Lifeworld, Place, and Phenomenology: Holistic and Dialectical Perspectives
David Seamon*
Professor of Architecture, Kansas State University, USA. Email: triad@ksu.edu
ABSTRACT
Article Info
Article type:
Research Article
Article history:
Received 13 June 2024
Received in revised from
23 June 2024
Accepted 26 June 2024
Published
online
07
September 2024
Keywords:
homeworld;
lifeworld;
lived
emplacement;
Lively, Penelope; natural
attitude; phenomenology;
phenomenology of place;
place.
In this article, I clarify the phenomenological concept of lifeworld by
drawing on the geographical themes of place, place experience, and place
meaning. Most simply, lifeworld refers to a person or group’s day-to-day,
taken-for-granted experience that typically goes unnoticed. One aim of
phenomenological research is to examine the lifeworld as a means to
identify and clarify the tacit, unnoticed aspects of human life so that they
can be accounted for theoretically and practically. Here, I discuss some key
phenomenological principles and then draw on phenomenological
renditions of place as one means to clarify some of the lifeworld’s social,
environmental, spatial, and geographical aspects. To concretize my
discussion, I draw descriptive evidence from British writer Penelope
Lively’s Spiderweb, a 1990s novel describing one outsider’s efforts to
come to inhabit a place—a fictitious present-day village in the
southwestern British county of Somerset.
Cite this article: Seamon, D. (2024). Lifeworld, Place, and Phenomenology: Holistic and Dialectical Perspectives. Journal of
Philosophical Investigations, 18(48), 31-52. https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2024.18406
© The Author(s).
https://doi.org/10.22034/jpiut.2024.18406
Publisher: University of Tabriz.
* David Seamon is Professor Emeritus of Environment-Behavior and Place Studies in the Department of Architecture at Kansas
State University in Manhattan, Kansas, USA. Trained in geography and environment-behavior research, he is interested in a
phenomenological approach to place, architecture, and environmental design as place making. He is editor of Environmental &
Architectural Phenomenology. His most recent books are Life Takes Place (Routledge, 2018) and Phenomenological Perspectives
on Place, Lifeworlds, and Lived Emplacement (Routledge, 2023).
Journal of Philosophical Investigations, University of Tabriz, Volume 18, Issue 48, 2024, pp. 31-52
32
[E]very opinion about “the” world has its ground in the pregiven world. It is from this very ground that I have freed
myself through the epoché; I stand above the world, which has
now become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon.
Edmund Husserl (1970, 152).
Introduction
In 1979, I published A Geography of the Lifeworld, a phenomenological examination of everyday
environmental experience—“the sum total of a person’s firsthand involvements with the
geographical world in which he or she typically lives” (Seamon 1979, 15-16).1 The book was a
revision of my 1977 doctoral dissertation, Movement, Rest, and Encounter: A Phenomenology of
Everyday Environmental Experience, written under the direction of human geographer Anne
Buttimer, who was then a professor in Clark University’s School of Geography in Worcester,
Massachusetts (Seamon 1977; Buttimer & Seamon 1980). Beginning in the late 1960s, Buttimer
and other human geographers such as David Ley, Edward Relph, Marwyn Samuels, and Yi-Fu
Tuan initiated a new disciplinary subfield called “humanistic geography.” This subfield sought to
position “humans and human consciousness, feeling, thoughts, and emotions at the center of
geographical thinking” (Cresswell 2013, 109). A primary aim was to understand the lived
relationship between people and the geographical world in which they find themselves. How and
why, for example, are places important in human life, what are they experientially, and how do
environmental qualities contribute to their constitution? What does it mean to be emplaced
humanly in a world that always includes geographical dimensions such as space, distance, nearness,
mobility, materiality, landscape, region, and nature?2
It was in the academic context of a developing humanistic geography that I wrote A Geography
of the Lifeworld (henceforth Lifeworld). At the time, humanistic geographers were experimenting
with a wide range of conceptual and methodological approaches that included idealism,
pragmatism, existentialism, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, and grounded theory (Cloke
et al. 1991; Ley and Samuels 1978; Seamon 2015). In Lifeworld, I drew on the philosophical
tradition of phenomenology, which, most simply defined, is the careful description and
interpretation of human experience, awareness, and meaning. The phenomenological focus is
phenomena— things or experiences as people experience those things or experiences.
Phenomenologically, the aim is to describe any phenomenon in its own terms as it is as an
experience, situation, or event understood via the real lives of real human beings. As philosopher
David Cerbone, explains, phenomenology works to hold attention on “‘the experience itself’, to
1
The book was reprinted in Routledge Press’s “Revival” series in 2015; for a set of commentaries on the book, see
Moores 2006; Seamon 2006.The current article draws from discussions in Seamon 2018, 2023.
2
Introductions to humanistic geography include Buttimer 1976; Cloke et al. 1991, Ch. 3; Cresswell 2013, Ch. 6;
Relph 1981; Seamon 2015, 2018, 2023; Seamon and Larsen 2021; Tuan 1976.
Lifeworld, Place, and Phenomenology: Holistic and Dialectical Perspectives/ Seamon
33
concentrate on its character and structure rather than whatever it is that might underlie it or be
causally responsible for it” (Cerbone 2006, 3).1
In Lifeworld, my phenomenological method was primarily grounded in what qualitative
researchers identify today as “focus groups” (Cameron 2000; Seamon and Gill 2016). Calling them
environmental experience groups, I gathered firsthand experiential accounts from small discussion
groups of volunteer participants who were willing to meet once a week to examine, in their own
daily lives, environmental and geographical experiences relating to specific weekly themes such as
movement patterns, emotions relating to place, the nature of noticing and attention, the meaning of
home and at-homeness, places for things, deciding where to go when, and so forth (Seamon 1979,
28). Through a phenomenological explication of some 1,500 first-person observations provided by
these environmental experience groups, I eventually arrived at three overarching themes—
movement, rest, and encounter—that delineated a common lived core of everyday environmental
experience. The book’s first section on movement examined the habitual nature of everyday
environmental behaviors and argued that the lived foundation of these behaviors is the
preconscious, intelligent awareness of the body, an aspect of human experience first explored
thoroughly by French phenomenological philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962). The second
section on rest considered people’s attachment to place and gave particular attention to at-homeness
and sustaining affective relationships with places and environments. The book’s third section on
encounter explored the multifaceted ways in which people make or do not make attentive contact
with their surroundings. I identified and described such modes of awareness as obliviousness,
noticing, watching, and heightened contact. The book’s concluding section examined the lived
relationships and interconnections among movement, rest, and encounter and argued that their
threefold structure offers one simple but integrated way to envision human environmental
experience conceptually and to think about design, planning, and policy practically.
