Studia
Ecologiae et Bioethicae
1/2003
Ludger HONNEFELDER*
Bioethics and the normative concept of human
selfhood
The course of public debate as well as common issues presently discussed among ethicists make it clear that developments in the life sciences and their application in modern medicine are confronting humanity
with questions that surpass by far the usual complex problems concerning the mere regulation of innovative technologies. These questions pertain to the core of our self-understanding as human beings, and are as
such pertinent to the foundations of morals and ethics on which we base
our lives.
This is not true of all discoveries in the field. Many developments in
the life sciences are completely novel and require a high degree of regulation. However, as experience has shown, even though the process is not
a simple one, or one capable of resolving all questions raised, in many
areas of the life sciences and their medical applications it suffices to refer
to the accepted norms at hand in order to reach a consensus regarding
the extent of necessary regulation.
But questions remain which can be resolved neither by the application of widely accepted norms, nor by the generation of new norms on
the basis of widely accepted principles; and it is these questions which
presently attract attention within the public at large as well as within the
scholarly debate. What makes these questions so important is neither the
novelty of the application context, nor the complexity of the consequences involved; it is the intimate link to the foundations of our morals and
to our normative self-image which guides us in our quest to develop and
to instigate new norms. This has a direct impact on the normative selfunderstanding of human beings, which is based on our status as responsible agents and as bearers of elementary rights and obligations.
If we try to identify the specific fields in which we are faced with
such fundamental questions, then surely innovations concerning possible intervention in genetics and reproductive medicine such as the cloning of human beings, germline manipulation or embryo selection are to
*
Uniwersytet w Bonn, Niemcy.
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Ludger Honnefelder
be included. The question to be answered is the following: Is the implementation of these novel possibilities on human beings consistent with
the basic norms of accepted universalist morals or ethics and the criteria
of responsible action manifested therein, or does it put the basic norms
and thereby the very endeavor of ethics, which is founded on the reciprocal recognition of autonomous subjects, into question? How can we
determine the status of the questions themselves and to what extent can
we reach a consensus concerning the answers?
1. From Chance to Choice: The approach of liberal eugenics
Progress in molecular biology and medicine has undoubtedly led to
means of intervention which have not only considerably expanded or
at least promise to expand the scope and magnitude of medical diagnosis and therapy, but which have also enabled us to manipulate the genetic endowment of humans in a way which would have a direct impact on
human identity and human nature a possibility which has thus far been
completely out of our reach. Even proponents of germinal choice technology such as G. Stock consider the possibility of intervening in or determining the genome of future individuals as the greatest challenge, since
it is inextricably related to what it means to be a human being and inevitably changes our image of ourselves1. What, however, is the precise
change under scrutiny and which challenge does it raise?
For R. Dworkin, the Anglo-American human rights theorist, it is the
possibility of displacing the boundary between inherited and produced nature that has caused the cloning of human beings and intervening in or
determining the genome of future individuals to be met by such widespread intuitive resistance. For, according to Dworkin, the boundary between chance and choice is nothing less than the spine of our ethics and
our morality2 and is as such fundamental to our distinction between
what nature has created and what we do in thatworld3. It allows us
to distinguish between what simply happens to us and what we are responsible for, and thus structures our values as a whole4 . Only because
we are who we are by coincidence and not by choice does not mean that
we have to somehow justify the genetic lottery in which all participate.
1
2
3
4
G. STOCK, Redesigning Humans. Our Inevitable Genetic Future, Boston-New York 2002,
110, 196, 155.
R. DWORKIN, Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambr. Mass. 2000,
444; ders., Playing God, in: Prospect. Selected Feautures, May 1999.
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Anm.2) 443.
Ebd. 444.
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Bioethics and the normative concept of human selfhood
On the contrary we must show solidarity with it5. If this boundary becomes displaceable, then the nature thus far prescribed to us will no longer be the absolute paradigm6 for something which is important to us
for the simple reason that it lies beyond our scope of power and responsibility. Humankind is afraid of losing its footing, and our fear of thus
losing security and stability expresses itself in our concern that with such
a significant genetic modification, as is made possible by contemporary
molecular medicine, we shall begin playing God7 .
According to Dworkin, what causes intuitive resistance is therefore
not only the genetic modification, but primarily its impact on our value
system. For it affects values which, being intrinsic to the objects and
events in question, are to be regarded as detached values. These are to be
distinguished from derivative values, which result either from a recourse
to interests, a cost benefit analysis or from social compromise8.
