AND HE STOOD IN HIS SHOES

2022

This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist. Friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist in two distinct ways. As I discuss in chapter 2, the first way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a priori arguments meant to show that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, the past must be finite. If the past is necessarily finite, then the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite. And if having a finite past suffices for having a beginning, then, since the past history of physical reality is necessarily finite, physical reality necessarily began to exist. I show that the arguments which have been offered thus far for the view that the past is necessarily finite do not succeed. Moreover, as I elaborate on in chapter 5, having a finite past does not suffice for having a beginning. As I discuss in chapter 3, the second way in which friends of the KCA have sought to defend their view that physical reality began to exist involves a family of a posteriori arguments meant to show that we have empirical evidence that physical reality has a finite past history. For example, the big bang is sometimes claimed to have been the beginning of physical reality and, since we have excellent empirical evidence for the big bang, we have excellent empirical evidence for the beginning of physical reality. The big bang can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, the big bang can be understood as a theory about the history and development of the observable universe. Understood in that sense, then I agree that the big bang is supported by excellent empirical evidence and by a scientific consensus. On the other hand, some authors (particularly science popularizers, science journalists, and religious apologists) have wrongly interpreted big bang theory as a theory about the beginning of the whole of physical reality. As I argue, while a beginning of physical reality may be consistent with classical big bang theory, classical big bang theory does not provide good reason for thinking that physical reality began to exist. In part II, I turn to discussing three necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, conditions for physical reality to have a beginning. Before discussing the three conditions, in chapter 4, I introduce three metaphysical accounts of the nature of time (A-theory, B-theory, and C-theory) as well as some formal machinery that will subsequently become useful in the dissertation. I introduce the first of the three conditions in chapter 5. According to the Modal Condition, physical reality began to exist only if, at the closest possible worlds without time, physical reality does not exist. I show that this condition helps us to make sense of various views in both theology and philosophy of physics. In chapter 6}, I introduce the second of my three conditions, the Direction Condition, according to which, roughly, physical reality began to exist only if all space-time points agree about the direction of time, so that all space-time points can agree that physical reality's putative beginning took place in their objective past. In chapter 7, I discuss the third condition, the Boundary Condition, according to which physical reality began to exist only if there is a past temporal boundary such that physical reality did not exist before the boundary. I show that there are two senses in which physical reality could be said to have had a past temporal boundary. Lastly, in chapter 8, I show that there is a relationship between my three conditions and classical big bang theory, even though the relationship is not the one usually identified in the literature. In part III, I present four arguments for the view that, at the present stage of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot know whether physical reality satisfies the three necessary conditions to have had a beginning and, consequently, we cannot know whether physical reality had a beginning. As I will prove in chapter 9, no set of observations that we currently have, when conjoined with General Relativity, entails that physical reality satisfies the Direction or Boundary Conditions. As I show in chapter 10, considerations in the philosophical foundations of statistical mechanics entail either that the Cosmos violates the Modal Condition or else that there is a transcendental condition on the possibility of our knowledge of the past that prevents our access to data we would need to gather to determine whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. In chapter 11, I show that there are a number of live cosmological models according to which physical reality does not satisfy the Boundary Condition. As long as we don't know whether any of those cosmological models are correct, we do not know whether physical reality satisfies the Boundary Condition. Lastly, I turn to confirmation theory and show that, at our present stage of inquiry, ampliative inferences for the conclusion that physical reality satisfies the Modal, Direction, and Boundary Conditions are not successful.

Abstract: Philosophical analysis is of vital importance for addressing the controversies in science and theology. This article evaluates the analyses concerning God and the beginning of the universe offered by a number of philosophers. It is shown that, while Linford is correct in that establishing that physical reality has a finite past is not sufficient for establishing that physical reality had a beginning, the objections which Linford, Schmid, Oberle, and Wielenberg have offered against the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God can be rebutted. The examination of the objections and rebuttals demonstrates how a more careful philosophical analyses of the issues concerning the argument against infinite causal regress, personal identity, timelessness, the definition and reducibility of time, and the causal principle can contribute to the interaction between science and theology.

Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 2018

Cosmological arguments for the existence of God defend God as a necessary being against (among others) the alternative that the universe came from nothing. "Nothing" is an ambiguous term, but when clarified it can be argued that a strong sense of the term is self-contradictory and thus impossible. This article discusses the arguments Lorenz B. Puntel has put forth in favour of this conclusion. The arguments herein rely on Puntel's understanding of theoretical frameworks in explanations, which is also discussed. This article finds that there are good arguments against the possibility of nothing in a strong sense of the term, ending by considering this argument's relevance to cosmological arguments for the existence of God.

Knowledge is possible, both a priori and a posteriori, empirically and scientifically acquired. It is all baked into reality by the Reality and none may avoid it. There is no conflict between the existence of the Unitary Infinite Being and science for the actual creation of the real infinite Nothing of Subtle Space from the OM point occurred spontaneously as the nature of nature where the Infinite Consciousness was not aware had occurred.

