Revisiting Deep Disagreement
DALE TURNER
California State Polytechnic University,
Pomona
LARRY WRIGHT
University o/California, Riverside
Abstract: Argument-giving reasons for a
view-is our model of rational dispute
resolution. Fogelin (1985) suggests that
certain "deep" disagreements cannot be
resolved in this way because features of their
context "undercut the conditions essential
to arguing" (p. 5). In this paper we add some
detail to Fogelin's treatment of intractable
disagreements. In doing so we distinguish
between his relatively modest claim that
some disputes cannot be resolved through
argument and his more radical claim that such
disputes are beyond rational resolution. This
distinction, along with some ofthe detail we
add to Fogelin's treatment, sheds some
useful light on the project of informal logic.
Resume: L'argumentation-Ia proposition de raisons pour soutenir un
jugement-est notre modele de resolution
de desaccord. Fogelin (1985) suggere que
certains des accords «pro fonds» ne peuvent
pas se n:soudre par I' argu-mentation parce
que des aspects d'un contexte de
contestation «etouffent les conditions
necessaires de I'argumentation» (p. 5). Dans
cet article no us ajoutons des details a
I'approche de Fogelin sur les des accords
difficiles a resoudre. Nous distinguons son
opinIOn relativement modeste que
I 'argumentation ne peut pas Tt:soudre
certains des accords et son opinion plus
radicale que de tels des accords son! au-dela
de resolutions rationnelles. Cette distinction
ainsi que d'autres informations sur
I'approche de Fogelin eclairent d'avantage
Ie projet de la logique non formelle.
Keywords: Fogelin, deep disagreement, articulation, understanding
1. Introduction: Disagreement and the Function of Argument
Argument--explicitIy setting out reasons for something~a
have a number of
functions. It can be used to articulate a position to oneself or to an audience; to
show to oneself or others that a position is at least reasonable; as a tool of intellectual
exploration or inquiry; and to help locate areas of disagreement with or without the
intention of addressing those areas. But clearly, one of the most obvious and
important functions of argument is the actual resolution of disagreement. We often
offer reasons for a view with the expectation that this will end disagreement in a
way that may be certified as rational. In fact, part of what motivates both
philosophical inquiry in general and the informal logic movement as a specialized
branch of it, is the sense that real progress can be made in the adjudication of
intellectual disputes-whether they be about age-old philosophical controversies
©Informal Logic Vol. 25, No.1 (2005): pp. 25-35.
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Dale Turner and Larry Wright
such as the existence offreewill, the rationality of the fear of death, the desirability
of embodied immortality, the nature and status of our epistemic claims, the nature
of moral judgment, or contemporary social controversies such as abortion,
euthanasia, sexual morality, capital punishment, the war in Iraq, taxation, or the
privatization of education and social security-by the careful construction and
analysis of arguments.
It is easy to see why we have such high expectations for argument. The use of
argument to adjudicate controversy can be inclusive and democratic. Moreover,
and perhaps more importantly, in countless mundane cases of disagreement we
employ argument with great success. For example, arguing that the heavy snowfall
in the mountains makes it reasonable to take the coastal route typically just ends
whatever disagreement two interlocutors might have had about how to get to their
destination. We expect it, then, to pay dividends in the more controversial aspects
of our social and intellectual lives as well.
This transfer of expectations has not gone unchallenged, however. Twenty
years ago Robert Fogelin (1985) suggested that in contexts of what he calls "deep
disagreement," argument fails to provide a means of rational dispute resolution:
"deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they
undercut the conditions essential to arguing" (p. 5). This is no mere philosophical
abstraction but rather something that applies to at least some of the items listed
above that are of central interest to the Informal Logic movement. Furthermore,
Fogelin thinks this may place the issues themselves beyond reason: "there are," he
concludes, "disagreements, sometimes on important issues, which by their very
nature, are not subject to rational resolution" (p. 7). Although this view has been
both attacked and defended in this journal, (Lugg, 1986; Davson-Galle, 1992) it
has been largely ignored in the teaching of controversy. This may in part be due to
the difficulty of the issue itself; but part of the problem may be that both Fogelin
and his defenders obscure things by running together two distinguishable
propositions.
