Bound to Cooperate: Europe and the Middle East

Sven Behrendt, Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.) Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East Sven Behrendt Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.) Bound to Cooperate – Europe and the Middle East Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.  2010 eBook edition (PDF) 3rd edition 2002  2000 Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh Editors: Sven Behrendt, Christian-Peter Hanelt Copy editor: Sabine Stadtfeld Production editor: Christiane Raffel Cover design: Nadine Humann Cover illustration: Photodisc/Lawrence Lawry Typesetting and print: Hans Kock Buch- und Offsetdruck GmbH, Bielefeld ISBN 978-3-86793-230-1 Contents Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sven Behrendt 12 Security Relations From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Collective Security in the Middle East and North Africa . . . . . . . . Abdel Monem Said Aly 35 An Inter-Regional Analysis: NATO’s New Strategic Concept and the Theory of Security Complexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan 55 Barcelona’s First Pillar: An Appropriate Concept for Security Relations? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rosemary Hollis 107 6 Contents The Middle East Peace Process Searching for a Sustainable Peace Settlement Between Israel and its Neighbours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eberhard Rhein 133 Europe and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Declaration of the European Council of Berlin and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joel Peters 150 Reconsidering the Economic Benefits of a Stable Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Riad al-Khouri 172 The Political Role of the EU in the Middle East: Israeli Aspirations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joseph Alpher 193 Foreign Policy Making and Strategies Institutional Constraints of the European Union’s Middle Eastern and North African Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jörg Monar 209 The Critical Dialogue Reconsidered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trevor Taylor 244 US Policy of Sanctions: Prospects for Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phebe Marr 263 Europe, the US and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anoushiravan Ehteshami 287 Transformation and Legitimacy Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World . . . . . . . . . Emma Murphy 311 Contents 7 Political Consciousness and the Crisis of Political Liberalisation in the Arab World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Walid Kazziha 342 Power Sharing and Elections in the Middle East and North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anoushiravan Ehteshami 359 The Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Person Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380 Preface At the turn of the century, Europe and the Middle East look like an odd couple. Their common historical experiences, geographical proximity, and economic interdependencies would deem it essential to develop closer political and economic relations. Yet, the two regions have rarely developed institutionalized forms of interaction on which more intensive relations could be based. The reasons for this are manifold: colonial history, nationalism, regionalism, and identity being only some of them. However, will the two regions be able to intensify their relations in the wake of the global transformation taking place? Will they be even ready to develop some modest forms of integration in order to be better equipped to meet the challenges of globalisation? Developing a broad strategic vision for cross-regional interaction is one thing, identifying solutions for contemporary political and economic problems quite another. The Middle East peace process has yet to achieve broad Arab-Israeli reconciliation. Economic inter- 10 Preface action is still limited, or at least one-sided. Comparatively few European companies enter the markets of the Middle East. Only a fraction of European exports are bound to go to this region. Political systems on the state as well as regional levels differ substantially as do political value systems. Migration causes fears and suspicions, but not intercultural curiosity. The list of obstacles to intensify crossregional affairs could be lengthened in extenso; however, on the one hand one has to identify them, but on the other, one has to develop workable options to solving them. For that reason, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Bertelsmann Group on Policy Research at the Center for Applied Policy Research of the University of Munich initiated the project ‘Europe and the Middle East’ in 1994. Since then the project has pursued several strategic objectives. It has developed options and strategies for strengthening Euro-Middle Eastern political, economic, and social relations. It has sought to overcome the structural communication and information deficits among, as well as within, the two regions and tried to serve as a political ice breaker where formal diplomacy failed. It has sought to bridge the gap between the world of academic knowledge development and the world of decision making in politics and business. The Kronberg Talks, gathering senior decision-makers from politics, business and the academic world from Europe, the Middle East and the USA served as the center of the project partners’ efforts. The Kronberg Talks have been convened for five years now and have developed into a stable informal institution and a focal point for exchanging ideas, views and perceptions. They have always reflected the mood of the time and thus have been able to serve as a diplomatic safety net when regional relations have become strained. To bring together high ranking political and economic leaders in Kronberg has been not enough