In this chapter, I draw partly on Lifeworld to examine directions for lifeworld research today,
giving particular attention to recent phenomenological research on place. Most simply, lifeworld
refers to one’s everyday, taken-for-granted experience that typically goes unnoticed. One aim of
phenomenological research is to examine the lifeworld as a way to identify and understand the
tacit, unnoticed aspects of human life so that they can be accounted for theoretically and practically.
Here, I identify four important assumptions that underlie a phenomenological understanding of
lifeworld and then draw on the concept of place to clarify some of the lifeworld’s social,
environmental, spatial, and geographical aspects. To concretize my discussion, I draw on
descriptive evidence from British writer Penelope Lively’s Spiderweb, a 1990s novel describing
1
Introductions to phenomenology include Cerbone 2006; Finlay 2011; Moran 2000; Sokolowski 2000; van Manen
2014. The classic work is Spiegelberg 1982.
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one outsider’s efforts to come to inhabit a place—a fictitious present-day village in the
southwestern British county of Somerset (Lively 1998).
Phenomenological Assumptions for Understanding Lifeworld
I grounded Lifeworld in the conceptual perspective of existential phenomenology, a mode of
phenomenological study originally developed by such philosophers as Merleau-Ponty (1962) and
Martin Heidegger (1962).1 These existential phenomenologists distrusted phenomenological
founder Edmund Husserl’s original emphasis on pure intellectual consciousness and instead worked
toward a reflexive understanding of everyday human life and its lived meanings (Moran 2000, 13-14).
Here, to clarify its nature, I discuss four central assumptions of existential phenomenology relating to
the nature of human being, experience, and understanding (Compton 1997; Seamon 2018, 2023).
These assumptions are:
Understanding grounded in experience;
Phenomena approached as openly as possible;
People immersed in the worlds in which they find themselves;
Describing and understanding lifeworlds as a major phenomenological aim.
1. Understanding grounded in experience
As I’ve already suggested, existential phenomenologists give attention to concrete human experience
and the lived reality of everyday life. Phenomenologist Max van Manen explains that the aim is to
discern “the primordialities of meaning as we encounter and live with things and others in our lived
experiences and everyday existence” (van Manen 2014, 28). At first glance, the use of the word
“lived” in phrases like “lived experience” or “lived meaning” may seem tautological—what, other
than “lived,” can experience be? For existential phenomenologists, however, “lived” is an essential
descriptor because it “announces the intent to explore directly the originary or prereflective
dimensions of human existence: life as we live it” (van Manen 2014, 28). Van Manen writes:
Lived experience is [the] active and passive living through experience. Lived
experience names the ordinary and the extraordinary, the quotidian and the
exotic, the routine and the surprising, the dull and the ecstatic moments and
aspects of experience as we live through them in our human existence (van
Manen 2014, 39).
In this sense, any phenomenological articulation of human beings and their worlds must be
grounded in an awareness, language, and conception that arise from, remain with, and return to lived
human experience and meaning. The foundation for conceptual and applied claims is human actions,
situations, events, and understandings as they happen spontaneously in the unfolding world of human
1
Introductions to existential phenomenology include Finlay 2011; Compton 1997; Seamon 2000; Valle 1998; van
Manen 2014.
Lifeworld, Place, and Phenomenology: Holistic and Dialectical Perspectives/ Seamon
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life, which is “the ultimate setting for ourselves and for all the things we experience” (Sokolowski
2000, 44). On the one hand, this unfolding world is inestimably more than what any one person can
experience or know. On the other hand, for each person, this unfolding world is always only what he
or she uniquely experiences and understands it to be. As philosopher John Compton explains,
The world is inexhaustible and transcends us; we are inevitably out in the middle
of it; it is experienced independently of us. At the same time, the world is what, in
the most inclusive sense, we experience (or perceive) it to be. There is no world
“behind” or “beneath” the world of primordial lived experience (Compton 1997,
208).
2. Phenomena approached openly
If the topical focus of existential phenomenology is human experience and meaning, the
methodological focus is empathetic contact with the phenomenon. The aim is an openness whereby
the phenomenon is offered a supportive space in which it can present itself in a way whereby it is what
it is most accurately and comprehensively. One way that founder Edmund Husserl described
phenomenology was “back to the things themselves,” by which he meant setting aside personal,
cultural, ideological, and conceptual prejudices so that one might offer the phenomenon a supportive
venue in which it can appear in a way that is most real (Moran 2000, 9). One of the most incisive
descriptions of phenomenological method is Heidegger’s cryptic directive: “To let that which shows
itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (Heidegger 1962, 58).
How, in other words, might we encounter the phenomenon so that it freely has the space to be what it
is rather than what we might suppose, imagine, claim, or dictate it to be?