If, as in the case of displacing the boundary between chance and choice, the validity of intrinsic values is affected, then we should not be surprised when deep moral uncertainty results and the fear of a moral
free-fall9 spreads.
As gravely as Dworkin is inclined to describe the situation, he is not
prone to draw the consequence that we should completely refrain from
making use of these novel possibilities; for this would be cowardice in
the face of the unknown10 . The proper reaction can only be one of further developing our morals with regard to the new challenge.
With this result, which he himself only sketches, Dworkin concurs
with the much more exhaustive diagnosis and substantiated approach put
forward by a group of prominent American bioethicists, namely A. Buchanan, D. W. Brock, N. Daniels and D. Wickler, in the book From Chance to
Choice11 . This group also sees the genetic modification of humans by means of cloning, germline intervention and embryo selection on the basis
of genetic testing, as raising a radically new type of challenge. What renders this challenge so fundamental is the potential not only to develop
forms of therapy for treating hitherto incurable diseases, but also to
shape some of the most important biological characteristics of the human beingswe choose to bring into existence12. After reaching the necessary level of technical development, there are several reasons which
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Vgl. ebd. 445.
Ebd.444.
Ebd.
Vgl. ebd. 427f.
Ebd. 445f.
Ebd.
A. BUCHANAN u.a., From Chance to Choice. Genetics and Justice, Cambridge 2000.
Ebd.XV.
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could lead us to make use of such a potential: the implementation of individual rights, especially the right to reproductive freedom, the desire
of future parents to have as perfect a child as possible, but also motives
resulting from public health care or job market interests not to speak of
the concept of genetic communitarianism as propagated by some social
groups with recourse to the freedom of religion.
What gives weight to the moral challenge lying in such scenarios is,
according to the mentioned group of authors, not only the concern that
our capacity for moral judgement and implementation might well not
suffice to effectively draw the necessary boundaries in time, especially
considering the temptations raised by the potential of these innovations.
For to this purpose we would have to be certain about the values that
allow us to also distinguish in this field between what we can do, and
what we should do. However, it is precisely this certainty which is missing. We must therefore ask: What are the most basicmoral principles
that would guide public policy and individual choice concerning the use
of genetic interventions in a just and humane society in which the powers
of genetic intervention are more developed than they are today?13.
As the question reveals, the diagnosed moral challenge goes far beyond questions concerning mere application. It concerns the very foundations of morality; however, this is no reason for a general ban, but rather
so the argument for permitting therapy a reason and incentive for a
thorough review and further development of our fundamental moral principles. According to the authors, this is also not contradicted by a historical analysis. For the shadow of eugenics, with which the second chapter
of the study extensively deals14 , does not end up labeling eugenics which
is precisely what the discussed genetic modifications are all about as simply illegitimate. But what could the basic moral principles be, which would permit a feasible distinction between legitimate and illegitimate eugenics and could thus effectively tackle the outlined challenge?
In attempting to answer this basic question, the authors do not depart from the field of deontological ethics, as expressed in the language
of fundamental rights based on elementary demands. In an appendix15
dedicated solely to methodological questions, the authors emphasize the
necessity to foster a broad and balanced discourse to mediate between
our basic moral intuitions, and specify the ideas considered fundamental
to the liberal moral-political theory16 which should be adhered to, namely the ideas of moral individualism, the fundamental equality of all people, the ability to criticize and revise individual concepts of the good
13
14
15
16
Ebd.4f.
Vgl. ebd. 27-60.
Vgl. ebd. 371-382.
Ebd. 373.
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Bioethics and the normative concept of human selfhood
with respect to justice in basic institutions and the necessity of distinguishing between the public sphere and the private17.
