A Comprehensive Approach to Operations in Complex Environments

C E N T E R F O R C I V I L - M I L I TA R Y R E L AT I O N S comprehensive approach timeline security structurally integrated corruption peacekeeping A COMPREHENSIVE infrastructure combat APPROACH TO training industry energy OPERATIONS IN peacekeeping reconstruction human rights experience COMPLEX structurally integrated planning strategic concept planning human rights ENVIRONMENTS demobilization timeline industry strategic concept challenging communication objectives challenging pre-crisis strategicelectrical concept gridsecurity comprehensive approach demobilization timeline corruption industry comprehensive approach soldiers civil-military objectives cooperation shared responsibility shipping de-conflicting rule of law threat assessment soldiers threat assessment efficiency soldiers currency flows shipping objectives shared responsibility social structure efficiency corruption de-conflicting cyber peacekeeping agencies policemen combatcombat currency flows Edited by social media internet complexities population agencies manage conflict infrastructure training humanitarian demobilization principles pre-crisis S C O T T M O R E L A N D experience policemen social media planning manage conflict shipping security and complexities structurally trust integrated efficiency communication energy food interaction S C O T Ttrust JASPER social structure crime reconstruction policemen risks food internet infrastructure reconstitution conflict civil-military organizations shared responsibility rule of lawconflict contested territory organizations cyber experience electrical grid risks manage conflict contested territory sabotage risks international partners electrical grid de-conflicting pre-crisis humanitarian principles conflict social structure complexities NAVALinteraction POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL crime cyber MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA organizations communication energy sabotage social media MARCH 2014 training population currency flows reconstruction humanitarian principles food internet international partners crime challenging international partners population threat assessment contested territory interaction cooperation cooperation human rights energy energy civil-military agencies trust sabotage rule of law comprehensive approach timeline security structurally integrated corruption A C O M P R E H E N Stimeline IVE strategic concept challenging A P P R O A C H infrastructure T O pre-crisis challenging combat comprehensive approach timeline O P E R AT I O N S I N comprehensive approach training industry energy C O M P L E X peacekeeping soldiers reconstruction experience human rights civil-military ENVIRONM E N T S integrated structurally peacekeeping industry communication objectives strategicelectrical concept gridsecurity demobilization corruption industry objectives cooperation shared responsibility shipping strategic concept currency flows human rights de-conflicting rule of law planning soldiers planning shipping objectives shared responsibility social structure threat assessment soldiers threat assessment efficiency efficiency corruption demobilization Edited by de-conflicting cyber peacekeeping agencies policemen combatcombat currency flows internet social media complexities SCOTT M O R EL AND population agencies manage conflict infrastructure training humanitarian demobilization principles pre-crisis and policemen shipping security social media experience planning manage conflict efficiency energy trust O T T JAS PER food complexitiesS C integrated structurally communication food interaction social structure trust crime reconstruction policemen risks internet infrastructure reconstitution conflict civil-military organizations shared responsibility rule of lawconflict contested territory organizations cyber experience electrical grid risks manage conflict contested territory sabotage risks international partners electrical grid de-conflicting pre-crisis humanitarian principles conflict social structure complexities interaction crime cyber organizations energy communication sabotage social media training population currency flows reconstruction humanitarian principles food internet international partners crime challenging international partners population threat assessment contested territory interaction cooperation cooperation human rights energy energy civil-military agencies trust sabotage rule of law Disclaimer The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, or Naval Postgraduate School. CENTER FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS Richard J. Hoffman, Director Joseph E. Andrade, Exercise Program Manager A digital version of this publication is available to view, download, or reproduce at http://www.ccmr.org. The unlimited reproduction of this publication is authorized. Table of Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 C h a p t er 1 . Principles and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 by George T. Hodermarsky C h a p t er 2 . Multidimensional Peacekeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 by Scott Moreland C h a p t er 3 . International Maritime Security . by Jeffrey E. Kline and Lyla Englehorn C h a p t er 4 . Deterrence of Cyber Aggression . by Scott Jasper C h a p t er 5 . Challenges to Energy Security by Daniel A. Nussbaum Appendix: Sources of Guidance List of Acronyms . Contributors Introduction T he notion of a comprehensive approach is not new. Its antecedents can be found in the writings of Clausewitz, who examined conflict in more than exclusively military terms. However, conflict in his age was focused mainly on the clash of military forces among sovereign nations. Although classic state-on-state warfare is not extinct, most conflicts today are far more complex, requiring various approaches and solutions. At the same time, the international geopolitical environment is rapidly evolving. Emerging factors include both globalization and competition for resources and an unstable international security environment including nonstate actors. To prepare to deal with such matters, this manual examines emerging characterizations of the comprehensive approach and its application to peacekeeping, the maritime domain, cyberspace, and energy security. Many nations recognize that the military instrument alone cannot deal with complex crises involving diverse communities and that existing strategies, organizations, and force structures might not be suited to future contingencies. Accordingly, national and intergovernmental organizations have sought responses to increasingly complex challenges. Among them is the notion of a comprehensive approach, however loosely defined or accepted. Nonetheless, the principles of a comprehensive approach have been applied in some operations, Comprehensive Approach and it remains indispensable to the conduct of ongoing and future Although no universally accepted definition of operations including civil-military missions. the comprehensive approach exists, the concept is The principles of a comprehensive approach can be extendfundamentally grounded in a congruence of effort, ed to multidimensional security missions involving maritime, not in unity of command. A working definition of cyber, and energy security. They expand traditional peacekeeping the approach is the manifestation of the idea of and humanitarian operational models that are prime applicamobilizing the resources of an entire society to tions of comprehensive approaches. Increasingly complex security succeed in complex operations. issues demand intelligent, discreet application of comprehensive approach principles to international crises that are studied in this manual through a series of four cases: synchronizing peacekeeping operations, preserving access to oceans of the global commons, deterring acts of aggression in cyberspace, and protecting supplies of energy resources. Some cases such as peacekeeping and maritime security have developed relatively mature models for the practical application of a comprehensive approach. Cybersecurity enjoys a general consensus regarding the need for coordinated efforts across the various sectors and organizations involved in and dependent upon maintenance of a safe and reliable cyberspace. Energy security, though certainly recognized as a collective challenge, has thus far proven too complex and politically sensitive to tackle in a coordinated fashion. Since 2006, NATO has championed a coordinated international effort to reduce risk and promote energy infrastructure security. However, its member states are sharply divided over the need, and indeed 1 the appropriateness, of a collective approach to energy security. Established Alliance members in particular argue that energy infrastructure protection should be national responsibilities, while others are concerned that NATO involvement in energy security would unnecessarily heighten regional tensions and disrupt diplomatically or economically driven solutions. While functional models have been used to a certain extent, a generally accepted concept of the comprehensive approach simply does not exist. Even though definitions remain elusive, it is possible to describe the approach and its core principles. Similarly, no agreement exists on the objectives of a comprehensive approach. But any discussion requires taxonomy or an attempt at classification, which this manual identifies as the coherent multidimensional response, or the principal goal of this approach. In the absence of a clear definition, mobilizing the resources of an entire society captures the meaning of a comprehensive approach. This description builds on the idea of whole-of-government that includes intergovernmental bodies, nongovernmental agencies, academic institutions, and the private sector as well as national resources. The first chapter of this manual, “Principles and Mechanisms” by George T. Hodermarsky, utilizes a working definition of the comprehensive approach to clarify its universal tenets and tangible benefits, as well as the issues and risks associated with its application. It is followed by a chapter on “Multidimensional Peacekeeping” in which Scott Moreland examines comprehensive approaches to peacekeeping that enhance coordination. Next, Jeffrey E. Kline and Lyla Englehorn focus on coordination models to counter a range of threats to the maritime domain in a chapter entitled “International Maritime Security.” The fourth chapter on “Deterrence of Cyber Aggression” by Scott Jasper looks at a vital domain of the global commons beset by theft of data, denial of service, and other malicious actions. The fifth and final chapter, “Challenges to Energy Security” by Daniel A. Nussbaum considers the security of resources, which is defined in terms of availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability. Finally, a few disclaimers are required at the outset. It is not possible to cover every aspect of a comprehensive approach. This manual considers ideas while making no attempt to expound a concept of operations or propose doctrinal tenets. It presents a high-level examination to allow for the application of the comprehensive approach to a range of scenarios. Therefore it does not represent a detailed guide to executing operations. THE EDITORS March 2014 2 Introduction Chapter 1. Principles and Mechanisms by George T. Hodermarsky A lthough no universally accepted definition of a comprehensive approach exists, it is possible to explain the concept. Recognizing the lack of a commonly accepted definition, the chapter uses mobilizing the resources of an entire society as the basis of a working definition. It expands on the notion of a whole-of-government approach by including intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academe, and the private sector. Despite the fact that a comprehensive approach cannot be precisely defined, the principles and mechanisms it employs are widely accepted and applied. Additionally, the lessons learned in contemporary stability and peace operations demonstrate the benefits of a comprehensive approach as well as the challenges to its implementation. Based on experiences in operations in the Objective Western Balkans and Afghanistan, NATO issued a Comprehensive To introduce benefits, issues, considerations, risks, Approach Action Plan in March 2012. The tasks associated with costs, and resource requirements for coordinating this plan are implemented by a combined civil-military task force uniformed troops, civilian agencies, and private that includes all relevant NATO entities and commands. sector organizations that share operational space NATO is not alone in its efforts to employ a comprehenin a zone of conflict or crisis. sive approach to operations. Other informative examples include support for the Dayton peace accords on Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, the United Nations (UN)-mandated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) campaign in Kosovo beginning in 1999, the peacekeeping intervention in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2000, and the multinational European Union (EU)-led counterpiracy efforts conducted off Somalia. Comprehensive Approach Action Plan NATO support within the international community to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and stabilization operations. This includes political, civilian and military involvement in the planning and conduct of operations. NATO will strengthen cooperation with partner countries, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local authorities. NATO recognizes the European Union and United Nations as key institutional partners. There are multiple interpretations of a comprehensive approach. Its characterization by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands captures its essence and clearly indicates civilian leadership. Moreover, Sweden has been at the forefront of thinking about a comprehensive approach. Indeed, the Viking Exercises have been centered on the idea of cooperation among governmental (civilian, military, 3 and police), intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations. Additionally, the doctrine emerging in the Netherlands—as civilian as possible, as military as United Kingdom contains a particularly helpful definition of necessary a comprehensive approach. Finally, the US National SecuSweden—integration of military and civilian activities rity Strategy recommends utilizing the approach while not including nongovernmental organizations defining or expanding the concept. United Kingdom—develop principles and collaborative The 2010 version of the NATO Strategic Concept processes to enhance likelihood of favorable and encourages the use of a comprehensive approach. Noticeenduring outcomes in particular situations ably, it describes the NATO contribution to a comprehensive United States—urge more comprehensive approach to approach while recognizing that the Alliance does not posregional security sess the necessary civilian capabilities to employ the concept alone. Allied joint doctrine endorses the commitment to this approach by developing it beyond the strategic level. By using the term international partners, NATO acknowledges the wide participation required for completion of a broad set of missions. In June 2013 a total of 114 nations were supplying more than 90,000 soldiers, policemen, and military observers to the United Nations in support of 15 National Perspectives • • • • Figure 1.1 UN and OSCE Contributions United Nations Multidimensional peacekeeping operations conducted by the United