Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary

SÜDOSTEUROPA, 37.Jg„ 7-8/1988 Andräs Bozöki* Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary** A Socio-Political Analysis of Alternative Ways to a Civil Society When entering adulthood these days, young people tend to experience the gradually narrowing of perspective, or better, the loss of perspective. In terms of dates and turning points, we are not referring to 1956 or 1968, but rather to 1980-81. These young people were bom into an “expanding” world which promised both economic growth and a thaw in politics. The seventies, which have been correctly but narrow-mindedly condemned as “anti-reformist” in recent times, were in actuality a period of “well-fare socialism” in which Hun­ garian society began to reach a modest middle-class level. However, the peri­ od between 1979 and 1981 was a turning point in both domestic and interna­ tional politics. We can easily recall the events of these years because we can still feel their effects. These are exemplified by: an increase in unsolved social problems; a serious inflation in prices; an increasing of external debt; a sec­ ond explosion of oil prices; the beginning of the war in Afghanistan; the de­ velopment of missiles in a divided Europe; the partly boycotted Olympic Games in Moscow; the “self-limited revolution” in Poland and the interna­ tional credit crisis which followed in its wake; the explosive political situation, generally within a pervasive cold war atmosphere. Of course there were few persons who could feel and measure all of these effects. The full scope of those problems arising and threatening to unsettle the familiar Hungarian way of life were best known in their entirely only by exclusive groups, customarily scientific and policy experts. The effects, how­ ever, could be seen by everybody. The critical point is that something changed at the end of the last decade in Hungary which stimulated the emergence of different types of critical attitudes. When describing critical attitudes in culture and politics, we must differen­ tiate whether we are discussing autonomous movements, initiatives, or valueorientations. The revival of critical attitudes in culture was first indicated by the forma­ tion of subcultures, such as punk and new wave. The new wave movement culminated in the period between 1980 and 1983, but we can still feel its ef­ fects. These fringe cultural groups, organized around tendencies in music, were very roughly marginalized during this time. The politically interpretable songs of the best punk groups in Hungary focused more and more global * Andräs Bozöki ist Wissenschaftlicher Assistent an der Abteilung Rechtssoziologie der Juristisch-Staatswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Eötvös-Loränd-Universität Budapest. ** Überarbeitete und gekürzte Fassung eines Artikels aus IJjüsägi Szemle, 3/1987, S. 38-49. 378 Andräs Bozöki problems such as: the future of mankind, problems facing culture as a whole, and the consequential chances of human survival. The various groups of art­ ists and literary circles and their followers have also represented a kind of crit­ ical attitude in cultural life. These heterogeneous, avantgarde groups are not completely separate ones; there is a living communication between them, which is exemplified by their members often participating in each other’s pro­ grams. Since we cannot separate these groups easily we also cannot make general­ izations about them either. Nevertheless, a general tendency is clearly percep­ tible. After keen investigations of reality and after series of sociographes and other documentaries at the turn of the decade, a new demand for “pure” aes­ theticism has been raised and increased in the various avantgarde, postmod­ ern, and sometimes anti-rationalist initiatives. This postmodernism can not really be effectively decribed as a new social movement or a new school of thought with a scientific direction. What is more important is the emphasis on cultural tendencies, concepts of values, and views. Accompanying this is apo­ calyptical thinking; inconsistency; the neutralization of the differences be­ tween “high culture” and mass culture; the toleration of different standards of behavior and lifestyles in principle, and the like. Since the negativity of the ex­ isting society has its complement in the positivity of poetry, and this has been ideologically formulated in the term “autonomy”, the criticism of this position has to be linked with a conception of literature as aesthetic transformation of social reality which takes literature as a specific ability of cognition that is able to mediate between sensuousness and abstraction. The “homo aestheticus” has become popular; abstract aestheticism, sarcas­ tic humor, and the new experiments are the means of stepping forward. The critical aspect of these attitudes is the rejection of so called “social reformist illusions”. The best works of literature are written in “the spirit of exact, light neutrality” - according to one of the youngest poets, Istvan Kemeny, in his critique on the subject. The alternative way-of-life-movement is also an expression of critical atti­ tudes: which can be exemplified by the establishment of psycho-clubs, and an increasing interest in Eastern religions and philosophies. The yoga movement and free religious communities are becoming more and more common. All of them are representatives of “escapist” ideologies and as such are a mixture of idealism, transcendentalism, as well as faintly and indirectly critical attitudes. There were some countercultural-type of groups which turned toward a criti­ cal art with political content. We can also mention here the period of the be­ ginning of democratic opposition (in the second part of the seventies) and the early ‘single issue’ movements. Group members not only wanted to achieve political goals but they sought also to change the existing way of life in Hungary as well. These forms of critical attitudes when viewed from the political level are in themselves surprising and even