In this paper we would like to look a bit more closely at the difficult questions
underlying the tractability of disagreement. In doing this we will distinguish Fogelin's
more modest claim that there are contexts of deep disagreement in which argument
fails to live up to its dialectical promise] from his more radical claim that deep
disagreements are not subject to rational resolution at all. Our hope is to cast some
useful light on the project of Informal Logic.
2. Getting clear on deep disagreement
To understand the nature and significance of deep disagreement Fogelin directs
our attention to contexts of "normal or near normal argumentative exchanges" (p.
4) such as the travel route example mentioned above. In such contexts interlocutors
share a background of commitments and understanding, including much about
what counts as a resolution of disagreement. Fogelin's Wittgensteinian view is that
Revisiting Deep Disagreement
27
it is these conditions that give argument whatever interest and value it has for us:
"the possibility of genuine argumentative exchange depends ... on the fact that
together we accept many things" (p. 4). And ifthere are non-normal argumentative
exchanges in which interlocutors fail to share a common core of framework
propositions, then, "argument, to that extent, becomes impossible" (p. 4). Fogelin
clearly thinks that there are circumstances or contexts that do fail to meet these
minimal conditions for genuine or productive argument, dubbing exchanges arising
in such cases "deep disagreements."
This is not the weak claim that in such contexts arguments cannot be settled.
It is the stronger claim that the conditions for argument do not exist. The
language of argument may persist, but it becomes pointless since it makes an
appeal to something that does not exist: a shared background of beliefs and
preferences. (pp. 4-5)
Argument then ceases to be a tool for the rational resolution of disagreement; one
of the primary functions of argument is undermined in such contexts.
To see how such contexts might undermine the conditions that make argument
possible, it would be good to be clear about what those conditions are. As a step in
that direction, consider the following conversational sketches in the ordinary human
circumstances they each suggest.
1. A colleague asks about an oil stain under my car. I tell her that my car
must have an oil leak since the stain is new and the car hasn't been
moved for a while. She thinks I must be right.
2. Several students drop by a professor's office during scheduled office hours to
ask about a quiz. The professor's door is open but she is not in the office. One
student suggests that she is gone for the day, but another points out that she just
saw the instructor in class and that there is a steaming cup of coffee on her
desk. The students jointly conclude that the instructor is around somewhere
and will be back shortly.
3. Laura asserts that her husband is having an affair. Her friend says that she
cannot imagine that John could do that sort of thing. Laura replies by pointing
out that he has consistently been home late for the past two weeks, often smells
of a perfume that she doesn't wear, and is trying to hide the fact that he is
calling the number of a high school sweetheart that he recently ran into at his
ten year reunion. Her friend finds it impossible to resist Laura's conclusion.
4. While out running errands together, my wife recommends that we go to the dry
cleaner before the grocery store. When I ask why she says simply: we need ice
cream. I head for the dry cleaners.2
5. Sara suggests to her husband that they go visit her mother. When asked for a
reason she responds by pointing out that a preemptive visit will preclude her
mother from visiting them. Her husband concurs.
In these cases of normal argumentative exchange, offering reasons successfully
produces intersubjective agreement. Of course, things need not go so smoothly in
any of these cases: complications and further disagreements can easily arise. But
,.
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Dale Turner and Larry Wright
because these examples were all chosen to illustrate Fogelin's normal circumstance
in which interlocutors share nearly everything relevant to the exchange, they would
also have a pretty clear sense of how to proceed in settling the matter if the first
gambit was not immediately successful.
To begin to see how and why departing very far from the congenial conditions
illustrated here might undermine the velY possibility of argument, it would be
worth saying a bit more than Fogelin does about just what it is in these conditions
that underwrites that possibility. The first thing to note is that what the interlocutors
share in such cases allows them to accomplish what they do quite economically.
In the examples given, the entire argument may be captured in a single complex
sentence in which the subordinating conjunction "because" connects the view
with an item or two or three of support. The oil must have come from my car
because the stain is new and the car's been there for some time. Or: we should
stop at the cleaners before the grocery store because ice cream is on the shopping
list. These arguments are thus easily cast into classic, schematic argument form,
S (support)
C (conclusion).
For instance:
S: We have ice cream on the shopping list.
C: We should stop at the cleaners before the grocery store.