Nations establish an integrated strategic framework with a shared vision of strategic objectives and set of agreed upon results, timelines, and responsibilities Organization for Security and Cooperation Since its founding, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has pursued a comprehensive approach to security and remains the only international forum to place human, economic, environmental, and political-military dimensions of security on an equal footing. peacekeeping missions. Although the world body does not use the term comprehensive approach, the Secretary General stated that an integrated strategic framework is “the guiding principle for all conflict and postconflict situations where the UN has a country team and a multidimensional peacekeeping NATO Perspectives operation, whether or not these presences are structurally • Enhance the contribution of comprehensive approach integrated.” to crisis management as part of the international UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of intercommunity and improve the capability to deliver action that involves the exchange of information, negotiastabilization and reconstruction effects. tion, deconfliction, mutual support, and planning undertaken • Ensure that force commanders at theatre level have the at every level among military elements and humanitarian power to conduct effective cooperation and coordination organizations, development organizations, and local civilian with local and international actors. populations to achieve their respective mission objectives. • Increase cooperation with partners to prevent crises, The Organization for Security and Cooperation in manage conflicts, and stabilize postconflict situations— Europe (OSCE) endeavors to prevent conflicts from arising the heart of the new strategic concept. and facilitate lasting comprehensive settlements in conflict 4 Principles and Mechanisms situations. It also enhances the likelihood of success in the postconflict task of rehabilitation. OSCE police operations are essential to both preventing conflicts and restoring stability following them. The OSCE role, however, is limited by insufficient resources to act globally, and its legitimacy has been questioned by a number of participating nations even in its own region. The United Nations has identified three broad levels of interaction between civilian and military organizations: cooperation, coordination, and coexistence. Cooperation is more readily achieved in peacetime. However, in conflict situations, the divide between civilian and military activities reduces coordination to the level of coexistence and deconfliction. United Nations Guidelines Civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility of the humanitarian and military actors, and it may take place in various levels of intensity and form. Where cooperation between the humanitarian and military actors is not appropriate, opportune, or possible, or if there are no common goals to pursue, then these actors merely operate side-by-side. . . . [The] UN CMCoord basic strategy ranges from coexistence to cooperation. In either side of the spectrum and in between, coordination—for example, the essential dialogue and interaction—is necessary in order to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency. Shared vision may be a bit far-reaching, so “mutual interests” might be a more realistic ambition. Unifying Principles While the term comprehensive approach is ill defined, it is essential to examine its principles. For this discussion the concept is identified as the employment of unified principles in planning and conducting integrated operations focused on cooperation and coordination with all relevant actors in an increasingly complex environment. The purposes of a comprehensive approach are developing cooperation among partners where feasible and integrating their various capabilities where possible. Its major tasks are Comprehensive Approach to Operations developing both a shared vision of strategic Purposes objectives and an endstate, requiring mutual • Increase cooperation with international partners to avoid crises, manage conflicts, awareness of threats, risks, and actions of and stabilize post-conflict situations. participants. • Effectively integrate multiple stakeholders with diverse perspectives, authorities, Employment of a comprehensive capabilities, and objectives. approach to operations will be challenging, • Extend comprehensive approach principles to multidimensional security missions. thus its costs, risks, and level of effort must Tasks be justified by its benefits. For example, the • Develop shared vision of the strategic objectives and a set of agreed upon results. theory of comparative advantage developed • Create public-private sector partnerships to enhance an awareness of threats and by the classic economist David Ricardo has vulnerabilities, assess risks, analyze collaboration, and manage incidents. relevance. In its simplest form, it argues that nations should concentrate on industries in which they are most competitive and trade with others to obtain those products they do not produce nationally. Extrapolating the theory to crisis management, organizations that are better at assisting refugees or providing humanitarian relief, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Medicens sans Frontiers, 5 Principles and Mechanisms should lead those tasks, while the armed forces should focus primarily on providing security and strategic lift capabilities. With a comprehensive approach to operations, participating organizations are tasked to do those things they do best. Obviously this theory has its limitations similar to models of a free market economy. However, applying its principles could yield efficiencies in allocating resources and reducing the duplication of effort. These principles are not a panacea for all of the problems that arise in a multidimensional operational environment, but even modest gains in providing a framework for interaction and opportunities for efficiencies in the employment of various capabilities justify the effort of this approach. Figure 1.2 The Scope of Civil-Military Relationships Cooperation Coexistence 
  Minimizing competition and deconflicting effectivenessand efficiency of the combined efforts Peacetime Combat Coordination The essential dialogue and interaciton necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, and minimize inconsistency While acknowledging its complexities and challenges, the development of a framework to enhance cooperation may lessen distrust and hesitancy among participants, boosting the number of organizations willing to accept responsibilities in cooperative missions. A Common Vision Before they can be applied, the principles of a comprehensive approach to operations have to be identified. First, the shared vision functions on a very high level. At times it is clearly stated and, for example, found in a United Nations mandate. Such manifestations by a respected worldwide organization greatly aid in reaching consensus on strategic objectives. Even with such direction, however, interpretations can vary widely. Second, congruence is defined as a state of agreeing or coinciding, of being compatible or conforming. This explanation is helpful because it is likely to be more acceptable and preferable to precise terms such as integration and interaction. Third, as mentioned earlier, some degree of cooperation and coordination enhances effectiveness. Fourth, and importantly, the successful application of a comprehensive approach to operations requires a deep level of understanding of the roles, missions, and capabilities of partners. 6 Principles and Mechanisms Principles A comprehensive approach to operations should be based on a common vision of strategic objectives, a congruence of effort, cooperation and coordination by relevant actors within an inclusive stakeholder network, and a shared awareness and due consideration of charters, interests, limitations, and perspectives. The former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, observed in an article published in PRISM (March 2011) that while the potential of a comprehensive approach remains “limited only by the desire to assist, in actuality it is difficult to mobilize, organize, and coordinate the activities of all these disparate actors. Even agreeing to a common purpose can be difficult to achieve, much less agreeing on where and how to do things.” Issues and Considerations While an important element in effective comprehensive approaches to operations, working with nongovernmental organizations is challenging because of their large number and the variance in their contributions. An estimated 1,300 different organizations operated at times in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, each organization has its specific mandate and objectives. Similarly, every military or civilian organization and private or governmental agency has its own culture and operating procedures, which may cause friction. Some organizations desire a maximum degree of cooperation and interaction while many also prefer or even insist on operating independently. Understandably, these factors often preclude establishment of common procedures. Globalization with its associated benefits and adverse effects, combined with technological advancements, have created an operational environment with further complexities and issues that have not been previously encountered. For diverse reasons organizations are reluctant to accede to long-term agreements. Hence cooperation tends to be ad hoc and situation dependent. While this approach may allow for more flexible and tailored coordination mechanisms once a mission is established, the lack of formal bonds discourages pre-crisis contact among unknown partners and forces inefficient in-stride coordination processes in the initial phases. Keeping One’s Distance Risks Although a comprehensive approach to • neutrality and independence dilemma for operations is dependent on interaction, many nongovernmental organizations players, especially nongovernmental organiza• perceptions of complicity with corrupt tions, make their contributions based on neutralregimes ity and independence. This need for impartiality, • tension between near-term military especially among humanitarians, may lead to imperatives and longer-term friction as these organizations must often interdevelopment objectives act with legitimate yet corrupt regimes as well as • legal restrictions on government support factional or insurgent groups to gain access to all of nongovernmental organizations populations in need. • compromise of organizational mandates In addition organizations whose objectives resulting from information sharing are long-term development (primarily civilian) are at times at odds with short-term security needs (normally military). To varying degrees most nations restrict the level of support they provide to nongovernmental organizations. Information sharing is a key 7 Principles and Mechanisms principle, but it may be challenging to execute. However, it may be possible to share the following types of information: • security information—data on civilians and situations in the area of operation • humanitarian locations—staff and facilities inside a military theater • humanitarian activities—routes and timing of convoys and airlifts to avoid endangering humanitarian operations or warn of conflicting activities • mine-action activities—information relevant to mining • population movements—major movements of civilians • relief activities—efforts undertaken by the military • post-strike information. Financial Oversight All operations have limited resources with transport and logistics assets particularly in demand. Any requirement to share these will result in complications and possible friction. Effective management of relief and Costs reconstruction funding requires mutual understanding and commitment by all involved parties as well • limited resources and logistics shared as the imposition of an infrastructure and resources among multiple organizations to maintain oversight. • challenge in maintaining oversight The benefits of pre-crisis interaction and and fiscal controls training are abundant and obvious. However, event • establishment of pre-crisis training sponsorship and funding, and the opportunity costs and exercises associated with participation continue to limit the • requirement for compatible number and scope of such exercises. Traditionally, communications equipment and military organizations support and rely heavily on procedures training and exercises. Conversely, nongovernmental organizations normally do not have the resources or desire to participate in such events even if their value is appreciated. Effective information sharing, even if limited by organizational mandates, requires compatible equipment and procedures, a situation that has its own inherent costs. Models for Employment If mechanisms, structures, and processes are lacking, it follows their development could benefit from the use of a model. However, there is an inherent danger in adopting a conceptual model because comCivil-Military Cooperation and Coordination plex problems are ill-suited for one-size-fits-all Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC): coordination and cooperation in support of solutions. Nevertheless, civil-military coopmission between NATO commander and civil actors including national populations eration, although primarily employed at the and local authorities as well as international, national, and nongovernmental tactical level, could provide some insights and organizations and agencies a possible foundation for a comprehensive Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO): effective coordination of actions by approach to operations. Both the NATO and all relevant European Union actors involved in both planning and subsequent EU definitions are similar and state the need implementation of European Union responses to crises for cooperation by all relevant actors. While —European Union Military Staff (2003) 8 Principles and Mechanisms models have value, a comprehensive approach must consider elements beyond those normally associated with the concept. A paradigm of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is useful in presenting its principles, which often represent a synthesis of similar recommendations. Importantly, the CIMIC concept and a comprehensive approach to operations are not the same thing. However, as the relevant NATO doctrine publication states, applying CIMIC principles will contribute to a comprehensive approach. They help to govern the military direction of CIMIC as well as the civil-military relationship. Moreover, the principles guide internal military processes and underpin effective civil-military relationships. It should be remembered that comprehensive approaches must: • • • • • • share awareness of issues and complexities of a crisis identify unique actors and appraise their contributions examine and understand motivations and objectives be based on mutual respect and trust defer to civilian authority even when primarily military promote effective communication among participants. Historically, both governments and organizations have developed structures that facilitate communication, cooperation, and coordination, which are manifested in numerous forms. Their functions have varied from near-traditional command and control to limited information sharing. In terms of nomenclature, distinctions among these structures are frequently distorted. There are multiple candidates that can serve