quite new. They must be judged within a con­ text: The recent decades have further strenghtened the tradition, more pecu- Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary 379 liar to Eastern rather than Middle European, according to which political op­ position can be expressed only if it is wrapped up in some cultural or literary form. Conversely the political reaction to them should also take the form of literature. Yet, something has changed since 1980. In these years Hungary’s younger generation has experienced the lowering of the standard of living; witnessed the polluting of the environment, and has been disappointed by the reduction of the chances of peace and even human survival. These pressing problems are to be seen against the backdrop of a political structure in which the leadership responsible for solving the problems, has essentially stagnated. Anxiety for the future has fostered an abstract fear which has become a com­ mon feeling shared by a large number of people. It is this anxiety and fear which has served to prompt the organization and action of several groups and initiatives. Many of these people did not want or could not accept their prede­ cessors’ disillusioned and almost relativist policy because they perceived that they had not been those who had made the ‘old’ consensus of the sixties. The thought was that now at the end of the eighties it is high time to make a new consensus based on different conditions, conditions of the eighties. There is a strong demand for political institutionalization on the basis of a democratic public sphere. The number of clubs and groups who generally dis­ cuss these problems at their regular meetings are on the increase. The most important ones are the Rakpärt Klub, FISZOK (Young Sociologists’ Club), the cooperating student-hostel movement (FIDESZ = Young Democrats’ Al­ liance). Recent sociological dealing with the problems of young Hungarians have reported the disintegrations of this generation and the isolation of the several groups differentiated by age. However, in recent years one of the groups distinguishable by the age of its members (similarity to different critical-oriented groups) has begun to show signes of consciousness and has now taken the first steps towards creating shared values and thereby creating a selfconscious generation. Their ideologies have different concepts concerning the meaning of reform and of how to go about carrying out reform. Nevertheless, they agree on the basic principles of reforming and on the necessity of intro­ ducing it. The reduction of benefits and the relinquishment of the values for­ merly declared socialist, have delineated the picture of a harsh, non-social so­ cialism. The critique of Stalinist socialism, which was an “obligatory model” for the East-European countries and the demand for a national and democratic sys­ tem of values, underlines the necessity of the sovereignty of the society and for providing the political system with a basis for legitimation. Single Issue Movements There are two types of critical initiatives at the political level: one has a gener­ al and the other a “single issue” basis. The so called single issue movements have both advantageous and disadvantageous aspects in comparison to move- 380 Andräs Bozöki ments concerned with general issues. Single issue movements have the advan­ tage of serving as a movement and an initiative simultaneously. That is to say, single issue movements are based on shared values and can be supported by a collective of people with a common goal and means for achieving this goal. Since such groups are spontaneous they are not threatened with sectarianism. Yet, they have the distinct disadvantage of having only a single goal, and, if this goal ceases to exist, the movement disintegrates with it. In Western socie­ ties, these “single issue” movements are and have been associated with move­ ments such as: peace, ecology, feminism, housing shortages, and the like: movements which are or have been more encompassing than merely youthmovements. In Hungary, in the past, there were only movements for peace and ecology (ecological ones are still existing, though environmental issues are still current) as well as for protecting certain towns. We find a paradoxical situation in the Hungarian political system: We have real political movements but which tend to shy away from crossing the border into the realm of politics. Owing to the polarized concept of society which has its origin in the political structure and in which expressions, like “we and they”, “inside and outside” are often used, these movements could expect longterm successes only if they defined their goals as special goals of the whole society and not as political alternatives. Leaders of single issue move­ ments attempted to acquire the absolutely necessary knowledge required for dealing with the given problem so that their competence could not be ques­ tioned. The sought to do everything in order to avoid direct engagement in policy, since this could provide a basis for the charge of being dissident. They had arguments beyond poltics (of universal importance) and arguments with no political connotations (purely professional). In 1982-3 Dialögus (Dialogue) represented the peace movement while in 1985-6 Duna Kör (Danube Circle) served the interest of the environmental movement. Both of these single inter­ est groups could be characterized by their efforts to maneuver toward a con­ structive critique. In the process of developing their community they were constructive and at the same time demanded autonomy which promised the development of a new political culture that would break with the old romantico-nationalist tradition endemic to social movements in Hungary of the past. The history of Dialögus shows well the beginning and vanishing of illu­ sions. On the way towards becoming an organization, through the long series of discussions about electing a leadership, direct democratic, anarchist, and representative democratic principles came into collision and shortly thereafter the “radical-autonomist” and “moderate-constructivist” groups turned against each other. An internal structural crisis of the Dialögus group served to weak­ en its effectiveness. With Dialögus made ineffective the two opposite wings blamed one another for the group’s problems: The “constructivists” spoke about “extreme radicalism” and the “autonomists” spoke about “the illusion of self-limitation”. But of course there were also general, international phe­ nomena; after the “hot autumn” in 1983, the peace movement had also de­ clined in Westem-Europe. Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary 381 The Hungarian Ecological movements, because they tie up with the interest of the local society more closely, seem to be more endurings and thus capable of surviving in spite of their shortcomings and failures. At the same time we ought to interpret the problem of the efficacy of peace movements in a wider sense. Although they have not been able to achieve a palpable result, we must not forget about the political socialization effect which has remained in the minds of the participants. Their behavior and their “collective memory” were effectively altered. Thus, the participants might still yet become a political power someday in the future. Currently, there are some amateur activists who have common experience in organizing movements and who will be able to reorganize themselves and others around another pressing issue that is con­ nected with a broader range of social problems. The common feature of the “single issue” movements is their openness and nimbleness. There is also a willful keeping of distance from politics, and a re­ serve from clearing up of the “final” ideological aims and values. The leaders do not aim to monopolize the whole personality of their followers in order to make a movement elite. It is very important that these groups use direct action in the tradition of the early workers’ movements and the western students’ demonstrations. Streets are to be used as a political tool. As an example Dialogus engaged in collective non-violent actions several times in the inner-city of Budapest. While the Western and Eastern critical movements of the sixties were led by the values of revolution, liberty, and self-realization, now the contemporary “single issue” movements find as the most important task the defense of the human being and human environment. General Political Ideologies The general types of critical ideologies appear partly in concrete initiatives (es­ pecially among the members of the democratic opposition), though most of them remain on the level of the value-orientations only. We can say that where movements or initiatives exist, there is no general ideology, and where general ideology exists, there is no movement. In comparison to the direction of criti­ cal thinking of earlier decades, the weakening of the influence of Marxism and the Frankfurt School is clearly exhibited. Along with this comes the claim to break with the dominant role of the German cultural tradition. At the same time, general interest has turned to the national historical tradition of Hungary and to the Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition. These are the basic poles of political attitudes. Inside the existing general political ideologies we can distinguish the socalled “third-road” ideologies and others which are based on the Western tra­ dition. However, the “third road” conceptions are not really homogeneous. Populist and liberal socialist ideologies serve to develop this point. Populists want to synthetize the opposite trends in defence of “national character”, 382 Andras Bozöki while liberal socialism, which is more modem, wishes to transcend the two presumably bad alternatives of capitalism and apparatus-socialism. But first we should mention a pragmatic tendency which seemingly chooses a “third road” with respect to ideology. For pragmatists the “third road” is not an organic development based on traditions or a strategic project with politi­ cal perspectives, but, rather is a middle-of-the-road policy. Pragmatists think that under the present Hungarian political system it is possible to have differ­ ent, but at the same time compatible value orientations to stand “inside” and “outside” without any commitment to the state or to the dissidents. Like the peace movement, pragmatists demand autonomy instead of constructiveness, but they criticize the political system as a whole and show an “alternative” to it. Yet, if this is a political alternative they must give up organizing their move­ ment since they are in the dilemma of whether to engage in politics or to organ­ ize a movement. Currently in Hungary, the pragmatists have chosen the former, leaving be­ hind the “single issue” strategy as they learned from the contradictions and failures of the peace movement. But this way is really not so easy. The middleof-the-roaders are aware of the fact that people are more and more apolitical and have better senses of relativity and of economic rationality than before. They are outside the official institutions - this in itself is a kind of criticism and have a moderate political program. They try to improve the present situa­ tion according to the existing possibilities. For them this is what the reform means: including everything which brings about improvement. However, the outcome is a rapid devaluation of the con­ cept of reform; because reform really does not mean the transformation of the social reproduction system as a whole, but, instead, the maintenance of the present political structure. Pragmatists rely on general feelings which exist among the members of the society but are difficult to express in terms of poli­ tics. They rely on those members of the current generation who chose not to be committed (or obliged) to any political tendency. Among their ranks they have many of the members of the “moderate-opportunist” wing of the former­ ly dissolved Dialogus group who, misunderstanding the logic of the political system, have blamed the “extremists” and the “fundamentalists” for