One way to put Fogelin's point is that the classic status of this form is no
accident, but is symptomatic of the central feature of normal argumentative
exchanges. This is that the interlocutors share enough solid understanding of the
world, the particular circumstances, and each other that the person giving the
argument knows or can easily find something relatively epigrammatic that will
produce agreement; and it will do so by appeal to the competent judgment of the
other. Were it obvious that this describes a fundamental constraint on the use of
argument, this topic would have generated no controversy. So to better see why
someone might think that departing from this condition might threaten the use of
argument altogether, it will be worth examining in some detail just what's entailed
in meeting it.
The first thing to note is that what our common understanding allows us to
omit from explicit consideration is in each case a strictly unlimited list of
considerations that would be relevant to the reasoning were we not able to simply
take them for granted. In the second example, for instance, we simply assume our
interlocutors know roughly how fast coffee cools when sitting at room temperature
and at any rate, that doesn't get hotter; that coffee is a beverage and one commonly
consumed at work; that cups of warm coffee do not spontaneously materialize on
desks, or even randomly; that coffee on a desk is not a common way to signal that
someone has gone for the day; that classes are nearby and recognizable by ordinary
students; that getting from class to office takes minutes rather than centuries; that
Revisiting Deep Disagreement
29
people do not usually die or vanish in these circumstances; and so on. If much on
this list were missing from an interlocutor's understanding, then nothing in argument
form would be up to the task of addressing the disagreement. What would be
needed would be on the order of an education, a richer life, or therapy, nothing that
could be accomplished epigrammatically. This is the position most of us are in
when the topic is exotically disciplinary. A standard paleobiological argument
concludes that every organism alive today has a common ancestor of a certain
quite particular makeup that lived two or three billion years ago. Its support appeals
to the nature of ribonucleic acid and its function in synthesizing protein molecules,
together with details of mutation rates, geophysical history, and systematic features
of the fossil record. From its provenance and location we can be reasonably certain
this is a good argument. But no epigrammatic augmentation of it would enable the
average intelligent, educated person to evaluate it. The reasoning would be accessible
only after serious immersion in a curriculum. Without that, we could not achieve
agreement on its· conclusion through this argument.
Furthermore, when the agreement induced by mentioning steaming coffee and
the recent sighting is of the proper sort, that is, the result of these items engaging
a competent judgment, this will be manifest in the intersubjective satisfactoriness
of other talk and behavior. In particular, the interlocutors should go on together in
fitting the support offered into various stories about the recent whereabouts of the
professor: musing about possible sequences of events, for instance, or checking
for coffee sources and other sightings. Were someone incapable of this, we would
properly doubt that the agreement, if real at all, was due to understanding the
reasons for the conclusion, as opposed to the authority of the arguer or the
agreement it produced in others. The inability to do anything like this in the
paleobiological case would be one manifestation of the non-specialist's incompetence
in its evaluation; and it would make clear that their quite reasonable acceptance of
the conclusion was based on their estimation of the argument's source and location,
not its substantive detail.
In the fourth example, which is a different kind of case, we take for granted
things like this too: that ice cream is frozen and that it will melt ifleft unrefrigerated
very long on a warm day; that today is warm; that we're going by car; that the car
is unrefrigerated; that the trip will take long enough to matter; and so on. But here
we take for granted many explicitly normative items as well: that ice cream is
better if not melted and/or refrozen; that this matters enough to affect itinerary;
that configuring the trip in this way is better than making two trips, or buying
another car, or skipping the ice cream, or buying something that would keep the
ice cream frozen; and so on. So in cases of "practical" reasoning, explicitly
concerning what we should do rather than simply what we should think, the
shared perception must be expanded to include common values and preferences
as well as judgments. Here again, a small difference might be treatable without
leaving the context of simple reasoning: e.g., "It's too small a matter to run back
for the freezer pack." But if it is not, or if the differences are large, this kind of
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Dale Turner and Larry Wright
case may prove even less tractable than the more or less purely "epistemic" ones
of the previous example. For curricula and even greatly expanded life experience
will frequently make little headway against different pictures of the good.