as models. Significantly, most of these structures are civilian in nature with militaries playing critical but nonetheless supporting roles. UN–CIMIC is the international military framework for civilCandidate Models military coordination for the complete range of operations to include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, • Civil-Military Operations Center and peace building. The role of the United Nations Humanitarian Civil• European Union Naval Force Somalia Military Coordination (UN–CMCoord) is facilitating dialogue and inter• Humanitarian Operations Center action between the civilian and military participants, protecting and • Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board promoting humanitarian principles, avoiding competition, minimizing • Joint Support Force inconsistency, and pursuing common goals when appropriate. • Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Even though the purpose of civil-military operations and Steering Committee humanitarian operations centers are similar, there are significant differ• Special Staff Offices ences. The former is established for a combined joint task force and the • United Nations Civil-Military latter by the government of the nation concerned, the United Nations, Coordination or possibly the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in unilateral US • United Nations Humanitarian Civiloperations. Humanitarian operations centers, especially when organized Military Coordination under UN auspices, are structured horizontally without any command or control authority, where participants are ultimately responsible to either their own organization or country. Lastly, the European Union Naval Force Somalia, which is conducting Operation Atalanta, is particularly relevant to an analysis of maritime security. Multidimensional Missions Geopolitical factors such as globalization, competition for resources, and international stability are evolving rapidly. Multidimensional missions perform 9 Principles and Mechanisms numerous tasks: military, police, rule of law, human rights, reconstitution, public information, et al. Like a comprehensive approach, no universally accepted definition of a multidimensional mission exists. What is clear, however, is that the missions examined herein go beyond military operations and need multiple components to be effective. The principles of a comprehensive approach can be extended to multidimensional security operations in support of maritime and cyber missions, which go well beyond military activities. Such operations include multiple players drawn from national civilian agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations, commercial and social media, and private industry. . . . Regardless of organizational structure, comprehensive approaches to operations must be guided by best practices developed through prior experience. Although this chapter has been focused on organizations, these structures are comprised of people, and interpersonal skills based on mutual respect are fundamental to effective interaction. Most operations will be at best unorganized, and at times chaotic, especially during their early days. The effects of this disorder can be mitigated through precision in terminology, which is critical to mutual understanding. The operational environment will be increasingly complex and will need to be adapted to changing conditions. Furthermore, when determining military courses of action, the effects on other players must be considered. Many of the risks associated with a comprehensive approach could be reduced through pre-crisis training and the establishment of a common lexicon. The United Nations, NATO, and other organizations offer relevant programs that could enhance the effectiveness of operations employing a comprehensive approach. Finally, undesired effects of military actions must be considered as well as perceptions of the independence and neutrality of the roles and mandates that distinguish individual cooperating organizations. 10 Principles and Mechanisms Chapter 2. Multidimensional Peacekeeping by Scott Moreland P eacekeeping operations are implemented not only to maintain security but also to restore public order, protect civilians, impose the rule of law, and integrate former warring parties into society. To carry out these missions, the United Nations (UN) Security Council issues mandates sanctioning peacekeeping operations in response to either crises or conflicts that threaten international stability. Peacekeepers may be deployed as blue helmets controlled by the United Nations or as part of a coalition or unilateral command authorized by a UN mandate such as the African Union forces in Somalia or the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are opportunities for applying the principles and mechanisms of a comprehensive approach. In addition to deploying security forces, UN peacekeeping operations are legitimate international coordination mechanisms that enable a range of partners to make contributions. In practice multidimensional peacekeeping furthers political, economic, and humanitarian development efforts by securing operational space in both conflict zones and during crises. Security operations are generally coordinated among official bodies but also include ways to facilitate ad hoc arrangements among peacekeeping forces and nonaligned Objective humanitarian actors, security support to local authorities, and To provide an overview of multidimensional authorization to intervene in cases of acute humanitarian crisis at peacekeeping, explore practical examples of complex the tactical level. operations, and identify comprehensive approaches In considering the applicability of multidimensional to peacekeeping operations that unify diverse aims peacekeeping as an exemplar of a comprehensive approach, and enhance coordination. this chapter examines both existing and emerging coordination mechanisms among key actors. The examination is based on current operations and aimed at enhancing the appreciation of multidimensional peacekeeping, identifying best practices, and applying lessons learned. Additionally, this chapter utilizes the essential principles and mechanisms of the comprehensive approach discussed in the previous chapter. A Practical Model The United Nations has not sanctioned the comprehensive approach as doctrine, but that is largely a question of semantics. However, the multidimensional approach has been defined by a UN resolution as a coherent operational model for 11 synonymous concepts that links the comprehensive approach to peacekeeping operations. The emphasis placed on coordinated and sustainable solutions relates to the goal of a comprehensive approach. While the United Nations endorses and actively seeks to implement a comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping, it faces many of the operational problems that also weakened NATO efforts in Afghanistan. Shifting allegiances, fluid security condiUN Multidimensional Approach tions, and internal disunity constantly threatened mis. . . a comprehensive, coherent, and integrated approach sion effectiveness and credibility in complex crises in the to the maintenance of international peace and security by Darfur, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Syria. preventing conflicts, preventing relapse, and building sustainable This chapter looks at the comprehensive approach peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, in the context of multidimensional peacekeeping operapeacekeeping, and peacebuilding strategies. tions. The topical sections are sequenced to provide an —Resolution 2086 (July 21, 2013) appreciation of multidimensional peacekeeping as a practical model for implementing the approach. From this point of departure, key tasks associated with peacekeeping will be examined with both the actors and organizational structures required to accomplish them. The chapter presents a model for deriving key multidimensional tasks from the mandate and associated lines of effort. This systematic approach links missions to accompanying tasks and desired outputs and culminates with an evaluation that attributes benchmarks and quantifiable productivity to measure task completion. This examination demonstrates interdependency connected to coordinated lines of effort and validates the comprehensive approach. Despite the imperative to make use of a comprehensive approach to multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the fundamental complexity and fragile security conditions of the missions pose numerous challenges. Many UN operations are designed with the uniformed military and police forces running security missions in the same space as nongovernmental organizations and UN activities. It is common for such entities to coordinate with financial institutions, development agencies, and nongovernmental organizations that react to public and private interests. In addition to developing military capabilities, regional organizations such as the European Union have also been developing and are deploying civilian response capabilities. The management or at least effective coexistence with mission actors presents unique and daunting challenges for leadership, mission coordination, and unity of purpose. Some of the more common challenges will be examined with possible options based on the unique characteristics of missions and actors that facilitate application of a comprehensive approach. Finally this imperative will be reprised and the best practices and lessons learned from peacekeeping operations will be reviewed to inform mission planning. Vital Partnerships The United Nations is the leading guarantor of peace. The complexity of modern conflicts and crises demands a flexible and responsive peacekeeping capability. Peacekeepers must be able to operate effectively among warring factions, criminal gangs, and citizens in need of security and humanitarian aid. Moreover, 12 Multidimensional Peacekeeping peacekeeping relies on political commitment as well as national contributions of reliable and sustainable support. no standing peacekeeping force Peacekeeping operations must also be buttressed by proper, peacekeeping operations completely dependent legitimate, and effective authorities to attract both local and interon donor nations national backing. In sum, peacekeeping missions cannot achieve peacekeeping budget under one percent of their objectives without the prospect of reconciliation. global military expenditures UN peacekeeping needs adequate and efficient means to funding, personnel, and resource shortfalls gain competitive advantage. New force structures such as formed overcome by depending on partnership with police units and military intervention brigades provide tactihost nations and external support cal advantages, more agility, and deterrent effect for peacekeeping missions. Coupled with satellite mapping and collaborative information networks, the stakeholders can better understand actions that impact on success. But these specialized forces and capabilities are not available to many troop-contributing nations. Thus the United Nations must depend on partners more closely identified with warfighting than peacekeeping. The same is true in those cases when for various reasons the United Nations depends on security partnerships rather than so-called blue helmet forces to fulfill a mandate of the Security Council. Whether adjunct security support involves African Union peacekeepers in Somalia or French-led troops in Mali, it provides essential peace enforcement capabilities in volatile regions. As the United Nations increasingly turns to external forces, its mandates must clearly specify actions and restraints that will sustain legitimacy and direct transition to sovereign authority without unduly hampering mission effectiveness. UN Overview • • • • Modern Challenges The term peacekeeping has traditionally been identified with lightly armed personnel who maintain separation between two sides in a conflict that agree to stop fighting. In the past, conflicts requiring peacekeeping operations were usually between two nations (interstate). By contrast, some recent conflicts have involved two or more factions in the same country (intrastate). Civilians are often targeted alongside the military, and the groups involved do not customarily observe the law of war. Given the sophistication and risks associated with peace operations, efforts such as peacemaking and rebuilding are required. Peacekeeping creates time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict. It utilizes military power to create conditions conducive to pursuit of a diplomatic solution. Traditional peacekeeping operations are defined by the following features: • involved parties agree to external intervention • conflict between two or more nations contained within a defined battlespace • international laws of armed conflict accepted by the combatants • impartiality exercised on the part of peacekeeping force • minimum use of force. Modern conflicts are a complex mix of internal and international influences. Their roots may be mainly internal, but they are complicated by cross-border involvement either by states or by economic interests and other international 13 Multidimensional Peacekeeping players who have an interest in the conflict. As a result, the structure of peacekeeping missions has also changed. Multidimensional Options UN peacekeeping operations involve military, police, politics, civil affairs, rule of law, election monitoring, human rights, humanitarian affairs, reconstruction, public information et al., which are essential to multidimensional missions. However, traditional peacekeeping often delivers inadequate intervention. As a consequence, peacemaking or peacebuilding—even peace enforcement—are better means of achieving and sustaining peace. Peace enforcement refers to situations addressed under chapter 7 of the UN Charter, namely “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Accordingly, it is usually reserved for Peace Operations violent conflict and departs somewhat from traditional peace• peacemaking—employs diplomacy and negotiation keeping. Its mission characteristics may include: to intervene in conflicts • peacebuilding—refers to UN action to establish conditions for peace by the empowerment of legitimate governance and protecting vulnerable peoples • peacekeeping—includes reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, improving security forces, strengthening the rule of law, improving respect for human rights, providing developmental • deployment of peacekeepers without consent of all sides in a conflict • more interaction between uniformed troops and humanitarian agencies • complex and long-term mission objectives involving various applications of military forces including maintaining, consolidating, and imposing peace as well as reconstruction, intervention, and humanitarian support. Peacekeeping operations have taken on a new face over the past decade. The lack of donor funding, equipment, and reconciliation techniques professional and technically competent troop contributions has been a major limiting factor in many blue helmet operations. Because of the capability gap, many UN operations are delegated to either non-UN regional or multinational security forums such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and African Union. This is particularly true of peace enforcement operations, which involve regional security imperatives and assertive military responses that may not be attainable or appropriate under direct UN auspices. assistance, and promoting peaceful mediation and Command and Authorities The UN Integrated Mission Planning Process (June 13, 2006) stated “an integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives of their common presence at the country level.” In recent crises traditional military command and control leadership has been challenged. Senior officers understand that operations are only one component of a larger campaign with a range of participants including host nation governments, external government agencies, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector actors. Since the military cannot impose leadership on these diverse but essential partners, leaders must internalize their need to include coordination and consensus, the essentiality of trust and information sharing, and the necessary constraints that bar full integration. 