ANALYSIS AND EVOLUTION OF SHA-1 ALGORITHM -ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE

International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 ANALYSIS AND EVOLUTION OF SHA-1 ALGORITHM ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE Malek M. Al-Nawashi1, Obaida M. Al-hazaimeh1, Isra S. Al-Qasrawi1,Ashraf A. Abu-Ein2andMonther H. Al-Bsool1 1 Department of Information Technology, Al-Balqa Applied University, Jordan 2 Department of Electrical Engineering, Al-Balqa Applied University, Jordan ABSTRACT A 160-bit (20-byte) hash value, sometimes called a message digest, is generated using the SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) hash function in cryptography. This value is commonly represented as 40 hexadecimal digits. It is a Federal Information Processing Standard in the United States and was developed by the National Security Agency. Although it has been cryptographically cracked, the technique is still in widespread usage. In this work, we conduct a detailed and practical analysis of the SHA-1 algorithm's theoretical elements and show how they have been implemented through the use of several different hash configurations. KEYWORDS Cryptography, SHA-1, Message digest, Data integrity, Digital signature, National security agency 1. INTRODUCTION In computing, a hash function is a procedure that accepts an input of variable length and returns an output of fixed length, often called a "fingerprint." The index into a "HASHTABLE" is a common application of such a function. Cryptographic hash functions are ideal for use in digital signature schemes and message integrity verification because of their extra features. A public key kp and a secret key ks are used in conjunction with two functions, Sign(M, ks), which generates a signature S, and Verify (M, S, kp), which returns a BOOLEAN indicating whether or not the given S is a valid signature for message M. Sign(M, Sign(M, ks), kp) = true for any given key pair (ks, kp) is a necessary condition for any function to satisfy [1-7]. Conversely, it should be unattainable to fabricate a counterfeit signature. Two sorts of forgeries can be differentiated: Universal forgeries and Existential forgeries [8-19].In the first scenario, the attacker uses the public key kp to generate a valid M, S pair. The attacker has no control over the message being computed; as a result, M is often generated at random. The attacker generates a valid signature S from the provided M and kp to establish a universal fake. Such a signature can be placed using a public-private key cryptosystem, such as RSA [20-26]. Here, the private key pair (n, d) is used to sign the message, while the public key pair (n, e) is used to authenticate the signature. Calculating the private part of the RSA key scheme efficiently enough to pull off a universal forgery is thought to be impossible. Finding an existential forgery, on the other hand, is a breeze: for any arbitrary S, we can easily determine the matching message M by solving M = Se% n. A further problem is that RSA can only sign messages up to a certain length; a simple but poor workaround would be to split the message up into blocks and sign them individually. A new message with a valid signature can be created, but an attacker can now rearrange the blocks to do so. In conclusion, the RSA method is somewhat sluggish. These issues may be fixed by using cryptographic hash functions. Such a hash function H, as was previously indicated, accepts a DOI: 10.5121/ijcnc.2024.16306 89 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 message of variable length as input and outputs a message digest D of defined length. A communication's digest is now signed instead of the original message itself. It is necessary to identify message M, given D, such that H(M) = D in order to establish an existential forgery. As shown in Figure 1 [8, 27-31], the SHA-1 algorithm's block diagram. Figure 1. Block diagram of SHA-1 algorithm 2. SHA-1 PROCESSES – ANALYTICAL EXAMPLE The purpose of this section is to explain the SHA-1 algorithm and its relationship to SHA-0 and SHA-2. Two distinct phases are discernible in each method, with the first being message expansion, and the second being a state update transformation that is repeated for a certain number of times (80 in SHA-1). We'll be utilizing the "and" operator, which performs a bitwise left-to-right shift, and the "and" operator, which performs a bitwise left-to-right rotation, in the next sections [32-34]. Messages up to 264 -1 bit in length can be fed into SHA-1, and the output is a 160-bit message digest. The input is split into 512-bit chunks and padded using the following method. After appending a 1, followed by zero padding until bit 448, the length of the message is placed in the final 64 bits of the message with the most significant bits zero-padded. A sample message and the same message with some zeros tacked to the end might collide if a 1 weren't appended first [24, 35-37]. The sections that follow will elaborate on these aspects. 