In any case, this way of thinking about what makes argumentative contexts
"normal" allows us to provide Fogelin's deep disagreements with some fine structure
that will clarify their nature and prospects. If the effortless success of "normal"
appeal to reasons derives from shared understanding and uncontroversial
competence, it should not be surprising that this success starts to elude us as we
share less and move beyond our clear competences. And although there will be a
considerable borderline of more or less indeterminate cases, we often find ourselves
in circumstances in which we all recognize argument to be the wrong form in
which to pursue agreement. Sometimes both sides will realize that one party needs
to accumulate the understanding and develop the competence that might allow an
argument to be effective. And of course pursuing this suggestion will often eliminate
a disagreement without ever returning to the argument itself.
Frequently enough, however, disagreement will survive initial attempts to deal
with it epigrammatically and neither side will concede that the other has any special
status or advantage; and it soon becomes clear that the dispute concerns what is to
count as proper understanding and genuine competence as much as it does the
substantive topic. Fogelin's own examples of hot social controversy (abortion,
affirmative action) seem to contain this component almost universally. But abstract
philosophical controversies over the famous "isms" (realism, solipsism, idealism,
empiricism, rationalism ... ) are equally good candidates.
This is why Fogelin's "modest" claim is not really modest at all; for if
disagreement of this kind is to be expected in addressing social and philosophical
disputes, then much of the motivation for the appeal to argument in such disputes
is undermined. This is not to say with Fogelin that there would be no point to
assembling arguments in such contexts, since argument has multiple functions,
only one of which is to resolve disputes; but it is to say that the point of argument
in such contexts is significantly restricted.
3. Defending deep disagreement
Fleshing out Fogelin's view in this way by itself provides some support for this
immodestly modest claim. In addition, however, any adequate defense must respond
to criticism. Andrew Lugg (1986), for example, claims that even Fogelin's modest
view is far too radical:
It is one thing to maintain that individuals may find themselves in the situation
of being unable to resolve their differences on the basis of shared
commitments, quite another to conclude that in such cases argument is
pointless .... (p. 48)
For argument to provide rational dispute resolution, Lugg thinks, we need not
begin with an elaborately shared understanding, because that is something that
may result from engaging in the practice of argument.
Revisiting Deep Disagreement
31
What I am suggesting is that we take common viewpoints to be what
individuals move towards rather than what they fall back to. Instead of
thinking of shared beliefs as "a common court of appeal", we should think of
it as a product of discussion, argument, and debate. (p. 49)
IfLugg is correct, Fogelin has described too narrowly the deployment of argument
in practical contlict resolution, and so his troubling conclusion can be resisted.
There are unquestionably examples of disagreement in which engaging in
"discussion, argument, and debate" leads to a new shared understanding. In fact,
it appears to happen regularly in local political disputes over, for instance, whether
a new football stadium should be built using taxpayers' money, whether protecting
the local environment is consistent with building a new light rail line, or whether
the city should entice more business into the area in order to increase its sales tax
revenue. In such cases, Lugg's suggestion that interlocutors can build to a common
understanding by retreating to neutral ground, untangling, coordinating and
synthesizing ideas, examining assumptions, reviewing alternative proposals, and
negotiating conflicting demands (p. 49) seems perfectly reasonable. But Fogelin's
point is not that what goes on in such dialectical free-for-alls cannot involve
argument, or even that the resulting resolution cannot sometimes be represented
as accomplished through nothing but serial arguments. It is that everything rests
on how much is shared to begin with. And when that is not enough to resolve the
conflict through the simple giving of reasons against a stable background of
understanding and competence, it will require altering this background in nonincremental ways, which is another sort of thing entirely. And we misrepresent the
source of success when things do work out in such circumstances as well as the
nature of our disappointment when they do not if we characterize as argument the
activity required to make argument possible. And this is especially damaging to the
enterprise of informal logic when it encourages us to distort the role and exaggerate
the prospects of argument form in the contexts of social controversy or ph ilosophical
abstraction that tempt our attention. For these are precisely the cases in which
neither side can lay claim to the level of understanding or clarity of competence
that characterize those quotidian uses of argument form that establish our
expectations of it.
We recognize this perhaps most easily in the second of these contexts, that is,
in abstract controversy over various forms of skepticism (external world, other
minds, induction), for instance, or the compatibility of free will with determinism.