14 Multidimensional Peacekeeping Integrated missions provide means to operationalize the concept of a comprehensive approach. They are defined by common purpose and the mutual awareness among various participants united under a mandate. Such missions are personified by a cooperative spirit and coordinated lines of activity. Their structures are influenced by operational conditions and intricate amalgams of political, humanitarian, security, and development imperatives. Likewise every mission requires unique capabilities tailored to meet the characteristics of the operational space. Integrated missions usually distinguish between lines of command, coordination, and communication. What is more, leaders must adapt concepts of mission command to focus on the synchronization and harmonization of diverse participants who are entangled within the same complex and disordered operational space. Initial attempts to enshrine integrated missions into fixed organizational structures and operational models proved to be difficult and counterproductive. As the multifaceted nature and inherent complexity of integration missions became evident, research shifted from standardized mission templates to a more agile visualization that first analyzed the operational requirements, then designed a suitable mission structure. As the integrated mission concept moved to the field, immediate conflicts emerged that necessarily imposed barriers on the full integration of all mission actors. For example, the need to safeguard humanitarian impartiality and neutrality often superseded the perceived efficiencies and enhanced security that might be gained by openly cooperating with military peacekeepers. Full mission integration may be tempered and limited by the factors that enable the success of a peacekeeping mission, namely credibility, legitimacy, and national or local ownership. Mission leaders must place the peacekeeping principles at the forefront and remember that coordinated efforts only enhance operational effectiveness when they are carefully orchestrated to uphold the legitimacy of the mission and its actors. The accompanying model (Figure 2.1) offers one graphical representation of how these disparate mission elements might be amalgamated in a cohesive organizational structure. The lines in the model organizational structure connecting various components reflect a flexible organizational network rather than a command structure. Agents connect to the mission according to their functions, responsibilities, and contributions. This delicate balance demands strong and responsive leadership in each functional area. Humanitarian agents must determine how they might cooperate with peacebuilding and peace consolidation components, especially in the midst of active conflict. Humanitarian space is also operational space, and mission leaders must appreciate the nexus of the two in order to achieve operational coherence among other elements of the UN mission, as well as external actors. Effort, Responsibilities, and Tasks The transition from conflict to sustainable peace is both delicate and arduous. A range of simultaneous and mutually supporting activities must be harmonized or deconflicted for peace and accountable governance to take hold. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions require united and sustained political leadership as well as a mandate and donor backing to provide requisite authority, finances, 15 Multidimensional Peacekeeping Figure 2.1 Model Organizational Structure for Integrated Missions Special Representative of the Secretary-General Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Regional Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator) Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General Joint Mission Analysis Center Joint Operations Center Joint Logistics Operations Center Chief of Staff/ Chef de Cabinet Director of Mission Support Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Political Affairs Rule of Law Elections Human Rights Public Information Police Commissioner Police Advisers Chief Integrated Support Services Force Commander Formed Police Units UN Authority UN Operational Control UN Tactical Control Coordination Sector Commanders Force Support Elements United Nations Development Program Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs United Nations Children's Fund United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights World Food Program World Health Organization National Organization Nongovernmental Organization expertise, and resources. Peacekeeping operations are fraught with scant resources and difficult conditions that necessitate focus on the most essential tasks. The UN Capstone Doctrine identifies core strategic peacekeeping tasks to: • create a secure and stable environment and strengthen the ability of the state to provide security with full respect for the rule of law and human rights • facilitate political processes by promoting dialogue and supporting legitimate and effective institutions of governance • provide a framework to ensure UN and other international actors pursue activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner. Operationalizing these tasks requires aligning several lines of activity in a comprehensive plan. Key peacekeeping functions are stipulated within a broader 16 Multidimensional Peacekeeping campaign plan including added tasks that may require support, coordination, or at least mutual cognizance between uniformed facilitate political processes peacekeepers and other lead agencies and organizations. create secure and stable environment These tasks address crosscutting issues that have an strengthen rule of law with respect for human rights impact on the implementation of the peacekeeping mandate promote social and economic recovery and ultimately transition to legitimate and effective governance. Mission leaders need to be aware of how their actions and aims impact the range of tasks, and at the least not work at cross purposes. Further, military leaders in particular must be cognizant of needs for political primacy and their command and coordination relationships with political leaders. They must adopt a consultative and unified approach to develop the trust and teamwork necessary to accomplish complex postconflict tasks. Peacekeeping Functions • • • • Challenges and Considerations It is now commonplace for a peacekeeping operation to share the same operational space with humanitarian nongovernmental organizations and UN specialized agencies, funds, and programs as well as international financial institutions, development agencies, and direct donor programs sponsored by external governments. Mission command and coordination mechanisms may not always be explicit, and even when coordination frameworks exist, they cannot be imposed and are hostage to the goodwill and compliance of the contributing agencies and organizations. The cohabitation of military operational space and humanitarian space is a perennial challenge in multidimensional peacekeeping. Peace enforcement missions especially may place tactical security requirements at odds with impartial humanitarian assistance. Recent operations have evidenced that providing military assistance through quick impact projects or command-directed local development efforts can be important components of the toolkit of commanders. As a result, military units are increasingly involved in delivering relief aid while humanitarian organizations must rely on the military to ensure the safety and security of their staffs and operations and also enable access to target populations. Many humanitarian actors view an inherent dilemma between the need for a coherent approach by all UN entities and the need for humanitarian operations Figure 2.2 Core Tasks of Peacekeeping Operations Post-Conflict Tasks INFRASTRUCTURE EMPLOYMENT ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION ELECTIONS POLITICAL PROCESS SECURITY OPERATIONS DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION RULE OF LAW CAPACITY BUILDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 17 Stabilization Transition Long-term Development World Bank / International Monetary Fund United Nations Peacekeeping International Committee of the Red Cross / Nongovernmental Organizations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Case Study: Directive from an Insurgent Leader The following narrative is excerpted from a directive issued by an insurgent commander to his subordinates, which appeared in an article by Ramey L. Wilson entitled “Be Wise, Not Foolish: Medical NGO Deterrence Through an Insurgent Lens” in Small Wars Journal, July 17, 2013. [N.B. Consider the humanitarian and military implications of the directive.] “If you decide to let them operate in your area, you must insure that the people perceive the NGO presence as evidence of our authority, not the corrupt government’s. More importantly, you must make it very clear to the NGO that we determine their access to the population. Without access to the people, the NGO will be unable to perform their work and will be perceived by their donors as ineffective and a failure. “You must communicate to the NGO that their personal safety and access to the sick are dependent upon two things. First, the NGOs must give us credit for all of the care they are providing, not the corrupt government. Secondly, they must have no contact with the foreign invaders or intelligence agencies of the corrupt government. The NGO must know that if any information about you or your fighters is passed to our enemies, either by their workers or their patients, it will be on their heads.” This excerpt highlights the complexity related to notions of impartiality and humanitarian space. From a humanitarian perspective, making concessions to insurgent leaders to gain access to populations in need might be acceptable trade-offs. From a military perspective, however, these concessions might empower groups that threaten security and jeopardize mission effectiveness. Moreover, it is not only so-called threat groups that might want to shape humanitarian assistance to achieve political and military goals. Humanitarians will be cautious about efforts that intend or are perceived to advance military objectives and cast doubt on humanitarian impartiality, whether requested by a mission or host nation, or by donors. Political, military, and humanitarian community leaders must understand the mission conditions to grasp how coordination might be effective and mutually supporting as well as how natural and proper limitations might impede unified action based on divergent organizational aims. to maintain neutrality and impartiality. Where military assistance tends to have a tactical aim that shapes security conditions, humanitarians tend to go where the need is most acute, regardless of factional affiliations or political sympathies. Groups or communities that militaries may classify as threats may be seen in turn by nongovernmental organizations as legitimate interlocutors for provision of humanitarian access to communities in need within the regions they control. If humanitarians interact too closely or openly with the military, there is concern that legitimacy and impartiality may be compromised. Additionally, the militarization of foreign aid can result in unanticipated security consequences. Tactically expedient assistance may lead to the perception that affected populations are favored over others, inflaming tension and even causing serious breakdowns in security and stability. Discreet coordination between uniformed peacekeepers and humanitarian agents can alleviate mission overlap, facilitate situational awareness, and preclude unintended consequences of poorly coordinated military-led assistance efforts. The Way Forward Peacekeeping remains a work in progress, and the complexity of modern conflicts and crises demands a flexible and adaptive approach. Increased demand for peacekeeping continues to stretch peacekeeping capacity thin, and reliance on national and regional security consortiums to enable and then augment UN peacekeeping is likely to increase. These missions demand sophisticated environmental 18 Multidimensional Peacekeeping awareness, professional discipline, and tactical restraint. Technical proficiency in high-end capabiliAlthough the military remain the backbone of most peacekeeping ties such as engineering, medicine, logistics, and air, operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators land, and sea transport are likewise required. and economists, police officers and legal experts, de-miners and With a broader range of objectives, UN electoral observers, human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs operations are increasingly multifunctional. Military and governance, humanitarian workers and experts in communications leaders must consider how security tasks relate to and public information. humanitarian, developmental, and political objec—UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations tives. A broader range of objectives demands a new multidimensional approach that includes military, civilian, and police involvement. This diversity requires unity of effort and purpose if the mission is to achieve coherence. It is also clear that peacekeepers must be capable of accomplishing a variety of tasks. In addition to a traditional security role, they are expected to uphold law and order, monitor human rights, and promote responsible and sustainable governance. Civil and Military Skill Sets . . . The comprehensive approach is one organizing concept for harmonizing the various efforts of a diverse assortment of contributors to multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Best practices for coordination and establishing unity of effort vary from one mission to another like the feasible level of cooperation among the participants. Leaders must understand their mission, the conditions, and operational contexts that introduce opportunities as well as the constraints that impact a coherent approach to common aims and objectives. The approach is not a prescription or a procedure; rather, it is a conceptual framework designed to assist leaders in the analysis and execution of cooperative mechanisms to reinforce multifaceted campaign aims, while appreciating that there will be deliberate and legitimate limits to full mission integration. As the lessons derived from multidimensional peacekeeping missions are internalized, the comprehensive approach concept should remain open to critical examination, evolution, and creative application. 