On the backdrop of a system of morals based on these ideas, the authors regard the new options made possible by genetics as an extension
of individual rights and freedoms and consider the very act of endorsing and protecting these individual rights, such as the right to reproductive freedom, as drawing the necessary line to rule out objectionable
practices, including state-controlled eugenics18. The right to reproductive
freedom with respect to making use of the possibilities that genetic technology and reproductive medicine may offer, is naturally constrained by
the formal requirements of justice, equal opportunity, the principle of
nonmaleficence, and the recognition of the freedoms of others. What follows from this is the obligation to observe the welfare of yet nonexistent
human beings affected by our actions, including avoiding suffering and
promoting care. This implies that in some cases the deployment of medical innovations would be refused, in others it would be permitted, which
would also not completely rule out cases of enhancement. As for individual freedoms and justice, the state has the obligation to protect the right to reproductive freedom, to enable equal access to the opportunities
in question, and to accompany the impact for handicapped people through a morality of inclusion. Prohibition is only acceptable on the grounds of avoiding foreseeable damage or upholding equal opportunity, inevitably leading to a limited genetic stewardship by the state with respect to the genetic well-being of future generations19. Moral firebreaks such as the distinctions between positive and negative eugenics or
therapy and enhancement do not offer an adequate solution to challenge
raised by these new technologies, but rather the endorsement of reproductive freedom, which in exceptional cases does not rule disregarding
the interests of third parties including those of the offspring, as long as
the principle of nonmaleficence as well as justice is upheld.
2. The debate concerning the ethical self-image of the human race
A diagnosis of the situation differing in several important aspects from
the study of the American group of authors, and thus drawing different
conclusions with respect to permissible therapeutic measures, is presented
by J. Habermas in his newest bioethical publication20. In accordance with
17
18
19
20
Vgl. ebd. 379.
Vgl. vor allem das Schlußkapitel in Buchanan (Anm.11) 304-345.
Ebd.336f.
J. HABERMAS, Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik? Der Streit um das ethische Selbstverständnis der Gattung, in: ders., Die Zukunft des Menschlichen. Auf dem Weg zu einer
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Dworkin and the cited American study (to which Habermas refers in his
notes), he agrees that possibility of genetic modification of human beings
would radically displace the boundary between nature as we find it and
nature as we ourselves create it, between chance and choice, a boundary
which is constitutive of the human condition. Such a displacement would
entail putting the system of norms on which our morals are based into question. Contrary to the authors mentioned, Habermas argues that the basic norms would not only be challenged, but rather directly affected. For
if it is inherent to the human condition that the determination of ones genetic individuality be immune to manipulation by third parties in a way
which surpasses all common possibilities of intervention (such as the choice of a partner), then the deliberate selection or modification of an individuals genome by means of genetic technology would change the nature
of the entire species. For such a modification would unilaterally and irreversibly intervene in the formation of a future persons identity and breach the boundary-sustaining, deontological sanctuary... which guarantees
ones personal inviolability, individuality and the unrenounceability ones
own subjectivity21 . It would affect the personal identity of the person in
question who, due to such foreign intervention, would no longer experience himself or herself as the sole author of his or her own biography. It would also affect the moral community, since it would raise members confronted with the scenario of a dislocated future22 who would have a different relation to their own inception than all others23. In contrast to all postnatal socialization efforts by others, these prenatal foreign intentions infringe on ones biography in a way to which the affected person can no
longer relate24. If the intervention is irreversible and all attempts at revision ruled out, then the reciprocity and symmetry constitutive to moral
equality is destabilized. What is then affected by the prospect of genetically modifying future human beings is the close association between personal inviolability and the sanctity of a persons natural physical development and embodiment25. The decision to dissociate the two would constitute, according to Habermas, not the displacement of one of many boundaries of human influence that have thus far been drawn by nature; it
would constitute nothing less than a self-declaration concerning the ethical self-image of our species... which in turn determines whether we may
further regard ourselves as authors of our own biographies and recognize
21
22
23
24
25
liberalen Eugenik?, Frankfurt 2001.
Vgl. J. HABERMAS, Replik auf Einwände, in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 50 (2002)
283-298, 287.
Ebd.
Vgl. ebd. 72ff.
Vgl. ebd.93ff.
Ebd. 41.
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Bioethics and the normative concept of human selfhood
each other as autonomous agents and persons26.
Against the background of such a diagnosis, it should come as no surprise that the conclusions Habermas draws regarding permissible therapeutic measures differ from those of the American authors cited earlier.