The exotic terms of these disputes and their interminability among uncontroversially
informed and intelligent people makes it fairly clear that they lie at the outer edge of
our competence and understanding. When we do schematize an argument in these
disputes, it rarely captures anything like a "normal" episode in which a reason
simply ends debate by appeal to a shared competence. Schematizing may help, but
the work is usually done by the way in which a simple structure can organize our
thinking as we work through subtle conceptual interconnections. And the rare
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Dale Turner and Larry Wright
epiphanies typically occur when study and reflection casts the structured sentences
in a new light, providing their words with unsuspected significance. Only in this
way can we begin to understand a'philosopher's suggestion that metaphors don't
mean what they seem to or, about free will, that "compatibilism is compatible with
incompatibilism".
But if it's easy to see that philosophical arguments are so unlike "normal" ones,
this is far more difficult when dispute concerns the hot social issues we like to
treat in our classes, such as affirmative action, assisted suicide, universal health
care, capital punishment, Roe v. Wade, and display of the Ten Commandments.
For these may be conducted in familiar vocabulary and do not obviously fall in a
special discipline of study. So it's easy to think that no special skill is required to
reason about such things.
When differences on topics like these resist easy treatment, however, they do
so typically because those differences, no less than exotic philosophical ones,
reach deep into what goes without saying beneath the flow of talk that invests our
words and sentences with the significance they have for us. Fogelin points us to
Wittgenstein's On Certainty (Wittgenstein, 1969) at this point in his discussion
precisely because a major theme ofthis work is how quickly we run up against the
limits of our ability to talk and think when our conversation drifts in this direction.
For our confident "going on together" in application of familiar concepts here
depends on our
sharing routes of interest and feeling, senses of humor and of significance
and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what
a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an
appeal, when an explanation-all the whirl of organism Wittgenstein calls
'forms oflife.' (Cavell, 1969, p. 52)
These are of course just what we do not share in deep normative controversy and,
as the difficulty of Wittgenstein's text suggests, even seeing this clearly, not to
mention articulating its role in our disarray, requires extraordinary insight and
patience.
So the hazard these cases represent for the pedagogy ofinformallogic is twofold.
First it requires highly refined analytical skills-not ones to be acquired by argument
or at all in a single semester-just to characterize disagreements at this level, to
even see where the issue lies and that it may vary substantially from person to
person. Second, even if we get this far, we must be prepared to find that the
differences can involve items on Cavell's list that no thoughtful person has ever
considered treatable epigrammatically. A third, less formal matter may actually be
the greatest hazard in practice: that the felt urgency of these issues naturally
undermines the patience required to treat a subject of this depth and subtlety. The
option of thinking the obduracy lies in the personal flaws of the opposition rather
than the difficulty of the topic may be irresistible. 3
Revisiting Deep Disagreement
33
4. Beyond argument: Why deep disagreement is not quite as bad as it
seems
The word "argument" is of course used quite broadly to cover everything from
independent variables in mathematics to the upleasantries antecedent to gunfire in
saloon parking lots. So the point here is not a lexical one. The issue concerns the
specific set of expectations attached to the word in philosophical contexts and
especially in the developing conversation of Informal Logic. In this context,
characterizing as argument the usual sort of articulate wrangling provoked by
disagreement in even the most civilized forums suggests that distinguishable activities
bearing very different relations to the outcome of that wrangling be evaluated
according to a single narrow standard. But if we try to assimilate these cases to the
paradigms of effective reasons-giving by representing their substance in
schematized form, we will omit much, usually most of what was required to reach
agreement. And it is here that the problem lies in what Fogelin and his most
enthusiastic defenders may have in common with many in the Informal Logic
literature who find his result appalling.
This is that the resolution of disagreement is rational only if it results from
arguments. But we often change our minds about something as the result of education
and experience the significance of which cannot be captured in a sentence or two.
When we read books, take courses, sharpen our perceptual and diagnostic skills in
application, and simply knock about in the world with our eyes and ears open, we
gain understanding in vast sweeps, not one proposition at a time. We must learn an
enormous amount this way before the practice of giving reasons is accessible to
us at all; and the value of that practice then rests on the objectivity of the
understanding thus accumulated. To stigmatize our standard ways of learning as
irrational demeans the concept of rationality.