19 Multidimensional Peacekeeping Chapter 3. International Maritime Security by Jeffrey E. Kline and Lyla Englehorn T he challenges of governance within the maritime domain exemplify the complex environment in which a comprehensive approach is essential. Even in the territorial waters of a single nation, maritime governance coordinates activities among many organizations that share information to establish awareness, agree on legal authorities, and deploy assets to patrol and counter threats in the commons. When disputes or conflicts occur on the open sea or within ungoverned territorial waters the situation can be aggravated by legal, historical, and cultural issues. The incentives to overcome maritime challenges arise from international recognition of the common benefit of the oceans as highways of trade, mediums of communication, and sources of food and natural resources. The concept of a maritime common is established by the freedom of the seas doctrine that initially appeared in Mare Liberum by Hugo Grotius in 1609. His thesis on the right of the Dutch East India Company to exploit colonies in Southeast Asia Objective drew on ancient free trade traditions and became the basis of To introduce stakeholders with varying interests in international law that identifies the oceans as global commons. the oceans to issues, examine models of maritime This settled admiralty law has been codified in the United Nations governance, and consider comprehensive efforts Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Convenby the United Nations and the European Union to tion on the Safety of Life at Sea. combat piracy. The value of the oceans is measured in trade and resources. The United Nations has reported that 7.8 billion tons of international cargo, or more than 80 percent of trade, is transported by sea. Additionally, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization indicates that fisheries and aquaculture provided 148 million tons of fish in 2010 with more than 80 percent consumed as food products. Additionally, 550,000 miles of undersea cables transmit the bulk of cyberspace communications. The oceans also provide energy resources for many nations through oil drilling, wind power, and wave motion. Moreover, they constitute natural frontiers that connect 80 percent of the nations in the world and serve as conduits for humanitarian response and logistics. Maritime Domain International treaties protect the oceans of the world as a common good. These agreements are enforced by a comprehensive approach that provides legal frameworks, resource allocation, commercial regulation, mitigation, and myriad 20 provisions. They challenge states, organizations, and corporations to accede to standards of conduct, protect vital interests, and resolve conflicts, but they do not prevent competition. With the rival claims in economic exclusion zones (EEZs) from the Arctic to South China Sea, offshore resources, and fishing The Challenge of the Sea grounds, and threats posed by crime and terrorism, the maritime The oceans of the world represent both a common domain is not lacking in challenges. good and a source of conflict. Overlapping The complexity of maritime issues can be illustrated by a political, military, economic, cultural, and other fairly straightforward example of piracy. A large container ship may interests necessitate a comprehensive approach to belong to owners in one nation, fly a different nation’s flag, and be ensure multidimensional response to crises. manned by a multinational crew to transport its cargo to anywhere in the world. Once taken by pirates, the ship becomes of interest to the various nation-states whose citizens are involved in this process. Which of these nations should take the lead in representing or acting on behalf of the hostages and goods being ransomed? Although recent practice has recognized ship owners to be the primary negotiators with the pirates and to have the final say on use of force, the answer to this question still depends heavily on the circumstances. Users and Abusers Nation-states are responsible for continental shelf and EEZ claims, and they introduce flagged naval and merchant vessels for political and commercial reasons. However, nations do not use oceans in identical ways. National maritime police, coast guards, customs and border patrols, naval forces, commerce and tourism agencies, and fishery authorities can exercise overlapping jurisdictions and interests in offshore and international waters. International organizations such as the United Nations International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce provide frameworks and mechanisms for nation-states and business interests to act collectively to mitigate risks ranging from weather to pirate attacks. These organizations are enabled and limited in their actions and resources by their members, but they do present a worldview and provide a communications umbrella for the maritime domain. For example, IMO and IMB collaboration efforts that institute best practices for safe navigation and countering piracy are disseminated throughout the commercial sector. Other organizations are focused on mitigating the threat such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which was created in 2009 by a UN Security Council resolution. Nonstate actors are divided into legitimate users and threats, with the latter group further broken into those who exploit the maritime domain for nefarious purposes and those who disrupt users. The actors include merchants, telecommunication conglomerates, deep-sea mining and drilling firms, fishermen, tourists, and scientists. Additionally, competing interests occur among the legal users. For example, fishermen and tourists are concerned with the impact of offshore drilling and resorts. Moreover, misgivings arise in the telecommunication sector over dredging projects and fishing practices that may compromise undersea cables. Nonstate threats include smuggling, poaching, polluting, and illegal immigration, and both terrorism and piracy endanger state and nonstate users. Actors 21 International Maritime Security fall into different categories based on location, intentions, and profiles. One man’s fisherman might be another man’s poacher, and environmental activists are seen alternately as watchdogs or disruptive forces operating outside the law and threatening legitimate maritime enterprises. For instance, Russia charged members of Green Peace with piracy for boarding an oil rig in the Arctic Ocean but then reduced the offense to hooliganism. Despite diverse intentions on the legitimate use of the oceans, a comprehensive approach representing a dependable range of users is needed to respond to crises. Governance Widely accepted principles establish and preserve maritime governance in territorial waters and on the high seas. For purposes of this discussion, governance is defined as the ability to mitigate risks related to use of the oceans or respond to emergencies through such activities as search and rescue. Moreover, it requires institutional integrity on the part of organizations engaged in maritime governance. For example, smuggling becomes hard to deter when customs agents are bribed to ignore shipments crossing borders. As a consequence integrity cannot be presumed in all situations and must be addressed in planning comprehensive approaches. The first principle of maritime governance is gaining timely knowledge about areas in question. Known as maritime domain awareness, this knowledge is the product of information based on intelligence and sensors that is analyzed and shared in responding to emerging issues. The difficulties involved in establishing maritime domain awareness are a function of the area of Principles the ocean concerned, resources needed to collect and analyze the infor• knowledge—maintain awareness mation, and the number of organizations requiring the information. For (collect, analyze, and share information) example, an observer scanning the horizon from shore with binoculars • platforms—patrol and response may spot potential poachers and alert someone to intercept them and • law—authority to operate check their license to fish. In contrast, the task of mitigating the risks of hurricanes to mariners requires weather forecasting that depends on worldwide sensors, multiple collection centers, complex prediction models, and global communications. Platforms such as ships and aircraft are needed to provide hosts for sensors, visual patrols for deterrence, and the ability to intercept, board, and detain potential threats. The capability of platforms to search, cover, and intercept determine the enforcement capacity of governance. Returning to the counterpoaching example, one intercept boat capable of traveling at 25 knots is sufficient to cover a ten-mile radius from the shore tower. If attempting to effectively respond to piracy in the Indian Ocean, however, more platforms are required to collect information, monitor activity, provide a deterrent presence, and react as needed to counter pirates. Finally, gathering information and responding necessitate a legal foundation to operate and prosecute offenders. In the case of counterpoaching, legal authority is delegated by the nation in whose waters the activities are conducted. The individuals both on shore and aboard the intercept boat might be fisheries officers enforcing the law. When extending the reach to the high seas and to the ungoverned territorial waters of other nations, legal authorities are less straightforward and enforcement 22 International Maritime Security is challenging. UN resolutions, international and bilateral treaties, court settlements, and historical precedents offer models for legitimate maritime governance. With a foundation of institutional integrity, the knowledge, platforms, and laws to establish maritime governance appear straightforward. However, executing the principles may be opposed at national and international levels by overlapping jurisdictions, rival claims, resource shortages, ungoverned waters, mistrust between nations and organizations, competing interests, and threats that exploit these seams. At a minimum, establishing governance in territorial waters requires the collaboration of nations, organizations, and nonstate actors. These challenges are underlined by successful efforts to crush the piracy that flourishes off the Horn of Africa. Combating Piracy The traditional world of piracy involves ungoverned land space and insecure waters, proximity to shipping lanes, and resources (men, arms, and boats). Identifying these conditions and the means required to address them comprises a comprehensive approach by the international community. The United Nations, Atlantic Alliance, and European Union have applied the principles of the comprehensive approach to countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. Pirate attacks and hijackings have decreased since 2010 in the Indian Ocean and around the world. The IMB cites preemptive naval actions against pirate mother ships, private security teams on board merchant vessels, and the applications of best practices in order to deter and defeat pirate attacks. The extent of cooperation that has been developed among navies from the shared objective of establishing maritime governance is unprecedented. More than two dozen nations have made contributions to naval deployments including Combined Task Forces 151, Operations Atalana and Ocean Shield, and efforts by Chinese, Indian, and Russian forces. Even though deployments operate under national guidance with varying rules of engagement, their common purpose led to Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings for mutual awareness. Those meetings coordinate information exchange, address communication conduits, deconflict operations, and represent the military contributions, requirements, and recommendations to the more policy-oriented Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. With UN resolutions as the legal basis, many navies apply the principles of maritime governance in a comprehensive approach. These efforts address the desire of the international community to counter the ungoverned seas element in a piracy environment. The operations reflect a comprehensive approach to deal with a complex maritime environment and differing national policies, but the challenges do not end there. The international community must address other facets of piracy including proximity to shipping lanes, ungoverned land, and a source of men, arms, and boats. Although merchant transit rerouting has been used to avoid or minimize exposure to pirates from Somalia, the Indian Ocean remains a major highway for world trade. With transit planning and additional IMB best practices, however, ships can make themselves hard targets. These best practices include increasing transit speed through risky waters, weaving during pirate attacks, creating physical deterrents to boarding, increasing freeboard, and having post-boarding response plans. 23 International Maritime Security In addition, private security companies aboard merchant ships in pirate waters have been successful in deterring attacks. The IMB Piracy Report Centre in Malaysia shares awareness worldwide on near real-time attacks to help vessels avoid danger. The activities of nongovernmental organizations are loosely coordinated with international and national efforts to introduce maritime governance in the shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean. For example, the International Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden was instituted by the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation of the UN International Maritime Organization to protect ships passing through high-risk areas. Merchants voluntarily report on convoy schedules, the entrance into and exit from the sea lanes, and incidents en route. The Horn of Africa In January 2013 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa. It acknowledged traditional concerns attributable to poverty, food scarcity, and lack of governance. On the danger to merchant shipping, a history of poor governance has encouraged pirates to seek havens and recruit impoverished locals to man their boats in Somalia. Earlier the Council of the Figure 3.1 Somali Piracy Threat (2005–2010) 24 International Maritime Security European Union provided a strategic framework for the Horn of Africa based on five lines of effort that included the following regional objectives: • • • • • build democratic, sustainable, and accountable political structures work with local and international partners to resolve conflicts ensure security in the region does not threaten neighboring nations support measures to promote economic growth and reduce poverty develop political and economic initiatives to foster cooperation. In addition, it established the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to coordinate strategy, organizations, and partners in support of regional efforts. The success in addressing foundational issues related to the Horn of Africa originates in the lessons of the European Union in developing a more holistic approach toward countering piracy. Those lessons highlighted several important areas that demonstrated a need to: • designate an overall coordinator to mount a comprehensive approach in the region • increase information sharing to combat the financial and logistical support of piracy • facilitate intelligence collection and relief efforts by nongovernmental organizations • organize representation in international bodies to address the incarceration of pirates, collection of evidence, and management of interaction with private security companies • establish a desired endstate or a shared vision among member states. These recommendations included economic components to develop port and fishery operations, livestock