The central means by which phenomenologists work to allow openness to the phenomenon to
happen is the phenomenological reduction, which refers to ways to facilitate a progressively
deepening awareness of the phenomenon so that it is seen in stronger and stronger light. Van Manen
(2014, 215) contends that this reduction incorporates contrasting but complimentary modes of
encountering the phenomenon—on the one hand, suspending any obstacles that block the
phenomenon (called “bracketing” or the “epoché”); on the other hand, moving closer to the
phenomenon via careful, persistent, deepening contact (called the “reduction” proper). Van Manen
writes:
The epoché describes the ways that we need to open ourselves to the world as
we experience it and free ourselves from presuppositions…. The aim of the
reduction is to re-achieve a direct and primitive contact with the world as we
experience it or as it shows itself—rather than as we conceptualize it. But we
need to realize as well that in some sense nothing is “simply given.” The
phenomenological attitude is sustained by wonder, attentiveness, and a desire for
meaning…. The reduction aims at removing any barriers, assumptions,
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suppositions, projections, and linguisticalities that prevent the phenomena and
events of the lifeworld to appear or show themselves as they give themselves.
So we need to engage in the reduction in order to let that which gives itself show
itself (van Manen 2014, 220-221).
In seeking to locate and describe the lived reality of human experiences and meanings,
phenomenologists are skeptical of any conceptual system that arbitrarily transcribes human life,
actions, and experiences into secondhand, cerebrally-derived presentations. Humanistic geography
arose in part because, in the 1950s and 1960s, the discipline was dominated by quantitative-analytic
research that reduced the lived richness of geographical phenomena to piecemeal, measurable, preestablished renditions that, to humanistic geographers, often seemed simplistic, intellectual caricatures
of the original phenomena (Cloke et al. 1991). More recently, existential phenomenologists have
criticized poststructuralist, social-constructionist, and relationalist approaches because they are seen
to misrepresent and reduce the complex plenum of human experience and meaning via preselected
social, cultural, political, gender, or discourse constructs and interpretations (Rojcewicz 2010;
Rosenau 1992; Seamon 2015).
3. People immersed in world
Phenomenologists claim that human experience, awareness, and action are always intentional—i.e.,
necessarily oriented toward and finding their significance in a world of emergent meaning. Human
beings are not just aware but aware of something, whether an object, living thing, idea, feeling,
environmental situation, or the like (Sokolowski, 2000, 8-11). Merleau-Ponty (1962, xvii) explains
that the distinguishing feature of intentionality is that “the unity of the world, before being posited
by knowledge in a specific act of identification, is ‘lived’ as ready-made or already there.” In this
sense, intentionality relates to “the ways we are ‘attached’ to the world” and means that, experientially,
we can never separate or “‘step out’ from the world and view it from some detached vista. We are au
monde, meaning simultaneously ‘in’ and ‘of’ the world” (van Manen 2000, 62).
The concept of intentionality leads to a central phenomenological claim crucial in understanding
lifeworld: that human beings are always already inescapably immersed and entwined in their
worlds that, most of the time, “just happen” without the intervention of anything or anyone
(Seamon 2014a, 5). How, phenomenologically, do we describe the way in which, existentially,
selves and world are reciprocally related and mutually dependent? How, phenomenologically, do
we locate and understand the complex, multivalent ways in which we, as human beings, are
intertwined, intermeshed, entrenched and submerged in the worlds in which we find ourselves?
Because of this lived intimacy between person and world, one cannot assign specific phenomena to
either person or world alone. Everything experienced is “given” but also “interpreted,” is “of the
world” but also “of the person” (Compton 1997, 208).
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One early thinker who explored the lived interconnectedness between people and their
geographical worlds was French historian Eric Dardel, who examined what he called
geographicality (géographicité)—the experiences and relationships binding human beings to the
earth and a lived situation he considered fundamental to human life (Dardel 1952; Relph 1985,
2014). According to Dardel, this intentional commingling between people and their geographical
worlds, though mostly taken for granted, is always inescapably present, whether the particular
geographical surrounds are ordinary or extraordinary, within or beyond the circle of usual daily life
(Dardel 1952, 1). As phenomenological geographer Edward Relph explains, geographicality is
“unobtrusive, inconspicuously familiar, more lived than discussed. It is, in fact, a naming of the
geographical forms of being-in-the-world” (Relph 1985, 21).
4. Describing and understanding lifeworlds
The everyday structure through which “being-in-the-world” unfolds is the lifeworld—a person or
group’s day-to-day world of taken-for-grantedness normally unnoticed and, therefore, concealed as a
phenomenon. “As conscious beings,” writes Moran (2005, 9), “we always inhabit—in a pretheoretical manner—an experiential world, given in advance, on hand, and always experienced as a
unity. It is the universal framework of human endeavor, including our scientific endeavours. It is the
general structure that enables objectivity and thinghood to emerge in different ways in different
cultures.” One aim of existential-phenomenological study is to disclose and describe the various lived
structures and dynamics of the lifeworld, which always includes spatial, environmental, and place
dimensions. There is a lived wholeness to lifeworld in that, on the one hand, it refers to the normally
unnoticed, automatic unfolding of everyday life as it happens for the individuals and groups
involved. On the other hand, lifeworld incorporates the world in which that unfolding happens. In
this sense, there is a lifeworld for each experiencing person and group but there is also a lifeworld
of the place or situation that embraces those individual and group lifeworlds. This collective
lifeworld is grounded and sustained, totally or in part, by the individual and group lifeworlds, just
as they are grounded and sustained, totally or in part, by the collective lifeworld comprising them.
Unless it changes in some significant way, we are almost always, in our typical human lives,
unaware of our lifeworld, which we assume is the way that life is and must be. This typically
unquestioned acceptance of the lifeworld is what Husserl called the natural attitude, because of which
we habitually assume that the world as we know and experience it is the only world. We “accept the
world and its forms of givenness as simply there, ‘on hand’ for us” (Moran 2005, 7). Husserl
characterized the natural attitude as “naïve” because “we are normally unaware that what we are living
in is precisely given to us as the result of a specific ‘attitude’. Indeed, even to recognize and identify
the natural attitude as such is in a sense to have moved beyond it” (Moran 2005, 55). The difficult
question, however, is “how one can awaken to the world as phenomenon instead of being directed at
the things and events that appear within that world?” (Jacobs 2013, 353). One pathway toward an
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answer is offered by Moran, who describes the complex lived relationship between the natural attitude
and the lifeworld:
In the natural attitude into which we are born or into which we wake, we encounter
not just individual things and indeed an environing ‘world of things’, but also living
organisms, bodies, like ours, which we encounter as persons, all within the context
of an infinite ‘surrounding world’. Moreover, we recognize that each of these
embodied persons has his or her own sensitivity, sphere of free movement, view
on the world, with its correlated aspects…, his or her stream of conscious
experiences, his or her ‘slant’ on the world, surroundings, or environment…”
(Moran 2005, 56).