to transport the strategic mission of the project into action. The project partners rather have an interest in contributing substantially to political dialogue among Europe, the Preface 11 Middle East and the USA. The project therefore has developed options and strategies of regional and cross-regional cooperation on the basis of sound academic analysis with the support of an international network of political scientists and economists. They, in numerous workshops preparing the Kronberg Talks and at various stages, have provided the project with essential insight into the ramifications of Middle Eastern, European, and American politics shedding new light on a diverse and complex political, economic, and social environment. And several times, the project succeeded to bridge the gap between the world of academic insight and the world of political decision-making contributing to more differentiated thinking on both sides. This volume reproduces their insight in the form of a collection of selected papers produced for the project. The contributions tackle a wide field ranging from regional security relations to the Middle East peace process, from the institutional constraints of EU foreign policy-making to transatlantic coordination of policy approaches and from the transformation of political and economic structures to legitimacy in the times of change. I hope that the public will appreciate this result of our work and value it as a substantial contribution to deepen cross-regional affairs. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the publishers, the editors, and all those involved in this project for their great work. Beyond this, my particular thanks go to Gabi Schneider, Daniel Braun and David P. Schweikard for their support and research. I hope that this publication contributes to a better understanding among Europe and the Middle East and provides a basis for further debate of the issues at stake. Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Werner Weidenfeld Member of the Board of the Bertelsmann Foundation Director of the Center for Applied Policy Research (C ⋅ A ⋅ P), Munich Introduction* Sven Behrendt Trends in international politics clearly indicate that global affairs are increasingly determined by a system of world regions. Regions integrate and become more cohesive; a process which at the same time enables states to pursue global interests from a strong home base. The relations among Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are deeply affected by these trends and processes. Consequentially, taking up the question what the strategic options for structuring the emerging relations between Europe and the MENA region are, is not only an academic exercise but an operative necessity, if the normative goal is, as this volume seeks to, to make a substantial contribution to cross-regional stability. This question becomes all the more relevant if one takes the structural imbalances between the two regions into account. Strategic * Parts of this contribution were presented to various workshops and the Kronberg Talks at the project “Europe and the Middle East”. Introduction 13 repositioning on the regional as well as the individual state level has dominated the relations between Europe and the MENA region in the 1990s. The EU has further pursued the process of integration, strengthening its institutional framework, and further deepening economic integration, most notably by introducing a common currency, the Euro within most of its member states. It is now on the way to strengthening its common foreign and security policy instruments. In the MENA region in contrast, integration has rarely if ever been a driving force moving political and economic relations. Rather, maintaining a regional balance of power among the constituent parts of a fragmented regional structure and the tendency to strengthen international alliances to improve regional positions have been the prevailing features of regional relations. In light of the geographical proximity, economic interdependencies, and shared historical experiences, however, from a European perspective, which this book is based on, two central questions arise: What interests does Europe pursue in the Middle East and North Africa? And how, if the goal of European policies is assumably to establish stable political, economic and social relations with its neighbours, could inter-regional relations best be organised? From an academic perspective, four assumptions of a viable European long-term strategic approach can be presented, leading the way to more stable cross-regional relations thereby fostering European interests: The first one would start from the empirical finding that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other.1 Turning this finding onto its head, European contributions towards comprehensive democratisation processes of the Middle Eastern and North African countries in its human and social development as well as institutional dimension would have a pacifying effect on the region. Furthermore, democratic structures have proven to be efficient instruments of conflict resolution within states. Thus, contributions towards democrati1 Russett (1993). 