exports, and telecommunications; security components to transform land governance; and judicial components to establish courts in Somaliland. These provide a template for efforts by the The Complexities of Piracy United Nations, European Union, and other organizations to establish effective governance in Somalia. New measures to enhance the effectiveness of counterProsecution of piracy-related financial transactions piracy efforts and successfully prosecute alleged is also under international consideration. The UN Security pirates will be crucial. The recommended solution is to Council passed Resolution 1950 in November 2010, which implement, on an extremely urgent basis, a comprehensive urges states to investigate transnational criminal networks that multidimensional plan targeting Puntland and Somaliland finance and receive funds from Somali piracy. In response, the and comprising three components—economic, security and Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia established jurisdictional/correctional—that would be brought to bear an expert group on illicit financial flows to monitor money simultaneously. going into and out of piracy activities. Further UN working —Report to the UN Security Council (2011) groups involving law enforcement organizations, private industry, and policy representatives have called for enhanced information sharing on financial transactions, increasing knowledge in channels of money laundering in the region, and better training to counter these activities. . . . The calls for a comprehensive approach to the complex issues of piracy have resulted in a decrease in Somali pirate attacks, which points to the success of 25 International Maritime Security the response. In fact, a comprehensive approach is being recommended to address piracy in other areas of the world. As governance and economic development languishes ashore in Somalia, piracy remains the easy business for many young Somali men, and the enterprise continues to expand and adapt. A report by the Center for Naval Analysis on illegal or unregulated fishing off East Africa found that pirates were moving beyond ransoming hostages and were now selling licenses to international fishermen and offering protection for their boats for a fee. This example demonstrates how threats adapt to changing conditions and the subsequent need to regularly assess and adjust actions taken in a complex and fluid environment. International responses to piracy illustrate the application of comprehensive approaches to the maritime domain. Although acknowledged as a common good, continued freedom to access the oceans implies that legal, political, and other implications must be comprehended before an approach is made to mitigate threats to sea lanes, resources, and infrastructures. Understanding the principles of maritime governance and addressing the threats to the global commons are the first steps to ensuring that the oceans remain available to all mankind. 26 International Maritime Security Chapter 4. Deterrence of Cyber Aggression by Scott Jasper A ll sectors of the economy rely on networks, systems, and services that form the integrated and interconnected domain known as cyberspace. Information and communication technologies are indispensable to national security, particularly in both the defense and intelligence communities. Cyber protection is challenging because the domain is boundless, constantly changing, and open to all comers. In addition, cyber aggression is relentless, pervasive, and dangerous, and includes the theft or exploitation of data, disruption or denial of access or service, and destructive actions such as corruption, manipulation, and damage. Cyberspace is probed and penetrated by hackers, criminals, terrorists, and foreign powers. As an interdependent network of information and communication technology infrastructures, it does not differentiate among commercial, civil, and military spheres. For example, industries own and operate 90 percent of Objective the critical infrastructure in the Nation. Cyberspace integration is vulnerTo secure cyberspace with its globally able to cascading disruptions of infrastructure or key resource sectors. connected structure of servers, switches, The severity and complexity of cyber aggression compels cooperaand routers with the cooperation of tion among stakeholders in the government, industry, and defense sectors individual stakeholders. to deter threat actors. The best way of attaining cooperation is examining and adapting extant models of the comprehensive approach as applied to mutual security concerns. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization declared in 2010 that the adoption of the comprehensive approach by member nations relates not only to operations but also to Alliance activities involving threats such as cyber attacks. The approach to cyberspace could be applied to cooperative efforts that deter aggression. Threat Actor Strategies Cyber warfare can be defined in military terms as armed conflict conducted entirely or in part by cyber means. Contemporary acts of cyber aggression such as criminal exploitation, military or industrial espionage, nationalist hacker protests, and infrastructure infiltration or sabotage might represent lower level means of cyber warfare. The buying or renting of viruses (malicious code), exploits (code vulnerabilities), bot (compromised machine) networks, and command and control servers provide an array of tools for hostile actors and states. An attacker may launch a military confrontation during a period of tension by attacking civilian 27 infrastructure, synchronizing cyber attacks with surprise military strikes, or waiting until the war starts to activate previously implanted cyber disruptions. In addition to military operations that deny opposing forces the effective use of cyberspace systems and weapons, some national cyber campaign doctrine includes disruption of governmental services, financial enterprises, and media outlets. The distributed denial of services (DDoS) assaults (that flood systems with useless traffic) on Georgian infrastructure in 2008 heralded the reality that cyber aggression will be a component of any future conflict. Blogs and forums spread instructions and script to pro-Russian hackers to disrupt Georgian public and private sector Web sites. During the ground invasion, command and control servers managed by a cybercrime group issued DDoS attack commands. Russian nationalists in the cyber riot in Estonia used similar means in 2007. Other nations might find comparable uses for nonmilitary actors and services against civilian targets. Chinese military doctrine calls for attacks on critical infrastructure in the enemy homeland in the event of war. In a conflict over Taiwan, computer network operations on the Mainland appear designed to target regional American logistics chains in host nations as well as logistics networks and companies in the continental United States. Failures of power grids, transportation networks, and banks could result in physical damage and economic disruption. The US military is dependent on this critical infrastrucAdvanced Persistent Threats ture at home and abroad. Chinese capabilities could Intrusions that penetrate networks and systems to covertly steal impede military readiness and the operation of US information, manipulate data, and cause damage are commonly critical infrastructure. characterized as Documented incidents of cyber aggression • targeted—approaching individuals with high-level access by indicate that phase zero (or the start) of cyber warfare spear-phishing with spoofed emails, workplace attachments, and may have arrived. The Pentagon has made routine social media allegations against China in its annual reports to Con• zero day—conducting reconnaissance to know target systems, gress, citing network exploitation to gather intelligence applications, and networks to exploit unpatched or unknown on governmental activities, economic interests, and computer vulnerabilities defense industries critical to US national security. One • stealthy—installing malware, back doors, and connections firm, for instance, was exposed as hacking information to servers to steal information, alter critical infrastructure, or on drone technology originating in Shanghai. manipulate operations The United States has performed acts of cyber aggression as demonstrated by the Stuxnet damage. President Barrack Obama ordered the attack against Iran under a program codenamed Olympic Games. This advanced persistent threat was discovered in June 2010 after it infected nuclear plants by exploiting formerly unidentified zero-day (previously unknown and unpatched) Microsoft vulnerabilities. Stuxnet interferes with the frequency of converter drives that control the speed of the system, and it causes damage. It likely put 25 percent of the centrifuges at Natanz out of action in 2009. Cutting-edge Stuxnet malware is connected in some fashion to the data mining Flame, Gauss, and Duqu viruses. The cyber activities of China and some other players differs from that of the United States because it provides state-owned enterprises with data to improve their competitive edge and also reduce the cost of gaining economic advantage. The statecriminal nexus is evident as intruders use similar tools such as Remote Access Trojan, 28 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression which include Poison Ivy, Ghost, and PlugX to capture and extract information. The impact of these intrusions on the United States amounts to billions of dollars in the loss of intellectual property and proprietary information. Competitive anti-access and area denial strategies evade direct attribution by condoning or outsourcing cyber power to proxy groups. The Cutting Sword of Justice activist group took responsibility for the Shamoon malware attack on the Saudi Aramco Oil Company in August 2012, but analysts suspect Tehran may have instigated it to gain influence after Riyadh pledged to increase oil production to compensate for sanctions against Iran. As Washington openly considered a military response to the use of chemical weapons by Damascus in 2013, the Syrian Electronic Army claimed responsibility for attacking the Web site of The New York Times, eliciting warnings of a cyber war if the United States launched military strikes. A Comprehensive Approach Cyber intrusions, disruptions, and attacks have escalated against defense systems, private industry, and critical public utilities. The US Army reported that more than 250,000 probes per hour target its systems and networks. An intrusion directed at a defense plant in 2011 filched more than 24,000 files, many related to sensitive technology. Hewlett Packard found in 2012 that the estimated cost of cybercrimes against 56 organizations averaged $8.9 million. The Department of Homeland Security emphasized that the cyber threat jeopardizes the security and availability of public services such as utilities, transport, health care, and banking. To highlight this point, the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team reported 124 attacks in 2012 that targeted public services and nuclear industries. Recent incidents reveal cyber aggression being employed in an increasingly systematic and coordinated fashion. Criminal exploitation, military or industrial espionage, hacker protests, and infrastructure infiltration or sabotage are ingeniously blended in competitor operations and campaigns. The threats range from advanced persistent threat intrusion to distributed denial of services, sometimes combined, as appeared to happen in the Dark Seoul DDoS attacks of 2013 on South Korean banks and media that served as a long-term subterfuge to steal military secrets. The protection of vulnerable but indispensable systems in cyberspace requires cooperation by private, governmental, and international partners to identify problems and find solutions. A comprehensive approach aligns parties based on shared interests, complementary opportunities, and mutual procedures. Given that the self-interest of organizations is facilitated by cooperative interaction, the approach seeks congruence of purpose, not unity of command. NATO recognizes implementation will require using civilian and military instruments that take into account the respective strengths and mandates of the participants. The comprehensive approach must be seen as more than a traditional whole-of-government approach because it integrates additional capabilities of allies and partners, nongovernmental and private voluntary agencies, international organizations, and the private sector to face international security challenges. As described in British doctrine, a comprehensive approach is based on shared principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favorable and enduring outcomes in particular situations. While the NATO model offers 29 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression a starting point to design an approach for a given domain, the methodology must be modified for different operational environments, structural characteristics, and prominent partners including commercial actors. An approach to cyberspace security could be described as employing unified principles and actions that integrate the capabilities of national governments, global industries, and international agencies to secure cyberspace. In its Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, the White House embodies this approach in suggesting public and private sector partnerships for cyber defense of critical infrastructure and key resources. Complementary Deterrence The head of US Cyber Command, General Keith B. Alexander, USA, told a Senate committee in March 2013 that he had some confidence in the capability to deter major state-on-state attacks in cyberspace, but not in the low-level harassment of private and public sites, property, and data. The solution may reside in applying the comprehensive approach to achieve deterrence of cyber aggression. Deterrence seeks to shape perceptions of costs and benefits that dissuade threatening behavior. The strategic debate during the Cold War over deterring attacks was normally divided into deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. With the strategic interdependence that resulted from globalization, one might add deterrence by entanglement. Because of the unique characteristics and complexity of cyberspace, the best course of action is to employ a multifaceted deterrence strategy that combines punishment (retaliation), denial (prevention), and entanglement (rules for behavior). The policy of the Department of Defense for maintaining effective cyberspace deterrence is partly founded on the ability to respond to hostile acts with proportional and justified measures. This form of deterrence by retribution is complicated by the difficulty of monitoring cyberspace, identifying intrusions, and locating the sources with a high degree of confidence in a timely way. For example, Advanced Persistent Threats mask the identities of attackers and sanction plausible deniability. If definitive attribution can be obtained, the military could act in self-defense within its prescribed authority to counter an equivalent armed attack in cyberspace. An alternative to the offensive use of malware is active defense. For industrial attacks it entails working with private sector partners to identify and interdict intruders, then deferring to appropriate government authorities for punitive actions. Deterrence by denial of benefit hedges against cyber aggression by increasing adversary risks while reducing incentives. Increased