Moran’s emphasis on the existential variedness of lifeworlds can be clarified in part by realizing
that any lifeworld incorporates three constitutional dimensions that, though always integrally related
and interconnected experientially, can be given specific research attention, depending on a
phenomenological study’s particular thematic focus:
First, a person or group’s unique individual situation—e.g., one’s gender, sexuality, physical
and intellectual endowments, degree of ableness, personal likes and dislikes;
Second, a person or group’s unique familial, social, cultural, geographical, and historical
situation—e.g., the time and place in which one lives, economic and political circumstances,
religious and societal background, technological infrastructure;
Third, a person or group’s situation as it involves their lived typicality as human beings
sustaining and sustained by a typical human world—e.g., the lived fact that we are bodily beings
of a particular size, morphology, and physical constitution that all contribute in specific ways to
how we experience and encounter our worlds.
As I sought to demonstrate in Lifeworld, any lifeworld is transparent in the sense that it is
normally tacit and just happens, grounded in spatial-temporal situations and events more or less
regular (Seamon 1979). As I argue in the last part of this chapter, one integral dimension of this
lived transparency is place, for which I explore some holistic and dialectical dimensions. Before
introducing that discussion, however, I present the concept of lifeworld in a more grounded, realworld way by drawing on a novel by critically-acclaimed British author Penelope Lively (Lively
1998).
Concretizing Lifeworld
Lively’s 1998 Spiderweb provides a sobering, present-day portrait of one newcomer’s effort to
become at home in England’s West Country. The novel is set mostly in Somerset, a bucolic region
that, though once perhaps an integrated lifeworld grounded in history and place, has become a diverse
mix of contrasting lifeworlds, more or less different because of time, happenstance, and varying life
Lifeworld, Place, and Phenomenology: Holistic and Dialectical Perspectives/ Seamon
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paths—in short, “people who have always been there and people who come there fortuitously”
(Lively 1998, p 1-2). Lively recounts the efforts of recently retired social anthropologist Stella
Brentwood to make a home for herself by purchasing and settling in a cottage near the small,
unremarkable Somerset village of Kingston Florey. From a lifeworld perspective, Stella’s story is
revealing because she tries to become a lived part of the Somerset lifeworld rather than remain the
detached observer she has been her entire professional life, studying lineage and kinship in farflung places like Egypt, Malta, and Scotland’s Orkney Islands. How, through commitment,
involvement, and affection, can she draw this chosen place inside herself so that she is a part of
the place rather than apart as she has always been as professional anthropologist? Early on in the
novel, she realizes that, until her present effort to make a home, she has never really felt a sense of
lived connection to the communities and places she studied, which are little more than “worlds out
there, richly stocked and inviting observation” (Lively 1998, 15). She has never really gathered
herself up into place and actually lived there:
Her professional life has been that of a voyeur, her interest in community has
been clinical. She has wanted to know how and why people get along with each
other, or fail to do so, rather than sample the arrangement herself. She had been
simultaneously fascinated and repelled. Moving around the world, she was
always alert, always curious, but comfortable also in the knowledge that, in the
last resort, this was nothing to do with her. Indeed, casting a cold eye back, it
now seems to her that she and her like can be seen as parasites. Intellectual
parasites (Lively 1998, 75).
In seeking finally to enter life rather than just to observe it, Stella sets herself to engage her
retirement place and to embrace its lifeworld: “This is where she would now live, not just for weeks
or months but for the foreseeable future. For years” (Lively 1998, 14). She takes long walks, drives
through the countryside, studies maps, reads local newspapers, and visits old buildings and places
of earlier historical times. She converses with locals, shops in the small village grocery, tries to
know her neighbors, and presents a talk to the local historical society. As Somerset as a place of
human life comes into focus, Stella realizes that it incorporates not one but many lifeworlds that
interact and overlap through subtle lived dynamics like family ties, longevity, employment,
commerce, and informal interpersonal encounters:
And thus Stella learned…. The place took shape. It ceased to be a landscape, a
backdrop…. Stella perceived the intricate system of checks and balances by
which things worked. She saw that there was a continuous state of negotiation,
of dealing, of to-and-fro arrangements. Everyone stood in a particular
relationship to everyone else, often literally so in terms of marriage connections
or distant ties of blood. People employed one another, or sold things to each
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other, or exchanged services, or simply rubbed shoulders here, there, and
everywhere. Each passing casual encounter in a lane or at a shop entrance
reinforced this subtle and elaborate system, as hard to penetrate as any she had
met.
But Stella also sees that, entwined within the more complex lifeworld of Somerset-as-place, is an
unspoken, less visible mesh of individually-defined lifeworlds grounding different individuals and
groups in differing ways with varying degrees of place engagement and place identity. Most
broadly, she identifies two distinct substrata of Somerset’s lifeworld mesh: On the one hand, the
all-important stratum of long-time residents deeply rooted in place; on the other hand, visitors and
residents from elsewhere, like her, who “would never be truly attuned” (Lively 1998, 72). All these
lifeworlds presuppose more or less different natural attitudes that, almost entirely prereflective and
unself-conscious, sustain one’s relative place status and degree of belonging:
For there were two layers here, she saw. There was the basic and significant
layer, which went back a long way—two, three, or more generations. These were
the people whose parents and grandparents looked out from here and who
continued to do so themselves, for whom these parts were the hub of things and
elsewhere was… elsewhere. Though, admittedly, a rather more familiar
elsewhere nowadays, thanks to several decades of mass communications and
package holidays. But grafted on to this layer was a further one, the layer of
subsequent settlement—some of it transitory, some more permanent. Most
transitory of all were the summer visitors, a valuable source of income for some,
a confounded nuisance for others. Then there were the more abiding settlers—
the retired, the owners of holiday cottages, the potters and woodcarvers and the
weavers. These were digested, up to a point and depending upon their personal
achievements in terms of participation and commitment…. But they would never
be able to plug into the elaborate communication system which hinged upon
intimate knowledge of how things stood, how things had changed and why, and
what this implied in terms of expedient response and reactions. They would
always tramp around wearing blinders. They would always speak with a foreign
accent.