If modifications are not possible without the stipulated consequences and
with our status as autonomous agents and the equality in choosing a lifeplan a cornerstone of our moral heritage is affected, then a deployment
of such measures would not be possible without abolishing our moral foundation. The idea of liberal eugenics, as put forward by Dworkin and
the others, is for Habermas self-contradictory27. According to him, the
only justifiable application is in non-instrumental cases which are inherent to the logic of healing28; such as permitting an intervention in cases without any possibility of obtaining a subjects consent if and only if
it serves the purpose of treating or avoiding serious disease and one would otherwise expect the subject to consent to such treatment. Of course
such an attempt to safeguard reciprocity and symmetry presupposes that
the unborn human is to be regarded as a second person29. In addition, a
purely therapeutic intervention for which we would be justified in expecting the subjects consent, made possible however as in the case of preimplantation diagnostics only through the elimination of other human
lives, nevertheless remains committed to the principle of protecting those deemed worthy of protection; the latter group, according to Habermas, includes prenatal human life thus sheltering it from instrumental
exploitation30.
If one asks how and why the principles of just coexistence, as expressed in the concept of the inviolability of human dignity, may be extended to encompass the entire species as well as unborn human life, then,
according to Habermas, one can only refer to the ethical self-image of
the human race in the Ethos of the species (Gattungsethik) inherent
to our moral convictions. It is in this self-image that the abstract rational morals of human-rights subjects themselves... find their footing31
and which calls on this side of the public debate concerning the moral
status of the embryo for an anticipation of the subject-status of unborn
human beings and thereby for an extension of the right to protection
from free and equal subjects to prenatal life as well.
26
27
28
29
30
31
Ebd. 49.
Vgl. ebd. 86ff.
Ebd. 79.
Vgl. ebd. 66ff.
Vgl. ebd. 56-69.
Ebd.74; vgl. auch ebd. 96.
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3. Key anthropological questions
Despite their differences, all authors discussed agree that the options
now open to us have a direct impact on the foundations of the human
condition. The reason for this is that intervening in human nature has an
impact on the identity of a person in such a way that directly affects his
autonomy and social equality. The moral relevance of such an intervention lies not in the fact that it modifies human nature as such, but rather
in the resulting displacement of the boundary between naturally developed
and created.
If it is inherent to the human condition that the boundary between naturally developed andproduced is highly relevant to the identity of a human
being and his self-understanding, and at the same time, this boundary is
not fixed but can instead be significantly displaced, then we must ask ourselves what distinguishes the new prospect of modifying the genome of
future human beings from other displacements of the boundary between
nature and culture, or between chance and choice, that have accompanied
the history of mankind as a cultural being thus far? Is this transformation
not inherent to mans quality of transcending his own nature32 , perhaps
even with the consequence that playing God will sooner or later be our
destiny?33 The mentioned authors supply us only with an indirect answer
to the question as to what boundary, from a moral point of view, the displacement of the boundary between naturally developed and produced should itself respect. According to Habermas, the American group of authors
regards the nature affected by genetic modification as a kind of inner
environment to which the subject in question can himself relate34. The
plea in favour of liberal eugenics would in fact lose its plausibility without such a premise. For the general relation between a subject and a person, this would not be convincing if we presuppose an inextricable union
between a personal and an organic system, unless of course we restrict genetic modifications to areas that are not crucial to personal identity, but
rather belong to a kind of inner environment. In this case, the normative upshot of liberal eugenics would already be inherent in its anthropological premises and would dismiss all genetic modifications to which a
subject could no longer relate. This leaves the question unanswered whether and to what extent there are genetic modifications that have such a
restrictive character and whether the interpretation of human nature as an
inner environment is at all plausible.
32
33
34
Vgl. K. Rahner, Schriften zur Theologie VIII, Einsiedeln-Zürich 1967,286-321.
Vgl. T. Peters, Playing God? Genetic Determinism and Human Freedom, New York u.a.
1997.
Vgl. Habermas (Anm.24) 89.
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Bioethics and the normative concept of human selfhood
In contrast to the position discussed, Habermas regards the displacement of the boundary between naturally developed and produced by means
of genetic modification as being morally contentious, because it involves
manipulation by third parties who intervene in the self-understanding
constitutive to a subjects identity in such a way, that with the exception
of the mentioned therapeutic case the subject can no longer retrospectively relate to the intervention. For this reason it must be regarded as an
unjustifiable infringement of personal autonomy and the principle of equality. This leads to the conclusion that the heteronomy of nature is to be
respected since it maintains autonomy and equality more strongly than the
intervention by third parties, except when such an intervention conforms
with the logic of healing in which the patient is regarded as a second
person whose consent we would otherwise be justified in expecting to obtain. Although the reference to autonomy and equality relieves Habermas
from recurring to strong anthropological premises, it also forces him to
make speculations regarding the extent to which genetic modifications would indeed result in a deficiency in autonomy and equality35.