2.1. Encoding Suppose we are using the SHA-1 algorithm to encode the word "Security". The binary representation of the word, acquired from the code as depicted in Figure 2, is indicated in Table 1. The encoded message in binary is shown in Figure 3. Table 1. Binary encoding for messages Letter S e c u r i t y ASCII 83 101 99 117 114 105 116 121 Binary 01010011 01100101 01100011 01110101 01110010 01101001 01110100 01111001 90 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 Figure2. Message to binary sequence – Code Figure3. Binary encoded message 2.2. Padding The following approach is used to pad the input before processing it in chunks of 512 bits. After appending a 1, followed by zero padding until bit 448, the length of the message is placed in the final 64 bits of the message with the most significant bits zero-padded. The length of our message is 64, therefore we add 383 zeroes to the end to make 484 and store the message length in the final 64 bits, as illustrated in Figure 4. Figure4. "Chunk" 0: 512-bits in size 2.3. Splitting To illustrate, in Table 2 we see chunk 0 being divided into 16 words, each of which is 32 bits in size. Table 2. Split words w [0] w [1] w [2] w [3] w [4] w [5] w [6] w [7] 01010011011001010110001101110101 01110010011010010111010001111001 10000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [8] w [9] w [10] w [11] w [12] w [13] w [14] w [15] 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000001000000 91 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 2.4. Extending Utilize mathematical techniques based on Figure 5 and Figure 6 to elongate words into a total of eighty words. Figure 5. Procedure expansion Code Figure6. Block diagram of the expansion procedures For the sake of clarity, we've isolated the word number 16 in its entirety here: w [16] = w [16-3] XOR w [16-8] XOR w [16-14] XOR w [16-16] w [13] XOR w [8] = 00000000000000000000000000000000 XOR 00000000000000000000000000000000 = 00000000000000000000000000000000 (w [13] XOR w [8]) XOR w [2] = 00000000000000000000000000000000XOR10000000000000000000000000000000 = 100000000000000000000000000000000 ((w [13] XOR w [8]) XORw [2]) XOR w [0] = 100000000000000000000000000000000 XOR 01010011011001010110001101110101 = 11010011011001010110001101110101 Left rotate by one= 1010011011001010110001101110101011 w [16] = 1010011011001010110001101110101011 Table 3 displays the 64 words formed after we iterated the techniques described above. 92 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 Table 3. Generated words w [16] w [17] w [18] w [19] w [20] w [21] w [22] w [23] w [24] w [25] w [26] w [27] w [28] w [29] w [30] w [31] w [32] w [33] w [34] w [35] w [36] w [37] w [38] w [39] w [40] w [41] w [42] w [43] w [44] w [45] w [46] w [47] w [48] 10100110110010101100011011101011 11100100110100101110100011110010 00000000000000000000000010000001 01001101100101011000110111010111 11001001101001011101000111100101 00000000000000000000000100000010 10011011001010110001101110101110 10010011010010111010001101001011 01001101100101011000111111010011 11111111111100111110011010111000 00100110100101110100011110010101 00000000000000000000010000001000 01101100101011000110111010111010 01001101001011101000110110101110 01111011110000111011001010011010 00110110011010100100101010000110 01001100111000111000100000101111 01011010111011100110001000001110 10110010101100011011100011101111 00000010111011000000000111100100 11001001100110011000110111111110 11011001101010010010111000010000 01011111001000100100111000000111 00100110100101110000010100010111 11111100100100001101110011110011 11110100011111111001110101110011 10111100001110110010100110101111 01100110101001001010100101100011 01010101000100111001100101011010 00111101101011011000000100101110 00011101010011011011101110100010 00111110000000010110100110001010 01111110110111101101101000111010 w [49] w [50] w [51] w [52] w [53] w [54] w [55] w [56] w [57] w [58] w [59] w [60] w [61] w [62] w [63] w [64] w [65] w [66] w [67] w [68] w [69] w [70] w [71] w [72] w [73] w [74] w [75] w [76] w [77] w [78] w [79] NULL NULL 01100010011000001000101001110111 11110010001001001110101001101001 10000110011111101011100101011011 