14 Sven Behrendt sation of the Middle East and North African states are a fundamental strategic approach to achieve overall domestic and international stability in the long run. To be sure, all existing democratic systems adapted themselves to respective political legacies. Neglecting the specific political realities and traditions within the Southern Mediterranean countries would thus be a wrong operational conclusion. But stressing the principle that political transformation would have to point towards the establishment of democratic structures should remain at the center of European long-term approaches. Second, free market economies and liberalised international trade relations improve overall standards of living. Given the stagnant economic systems in many countries of the MENA region, economic transformation has to be based on two principles: on the one hand on the need for the liberalisation of the internal economic systems of MENA countries in order to increase productivity. On the other, in its international dimension, on liberalisation of trade relations, openness for foreign private investment, and the like, as this will expose economies to international competition causing adaptation processes leading towards increasing productivity and economic growth in the long run. To be sure, in order to increase the impact of economic reform strategies, they must be complemented by an overhaul of social security and fiscal systems. Underdeveloped management skills, inefficient bureaucratic structures, the ineffectiveness of the rule of law are some other issues which need urgent attention. Third, a framework of effective regional institutions provide mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution processes. They lower the impact of international anarchy on the behaviour of states as they provide for a normative system of appropriate behaviour in interstate relations. They reduce transaction and information costs and thereby reduce the risk of misperception and misinterpretation causing irrational action. But as it is the case with regard to the first two points, theory is one side of the coin, political realities within and among the regions another. In a space as diverse as the Euro- Introduction 15 MENA region, international institutions will only succeed to display their intended function if they are established according to the principle of appropriateness, that is to provide an institutional problem solving framework where really needed. Fourth, democratisation, economic development and integration, and international institution building must be supplemented by broader cultural dialogue. During the European integration process, Europeans realised that their relations were strained by different interpretations of political symbols and misunderstandings related to language and culture. What is essential for the creation of a common European identity, a broad cultural dialogue underpinning all levels of political, economic and social interaction, is a necessity for building a Mediterranean identity on which more stable cross-regional relations can be based. These four principles are elements on which a more differentiated European strategic approaches towards the MENA region could be based. In order to achieve its goals, however, the European Union also needs to reconsider its own strengths and weaknesses and match interests with capabilities to fine-tune policies which it has developed in the past decades to structure cross-regional relations. In doing so, the EU can rely on four major assets. It is the dominant regional political and economic power, it has developed a culture of peaceful conflict resolution and negotiation, it maintains considerable military strength based on the collective potential of the EU member states, and it maintains strong cultural ties with the societies of the MENA region. On the other hand, Europe is still not a cohesive geopolitical unit. It has yet to define its political and social identity, and, consequentially, its global political interests. Furthermore, it will be preoccupied with Eastern European enlargement and reform of its own institutional framework in the coming years. Military integration and the development of a European defence identity have only just begun to be considered seriously. Based on these strengths and weaknesses, it is in the interest of the EU to develop good neighbourly political, economic, social, and 16 Sven Behrendt cultural relations with the individual countries of the MENA region and the region as a whole, based on mutual respect for respective identities. These goals can be realised by establishing appropriate fora of cross-regional conflict resolution, contributions to the ability of the respective political systems to adapt to international and domestic political changes and support efforts to gradually integrate into the world economy. By addressing these aspects, this book takes a normative and an analytical perspective at the same time. It is normative, because it tries to contribute to developing appropriate strategies to achieve Europe’s general aim of establishing good neighbourly relations with its Southern neighbourhood. It is at the same time analytic, because it uses past experiences to provide the reader with ideas of workable strategic concepts aimed at strengthening cross-regional relations. The book looks at the multilayered political, social and security relations from different perspectives: it identifies actors, their interests, strategies and normative preferences. It analyses outcomes, decomposes decision-making processes and institutions. It also analyses the overall structures within which actors of the Euro-MENA relations as well as within the MENA region itself interact. It would be a Sisyphean task to order the different cross cutting causal relationships into one cohesive whole. Obviously this is not the aim of this book. It rather reflects the multiplicity of issues on the table of the cross-regional debate. Europe and Regional Security The volume turns first to regional interstate relations. How can the anarchic regional system of states be transformed into a system governed by international norms guiding the behaviour of its constituent parts? The regional system of the MENA region in the past has proven to be highly resistant against efforts to develop functional international institutions. Most efforts to establish an appropriate institu- Introduction 17 tional framework for peaceful conflict resolution ended in the nirvana of endless debates on regional cooperation or produced harmlessly superficial and loosely organised international