How one achieves or does not achieve “belonging to place” is one of Lively’s major themes in
Spiderweb. On the one hand, Stella realizes that really belonging somewhere requires devoted
engagement: “Now was the time to prove herself. Even if she could not hope to melt into the ancient
levels of this place…, there were still slots into which she could fit in the wider context. Join things,
she told herself sternly…. Participate” (Lively 1998, 76). On the other hand, she faces an unyielding
disinterest in engaging this place:
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She [became aware of] a reality that continued to surprise her—this house that
was apparently hers, this pleasant landscape in which she had fortuitously
arrived… She was comfortable enough with these surroundings, but still not
certain how she had gotten here or why. In the past there had been good reason
to be wherever she found herself. Now, she was where she was simply because
one had to be somewhere (Lively 1998, 133).
The insurmountable challenge for Stella is to move from detached observer to immersedinhabitant-in-place. Partly because of unexpected, unsettling events, Stella cannot find in herself
the personal commitment or involvement required for fully inhabiting her retirement place. She is
unable to intertwine her lifeworld with the lifeworld of Somerset. She cannot shift from outsider to
insider, never really fits in, and eventually leaves. I return to Stella’s situation later in this chapter,
but first I examine conceptual and lived connections between lifeworld and place.
Placing Lifeworld
As I’ve emphasized repeatedly, a central phenomenological assumption is that people and their
worlds are integrally intertwined. If the concept of lifeworld offers one way to clarify this lived
intimacy between people and world, another useful concept is place, which is powerful conceptually
and practically because, by its very constitution, it offers a way to specify more precisely the
experienced wholeness of lifeworlds.1 Phenomenologically, place can be defined as any
environmental locus that draws human experiences, actions, and meanings together spatially and
temporally (Seamon 2014, 1). By this definition, a place can range from an environmental element
or room to a building, neighborhood, town, city, or geographical region. Phenomenologists are
interested in the phenomenon of place because it is a primary contributor to the spatial,
environmental, and temporal constitution of any lifeworld. Human being is always human-beingin-place.2 As phenomenological philosopher Edward Casey explains,
The relationship between self and place is not just one of reciprocal influence (that
much any ecologically sensitive account would maintain) but also, more radically,
of constitutive coingredience: each is essential to the being of the other. In effect,
there is no place without self and no self without place. What is needed is a model
wherein the abstract truth of this position… can be given concrete articulation
without conflating place and self or maintaining the self as an inner citadel of
unimplaced freedom (Casey, 2001, 684).
1
Reviews of place research include Cresswell 2014; Gieryn 2000; Janz 2005; Lewicka 2011; Manzo 2005; Patterson
and Williams 2005; Seamon 2021; Trentelman 2009.
2
Discussions of a phenomenological approach to place include Casey 2009; Donohoe 2014; Malpas 1999, 2001, 2009,
2014; Moores 2012; Mugerauer 1994; Relph 1976, 2009; Seamon 2000, 2013a, 2014b, 2018, 2023
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As indicated by Casey’s emphasis on lived inseparability and intertwinement—what he calls
“constitutive coingredience”—place is not the physical environment distinct from the people
associated with it. Rather, place is the indivisible, typically transparent phenomenon of person-orgroup-experiencing-place. The phenomenologist recognizes that places are dynamic, shifting, and
encountered differently by different experiencers (Seamon 2014b, 2018). For example, the same
physical place can invoke a wide range of place experiences and meanings existentially (as
illustrated by Stella Brentwood’s progressive recognition of Somerset lifeworlds). Similarly, over
time, a person or group’s experience and understanding of place may shift (for example, Stella’s
eventual failure to inhabit her chosen place). In short, place as a phenomenon is typically complex
in experiential constitution and dynamic in the sense that all places change over time. In the last
part of this chapter, I offer one way to clarify this lived complexity by considering some holistic
and dialectical aspects of place that I illustrate experientially via Stella Brentwood’s situation in
Spiderweb.
Place as Wholeness
Phenomenologically, place is a significant concept because, by its very constitution, it offers a way
to articulate and understand the experienced wholeness of people-in-world (Casey, 2009; Malpas
1999; Stefanovic, 2000). Place is a phenomenon integral to human life and holds worlds together
spatially and environmentally, marking out centers of human experience, meaning, and action that,
in turn, make place. One of the most important thinkers for understanding the wholeness of place
is Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1968), who contended that the lived foundation of human experience is
perception, which he interpreted as the immediate, taken-for-granted givenness of the world
undergirded by the lived body—a body that simultaneously experiences, acts in, and is aware of a
world that, typically, responds with immediate pattern, meaning, and contextual presence. MerleauPonty understood the lived body as a pre-predicative, lived relationship between an intelligent but
unself-conscious body and the world it encounters, understands, and makes use of through
continuous immersion, awareness, and actions. “The body [is] the place,” he explains, where we
“take a hold upon space, the object, or the instrument” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 154).
In considering the relationship between the lived body and place, one can speak of
environmental embodiment—in other words, the various lived ways, sensorily and motility-wise,
that the body in its pre-reflective perceptual presence encounters and reciprocates with the world
at hand, especially its environmental and place dimensions (Finlay 2006; Seamon 2013a; Toombs
2001). Merleau-Ponty argued that perception incorporates a lived dynamic between perceptual
body and world such that aspects of the world—for example, seeing the softness of wood shavings
or hearing the hard brittleness of glass when it breaks (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 229)—are understood
because they instantaneously evoke in the lived body their interconnected, experienced qualities.