security and resilience of networks and systems can discourage attacks. Defensive measures emphasize continuous protection of multiple threat points including network, endpoint, Web, and email security. Critical security controls provide technical means to monitor networks and systems, detect attempted attacks, identify compromised machines, and interrupt infiltration. These measures are designed to identify commercial tools that can detect, track, control, prevent, and correct weaknesses or misuse at threat points. Pursuit of deterrence by entanglement has the potential to reduce the risk of miscalculation and conflict. Cyberspace governance is extremely difficult because of requirements to prosecute nefarious acts across multiple lines of jurisdiction. The gap between capabilities and enforceable guidelines is complicated by the speed at which the domain changes and by its global nature, which transcends issues of 30 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression sovereignty. Collaborative means such as international norms promote order in cyberspace by encouraging states to meet their responsibilities to prevent crime and enact appropriate and effective self-defense measures. Likewise, regional or bilateral dialogue builds trust and provides opportunities to share threat indicators, communicate incidents, and manage crises collectively. A comprehensive approach can achieve complementary strategies for deterrence of cyber aggression. The following questions are pertinent when considering cyber deterrence options. • What offensive concepts can achieve deterrence by punishment? Is there a current need for implementing the concept of active defense? • What defensive measures can attain deterrence by denial? Is there a need for public-private partnerships to improve information sharing and create risk-based standards? • What collaborative mechanisms are best suited to achieve deterrence by entanglement? Is there a need for new international treaties, norms of behavior, or cyber conidence-building measures for cyberspace? Deterrence by Punishment For offensive cyber operations in self-defense, a response whose scope, duration, and intensity will likely cause significant kinetic damage demands complete certainty of attribution. Intrusion traffic and exfiltration of information often routes through compromised servers in a third country, complicating proof of origin. Finding servers in nations or malware that contain national language characters does not necessarily provide sufficient evidence to confirm that any government endorsed or commissioned a given event. For example, China may have been responsible for attacks on South Korean banks and television networks in March 2013 based on Chinese words and other clues in the malware. However, such indicators are commonly used by cyber attack designers for disinformation and were even found in Stuxnet. The lack of timely attribution complicates decisions on offensive operations, driving requirements for cyber intelligence that go beyond issues of vulnerability and software identification. Although some argue that fundamental interconnectedness of networks means the effects of offensive cyber operations cannot be limited, others claim that contained operations are possible even in broadly connected systems. Nevertheless, deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental escalation could trigger a chain reaction that unintentionally intensifies conflicts. Only the President of the United States can approve a cyber operation capable of significant consequences, a hard decision because of the inability to predict collateral damage and political implications. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty guarantees individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack on any of its signatories. When applied to cyber threats, the Tallinn Manual (rule 13) stipulates that the scale and effects determine whether a cyber operation qualifies as an armed attack. Although Stuxnet caused physical damage, the International Group of Experts that developed the Tallinn Manual was divided on whether the damage constituted an armed attack. The NATO Policy on Cyber Defense reiterates that any collective defense response is subject to political decisions by the North Atlantic Council. This ambiguity might 31 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression give an adversary good reason to use cyber as a method of attack against critical infrastructure. The imposition of costs in deterrence by punishment can reduce the willingness or ability of an adversary to go on the offensive. The controversial concept of active defense entails returning fire at hackers to prevent further disruption. In active defense, networks and systems are monitored to intercept malicious traffic. Once the malware is detected, actions can be taken including diversion to a holding area or other actions aimed at the attacker. The issue is whether to regulate or standardize the actions. A public-private partnership could provide the uniformity of government coordinated responses and the advantage of private sector access to top technologies and experts. But legal constraints must be adapted to permit more aggressive defensive tactics. Deterrence by Denial Information technology security practitioners acknowledge increasing network vulnerabilities with particular concern over advanced persistent threats and mobile platforms such as smart phones and iPads. The unpredictable effect of active defense on third parties makes passive defense for denial of benefit a preferable option. A defense-in-depth strategy can theoretically protect the computers, networks, and control systems in critical infrastructure and key resource sectors from cyber aggression. Layering multiple security technologies combined with best practice endpoint management can decrease the risk of malware penetration because each layer can block a different aspect of multipronged cyber attacks. Given that the greatest barrier to achieving endpoint security is insufficient resources, the government should consider providing market incentives for private sector investments in cybersecurity. In February 2013, after Congress failed to enact legislation, President Barrack Obama signed an executive order entitled “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.” It sought to establish a partnership with private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure to both improve information sharing and implement risk-based standards. The order also expanded the role of the Department of Three Case Studies Digital Espionage—Flame Virus (2012): Copied keyboard entries, sifted email and text messaging, captured screen shots, and recorded microphone sounds. It infected computers by scanning for and querying Bluetooth devices to create social profiles. It took up to 20 megabytes with command and control network of 50 to 80 registered domains for built-in and downloadable modules. Distributed Denial of Services—Estonia (2007): Assault from botnet identified with both cybercriminals in St. Petersburg and the Russian Business Network spread to 85,000 computers. It became first reported act of cyber aggression against a NATO member. Conditions under which attacks may trigger collective defense under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remain vague. Destructive Attack—Stuxnet Worm (2010): Targeted Iranian nuclear plants by exploiting unidentified zero-day Microsoft vulnerabilities. It inhibited frequency converter drives to control speed and damage the system. Ultimately it was discovered in 170 power plants including some in North America. It could be considered an armed attack because it damaged or destroyed equipment. 32 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression Homeland Security in providing classified cyber threat and technical information to both public and private sector custodians of critical infrastructure. Moreover, the executive order tasked the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop a cybersecurity framework that incorporates consensus standards and best practices. The framework will provide a prioritized, repeatable, and performance-based approach to assessing and managing cyber risks. An offense-informs-defense model that uses knowledge of actual attacks that compromise systems can shape the development of technical measures. The Council on CyberSecurity leads development of critical security controls to provide a prioritized, risk-based approach to security based on an understanding of current attacks. The controls encompass best practices that include vulnerability assessment, malware and boundary defenses, access control, account monitoring, and data loss prevention. The inaugural cybersecurity framework is assembled around the core functions of identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover. Critical security controls are part of informative references that illustrate methods to carry out the activities under the functions. The White House drafted an initial set of incentives for private industry to adopt these best practices, including cybersecurity insurance, liability limitation, and rate recovery. Figure 4.1 Functions of a Comprehensive CyberSecurity Framework IDENTIFY Develop understanding to manage cybersecurity risk asset management, business environmental awareness, governance, risk assessment and management PROTECT Implement safeguards to ensure essential services access control, awareness and training, data security, information protection processes and procedures, maintenance DETECT Rapidly identify when a cybersecurity event occurs anomaly and event identification, continuous security monitoring, detection processes RESPOND Take action to counter or contain a cybersecurity event response planning, coordination, analysis, mitigation, improvements RECOVER Restore capabilities or services impaired by a cybersecurity event recovery planning, systems restoration, communications and assurance, improvements and lessons learned Deterrence by Entanglement The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the first such international treaty, outlined the widest possible means of cooperation to investigate crimes involving computer systems and data and to gather evidence electronically on criminal 33 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression offences. Deterrence is explicitly cited to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of these systems. This agreement also provided for deterring cross-border crimes while recognizing issues of national sovereignty. To date, only 35 nations including the United States have acceded to the treaty though others are in the process of ratifying it. Some believe nations should be held accountable for malicious actions or transiting information systems within their borders by introducing norms of responsible behavior. By respecting behavioral norms, US strategy can assure predictability that helps to prevent misunderstandings that may lead to conflict. China and Russia have urged the United Nations to adopt their International Code of Conduct for Information Security to enable greater control over content. Despite the limited interest in additional international agreements, plenary speakers at the Budapest Conference on Cyberspace stressed the need for norms. A follow-on conference resulted in the Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace, which provided new guidelines for coping with threats from cybercrime and cyber war. Confidence building can prevent conflicts through measures that establish transparency, cooperation, and stability. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe seeks to reduce misperception, escalation, and conflict resulting from information and communication technologies. The United States and Russia have formed a working group to assess emerging threats and move toward introducing confidence-building measures to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding cyber incidents that could develop into bilateral crises. . . . Cyber warfare has been described as a conflict between nations where attacks originating in the digital domain are directed against military and industrial targets for political, economic, or territorial gain. The term cybered-conflict might be better suited than cyber war in indicating the complexity and ambiguity of hostilities waged in cyberspace that include asymmetric conflicts, hybrid warfare, and counterterrorism. General Martin Dempsey, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently warned that “disruptive and destructive cyber attacks are becoming a part of conflict,” and that “civilian infrastructure and business are targeted first.” Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta affirmed that “an aggressor nation or extremist group could . . . contaminate the water supply in major cities or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country.” Still, the majority of reported cyber attacks have not been violent, purposeful, and political, and are thus more accurately described as hostile or disruptive cyber activities. Cyber activities are merely acts of aggression—at most a lower level component of cybered-conflict. General Dempsey claims national mission teams could defend against these hostile activities but recognizes the need to collaborate with other nations to establish norms of behavior in cyberspace and improve information sharing and standards. However, it is difficult to establish consensus regarding the legitimate and effective employment of deterrence strategies that encompass offensive concepts (punishment), defensive measures (denial), and collaborative mechanisms (entanglement). Within the United States, the Office of Cyber Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense attests to the need for the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the 34 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to coordinate with public, private, and international partners in cybersecurity efforts. Although some workshops have been based on a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity and others on cyber deterrence, there is little empirical work on intersecting issues like attribution, legality, liability, privacy, verification. The questions raised in this chapter offer a point of departure for analyzing the viability of offensive concepts, defensive measures, and cooperative mechanisms. Further research is necessary to determine exactly how a comprehensive approach can achieve complementary strategies for deterrence of cyber aggression. 