Zygon, 2009

This paper explores a simple argument for a Ground of Being, objections to it, and limitations on it. It is nonsensical to refer to “Nothing” in the sense of utter absence, hence nothing can be claimed to come from Nothing. If, as it seems, the universe, or any physical ensemble containing or causing it, is past-finite, it must be caused by an uncaused Ground. Speculative multiverses, many-worlds, and pocket universes do not affect this argument, but the quantum cosmologies of Vilenkin, and Hartle and Hawking, which claim the universe came from “literally” Nothing, would. I argue that their novel project cannot work for reasons both physical (e.g. their “nothing” is actually a vacuum state governed by eternal physical laws) and methodological (e.g. physical theory cannot explain the emergence of the physical per se). Thus my argument stands. However, as Hume showed, a posteriori arguments like mine can only infer a Creation, and Creator, of a certain character, namely, a stochastic concept of Creation and a panentheistic, partly physical Creator lacking omniscience and omnipotence. But rather than undermining the cosmological argument, as Hume intended, these limitations liberate the concept of the Ground from unnecessary problems, e.g. the problem of evil.

Everything starts in a big mystery: "the Unmanifested and the Manifested." Imagine we imploded the entire universe into a single spot. This spot would contain the whole imaginable universe. So let us call the zero spot "the Unmanifested", which is the spot that contains EVERYTHING. At some point in time, at the birth of chronology as we know it - at time zero, the Unmanifested manifested itself by first creating LIFE, the Divine flow, which is represented by the number One. Next, Manifestation gives birth to DUALITY: Energy and Matter or the Abstract and Concrete, and it is represented by the number Two. This is a seed thought so that we can understand our Essence, the Individual Consciousness which is represented by a single model. Both the entire Manifested Universe and the Universal Consciousness were formed this way. This is the Foundation Stone - the Triple Enigma.

How something could have arisen from nothing is one of the most fundamental yet counterintuitive aspects of our existence. For if something exists and we know it does since we experience it, there must have been a cause to that something, but then wouldn't that cause also must have been something? Exploring the works of Massimo Melli, Walter Gomide and my own in order to solve the paradox of this universe's ontology.

Questions regarding the formation of the Universe and what was there before the existence of Early Universe have been great interest to mankind of all times. In recent decades, the Big Bang as described by the Lambda CDM-Standard Model Cosmology has become widely accepted by majority of physics and cosmology communities. Among other things, we can cite A.A. Grib Pavlov who pointed out some problems of heavy particles creation out of vacuum and also other proposal of Creatio ex nihilo theory (CET). But the philosophical problems remain, as Vaas pointed out: Did the universe have a beginning or does it exist forever, i.e. is it eternal at least in relation to the past? This fundamental question was a main topic in ancient philosophy of nature and the Middle Ages, and still has its revival in modern physical cosmology both in the controversy between the big bang and steady state models some decades ago and in the contemporary attempts to explain the big bang within a quantum cosmological (vacuum fluctuation) framework. In this paper we argue that Neutrosophic Logic offers a resolution to the long standing disputes between beginning and eternity of the Universe. In other words, in this respect we agree with Vaas, i.e. it can be shown: "how a conceptual and perhaps physical solution of the temporal aspect of Immanuel Kant's " first antinomy of pure reason" is possible, i.e. how our universe in some respect could have both a beginning and an eternal existence. Therefore, paradoxically, there might have been a time before time or a beginning of time in time." By the help of computational simulation, we also show how a model of early Universe with rotation can fit this new picture. Further observations are recommended.

Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 2019

The Binary Universe - A Theory of Time - ISBN 978-0-9568002-4-4, 2018

This paper is a philosophical one, it is speculative, but that does not mean it is merely philosophical hand waving. Much thought has been given to these ideas over some years and the basis for them is the postulated Binary Universe Theory, or B.U.T. Using accepted scientific knowledge, the proposals herein are logical deductions based on the “B.U.T.” that present a unique picture of the very beginning of our universe and eliminate certain problems with the Big Bang theory, such as the infinitely dense singularity extrapolated backwards from cosmic expansion. I am an Engineer, not a professional physicist, an expert in mathematics, or a particle physicist and so clearly, I am unable to construct a theory of the beginning, working backwards in time towards the Big Bang, as is currently being attempted in mainstream science. I can only present my offerings from a higher level. I am forced to start at the beginning and deduce my way forward, in time, from some initial condition. I must start with nothing and work my way forward. However, unlike current mainstream physicists, my understanding of our binary universe will guide me along the way and will certainly direct my thinking differently. It may allow me to progress our understanding of the cosmos where others are stuck with philosophical issues or erroneous assumptions. This constructive approach has certain advantages, given that neither approach can ever be proven in full. Perhaps both approaches will always be necessary, for us to get the whole picture.