Merleau-Ponty also related the lived body to a more active, motor dimension of perception—what
he termed body-subject, or pre-reflective corporeal awareness manifested through action and
Lifeworld, Place, and Phenomenology: Holistic and Dialectical Perspectives/ Seamon
43
typically in sync with and enmeshed in the physical world in which the action unfolds (Merleau-Ponty
1962; Morris 2004; Seamon, 2013a).
Drawing on the concept of body-subject, other phenomenological studies have pointed to its
spatial and place versatility as expressed in more complex bodily ensembles extending over time
and space and contributing to a wider lived geography (Allen 2004; Hill 1985; Seamon 1979;
Toombs 2001). In Lifeworld, I highlighted two such bodily ensembles: first, body ballets—sets of
integrated gestures, behaviors, and actions that sustain a particular task or aim, for example,
planting a garden, doing laundry, setting a table, and so forth; and, second, time-space routines—
sets of more or less habitual bodily actions that extend through a considerable portion of time, for
example, a getting-ready-for-bed routine, or a Saturday-afternoon-shopping routine (Seamon,
1979, Ch. 6). Perhaps most pertinent to the wholeness of place is the possibility that, in a supportive
physical environment, individuals’ bodily routines can converge and commingle in time and space,
thereby contributing to a larger-scale environmental ensemble that, in Lifeworld, I called place
ballet—an interaction of individual bodily routines rooted in a particular environment, which often
becomes an important place of interpersonal and communal exchange, meaning, and attachment.
Examples would include a popular student café, a well-used village grocery; a vibrant city street,
a lively urban plaza, or a flourishing urban neighborhood (Fullilove, 2004, Jacobs, 1961;
Klinenberg, 2004; Oldenburg, 2001, Seamon, 1979, 2013a; Seamon & Nordin, 1980).
Place Ballet in Spiderweb
In her novel, lively infers direct and indirect references to place ballet. She describes how
southwestern England shifts in summer, as tourists and vacationers overwhelm the region. Yet “real
life continues” and “People are still growing things and selling them and providing one another
with services and necessities. Most of them spend most of their time in one place, contemplating
the same view, locked in communion with those they see every day” (Lively, 1998, 6). Throughout
the novel, Lively sketches the life of Somerset by inserting items from the local newspaper
highlighting events like fox hunts, puppy shows, livestock sales, and entertainment venues.
Intimating the presence of a Kingston Florey place ballet, lively describes the importance of the
village green as “the scene of various concurrent actions, most of them mutually exclusive” (Lively,
1998, 184). Teenagers regularly hang out at one corner of the green and ignore a gathering of
mothers with small children, who in turn ignore Stella and other older users—mostly “the retired,
the settlers, the colonizers” (Lively, 1998, 184).
Another important site of village place ballet is the local shops, which “still had some clout as
“centres for the exchange of information and opinion” (Lively 1998, 120). As one way to learn
about Kingston Florey, Stella regularly shops in the village grocery nearest her cottage—an
establishment run by Molly, “a product of the place” and with whom it is “neither possible or
expedient to complete any transaction without a conversation” (Lively, 1998, 121). After two
months in her new home, Stella is asked by Molly if she is getting to know her neighbors. Molly
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then offers an unasked-for evaluation of the “mixed lot along the lane there” (Lively, 1998, 121).
She is particularly critical of the dysfunctional Hiscox family, who will play a key role in Stella’s
eventual departure from Kingston Florey: “those boys—not what you might call charmers, those
two, are they? Never a civil word” (Lively, 1998, 121).
At one point in the novel, Stella contrasts her Kingston Florey encounters with her research
observations in a Malta village where old men sat regularly on a bench under a tree and where, at
every street corner, “there was forever a knot of talking women.” The village is a perpetual place
ballet, and Stella generates a list of its parts:
The informal conference centre that was the shop or the coffee house. The
comments and interrogations shouted from the doorways. The small excursions
on foot from here to there for no particular purpose other than to see who might
be around… In other words, the fervent face-to-face community life of a world
largely innocent of cars and telephones, for better or for worse. What have we
come to? Thought Stella (Lively, 1998, 75).
Stella, however, is not sure that she would wish to live like that, even though Kingston Florey might
offer similar possibilities, if only she could become more deeply engaged. Independent and detached,
however, Stella finds intercourse with her new world difficult: She “retreats behind her closed door
and into the protective shell of her car, from which a wave and a smile will suffice” (Lively, 1998,
75).
Place as Dialectic: Homeworld and Alienworld
If place can be examined phenomenologically as an environmental whole via concepts like place
ballet, it also can be considered dialectically in terms of such lived binaries as here/there, near/far,
center/horizon, dwelling/journey, horizontal/vertical, insideness/outsideness, and so forth (e.g., Casey
2009, Harries 1997; Relph, 1976, Seamon, 1979; Tuan, 1974, 2014, 9-28). Binary relationships are
significant phenomenologically because environmental and place experiences often involve some
continuum of lived opposites as, for example, Stella Brentwood’s efforts as an outsider to become
an insider to place. To illustrate one way in which a dialectical perspective might shed additional
light on lifeworlds and places, I discuss Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological explication of
homeworld/alienworld (Husserl, 1973).
To clarify this lived binary, one first needs to understand the lived meanings of homeworld and
alienworld separately. As Husserl interpreted it, the homeworld is the tacit, taken-for-granted
sphere of experiences, understandings, and situations marking out the world into which each of us
is born and matures as children and then adults. The homeworld is always in some mode of lived
mutuality with the alienworld, which is the world of difference and otherness but is only provided
awareness because of the always already givenness of the homeworld (Donohoe, 2011, 2014, 1220; Seamon, 2013b; Steinbock, 1995, 178-85). Phenomenological philosopher Anthony Steinbock
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emphasizes that homeworld and alienworld are always “co-relative,” “co-constitutive,” and “cogenerative” in the sense that neither can be regarded “as the original sphere [of lifeworld], since
they are in a continual historical becoming as delimited from one another” (Steinbock 1995, 179).