4. The moral challenge
Allow me to summarize the points stated thus far.
1. What constitutes the moral challenge according to the authors mentioned is the fact that the novel possibilities of intervention raise questions concerning premises, which have not needed addressing in traditional moral discourse, and that meeting the challenge requires additional premises which most likely cannot be formulated on the basis of traditional morals; these premises applying to the general framework as
well as specific contexts.
2. The American group of authors asks whether our system of morals
can be based on the reciprocal recognition of autonomous and equal subjects if genetic modifications affect the nature constitutive of a subjects
identity, in addition to the fact that these modifications are inflicted on
not yet existing subjects. And if so, how can a consensus be reached regarding regulation, if even displacing state-controlled eugenics to the individual decision of parents does not solve the general problems associated with eugenic application of genetic technology? If, as opposed to the
public health model, the personal service model is not able to solve
the problems, then one must ask whether there is a third approach which
might allow the use of genetic modification without infringing on equality, autonomy or personal inviolability?36.
35
36
Vgl. dazu Siep (Anm.37)....
Vgl. ebd. 11ff.
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3. The answer developed by the American group of authors suggests
that this is possible if one applies the constraints of nonmaleficence and
equal opportunity, as guaranteed to born humans, to future humans as
well37. But the question remains as to how such a principle can be introduced to an individual case without having unacceptable consequences
in other areas? And how could we justify not being able to grant future
and unborn human beings a status rendering them worthy of protection?
4. If one includes forms of genetic enhancement as an area in which
one may legitimately apply the principles of nonmaleficence and equal
opportunity, then one faces the problems of identifying what is to be
considered as an enhancement, of determining for which forms of enhancement one can presuppose otherwise obtaining the patients consent38 , and of deciding how to avoid a social colonization of natural
inequalities and their consequences39. If one wishes to achieve this through restrictions on the basis of the principles of nonmaleficence and adequate care and curtail reproductive freedom by means of state measures,
one would then have to justify at least the state action involved by appealing to criteria such as disease relation.
5. Concerning the extension of entitlements to justice granted to autonomous and equal subjects to not yet existing humans, the authors face
the problem that, according to accepted morals, not yet existing humans
are not regarded as legal subjects and it has not yet been possible to reach a social consensus regarding the moral status of unborn human beings on the basis of these morals.
6. Habermas sees clearly that the moral intuition to the effect that cloning, germline intervention and embryo selection are seen as a violation
of the right to self-determination and the principle of equality can only
be adequately established if one presupposes an intrinsic value of human life before birth40. However, he considers an interpretation of human development in favour of an unconditional moral status even of
unborn humans as reasonably controversial41. If human dignity is,
strictly speaking, contingent upon the symmetry of relationships, then its
inviolability could only hold for legal subjects42.
7. This, however, does not rule out for Habermas that the members of a
legal community may mutually make a moral commitment to grant unborn human beings though not inviolability, but undisposability43 , and as a refe37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Vgl. Buchanan (Anm.11) 242-257.
Vgl. ebd. 219ff.
Vgl. ebd. 82ff.
Habermas (Anm.24) 61.
Ebd. 60f.
Vgl. ebd.62.
Ebd. 59.
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Bioethics and the normative concept of human selfhood
rence point for our obligations [grant them] legal protection44. Beyond mere
appreciation for what it is, pre-personal life, though not yet addressable in its
prescribed role as a second person, [has] an integral value for the entirety of an
ethically constituted form of life, so that it and this is the suggestion should
be granted protection on the basis of the dignity of human life, though not
due to human dignity, which is legally guaranteed to all persons45.
5. Critical evaluation and an alternative: The recourse to human dignity and human rights.
If we proceed on the basis of the arguments presented thus far, we
are faced with grave problems and doubts regarding both the diagnosis
and the therapeutic measures associated with the positions discussed.