constructs. Although some readers might argue that this book adds another layer to that debate, some of the thoughts given by Said Aly, Wæver/ Buzan, and Hollis might contribute to identifying the obstacles to international cooperation more appropriately than was done before. The key argument of the book is presented by Abdel Monem Said Aly, who reminds us of two streams of thought fighting with each other over conceptual predominance not only in the mind sets of Middle Eastern decision-makers but also in the discursive crossregional debates2 on the future of Euro-MENA relations. The one is the “geopolitical” agenda, which assumes that states compete with their rivals for power and influence in order to insure their very survival or to sustain regional hegemony. Changing the region’s relative balance of power towards one’s favour then becomes the ultimate goal of states. In contrast to this approach based on neo-realist assumptions,3 the “geo-economic” agenda locates the threat to the survival of the state not in the domain of traditional international, that is: state-to-state relations, but in the inability of these states to provide for an adequate institutional framework that would allow economic growth. The threat to the state’s survival stems from within – the crisis of the state being unable to legitimise itself, because it neither provides adequate material provision, political participation or ideological power; and it stems from the outside environment of the state as globalisation and economic competition have a direct impact on the states’ ranking within the international system. While taking a note of his argument to be used again in other parts of the book, the first section turns to the preconditions of inter2 3 Risse (2000). Waltz (1979). 18 Sven Behrendt national institution building. In their contribution Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan argue that the most appropriate way to conceptualise regional conflicts and security relations is by introducing the notion of “regional security complexes”. The first, still principal, and in many ways defining core security-complex in the MENA region, as Wæver/Buzan argue, is the conflict centred in the Levant between the Palestinians and Israel. This local struggle sets up a much wider hostility between Israel and the Arab world, and to a lesser extent, between Israel and the even wider Islamic world (particularly, after 1979, Iran). The Arab-Israeli conflict, and the strong transnational qualities of Arab nationalism and Islamic politics which it amplified, is what gave the Middle East its overall coherence as a security complex. The second core complex in the MENA region, centred on the Gulf, is based on a triangular rivalry amongst Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, though there is also a peripheral rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This complex also influences security relations in the Eastern Mediterranean region, and in particular Israel has developed a clear sense for security threats emanating from the Gulf region. The third, weaker complex in MENA region’s security concerns is that in the Maghreb. It is basically about a shifting and uneasy set of relationships among Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, also extending into Chad and Western Sahara. Each of these regional complexes has a distinct dynamic at its core, only their geographical proximity helps to knit the whole MENA complex together. Facing perceived security threats emanating from the MENA region but not realising the multifaceted regional security relations, several Western agencies have tried to engage in structuring security relations with and within these security complexes, Rosemary Hollis argues. In the 1990s, there were four prominent organisations with a remit to address certain aspects of security in the Mediterranean: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Introduction 19 Union (WEU), and, within the Middle East peace process, the multilateral group on arms control and regional security (ACRS). NATO, WEU and OSCE were developed in the context of East-West confrontation, but have changed in their focus and outreach since the end of the Cold War. All three organisations have developed a dialogue with non-member Mediterranean countries: NATO’s Mediterranean initiative of 1995 launched a dialogue with six countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. As of the end of 1998, the WEU was engaged in dialogue with the same six, plus Algeria, Cyprus and Malta. The OSCE started a dialogue in 1994 and has granted observer status to Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Israel. But these initiatives are burdened by several obstacles, of which Hollis identifies two to be the most important ones: NATO and the WEU incorporate in their history and identity responsibility for the defence of Europe. When organisations tasked with the collective defence of their members enter dialogue with non-members, who are perceived as a potential source of threat, they risk reinforcing rather than ameliorating suspicions between them. Second comes the overlap between the frameworks of the different agencies. The existence of multiple initiatives represents a problem in so far as this means duplication and dissipation of effort. Of even greater concern is the potential for competition and even contradiction between the various endeavours. What becomes clear from these assessments is that the Mediterranean region is not a cohesive “security complex”. Security concerns in the Western Mediterranean differ fundamentally from security concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean. And none of the above mentioned initiatives include those countries, which play an important role in structuring security relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, notably Iran, Iraq, and the countries of the Gulf region. In addition, the slow pace of the Middle East peace process has limited the effectiveness of the dialogue frameworks. 