In this situation of co-constitution and go-generation, the homeworld is that lived portion of the
lifeworld wherein one is most unself-consciously who one is, largely because of the happenstance
of time, place, birth factors, and familial and societal circumstances. As phenomenological
philosopher Jane Donohoe explains, the homeworld is “a unity of sense that is manifest in a pregivenness of the things of the world that constitute the norm by which we judge other worlds and
by which the pre-givenness of other worlds becomes given” (Donohoe 2011, 30). Here, norms and
normativity do not refer to some arbitrary ethical or ideological system of right and wrong or better
and worse but, rather, to “a foundational standard to which other places are compared in terms of
our embodied constitution of the world” (Donohoe, 2011, 25).
The normative significance of the homeworld is entirely relative objectively but, subjectively,
affords the taken-for-granted world view and values by which the person and group evaluate
lifeworlds more or less different than their own. The homeworld incorporates one’s manner of lived
embodiment, and his or her lived relationships with place evoke a particular mode of comportment
that “is not simply one’s comportment toward this particular place, but simply one’s comportment”
(Donohoe 2011, 31). In this sense, we always “carry with us the structure of our [homeworld] in
the structure of our lived-bodies, in our typical comportment and in our practices” (Steinbock,
1995, 164).
Though still remaining in the natural attitude, we only recognize the presence of the homeworld
when we find ourselves in worlds different from its tacit typicality, normativity, and taken-forgrantedness. In relation to the homeworld, the alienworld presents norms, behaviors, and situations
that are more or less different from what a person in his or her homeworld takes for granted. As
Steinbock explains, the homeworld plays a central role in sustaining the identity we understand as
ourselves:
A homeworld is privileged because it is that through which our experiences
coalesce as our own and in such a way that our world structures our experience
itself. This constitutional privilege… is indifferent to whether we like it or not,
or to whether it makes us happy or miserable. The point is that the norms that
guide the homeworld are our norms, our way of life, as that to which we have
accrued (Steinbock, 1995, 232).
Husserl argued that we potentially grow as persons through two sorts of lived exchanges
between homeworld and alienworld—what he calls appropriation and transgression (Steinbock
1995, 179). In appropriation, we involve ourselves in situations of “the co-constitution of the alien
through appropriative experience of the home” (Steinbock, 1995, 179). Conversely, transgression
involves situations of “the co-constitution of the home through the transgressive experience of the
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alien” (Steinbock, 1995, 179). In appropriation, we encounter qualities of an alienworld within our
own homeworld; perhaps we accept those qualities because they are helpful, inescapable, or
revelatory. In a reciprocal way, in transgressive experiences, we encounter the alienworld because
we have left our homeworld; as in appropriation, we recognize and perhaps accept potentially
necessary or helpful qualities of that alienworld (Seamon, 2013b). Steinbock (1994, 214) describes
appropriation and transgression as modes of “critical comportment” that “may entail the renewal
of a homeworld’s norms, revitalizing and renewing its internal sense; [this process] may even
demand going against the prevalent normality, replacing old norms with a new ethical normality
in an attempt to realize the homeworld more fully.” One must emphasize, however, that
appropriation and transgression can also involve the acceptance of alienworld values and actions
that undermine the homeworld and weaken its lived integrity as a lifeworld.
I am not claiming here that the homeworld/alienworld dialectic works conceptually for
describing all manner of places. Especially in today’s world of social and cultural diversity,
however, Husserl’s phrasing offers a valuable way to think through place complexity: the way, for
example, socially-different neighborhoods perceive and interact with each other; or the situation of
a household of domestic violence or child abuse. Husserl’s homeworld/alienworld offers one way
to understand the typical, taken-for-granted ground of the places in our lives: That place is part and
parcel of the homeworld’s normative significance so who people are in their homeworld places is
not simply their comportment in or way of being toward those places but simply their comportment
and way of being (Donohoe, 2011, 31).
Homeworld and Alienworld in Spiderweb
In Lively’s novel, the lived binary of homeworld/alienworld marks a central factor because of
which Stella Brentwood ultimately fails in making Somerset a home. Sarah describes her
homeworld before retirement in terms of a “bird of passage”: “in the field she had been in the
ultimate state of transience—the invisible observer, the visitor from outer space. The people in
whom she was interested were there, in that place—she herself was both there and crucial apart”
(Lively, 1998, 176). At one point, she describes her life as a mesh-like homeworld comprised of
temporary places and connections encountered in shifting ways because of shifting selfunderstandings:
She saw lines—black lines that zig-zagged this way and that, netting the map of
England, netting the globe, an arbitrary progress hither and thither. And
sometimes these lines crossed one another. The intersections must surely be
points of significance—these places to which she had been twice, three times,
many times, but as different incarnations of herself, different Stellas ignorant of
the significance of this site—that she would revisit it as someone else.
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In many ways, Somerset is an alienworld for Stella, particularly in the sense that it challenges her
to enter into place via efforts of appropriation and transgression whereby she attempts to make
Somerset’s presence a part of her lifeworld, which, reciprocally, might become a small but
embedded part of Somerset’s lifeworld. Unfortunately for Stella, one of her neighbors is Karen
Hiscox, her husband Ted, and two sons. Though Stella only makes their acquaintance superficially,
this family demonstrates a profoundly dysfunctional homeworld grounded in psychosis and
physical and mental abuse. Forties-something Karen Hiscox is deeply disturbed psychologically,
partaking in explosive verbal attacks against people by whom she feels slighted, including her
husband and sons: “She always won in a fight—with anyone at home or outside—just because she
never gave up. She could shout anyone down—eventually the other person had had all they could
stand and backed off” (Lively, 1998, 168). Teenage sons Michael and Peter have absorbed her
odious ways and are “a general cargo of resentment” (Lively, 1998, 176). They misunderstand
Stella’s neighborly actions and eventually, out of misplaced spite, shoot and kill a shelter dog that
Stella has recently adopted as one way to engage with her place.