5.1. Let us begin with the diagnosis:
As the discussion thus far has clarified, the innovative possibilities of genetic intervention into the nature of the human subject lead a universalist system of morals, which serves as a foundation for both positions, not only to
the limits of its capacity, but also question important premises underlying it.
a) Due to the fact that moral systems are constituted in relationships of mutual recognition, morality becomes dependent upon the existence of legal subjects and remains restricted to such. The intuition that unborn or
future human beings are to be included can only be indirectly accounted
for, either by an extension of the concepts of equality and justice beyond
the previously defined strict members of a possible moral community or
by introducing additional criteria for being worthy of protection. If, as is necessary in the first case, one extends the (strong) concept of a legal subject,
as posited in the moral systems in question, to include unborn and future human beings, this, as was shown, inadvertently leads to counterintuitive consequences, such as the unrestricted subsumption under the criterion of equality (which encompasses all subjects). Other possibilities of
bestowing moral claims to unborn or future human beings, such as by a
principle of anticipation with recourse to a species-related ethos, may
clearly only be established at the price of expanding the concept. However, such an expansion would be inconsistent with the fundamental contractualist character of such a moral system. For the anticipation can only
then be reasonably applied to an unborn human if an identity of the
unborn human with the born legal subject is stipulated, which presupposes the extension which shall be introduced by such anticipation. Moreover it is not very convincing if the call for expanding the number of
addressees of a universalistically conceived moral system can only be accounted for by a species related ethos which by definition is not justifiablke in a universalist way.
44
45
Ebd.66.
Ebd.67.
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b) Furthermore, the presupposed concept of an autonomous, responsible
subject implies a relationship of the subject to its own nature as that of a
system to its (inner) environment. This, however, amounts to a latent
form of Cartesianism, which is itself cast into serious doubt precisely due
to the possibility of intervening into a subjects nature by the novel means of genetic technology. Modifications of nature by others which directly affect the identity of a subject and its relation to itself and furthermore touch the fundamental equality between subjects in a severe manner, change the subject in a way to which it can no longer relate. The
vulnerability of the subject which becomes evident by the discussed
options of genetic manipulation, presupposes a concept of the unity of a
subject and its nature, or more precisely, a interleaving of identity and
non-identity, of subject and nature, which cannot be properly accounted
for in the concept of an autonomous, responsible subject without surrendering its function as being constitutive to moral systems.
c) The precarious character of the relationship between subject and nature
becomes evident when (as discussed by the American group of authors)
we try to apply justice claims under the conditions of possible modifications of a subjects nature. If justice involves (if not in all cases, then in general) correcting natural inequalities, what then could serve as a measure
for justice if nature, including all previous natural inequalities, becomes
the object of human production? A modification affecting not only this or
that property, but rather the entire ensemble, would constitute not only
colonization of natural inequalities, but rather a kind of total expropriation. In the extreme (and perhaps fictional) case of producing nature in its
entirety, it becomes evident that the boundary between naturally developed
and produced can be displaced even further, and that this cannot arbitrarily
continue without fundamentally transforming the relations involved. A
measure for the limits to the displacement of the boundary cannot be derived from the concept of an autonomous subject. The recourse to the logic of healing, that is, to the criterion of diesease and health is intuitively
appealing. However, it presupposes as point of comparison a concept of
nature which in its entirety is intact; such a recourse is in addition plagued
with the recurring problem of proper delineation.
d) If the boundary deemed necessary is to be drawn in form of legally binding
regulations in lieu of the unborn or future subjects affected by the displacement, we must then ask what criteria should such a stand-in protection adhere to. Since in the case of unborn and future subjects the recourse to their
stipulated intentions actually relies on what we ourselves deem to be the
good or obligatory, we are in need of something like an objective order of
goods and claims. Habermas relies on an objective legal order. However,
such an order inevitably emerges from the given relationship of a subject to
its nature. How could the recourse function if this relationship itself is ren-
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Bioethics and the normative concept of human selfhood
dered an object of modification? Moreover, we are faced with key questions
regarding an order of rights and goods, such as the priority of a life without genetically caused handicaps over physical life itself a question which a
contractualistically founded universal moral system can only address on the
basis of the self-determination of the affected person.