20 Sven Behrendt How can that huge “melange” of security complexes, initiatives, concepts, and ideas be brought into a cohesive and comprehensive whole? If one takes the notion of security complexes seriously, that is, one assumes that security threats in this part of the world do not travel long distances, then thinking small but efficient might be an appropriate way to deal with the problems. In consequence, that would mean to establish regional security regimes in the Western and in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean and in the long run identify a way to integrate the states of the Gulf region into the latter one. Still, there might be a function for an all encompassing Mediterranean institution, but this would have to restrict itself to rather general confidence building measures. Europe and the Peace Process Turning towards the Eastern Mediterranean, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the dominating cause for the retardation of regional integration processes, if they existed at all. And for decades the Middle East peace process has been a fundamental component of international politics. Most of the time the term “peace process” was not the appropriate one to describe Arab-Israeli interaction, however. More efforts were spent on digging into positions than on moving the process forward to a mutually beneficial end. At some stage, one might even argue, the survival of the indefinite Arab-Israeli antagonism was more in the interest for some of the regional leaders than the successful conclusion of the conflict. During the Cold War indeed the Arab-Israeli orbit was well connected to East-West antagonism, enabling the parties to extract essential material or political resources depending on whose side they were allying with. The end of the Cold War changed the rules and the structure of the peace process game. Outplaying East against West and vice versa was not a feasible option anymore. The only thing to offer to the international community Introduction 21 now was talking peace. Peace rhetoric flourished tremendously; and talking peace became a multibillion dollar business. But making peace was something different. Some moves were made here and there, even some breakthroughs on the way, but no end has been put to the conflict yet. Thus, a decade or so after the end of the Cold War and the new rules of the peace process game in place, it is time for stocktaking and looking into the future. The first lesson drawn from the experiences with the peace process is that economic cooperation cannot compensate for a political settlement. One of the conceptual assumptions of the peace process from 1991 to 1995 was that the economic vision of a New Middle East would be able to produce an atmosphere on which a political settlement could be based. Though the economic vision laid the ground for the first breakthrough among the PLO and Israel in the secret Oslo talks in 1993 and gave reason for the European Union to contribute massive financial resources to the peace process, the economic agenda has been pushed to the sidelines since 1995. Since then the vision of a New Middle East has not been able to create new impetus in the process. The second lesson to be learnt is that implementing agreements is no less difficult than negotiating them. Indeed, what has been one of the basic principles of the process, namely the concept of gradualism in the negotiation as well as the implementation process on the Israeli-Palestinian track, developed into a stumbling block for the overall process. The concept of gradualism stipulated that those issues of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process which would be difficult to agree on at the beginning of the process would be kept for the final status negotiations: the future of Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, borders, refugees. This arrangement enabled the two sides to gradually transfer some authority to the Palestinians and to implement agreements reached on less contested issues in the meantime. This step-wise implementation process, however, caused pitfalls and stumbling blocks, as it gave both sides the opportunity to 22 Sven Behrendt cheat on some aspects of the implementation process or accuse the other side of cheating and consequently slowing down the pace of the implementation process. Third, all involved actors in the peace process, within the region as well as external ones, have developed a sense of what cooperative and what non-cooperative behaviour constitutes in the peace process. The international community defined the principles by which constructive behaviour could be assessed. By using positive and negative sanctions, including declaratory diplomacy, in many cases it was able to downgrading demands of the negotiating sides in the peace process. Fourth, in the post-Cold War era uncooperative behaviour in the peace process weakened existing alliances and will eventually lead to regional and international isolation. This in turn will disable regional actors from gathering support or building new alliances against broader security threats. Cooperative behaviour, on the other hand, strengthened existing alliances and will open the possibility to develop new ones. What is valid with regard to unilateral action is also valid in relations between the region and its broader international environment. The more the Arab-Israeli orbit will prove to be unable to produce any meaningful results in the peace process, the less political attention and material contribution it will be able to attract. The international community would then gradually dissociate itself from what would be considered a helpless case, and engage in contingency planning. Fifth, the structure of the peace process matters as much as its substance. The lines