Lively’s novel is powerful, partly for the way it depicts these two geographically adjacent but
dramatically contrasting homeworlds that have no lived sense of the other. Stella sees Peter and
Michael as “poor little tykes,” whereas they see Stella as an old woman who regularly makes fun
of their appearance and possessions, even though all she is attempting is to be friendly to the two
teenagers by greeting them when she sees them and asking what she assumes to be pertinent, nonjudgmental questions about their lives. Ironically, in trying to engage with her place through getting
to know Michael and Peter, Stella unknowingly turns them against her, and they shoot the dog,
which Stella has left alone in her unlocked cottage: “they’d be one up on that silly old cow forever
now…” (Lively, 1998, 197).
The lived binary of homeworld/alienworld is useful because all places have a generative
dimension by which they evolve, devolve, or remain more or less the same. Especially today when
shared geographies sometimes clash because of social and cultural diversity, homeworld and
alienworld offer a useful way to think about identity, alterity, commonality, and the reconciliation
of differences. For much of her professional life, Stella took for granted a homeworld incorporating
a detached attitude—from the places she studied and from the lifeworlds associated with those
places: “The people in whom she was interested were there, in that place—she herself was both
there and crucially apart. If she lived permanently anywhere, it was in a landscape of the mind”
(Lively, 1998, 176). Successfully objectifying the homeworlds of others, however, is a much
different lived situation than subjectively dissolving one’s objectifying attitude to place and
becoming deeply rooted, like Stella’s garrulous postman, a Somerset inhabitant by birth who “was
of this place, and knew what was what” (Lively, 1998, 93). Yet again different is the dysfunctional
insularity of the Hiscox homeworld, which takes for granted and perpetuates a damaging way of
being those distrusts and despises the “alienworld” of any “different” person like Stella, for whom
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the Hiscox sons have no intellectual or emotional means to be interested in or trust. Once they kill
her dog, Stella’s brittle lived connectedness to place is broken, and she leaves—to where, we’re
not told.
Understanding Lifeworld and Place
In this chapter, I have sought to clarify the phenomenological concepts of lifeworld and place and
suggest some ways in which they can be considered holistically and dialectically. The examples
here are limited, and one could draw on other holistic and dialectical interpretations to generate
complementary understandings of lifeworld and place. In Lifeworld, for example, I drew on several
lived binaries grounded in the movement/rest dialectic and offering interpretive ways to understand
that dialectic via more penetrating lived structures like home/horizon, dwelling/journey, and
insideness/outsideness (e.g., Buttimer, 1980; Jager, 1974; Relph, 1976; Seamon, 2008). I also
considered how the lived wholeness of everyday environmental experience could be portrayed
through the interconnected “triad” of movement, rest, and encounter. I identified two
complementary lived ways whereby people understand and engage with their geographical worlds
(Seamon, 1979, Ch. 18). On the one hand, I identified a triad of habituality, which referred to the
usual ordinariness and humdrum of everyday life, which much of the time involves taken-forgranted repetition and routine that most people, unless required, are unwilling to change. On the
other hand, I identified a triad of openness, which involves those moments in day-to-day life when
one is suddenly aware of the world in a more alert, sensitive way. Ultimately, everyday
environmental experience involves some lived combination of these two triads, though
phenomenologically a major aim is to develop self-conscious means for more often invoking the
engaged, expanding awareness of the triad of openness.
The broader point to be made is that there are many interpretive ways to direct
phenomenological studies of lifeworld and place, and I hope this chapter points toward some
promising possibilities. An existential-phenomenological understanding of lifeworld and place
begins with the specific experiences of specific individuals and groups in specific times and places.
The aim, however, is not idiographic descriptions of particular real-world situations. Rather, these
situations are a descriptive context for exploring and locating broader patterns and structures of
human experience and human life.
In ending this chapter, I want to make one last important point about lifeworld. One mistake
made by newcomers to phenomenology is to objectify lifeworld by misunderstanding it as a thing
that can be separated from the experiencer of which it is part. One can never say that he or she
“has” a lifeworld. It would be more accurate to say that the lifeworld “has” us in the sense that the
lifeworld is the always, already pre-given world in relation to which the experiencer has no choice
but to be entwined and a part. Lifeworlds can change for better and worse, but always this change
happens because of and via the lifeworld—for example, a young woman is able to break out of a
limiting homeworld because aspects of her lifeworld open horizons to education and a better life.
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The concept of lifeworld is so difficult to grasp because it is always present but almost always
hidden from conscious awareness. At times, when some aspect of the lifeworld suddenly shifts—
for example, our computer crashes or our car won’t start—we realize the taken-for-granted
structure and connectedness of daily life but this realization remains within the natural attitude.
Most of the time, daily life just happens and the lifeworld and natural attitude stay hidden as
phenomena. As Husserl writes: “The world is pre-given to us, … not occasionally but always and
necessarily as the universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to
live-in-certainty-of-the-world” (Husserl, 1970, 142).
One aim of phenomenology is to reveal, describe, and interpret the various dimensions of
lifeworld and natural attitude. Phenomenology, writes Merleau-Ponty, “slackens the intentional
threads which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
xiii). At the same time, phenomenological discovery is not easy or immediate because so often it
reveals aspects of lifeworld and place that are “strange and paradoxical” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
xiii). One need go no further than the uncanny, inopportune adjacency of Stella Brentwood and the
Hiscox family—an unpredictable and unfortunate alignment of serendipity and geography that
unravels one person’s possibility for embracing place. “Fortune,” writes Lively, “can serve up some
strange conjunctions” (Lively, 1998, 2).
Yet running beneath the ambiguity, uncertainty, and hazard of real-world human experience are
essential, invariant, non-contingent structures marked by phenomenological concepts like
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and homeworld. These lived structures always and inescapably
underlie human worlds, wherever and whenever. A primary aim of phenomenological explication
is to make these lived structures available for academic research, practical intervention, and deeper
understanding.
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