01000011100100011010000110101001 01100001011011101000000010000000 01110001000000110010000000011010 01011110111100001010000010001111 10111110001101110101111111001100 00000011011100010011110011111011 10001011111110011111010000100110 11000110100000011001110110110100 00010001011111010111111101010100 11010010011101110011100000000101 10101000001000111011100001101101 00100111110110000111100001001100 11000001011101001010111100110101 10011110100110010110111101110100 00111011001010011000111101010100 11000001110010100001011010110101 01111010111011010010001100100111 10101101100000010010111010111101 01001101101110111010001000011101 00000001011010011000111000111110 10110010011101100101010011000100 00101101101001001101100001001100 01000001100010010001010000110001 11001110100101011100111110000000 11011100001011100111100010100101 11101011110110001000010110011010 10111010010111111111011111111111 10010001110111001000001001000001 NULL NULL 2.5. Compression Function and Constants The terms from Tables 2 and 3 were analyzed, and the results were then organized into four categories (Function1, Function2, Function3, and Function4) as shown in Table 4. SHA-1 employs five 32-bit variables (A, B, C, D, and E) as the initial hash values as shown in Table 5. These primary hash values come from the decimal parts of the square roots of prime numbers and are used as constants. 93 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 Table 4. Words categories – Based Functions Function 1 w [0] 01010011011001010110001101110101 w [1] 01110010011010010111010001111001 w [2] 10000000000000000000000000000000 w [3] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [4] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [5] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [6] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [7] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [8] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [9] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [10] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [11] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [12] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [13] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [14] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [15] 00000000000000000000000001000000 w [16] 10100110110010101100011011101011 w [17] 11100100110100101110100011110010 w [18] 00000000000000000000000010000001 w [19] 01001101100101011000110111010111 Function 3 w [40] 11111100100100001101110011110011 w [41] 11110100011111111001110101110011 w [42] 10111100001110110010100110101111 w [43] 01100110101001001010100101100011 w [44] 01010101000100111001100101011010 w [45] 00111101101011011000000100101110 w [46] 00011101010011011011101110100010 w [47] 00111110000000010110100110001010 w [48] 01111110110111101101101000111010 w [49] 01100010011000001000101001110111 w [50] 11110010001001001110101001101001 w [51] 10000110011111101011100101011011 w [52] 01000011100100011010000110101001 w [53] 01100001011011101000000010000000 w [54] 01110001000000110010000000011010 w [55] 01011110111100001010000010001111 w [56] 10111110001101110101111111001100 w [57] 00000011011100010011110011111011 w [58] 10001011111110011111010000100110 w [59] 11000110100000011001110110110100 Function 2 w [20] 11001001101001011101000111100101 w [21] 00000000000000000000000100000010 w [22] 10011011001010110001101110101110 w [23] 10010011010010111010001101001011 w [24] 01001101100101011000111111010011 w [25] 11111111111100111110011010111000 w [26] 00100110100101110100011110010101 w [27] 00000000000000000000010000001000 w [28] 01101100101011000110111010111010 w [29] 01001101001011101000110110101110 w [30] 01111011110000111011001010011010 w [31] 00110110011010100100101010000110 w [32] 01001100111000111000100000101111 w [33] 01011010111011100110001000001110 w [34] 10110010101100011011100011101111 w [35] 00000010111011000000000111100100 w [36] 11001001100110011000110111111110 w [37] 11011001101010010010111000010000 w [38] 01011111001000100100111000000111 w [39] 00100110100101110000010100010111 Function 4 w [60] 00010001011111010111111101010100 w [61] 11010010011101110011100000000101 w [62] 10101000001000111011100001101101 w [63] 00100111110110000111100001001100 w [64] 11000001011101001010111100110101 w [65] 10011110100110010110111101110100 w [66] 00111011001010011000111101010100 w [67] 11000001110010100001011010110101 w [68] 01111010111011010010001100100111 w [69] 10101101100000010010111010111101 w [70] 01001101101110111010001000011101 w [71] 00000001011010011000111000111110 w [72] 10110010011101100101010011000100 w [73] 