of communication among Israel and the leaders of the Arab sides could not be taken for granted. The political implications of merely talking to each other disrupted the free flow of information among the sides and led to collectively irrational behaviour. The understanding that talking to each other was an act of normalisation, a position taken in particular by some Arab governments in recent years, caused a structural and profound information deficit on which misunderstanding and misperception was based. Introduction 23 Sixth, the EU massively strengthened its position as a player in the Middle East peace process. It was the main actor emphasising the relevance of regional economic integration when the peace process gained new momentum after the second Gulf War. Although few steps have been taken until now to implement regional integration schemes, it was vital for the development of a positive-sum mentality that was necessary to overcome zero-sum-perceptions. In particular its work in the Regional Economic Development Working Group was a crucial contribution to the success of the Oslo secret talks. After signing the Oslo agreements, the EU massively supported the Palestinian Authority. When – in consequence of strained ArabIsraeli relations – all other initiatives such as the Middle East North Africa economic summits, the multilateral working groups and other fora of Arab-Israeli reconciliation degenerated in the period from 1995–1999, the Barcelona process initiated in 1995 to develop an Euro-Mediterranean Partnership provided a diplomatic safety net. This is not to overvalue the impact of the Barcelona process during this period, but it was the only regional forum preventing the peace process from “spilling back”. The Special Envoy to the Middle East Peace Process of the EU, Ambassador Miguel Moratinos, contributed to a number of initiatives. He worked with the parties to signing the Hebron Protocol, proposed a “Code of Conduct”, initiated EU/ Palestinian cooperation on security issues, was active in implementing an EU-Israeli Joint Dialogue including five working groups, contributed to people-to-people programmes, and to the Palestinian agreement to the Wye Memorandum. The lessons of the peace process and the strategic environment of the regional parties indicate that, assuming a positive scenario, the peace process will go through three phases in the coming years. In the first phase, negotiations among Israel and its Arab neighbours will result in a peace settlement. Implementation of the agreements will have to be secured in the second phase. The following third phase will witness normalisation among the regional actors and the 24 Sven Behrendt normalisation of relations within the region and with the international community. Based on the lessons of the peace process, now the European Union needs to define its role in the final phases and various tracks. The EU’s role in the peace process will have to correspond with these phases if it is to be effective. It will change from that of a mediator or facilitator in the short run, to that of a party to the implementation process in the medium run. As political relations within the region normalise, so will regional relations between the Middle East and Europe. Eberhard Rhein and Joel Peters describe thoroughly how the EU can make an impact on the Middle East peace process. Riad al Khouri takes another look at the economic potentials after peace is achieved. Institutions, Strategies and Preferences Conventional studies on international relations assume nation states to be the fundamental actor in world affairs. But this assumption is insufficient if one acknowledges the empirical observation that the EU played a relevant role in the MENA region. It is not yet a state, but its actions have decisive impact on regional and cross-regional affairs. How then can the behaviour of the power in the making be explained? A closer look into the EU emphasising on the institutional design of the EU might contribute to the understanding about why the EU is behaving in a certain way. The EU is far from being a coherent geopolitical actor, reacting to changes in international relations, such as Arab-Israeli relations, in a rational strategic way. It is rather an institutionalised decision-making process in which different groups, institutions, and individuals try to pursue their own interests. The result of that process does not necessarily have to correspond with what would be a rational choice to deal with the one or the other problem in international affairs, but it is the result of an internal process producing a certain outcome. Jörg Monar’s contri- Introduction 25 bution thoroughly describes how the EU structures its foreign relations taking into account its institutional design. If Monar’s contribution takes an inside-out perspective, Joseph Alpher describes how the EU’s policies are perceived by addressees of these policies. One of the fundamental problems of the EU in the Middle East peace process and among the regional actors is that from an outsider’s perspective it is hard to understand why the EU is behaving in a certain way. This problem becomes all the more relevant if the EU’s policies are addressed to make a difference in a policy field in which other actors act to defend their perceived vital interests. The imbalance between limited attention and capability and defence of vital security interests causes fundamental misunderstanding. This might be one main approach to explain why the Israeli political elite and public have been so hesitant in endorsing a more pronounced role of the EU in the Middle East peace process. The section turns yet to another aspect of Europe’s regional approach, which at the same time sheds light on the differences in terms of the conceptual foundations of foreign policy making in Europe and its transatlantic partner, the USA. At the time of publishing, transatlantic tensions over appropriate Western strategies to cope with states perceived as destabilising their regional environment, most notably Iran, decreased. But in the mid-nineties, transatlantic relations were tested by disagreement over what were appropriate approaches towards dealing with Iran. Trevor Taylor, Phebe Marr and Anoushiravan Ehteshami use this phenomenon as an instructive case study to show how a different institutional set-up and political culture affects foreign policy-making. They discuss the different strategic approaches of the US and the European Union towards Iran in the 1990s with reference to actual developments and policies, thereby also illustrating how the different strategic approaches of the Trans-Atlantic partners stood in sharp contrast to each other. 