when some parties to the dispute are not
sincere in an effort to move forward in good faith to resolve
the disagreement. Moreover, it is possible that the relevant
disagreement may be so deep (in all three kinds of ways)
that there is not enough significant overlap to employ this
strategy. This could happen, for example, when the relevant
conceptual frameworks involved are simply alien to one
another. In such circumstances, the incompletely theorized
agreement strategy will be limited in its effectiveness. However, this kind of approach, we submit, is worth investigating
further as a way of trying to address important political and
social issues in the context of deep disagreements, whether
those disagreements are at the principle, sub-principle or
framework level.
5 Conclusion
In the epistemic and argumentation theoretic literature
the term ‘deep disagreement’ has been used to characterize a variety of different kinds of intractable differences of
opinion. In this paper, we discussed three different kinds
of disagreement that could be reasonably characterized as
“deep.” In each case, the disagreement is deep because the
participants to the disagreement are unable to provide an
epistemically cogent argument to one another in support of
their varying points of view. However, in spite of the inability to offer epistemically cogent arguments, it is nevertheless possible, in some circumstances, for deeply disagreeing
parties to rationally navigate their deep disagreements. We
discussed one strategy for navigating deep disagreements
that has been raised in the literature, highlighting its versatility in responding to the varieties of deep disagreement
considered here.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Ethical Approval This article does not contain any studies with human
participants or animals preformed by any of the authors.
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