35 Deterrence of Cyber Aggression Chapter 5. Challenges to Energy Security by Daniel A. Nussbaum A ll sectors of a modern society and economy depend on energy. Thus any disruption to energy has serious consequences across a wide range of systems, organizations, and communities. The security of energy necessitates ensuring that supplies meet the demands imposed by consumers. Moreover, energy security is fundamental to national defense including military operations. Yet achieving security is difficult because of both its complexity and extent. Diverse situations such as burning Iraqi oil fields after the Gulf War, natural disasters such as the Fukushima earthquake and Hurricane Katrina, and attacks on power substations have widespread ramifications. These challenges to energy security Objective impact how various communities collectively plan and implement safeguards and resolutions. Define energy security, identify potential Because of the rapidly expanding consumption of energy disturbances, and determine measures to secure around the world, opportunities to threaten energy security are energy supplies through a comprehensive approach. increasing, and will continue to magnify in the future. Data compiled by the International Energy Office for 2013 and the estimated demands for energy over the next two decades validate claims that the growth in consumption will be great, and will be accompanied by a subsequent increase in energy security vulnerabilities. Some Deinitions A recent study defines energy security as reliable access to sufficient, affordable energy supplies to fuel economic growth. Alternatively, the “4-As” model represents energy security in terms of availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability. On examination, the concept of affordability, though intuitively meaningful, is complex and difficult to fully understand and explain. Recog4As: Available, Accessible, Affordable, Acceptable nizing this, the Military Opera• availability—involves the physical occurrence of energy that may tions Research Society organized make it either easy or hard to retrieve a workshop for experts and • accessibility—addresses the geopolitical environment with special analysts to research challenges to regard to energy that can be retrieved and made usable affordability, using affordability • affordability—speaks to the financial implications of energy analyses to improve decisionmaksecurity with respect to consuming energy according one’s means ing, and criteria for the provi• acceptability—concerns the environment in the sense that the sion of consistent and useful footprint of energy retrieval does not violate policy-based norms affordability analyses. It also 36 offered background on affordability analyses and created a framework for developing a practical manual for affordability analysts to review strategic goals, determine desired outcomes, and identify the capabilities and resources required to achieve affordable and acceptable levels of energy security. By comparison, Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University has proposed a more simplified definition of affordability: “The uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price with little environmental footprint.” Threats to Energy Security An important issue to address is planning for threats to energy security. Risks arise from many sources including natural disasters, acts of sabotage, national traumas, contested international space (from challenges to Kuwaiti sovereignty to navigational rights through the increasingly accessible Northwest passage), peacekeeping, peacemaking, high levels of volatility in energy commodity prices, and flash transnational currency flows. Another critical but often overlooked threat to energy security is aging or sabotage of infrastructure. Infrastructure refers to procedures and hardware occupying a position between generating energy (such as oil wells, power plants, and photovoltaic solar arrays) and consuming energy (government, commercial, and consumer end-use). Therefore infrastructure occupies the position between supply and demand within the energy enterprise. The aging or sabotage of infrastructure deserves attention not only because of its criticality to the enterprise, but because it is a known and noticeably weak link. Infrastructure vulnerabilities have consequences for energy security and, importantly, secondary and tertiary consequences with less apparent implications. A high-level systems engineering understanding of infrastructure encompasses the operation and linkages of three major components: • generation—oil, gas, coal, nuclear, hydro, solar, wind, and geothermal power plants • transmission—independent system operators that coordinate, control, and monitor the electrical power system within a given nation or region • consumption—use by commercial, consumer, public, and defense sectors as well as generation and transmission segments of the energy enterprise. Two grid outages merit mentioning. The Northeast blackout in 2003 was a widespread power outage that occurred throughout parts of the Northeastern and Midwestern United States and Ontario. It was the second most widespread blackout in history, affecting an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight US states. The primary cause was a software bug in the alarm system at the FirstEnergy Corporation in Ohio. Operators were unaware of the need to redistribute power after overloaded transmission lines hit unpruned foliage. What would have been a manageable local blackout cascaded into widespread distress on the electric grid. The other outage took place as the result of a sniper attack on transformers and infrastructure at the Medford substation of Pacific Gas and Electric in San Jose, California, in 2013. This recent incident underlines concerns over the vulnerability of the electric grid to sabotage and demonstrates the importance of understanding 37 Challenges to Energy Security Figure 5.1 Worldwide Energy Production • With world GDP rising by 3.6 percent per year, energy use will grow by 56 percent between 2010 and 2040. Half of the increase is attributed to China and India. • Renewable energy and nuclear power are the fastest-growing energy sources, each increasing by 2.5 percent per year; however, fossil fuels continue to supply almost 80 percent of world energy use through 2040. • Natural gas is the fastest growing fossil fuel in the outlook, supported by increasing supplies of shale gas, particularly in the United States. • Coal will grow faster than oil use until after 2030, mostly because of increases in Chinese demands, and slow growth in oil demands by OECD member countries. • Given current policies and regulations, worldwide energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are projected to increase 46 percent by 2040 reaching 45 billion metric tons in 2040. —US Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2013, the context of an attack including determining whether it is a precursor to broader attacks. Susceptibility to Breaches While all sectors of society and the economy rely on energy, it is necessary for the purpose of analysis to have a rough taxonomy of generalized sectors with interests in maintaining energy security, each with its own subcategories. For the purpose of understanding the comprehensive approach to energy security, the following agglomerations are proposed: civilian and military components of government, commercial entities, and private sector organizations. Each of these is required to address issues associated with energy security at one time or another. The modern world is dynamic and interconnected. Depending on external circumstances, some or all elements of the society will be affected by active threats or risks to energy security requirements. Moreover, the situation has the potential to escalate rapidly from no participants, to some participants, to many participants, to all participants simultaneously. Figure 5.2 Worldwide Energy Consumption 900 800 Quadrillion British Thermal Units 700 Rest of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 600 500 400 Rest of non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 300 India United States 200 China 100 0 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 S  US Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2013 38 Challenges to Energy Security 2035 2040 Figure 5.3 Average Number of Outages Per Year* Affecting >50,000 people and >100 Megawatts 160 140 Number of Incidents 120 100 80 60 40 20 >50,000 People 0 >100 Megawatts 2000–2004 2005–2009 2010–2012 * Heavy reliance on grid but decreased reliability Critical infrastructure protection exemplifies an arena that displays a tendency for risks to escalate and spread. The term critical infrastructure describes those assets that are essential for society and the economy to function. According to the Center for Infrastructure Defense at the Naval Postgraduate School, critical infrastructures are composed of systems of components that combine to achieve desired functions or that fail when the functions are disrupted. As critical infrastructure protection is situated at the nexus of cyber and energy structures the well-known public policy debate over protecting against cyber attacks clearly spills over to energy infrastructures. Cyber attacks interfere with electrical systems, pumps transporting liquid fuel, and the machinery relying on liquid fuel. Thus commercial, government, and private sector consumers who are impacted care a great deal about this situation. The same cyber attacks can undermine the ability of the US Navy to provide timely refueling of combat logistics fleet ships that replenish warships at sea, impacting on military operations. Accordingly, military forces also affect the situation. Finally, it is easy to imagine that first responders in the civilian sphere will be hindered in performing their missions by degraded communications systems, all of which are energy dependent. It becomes obvious that a small-scale attack can readily escalate to involve even more stakeholders who find their equities seriously compromised. Energy consuming nations are subject to the fragility of stability because policymakers and analysts must consider worst-case scenarios and develop risk mitigation strategies to defend against potential breakdowns. The accompanying table indicates the complexity and interactions among threats to energy security and the categories directly affected by these threats. An “x” in a cell indicates a threat to the sector in the first row by a threat in the first column. The table has been filled in 39 Challenges to Energy Security conservatively. That means that a nexus is not identified unless it is clear and unassailable. Thus if the table was completed less conservatively, it would be filled out more densely and indicate greater complexity in subsequent interactions. The complexity of energy security requires using the comprehensive approach. Preplanned exercises offer fruitful ways to analyze energy security considerations. On the civilian side, these might look like the sort of exercises conducted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States, or on the military side, the regular exercise programs sponsored by NATO, especially training including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. . . . Although definitions of energy security can rapidly become complex and abstruse, the core of the definition provided by Gawdat Bahgat is the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price with little environmental footprint.” Depending on external circumstances, the challenges to the availability of energy supplies have the potential to escalate from affecting selected consumers to impacting global markets. A military approach to such circumstances might consider a continuum of military operations that has six stages: shaping the environment, deterring the threat, seizing the initiative, dominating the enemy, stabilizing the environment, and enabling civil authorities. In addition, preplanned exercises that incorporate energy security considerations are also useful tools. They may include FEMA-type exercises on the civilian side and NATO exercise programs on the military side. It is noteworthy that the latter regularly incorporate aspects of both humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Given the complexities of the interaction among multiple parties, the requirement exists to accommodate such relationships and diverse or even contradictory interests lest the complexity of energy security leads to a reaction against cooperation. Finally, the realm of energy security presents unanswered questions based on the inherent complexity of the subject. There is no way to address this complexity other than as part of a comprehensive approach. 40 Challenges to Energy Security Appendix: Sources of Guidance Extensive guidance exists on developing comprehensive approaches to operations and applying them to specific challenges. The following list of selected US and international publications is related to the field of civil-military operations as discussed in chapter 2 on multidimensional peacekeeping. NATO Standardization Agency, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.9, Allied Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (February 2013). UK Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, Joint Discussion Note 4/05, “The Comprehensive Approach” (January 2006). UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (“Oslo Guidelines”) (November 2007) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies” (March 1, 2008). UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (March 2008). US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07, Peace Operations (August 1, 2012). ———— Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (June 24, 2011). ———— Joint Publication 3-29, Humanitarian Assistance (January 23, 2014). US Institute of Peace, “Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and NonGovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments” (July 24, 2007). 41 List of Acronyms CAO CBM CIMIC CIP CMCO DDoS EEZ EU FEMA IMB IMO NATO NGO OSCE UN 42 comprehensive approach to operations confidence-building measure civil-military cooperation critical infrastructure protection civil-military coordination distributed denial of services economic exclusion zone European Union Federal Emergency Management Agency International Maritime Bureau International Maritime Organization North Atlantic Treaty Organization nongovernmental organization Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe United Nations About the Contributors LYLA ENGLEHORN is research associate and concept generation director of the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research at the Naval Postgraduate School. Her research interests include multimodal information sharing, international maritime defense, and the implications of climate change for global security. GEORGE T. HODERMARSKY is chief analyst with Science Applications International Corporation. His research focuses on joint and multinational concept development, experimentation, and assessment. Dr. Hodermarsky previously worked at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, and US Joint Forces Command. SCOTT JASPER is deputy director for operations in the Center for Civil-Military Relations and lecturer in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. His edited volumes include Securing Freedom in the Global Commons and Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security. JEFFREY E. KLINE holds the Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis in the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He teaches joint campaign analysis and executive risk assessment and is coordinator of maritime security education programs. Most recently he contributed to the book is Responding to Capability Surprise: A Strategy for US Naval Forces. SCOTT MORELAND is deputy program manager for peacekeeping and crisis response exercises in the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School. In addition, he lectures on defense transformation and international civilmilitary relations. His current areas of research include the global commons and comprehensive approach to crises. DANIEL A. NUSSBAUM chairs the Energy Academic Group and teaches in the Operations Research Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. Formerly, he was director of the Naval Center for Cost Analysis and served as chief advisor to the Secretary of the Navy for guiding, directing, and strengthening cost estimating and analysis. 43