26 Sven Behrendt Transformation and Legitimacy After having covered the international dimension of Euro-MENA relations, the volume turns yet to another aspect of cross-regional relations: that of domestic political and economic transformation. Since fundamentalism, terrorism, socio-economic underdevelopment, and the like have been identified as threatening Europe’s security interests in various ways, Europe believes it is legitimate to take a position on domestic politics of MENA states with a focus on economic and political transformation. This book argues that one of the keys to successful transformation rests with the question of the future role of the state in the MENA region. Two aspects make the question of the future role of the state in the Middle East and North Africa a valid one: First are the overall global evolutionary processes of the new international political system, which will in the future be structured mainly along economic lines. These processes encompass all regions of the world and it is for each one of them to decide whether to remain in the backseat or join in. The flow of capital and goods pressure all countries to compete against each other on the global market for market shares and investment, and to adjust their political, economic and administrative institutions accordingly. Although the slow pace of reform processes in many Arab states suggests otherwise, there will be no escape to adapt to the demands of globalisation. A second, and more immediate cause for embarking on comprehensive modernisation, is the Barcelona process as initiated by the member states of the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean countries. In their statement of November 1995 the signatories of the declaration agreed to the “acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of their populations, increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region, encouragement of regional cooperation and integra- Introduction 27 tion.”4 The economic relationship between the EU and the states of the Southern Mediterranean region was to be based on new contractual grounds, and the implementation of the principles set in Barcelona to be realised through the conclusion of bilateral association agreements. Until now such agreements have been concluded with Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Israel, an Interim Association Agreement with the PLO in favour of the Palestinian National Authority, and negotiations finalised with Egypt. Only Algeria, for its long domestic political problems, Lebanon and Syria which only slowly decided to embark on negotiations with the EU, are left behind. Libya for political reasons has been completely left out of the process as of now although moves in the spring of 2000 indicated that the Libyan government understands the necessity to connect to the process. Only few observers doubt that the future role of the state necessarily has to be redefined if the goals of the Barcelona process are finally to be realised. The World Bank in its World Development Report of 1997 stated that the “last fifty years have shown clearly both the benefits and the limitations of state action”5. In particular it is the limitations of state action in a modern global economy that will be of relevance for the future political, economic, and social development among and within countries. Analysts identify in particular the incumbent political regimes as constituting the greatest obstacle to both political and economic reform.6 However, transformation of state institutions to achieve more efficiency and to improve performance shake the very foundations of the political systems in the Middle East and North Africa themselves. The state in the MENA region has been used by various interest 4 5 6 Euro Mediterranean Partenariat, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona 27– 28 November 1995: 4. The World Bank 1997: World Development Report. The State in a Changing World, Summary, Washington: 1. Barkey (1995). 28 Sven Behrendt groups to realise their political interests, while at the same time providing them with the opportunity to acquire political rents from their positions. Policy-makers in state institutions thus are moved by mixed motives and “a desire to pursue the public good and the desire to advance their personal interests.” This phenomenon is by no means unique to the MENA region. However, given weak institutional provisions for “checks and balances”, the “deep distributional conflicts and constraints embedded in state institutions are at the heart of the explanation for so many countries’ failure to reform.”7 As the MENA countries have been slow in implementing steps towards transformation, it has led some to argue that the overall economic decline of the MENA region during times of rapid globalisation is the major fourth crisis of the Arab world, following the Six Day War of 1967, the Iranian revolution, and Saddam Hussein’s hegemonic posture in 1990.8 Given that the international economic environment of the MENA region will change in the future as rapidly as it has done in the last decade, what lies ahead, beyond