their fail­ ure. In their program they have pointed out that instead of establishing a move­ ment they prefer types of activities which can be pursued by small groups; and based on this, they strive to develop a tolerance in debates and polemics, to­ gether with a sense of competency among the citizens; thereby, creating a civil society in order to maintain loyal partnership with the structure power. But at this point their ideas fail. The adjustment to the present system be­ comes an end in itself because their critical attitude - beyond the mere declar­ ation of its own existence - has no explicit objectives, priciples, and values. The picture of the “anti-political civil society” delineated in their program is a the­ oretical nonsense over the conditions of state-socialism. Civil society can be non-political in democratic conditions, but it does not work this way when the Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary 383 public sphere and political rights are restricted. This is a semi-embourgoisement: a middle-class manner but without a “citoyen” mind. This began to de­ velop in the seventies but did not prove to be a proper solution to the problem of democratization. Despite its criticism of bureaucracy, it seems to be an in­ sufficient political program in the eighties. The next type of the general ideologies is a classic “third road” value-sys­ tem, which is essentially populism. The populist ideology plays an important role in the peripheral or semi-peripheral countries. Essentially this is an origi­ nal proposition to overcome the disadvantages which raised from the slow and dissimilar social evolution of the area. It appeared in Russia in the first part of the 19th century in the discussions of “zapadniks” and “slavofils” and then among the “narodniks”. In Hungary we can speak about the “populist” and “urban” (Western oriented) circles among the intellectuals in the thirties. This distribution was a doleful symptom of the dissolution of the “homeland and progress”-program in the Hungarian reform-age in the last century. The question was posed in this way: Should Hungary develop from within, in her own organic way, or should the country push itself forward into a moderniza­ tion program brought in from the West? The populist ideology claims and demands the organic improvement. Popu­ lists adhere to the notion that the nation has to follow an internal value-system which is adequate to its own collective identity. According to the populists: To accept external, global ideologies leads to alienation. The general value orien­ tation must not be independent from the traditions, communities, and natural authorities (which recall the precapitalist societies) and from the normative standards of behavior. To their mind society is basically a moral phenomenon and they examine the economic or political changes from moral aspects, above all. According to the populists, economic and political spheres in them­ selves are not able to touch the deeper strata of national existence; the big world-trends like capitalism and socialism operate only on the surface of the national interest. They examine these trends from the standpoint of the national character and what social consequences these trends have brought in the past. They deal in the first place with the situation of national minorities in neighbouring countries (especially in Romania), and with the damaging consequences of urbanization and industrialization: the decreasing number of inhabitants; the increasing of divorces; the disintegration of families; the high mortality, the problems of birth-control and the associated social deviances. Their relation is ambivalent towards every government; that is, critical and conciliatory at the same time. This occurs because the populists’ relation to politics, as a sepa­ rated social sphere, is fundamentally ambivalent. The only possible policy for them is moral policy. This kind of populist “third road” is living as an emotional attitude and as a theory on the basis of populist writers’ thoughts which frequently appeared in the twenties-thirties. The peasantry, the original social basis of populism, has changed in consequence of the social mobility accompanying the forced in- 384 Andräs Bozöki dustrialization and collectivization. Nevertheless, the traditional populist ide­ ology has not disappeared. Some country-side papers and journals as well as some universities and high schools have helped to give strong intellectual sup­ port to this ideology. The populists organized at their meeting in Lakitelek, in September 1987, the widest front of oppositional thinking represented by the MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum). For these members, the main value of the reform is nei­ ther the market economy nor the institutionalization and manifestation of la­ tent political pluralism, i.e., multi-party system, but the priority of solidarity values in a national framework. Nowadays we can experience a rapproche­ ment between the representatives of populism and liberal socialism. The liberal socialist ideology aspires to make consistent liberty values with equality values and political democracy with socialism. It Finds the guarantee and the possibility of renewal in the third value of the classic triad - in the idea of fraternity and solidarity. For the representatives of this ideology the ideal socialism would be the socialized life and economic cooperation without etatism, planned economy, and a redistributive order. They assert that demo­ cratic processes have to operate not only in the political sphere, but in the eco­ nomic field as well. What is self-government in political life, is cooperation in agriculture and self-management in industry. The program of free confederacy is standing on the basis of public property (against nationalized or private property) and the market operates in subordination also. The “free corpora­ tions of free individuals” (Oszkär Jäszi) are the negation of both the competi­ tive system of classic liberalism and the impersonal party-state dictatorship