So we may reasonably endorse dispute resolution on this basis too. If the topic
is one on which the contending parties can guide themselves to a common
understanding in recognizably standard ways, the resulting agreement will have
credentials as good as any resulting from canonical argument evaluation. But this
also makes clear why we cannot in general award such credentials to the result of
the dialectical free-for-all that occurs when people get together to "work out their
differences" on a contentious matter. For, as anyone who's served on an unruly
jury will attest, what's effective in such forums will usually embroil the above sort
of "rational" activity in a complicated mix of friendly cajoling, facile eloquence,
strategic positioning, social pressure, veiled threats, and pure negotiation: activities
that are distinctly not standard ways of accumulating understanding about the
truth of a proposition. 4
Of course the earlier caveats naturally apply here too. For when we fail to
share all those things Cavell finds in a "form oflife" this will show up in our sense
of what procedures are standard: one man's facile eloquence is another's splendidly
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Dale Turner and Larry Wright
instructive figure. Which explains why in general, when we try to discuss matters
on which we do not share a sense of what appeals are acceptable, the problem is
one of communication, resulting in cross purposes more than transparent
disagreement. For these differences affect the very significance of the words
expressing the judgments based 011 them. s This does not, as sometimes supposed,
constitute a formal barrier to understanding each other. But given the special
training and patience required to even see when a standard is being adher:ed to
rather than violated, it does gesture at the sort of challenge we face in doing so.
Notes
I We only mean to suggest that Fogelin's "modest" claim is modest with respect to the more
radical claim with which he concludes the paper. Both claims are, for reasons that will become
clear as we proceed, not modest at all.
2 This example is based on the only example Fogelin (1985) gives us ofa normal argumentative
exchange.
3 Fogelin (1985) cites Wittgenstein (1969) on this point, "Where two principles really do meet
which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and a
heretic." (1985, p. 6) A good illustration of this point can be seen in the current debate over
evolution and intelligent design creationism (IDC). Proponents of both views tend to insult the
other side as much as engage it. Wittgenstein's diagnosis is surely correct in this case. Just as
IDC proponents tend to· use the design vocabulary to express a certain spiritual commitment,
proponents of evolution often use Darwinian vocabulary to simply express a secular worldview.
4 This point suggests a fundamental problem with the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.
See Turner (2000) for a detailed discussion of this problem.
S This is why one might be wary of the strategy for resolving disagreements in cases such as
abortion, euthanasia, and distributive justice developed by Ronald Dworkin (1994, 2000). Dworkin
claims, for example, that disputants in the abortion debate really do agree on the fundamental
issue-both sides accept the abstract principle that life is sacred. But as Campolo (this volume)
suggests, this move to an abstract principle does little real work. The dispute arises precisely
because words like 'sacred' owe their significance to radically different takes on our existence,
which must be addressed before such terminology can express a common commitment. Without
this, common vocabulary just makes it more likely disputants will talk past one another.
References
Cavell, S. 1969. Must We Mean What We Say? New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Campolo, C. 2005. "Treacherous ascents," Informal Logic, 25.1: 37-50.
s
Dworkin, R. 1993. Life Dominion: An argument about abortion, euthanasia and
individual freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Dworkin, R. 2000. Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Davson-Galle, P. 1992. "Arguing, Arguments, and Deep Disagreements," Informal Logic,
14.1: 147-156.
Revisiting Deep Disagreement
35
Fogelin, R. 1985. "The Logic of Deep Disagreements," Informal Logic, 7: 1-8. (Reprinted
in Informal Logic, 25,1: 3-11.)
Lugg, A. 1986. "Deep Disagreement and Informal Logic: No Cause for Alarm," Informal
Logic, 8: 47-51.
Pennock, R. 1999. Tower of Babel: The Evidence Against the New Creationism.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Turner, D. 2000. Fallacies and the Concept of an Argument. Ph.D. Thesis. Riverside:
University of California.
Wittgenstein, L. 1969. On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wright, L. 1995. "Argument and Deliberation: A Plea for Understanding," The Journal of
Philosophy, 92, 565-586.
Dale Turner
Department of Philosophy
California State Polytechnic University, Pomona
Pomona, CA 91768
dturner@csupomona.edu
Larry Wright
Department of Philosophy
University of California, Riverside
HMNSS Building, Room 1604
900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521
larry. wright@ucr.edu