5.2. Let us now proceed with the therapy
If we wish as is the case in the positions discussed to allow for
the intuition that the basic requirements of universalist morals be extended to future and unborn human beings, then in founding such a moral
system we will not be able to avoid introducing premises that go beyond what is acceptable within a contractualist framework. Since it has become clear that the intuition calls for such premises and these are at
least to some extent implicitly advocated in the positions discussed, it
would fully correspond with the method of establishing a refelctive equilibrium between our fundamental moral intuitions as propagated by
the American group of authors if we were to introduce an appropriate
revision in the founding of a universalist moral system.
a) The basic intuition calling for an extension of the group of moral addressees to future and unborn humans is in my opinion nothing but
the basic intuition on which the idea of human rights is based, and
which secures this ideas binding character. It is the belief that all living beings that we refer to by means of the sortal predicate human
being have an intrinsic or unconditional value which bars them from
being evaluated in comparison to other goods. This means that all morality is based on a fundmental practical judgement stating that a human, as a living being equipped with the natural capacities of reason
and free will is an intrinsic or unconditional good, and that humans
have this value simply for being humans, that is, regardless of all other
properties except for the property of being human; in other words, for
being referred to by means of the sortal predicate human.
b) This fundamental practical judgement can itself be accounted for in more
detail, to which purpose there are several approaches. A rather apparent
explanation is that we presuppose such a value judgement in all contexts
of action and communication, and that its denial would lead to the dissolution of the framework regarded by all participants as binding. In
this sense we are justified in claiming that a contractualist founding of a
moral system presupposes such a fundamental practical judgement.
c) If, in contrast to the intention underlying the idea of human rights, the
fundamental practical judgement which assigns human beings their intrinsic value is not to be arbitrarily restricted, then it has to refer to human beings as human beings, that is it has to refer to the same object to
which the sortal predicate human being refers. However, the sortal
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predicate human being refers to a certain type of living being during
the time of its existence. Modern enlightenment had taken this into account and placed in the General land law for Prussian states (Allgemeinen Landrecht in den preussischen Staaten) from 1794 all humans under the protection of law from their birth to their deaths. Kant also states that we are
obligend to maintain the concept of substance in practical philosophy as
well, and regard human beings as a living beings in the sense of persisting entities and correspondingly as goods worthy of protection.
d) If intrinsic value must be assigned to humanbeings as human beings,
and the human being is to be understood as a specific unity of subject
and nature, then the natural dispositions, which must be regarded as
necessary conditions for subjectivity, are to be protected as well. This
is so in the case of the idea of human rights when under the label of
human rights we protect from intervention by the state or by
others certain natural frame-conditions such as bodily integrity and
the right to life as fundamental rights. This could be considered as a
departing point for designating the boundary beyond which intervention by means of genetic technology and reproductive medicine would
be regarded as illegitimate, insofar as they would affect future or
unborn human beings which as such are not able to give their consent.
Bioetyka i normatywne konsekwencje koncepcji cz³owieka
STRESZCZENIE
Rozwój nauk o ¿yciu oraz ich zastosowanie w medycynie prowadzi do pytania, które jest czêsto pomijane, chocia¿ odnosi siê ono tak wa¿nej sprawy jak
regulacja prawno-etyczna nowych technologii. Waga tego pytania nie rodzi siê
jednak ani ze wzglêdu na now¹ sytuacje, ani te¿ z powodu konsekwencji nowych rozwi¹zañ, ale przede wszystkim z racji wewnêtrznych zwi¹zków istniej¹cych miêdzy uzasadnieniem moralnoci i obrazem cz³owieka, co umo¿liwia
odnajdywanie nowych norm moralnych. Dotyczy to szczególnie genetyki i medycyny zajmuj¹cej siê reprodukcj¹ ludzk¹. Mo¿liwoæ genetycznych modyfikacji cz³owieka przesuwa granicê pomiêdzy natur¹ zastan¹ a natur¹ tworzon¹
przez ludzi; pomiêdzy istniej¹c¹ szans¹ a dokonywanym wyborem. Jest to granica konstytuuj¹ca ludzk¹ kondycjê. To przesuniêcie granicy mo¿e zakwestionowaæ ca³¹ dotychczasow¹ moralnoæ opart¹ na naturze.
Modyfikacja genomu pojedynczego cz³owieka mo¿e prowadziæ w konsekwencji do zmiany natury ca³ego gatunku. Oznacza³oby to tak¿e naruszenie
to¿samoci osoby. Cz³owiek móg³by patrzeæ na siebie jako na autora w³asnej
biografii. W tej sytuacji nale¿y odwo³aæ siê do podstawowej intuicji, która stanowi fundament praw cz³owieka, ¿e ludzka istota posiada wewnêtrzn¹ i nieuwarunkowan¹ wartoæ, która chroni j¹ przed porównywaniem do innych
dóbr. Oznacza to, ¿e ludzka istota posiada wartoæ sama w sobie, niezale¿nie
od takich czy innych jej w³aciwoci.
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