over needs. This ideology would like to reach the face to face personal rela­ tions of precapitalist societies without their hierarchical structure. Its antropological ideal-type is not the individual entrepreneur or state-bureaucrat, but the “cooperative person”. They imagine a corporation-network on the princi­ ple of democratic decentralization without democratic centralism. The pre­ sumed picture of the “cooperative man” emphasizes the importance of discus­ sion, cooperation, and communicative rationality. The theory rejects the fetishism of growth and it would restrain the economic effectiveness in order to create a solidarity-type of social integration. There are Utopian elements in the liberal socialist thinking: they suppose as a starting point an ideal state, not a real state. Liberal socialist thought pre­ sumes that cooperation is more important for the individuals than their selfish goals. It presumes that the avoidance of alienation is more important than the principle of benefit. The optimum between liberty and equality is verified here theoretically only, although their historically developed optimum has been re­ alized in another way: The social-liberal systems in the West have developed through the welfare state, without having to overcome the legacy of dictatorial socialism. Nevertheless, the critique of the theoretical mind and the critique of the attached social action are two different creatures. The program of political democracy, free cooperations, solidarity, and socialization is as actual as in Critical Movements and Ideologies in Hungary 385 earlier times. The liberal socialist thought started from Georg Lukäcs’s cri­ tique on Stalinism, though today there is a greater effect of Oszkär Jäszi’s, Istvän Bibo’s, or for instance Jürgen Habermas’ theories on the thoughts and ideals of young intellectuals. Especially Istvan Bibo’s idea is often quoted, claiming that adaption of Western-type liberty-processes are not contradictory to the evolution toward a non-exploited society. Although there are not too many conscious propagators of the positive program of this ideology, its emo­ tional basis is quite broad among the political or quasi-political communities. According to liberal socialists the existing model of socialism could be re­ formed, and even, to their mind, a radical reform is the only chance for social­ ism to survive. The last element of our tipology is the liberal democratic political value scale. We have to mention here the liberals and the market-oriented demo­ crats. They are so close to each other that we can analyse them together. Libe­ rals would choose less state while democrats prefer a democratic state. Their thinking has been formed by the worldwide affirmed neoliberal-neoconserva­ tive trend, but they themselves - and here the exception proves the rule - have not become antidemocratic liberals. Liberal democrats want a pluralistic political system and a market economy. However, not the reception of the role of market distinguishes them from the liberal socialists (who also accept the market-type of distribution), but the ac­ ceptance of the priority of private ownership against public. According to the liberal democrats a society would function well if its subsystems worked fol­ lowing their own logic. This would be found, for example, as democracy in politics and a market system in the economy. If previously alien logics have been built in, its disfunctional effects have to be compensated for afterwards by a separated institutional system. According to the liberal democrats the process of modernization in Hungary has to follow the well proved western pattern. Their basic values are individual freedom and common engagement in politics coming from below, that is, in other words, the individual entrepre­ neur and the civil society. In this thinking, property is not the restriction of freedom, but its guarantee. Because of this they reject the ideals of socialist common ownership and the anarchistic negation of ownership. They agree with other groups that social institutions have to develop from real practice, as a result of self-organizing processes, both in the case of representative forms, corporations, or local organizations. Their relation to the reform is ambivalent. The majority of them demand a radical reform, expecting much from its social effects. On the other hand, they are skeptical about the question of reform, expressing that this system cannot be improved. There are many people in the younger generation for whom this value-scale is not so much political ideology as a way of life. In a polarized situation they would be the possible followers of this ideology. Manifest for­ mulations of the liberal democratic views are suppressed to the “second pub­ licity”, but their appearance is not dominant even there. Yet, we can find these views in non-expressed forms in numerous economic of sociological articles. 386 Andräs Bozöki We suppose that if the political system had been more democratic, these types of views would have been better supported. Conclusions Finally we summarize our typology in the following table: critical movements and ideologies political cultural avantgarde alternative “single issue’ general literary and art groups way of life initiatives peace mov. ecological movements ‘third road’ ideologies ' prag­ matic \~ populist liberal democrat liberal socialist The social critical actions and value-orientations mentioned above are not al­ ways in their full scope and content conscious among the participants. This occurs because the existing political structure has little tolerance of such a consciousness. The society as a whole can be much more characterized by the fact of neutralism, inarticulation, and the sum of powerless wishes. They are common in suppressed criticism without manifestation. Nevertheless these movements, initiatives, and groups could be the possible representatives of a new political articulation. At the very least, they could support the process of transition. 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