00101101101001001101100001001100 w [74] 01000001100010010001010000110001 w [75] 11001110100101011100111110000000 w [76] 11011100001011100111100010100101 w [77] 11101011110110001000010110011010 w [78] 10111010010111111111011111111111 w [79] 10010001110111001000001001000001 Table 5. Words categories h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 01100111010001010010001100000001 11101111110011011010101110001001 10011000101110101101110011111110 00010000001100100101010001110110 11000011110100101110000111110000 94 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 Each 512-bit block is compressed using SHA-1's compression algorithm. There are a total of 80 iterations in the compression process, each of which operates on a single 32-bit word of the message's schedule. Figure 7 depicts the actions that must be carried out for each round. Figure 7. Compression algorithm A logical operation is chosen from Function-1, Function-2, Function-3, or Function-4 depending on the rounded value as illustrated in Table 6. Then the selected function is applied to the current 32-bit word, together with additional variables and constants, utilizing bitwise AND, OR, XOR, and NOT operations. Finally, the result of the logical operation and the current word are used to modify the five hash variables (A, B, C, D, and E).The SHA-1 round operation is illustrated in Figure 8 [38-40]. To clarify, in this paper we will provide a thorough explanation of the first element of the word, denoted as word [0], in the subsequent steps (Algorithm-1): Table 6. Function determination Function-1 F1=([B] AND [C]) OR ([!B] AND [D]) K1= Constant Factor K1= 011010100000100111100110011001 Function-3 F3= ([B] AND [C]) OR ([B] AND [D]) OR ([C] AND [D]) K3= Constant Factor K3=01101110110110011110101110100001 Function-2 F2= [B] XOR [C] XOR [D] K2= Constant Factor K2= 01101110110110011110101110100001 Function-4 F4= [B] XOR [C] XOR [D] K4= Constant Factor K4=11001010011000101100000111010110 Figure 8. SHA-1 round operation 95 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 Algorithm-1 - Steps Step 1: Step 2: Step 3: Step 4: Step 5: Step 6: Step 7: Step 8: Action Set A=h0 = 01100111010001010010001100000001 Set B=h1 = 11101111110011011010101110001001 Setup of hashing variables. Set C=h2 = 10011000101110101101110011111110 Set D=h3 = 00010000001100100101010001110110 Set E=h4 = 11000011110100101110000111110000 Function selection word[0] belong to Function-1 as shown in Table 4 F1= (B AND C) OR (! B AND D) B =11101111110011011010101110001001 C =10011000101110101101110011111110 Get the truth table value for !B =00010000001100100101010001110110 Function-1. D =00010000001100100101010001110110 F1 =10011000101110101101110011111110 Calculate Temp: A=01100111010001010010001100000001 Temp = ( ALrot 5 ) + F + E (A Lrot 5) = 11101000101001000110000000101100 + K + Current word F= 10011000101110101101110011111110 E= 11000011110100101110000111110000 K1= 01011010100000100111100110011001 [Lrot = Insert the first five w [0]=01010011011001010110001101110101 bits last] Temp= 1011110011000110011111110000101000 Update the hash variables. A = 11110011000110011111110000101000 E=D B = 01100111010001010010001100000001 D=C C = 01111011111100110110101011100010 C = B Lrot 30 D = 10011000101110101101110011111110 B=A E = 00010000001100100101010001110110 A = Temp A total of 79 times, iterate For (inti=0; i<=79; i++) Steps 1 through 5. h0=4066173368 =11110010010111001110000110111000 = (F25CE1B8)HEX h1=2744761734 =10100011100110011011110110000110 = Update the constant (A399BD86) HEX variables. h2=0564491303 h0 = h0old + A =00100001101001010111010000100111 = h1 = h1old + B (21A57427) HEX h2 = h2old + C h3=2717923764 h3 = h3old + D =10100010000000000011100110110100 = h4 = h4old + E (A20039B4) HEX h4=2973316571 =10110001001110010011010111011011 = (B13935DB)HEX Message Digest = Hash Message Digest (Output) = (Security) = h0h1h2h3h4 f25ce1b8a399bd8621a57427a20039b4b13935db As previously stated in this document, the hash function receives an input and generates a 160-bit (20-byte) hash value, also referred to as a message digest. The resulting value, represented in hexadecimal as "f25ce1b8a399bd8621a57427a20039b4b13935db" is equivalent to 160 bits. 96 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 3. EVALUATION The SHA-1 hash method was long thought to be impenetrable, however it has since been found to be vulnerable to a number of attacks. It is possible to identify two different messages that generate the same hash result, which is SHA-1's fundamental vulnerability. As shown in Table 7, this can be used in a variety