the definition of the substantial goal of the transformation process, is the organisation of the political process by which these goals should be realised. Certainly, existing cultural, economic, political, and social institutions and relationships prevent any state emerging like a phoenix from the ashes. Given these institutions, transformation processes will only unfold according to specific path dependencies.9 It is then the organisation of the process of modernisation which matters. Essential for that process to succeed is to acknowledge that transformation processes are inherently unstable. Measures such as deregulation and privatisation, as well as the streamlining of government, which are put forward by the “Chicago School”10 and embraced by international development 7 8 9 10 World Development Report (1997: 13). Ajami (1997). North (1990). Lane (1997). Introduction 29 agencies, will cause severe political problems. In fact the process of modernisation and change “breeds instability”, as urbanisation, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure create expectations which, if unrealised, potentially sharpen societal, political, and economic conflict.11 In order to escape from this ever growing lack of legitimacy of the state, and provide for the necessary steps to create the framework in which the private sector driven market economy can develop, Emma Murphy in her contribution to this volume presents three strategies for transformation: the first emphasises restructuring the statesociety bargain. A process of gradual political reform, including the introduction of political party pluralism and competitive elections would be used to substitute for the state’s economic obligations. This would broaden the base of responsibility for difficult decisions, although it might be more of a tactical manoeuvre than a genuine effort to open up the political arena. Another strategy would call for a new balance in public and private provision. This strategy would target the poorest within the populace which at the same time are easily recruited by political activists, and therefore are difficult to control. A differentiated system of redistribution would ensure that some of the benefits of economic policy reform would go to the lower social strata, thus making the new policies more appealing. Third, a ruler-regime differentiation strategy would ensure that the system as such remains stable, as the ruler should have the opportunity to put on the brakes if the reform policies are implemented too quickly. At the same time, he would stay out of the public debate over structural adjustment and thus could balance political forces. Some years ago, a book with the programmatic subtitle speaking of the renewal of politics in the Muslim world caught the attention of the public. Its aim was to take another look at the problems of democratisation, and linking them to the social changes of the last 11 Huntington (1976). 30 Sven Behrendt two or three decades.12 One of its main arguments was that the balance sheet of democratisation was not hopelessly pessimistic. Walid Kazziha argues against that hypothesis, when he states that the ultimate results of the so-called process of political liberalisation of regional political systems have been rather disappointing. But the contribution of Anoushiravan Ehteshami seems to confirm a more positive assessment. In every year since 1989 national elections have taken place in one or more MENA states. Since 1992 in particular, a flood of election activity has been gripping the region and even sometimes countries where meaningful elections had been almost completely absent in previous decades, ranging from presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections to national referenda and plebiscites. The West has had difficulties to assess the impact of elections in the MENA countries on political life. Elections eventually also took place during times of Communist rule in Eastern Europe without really presenting choices and/or being based on an environment within which a free choice could be made. But one could be well advised to acknowledge that in the MENA region elections do indeed take place, which is a good step forward. Elections might not yet be free and fair and might not stand up to international standards, but they take place and serve as a focal point in the transnational debate about their effectiveness, thus putting pressure on the regimes for improvements. This volume suggests that the relations between Europe and the Middle East are multilayered and that all strategies towards deepening cross-regional relations have to take into account the complexities of that relationship as well as the complex political, economic, and social structures within the two regions. The following contributions should help to analyse and thereby reduce some of these complexities. 12 Salamé (1994). Introduction 31 List of References Ajami, Fouad 1997: The Arab Inheritance, in: Foreign Affairs, 76/5. Barkey, Henri 1995: Can the Middle East Compete?, in: Journal of Democracy, 6/2. Huntington, Samuel 1976: Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven/London. Keohane, Robert/Joseph Nye 1977: Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition, Boston. Lane, Jan-Erik 1997: Public Sector Reform. Only Deregulation, Privatisation and Marketization?, in: Lane, Jan Erik (ed.): Public Sector Reform. Rationale, Trends and Problems, London. North, Douglass 1990: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, Cambridge. Risse, Thomas 2000: Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in International Relations, in: International Organization, 54/1. Russett, Bruce 1993: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton/New Jersey. Salamé, Ghassan (ed.) 1994: Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, London/New York. Waltz, Kenneth 1979: Theory of International Politics, Reading/Mass.