of attacks [31]. Table 7. SHA-1 attacks Attack Birthday Attack Man-intheMiddle Certificat e Forgery Description The birthday attack is a form of collision attack where an attacker tries to identify two different messages that produce the same hash value. A birthday attack on SHA-1 only requires 280 calculations, which is well within the capabilities of today's computers [6, 31]. A man-in-the-middle attack is one in which a third party eavesdrops on a conversation between two others and modifies the information being exchanged. It is difficult to detect tampered data when using SHA-1 since an attacker can generate a fake message with the same hash value as the original [36, 37]. Digital certificates use SHA-1 to ensure that a website or service is legitimate. Collision attacks, however, allow an adversary to forge a certificate that has an identical hash value to a legal certificate [33, 40]. Substitutes for SHA-1, Stronger hash algorithms, such as SHA-2 and SHA-3, are recommended in place of SHA-1 because of its flaws. Table 8 shows comparisons between different SHA families. The SHA-2 family of hash algorithms generates hash values of varying lengths, from 256 bits to 384 bits to 512 bits. The successor to SHA-1, SHA-2 is often regarded as more secure. NIST developed SHA-3 in 2015, which is a more recent hash function that generates hash values in a different way than SHA-2 [41-43]. 97 International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024 Table 8. The SHA family comparison Algorithm Bit output size In-state bit size 160 160 (5 × 32) Bit-size Rounds block SHA-0 SHA-1 SHA-224 S H A3 SHA-256 256 SHA-384 384 SHA-512 512 SHA512/224 224 SHA512/256 256 SHA3224 224 SHA3256 256 SHA3384 384 SHA3512 512 512 Initially Reference released 1993 [40] 80 XOR, OR, AND (MOD 232) ADD, LROT 1995 [6] 2004 64 XOR, OR, AND (MOD 232) ADD, LROT 224 256 (8 × 32) S H A2 512 Operations 2001 2001 512 (8 × 64) 1024 80 SHR, XOR, OR, AND (MOD 264) ADD, LROT [27] 2001 2012 1152 1600 (5 × 5 × 64) 1088 24 832 XOR, ROT, NOT, AND 2015 [3, 41-45] 576 4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS This paper aims to elucidate the theory of the SHA-1 algorithm, progressing from basic to advanced concepts. 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Zhuang, "A new security boundary of component differentially challenged XOR PUFs against machine learning modeling attacks," International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC), vol. 14, no. 3, 2022. AUTHORS Malek M. Al-Nawashi is a Lecturer in the Department of Computer Science and Information Technology at AL-BALQA Applied University, Jordan. He has completed his Ph.D. Degree at University of Salford Manchester in Computer Science in 2019. His main research interests are image processing and machine learning. He can be contacted at email: nawashi@bau.edu.jo. Obaida M. Al-Hazaimeh earned a BSc in Computer Science from Jordan's Applied Science University in 2004 and an MSc in Computer Science from Malaysia's University Science Malaysia in 2006. In 2010, he earned a Ph.D. Degree in Network Security (Cryptography) from Malaysia. He is a Full Professor at AL-BALQA Applied University's department of computer science and information technology. Cryptology, image processing, machine learning, and chaos theory are among his primary research interests. He has published around 52 papers in international refereed publications as an author or coauthor. He can be contacted at email: dr_obaida@bau.edu.jo. Isra S. Al-Qasrawi received the BSc Degree in Computer Science from AL-BALQA Applied University, Jordan in 2004, the MSc in Computer Science from YARMOUK University, Jordan in 2009, she earned a Ph.D. Degree in Business Intelligence from The World Islamic Sciences and Education University. She is working as lecturer in AL-BALQA Applied University department of Information Technology. She can be contacted at email: israonnet@bau.edu.jo Ashraf A. Abu-Ein is a Full Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering. He has completed his Ph.D. Degree at National Technical University of Ukraine in 2007. Now, he is a lecturer at AL-BALQA Applied University, Jordan. He can be contacted at email:ashraf.abuain@bau.edu.jo Monther H. Al-Bsool received the BSc Degree in Computer Engineering from Jordan University of Science and Technology in 1998, the MSc in Computer Information Systems from Arab Academy for Financial and banking science, Jordan in 2004. . He is working as lecturer in AL-BALQA Applied University department of Information Technology. He can be contacted at email: monther.bsool@bau.edu.jo 101