Transforming the Risk Dynamics in Intractable Conflicts:

TRANSFORMING THE RISK DYNAMICS IN INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS Transforming the Risk Dynamics in Intractable Conflicts: Civil Society in Israel as a Case Study Eitan Reich Columbia University TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 2 Table of Contents GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................... 3 ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Background ......................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Issues and Goals ................................................................................................................................ 11 1.3 Conflict Map – Visual and Narrative ................................................................................................ 13 1.4 Literature Review.............................................................................................................................. 21 1.5 Existing Frameworks ........................................................................................................................ 27 1.6 Rephrasing the Research Question.................................................................................................... 29 CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................................. 30 2.1 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 30 2.2 Data Collection ................................................................................................................................. 30 2.3 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 31 2.4 Data Interpretation ............................................................................................................................ 44 2.5 From Data to Intervention Strategies ................................................................................................ 48 CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................................. 50 3.1 Intervention Method.......................................................................................................................... 51 3.2 Rational for the Methodologies......................................................................................................... 52 3.3 Addressing the Needs........................................................................................................................ 56 3.4 Strength-Weakness-Opportunity-Threat (SWOT) Analysis ............................................................. 59 3.5 Capacity Building/Sustainability ...................................................................................................... 61 3.6 Impact of the Intervention ................................................................................................................. 62 CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................................. 62 4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 62 4.2 The Network ..................................................................................................................................... 64 4.3 The Intervention and Challenges to Sustainability ........................................................................... 67 4.4 Strategies for Sustainability .............................................................................................................. 69 CHAPTER 5 ................................................................................................................................. 73 5.1 Meeting Goals ................................................................................................................................... 73 5.2 Applications and Limitations ............................................................................................................ 74 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 75 Annex 1 – Historical Maps ........................................................................................................... 81 TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 3 Annex 2 - Survey Questioner to Israeli Civil Society................................................................... 82 Annex 3 - Risks mentioned in the ‘Peace Index’ surveys ............................................................ 83 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Civil Society – “is the sector of voluntary action within institutional forms that are distinct from those of the state, family and market” (Paffenholtz, 2009, p. 187). Network – a social structure made up of “a collection of nodes connected through links” (Sageman, 2004, p. 137). ACLU – American Civil Liberties Union ACRI – Association for Civil Rights in Israel BDS – Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions CS – Civil Society DST – Dynamical System Theory MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs NIF – New Israel Fund NGO – Non Governmental Organization PA – Palestinian Authority (also called PNA) PM – Prime Minister PN – Peace Now PNA – Palestinian National Authority UN – United Nations US – United States TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 4 ABSTRACT In this research, the risks perception of Israeli Jews will become the basis for looking at the Israeli Palestinian conflict as a case study for an intractable conflict. By mapping the complexity of risk dynamics in the conflict system, through collecting data from three levels of sources, a new understanding of how the perception of risks contribute to the intractability of the conflict will be achieved. Furthermore, combining this new understanding with frameworks taken from the DST approach and from Anthropology, which relate to the rationale of risks analysis, together with the functions of civil society theory during peace building, this research will suggest an interventionary process that will transform the current dynamics of the conflict. This intervention will be based on a process called ‘scenario thinking,’ which will allow the weaving together of a network of participants on the micro level of civil society into a core group of leaders which will impact the system on the macro level. This network will envision future possible scenarios based on the key uncertainties identified and will establish a monitoring task force which will conduct ongoing monitoring of these scenarios and their indicators. This intervention will create the change in the skills and function of civil society that will allow it to work on the edge of chaos and become a key factor in the transformation of the risks system. Although the research is limited to one case study and to the Jewish Israeli public, it is suggested that the findings could be implemented in other contexts and with larger groups of stakeholders. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 5 CHAPTER 1 1.1 Background The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an intractable one (Coleman, 2014, p. 716; Coleman, 2011, p. 114; Cuhadar & Hanafi, 2010, p. 207). It has been going on for decades with periodic escalations and violent phases, the most recent of them being the summer of 2014. This conflict has been in the world’s media and attracted diplomatic attention for many years but has still refuted many attempts of resolution by traditional conflict resolution methods. Cuhadar and Hanafi (2010) say that “efforts to resolve the conflict, whether by traditional means, such as negotiation and mediation, or by military means, have failed time and again over many decades” (Ibid). This research will explore how risks, perceptions, and their dynamics provide an insight into the barriers and opportunities for a resolution of intractable conflicts (see Peleg, 2013). These insights, in turn, will inform the role of civil society in such conflicts. Intractable conflicts make up 5% of all conflicts (Coleman, 2011) and are suggested to be addressed through the Dynamical Systems Theory approach (Coleman, 2011) which will be elaborated on below. An approach dealing with intractable conflicts should focus not on actors, events, root causes, or core issues but rather be pointed at the dynamics and relationships between them. As Coleman (2011) suggests this “does not aim to identify and satisfy underlying interests and needs in order to resolve the presenting conflict” but “looks to transform the dynamics of the system maintaining the status quo” (p. 111). These dynamics, which we’ll explore in chapter 2, will then be combined with a look at the role that civil society plays as an intermediate between the private and political spheres (Spurke, 2010). But, in order to do all this, we will now present the background and context of this case study. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 6 There are many root causes identified for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including ethnic conflict between national identities, a religious conflict over beliefs and history, a competition over resources, and many combinations of these and other causes. Furthermore, there is more than one version as to this conflict’s origins and its starting point in history. Some see these origins imbedded in the rise of the Jewish and Arab national movements at the end of the 19th Century (combined with the decline of the ruling empires who governed the region for centuries, the Ottomans and then the British/French). For example, Smith (2013) describes how for each side “The idea of fairness under the mandate, of encouraging the development of self-governing institution, could apply only to themselves, not to their rivals” (p. 86). Others see it as starting only with the actual establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, following the 1947 UN partition plan which divided British mandatory Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab nation states and the war that followed (see Annex 1, map #1 and Morris.1990). Nevertheless, there is no argument about the crucial role played by the rise of National Socialism in Germany and its consequences for European Jews, the Holocaust (Segev, 1993; Naor, 2003). Thus, linked with both regional and global dynamics far beyond its local scope, this intractable conflict had developed its own internal dynamics over time. From the mass population displacement of Palestinian refugees created by the 1948 war (referred to by Israeli as ‘the war of independence’ and by Palestinians as ‘Al-Nakba’ or ‘the catastrophe’) (see Annex 1, map #2) up to the 1967 war (called by Israelis ‘the six days war’ and by Palestinians, ‘Al-Naksa’ or ‘the setback’), in which Israel occupied lands beyond its recognized borders (‘the Green line’ based on the 1949 armistice agreements, see Annex 1, map #2). These lands were occupied from Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian rule and included the eastern parts of Jerusalem which were divided from 1949-1967 (Segev, 2007) (see Annex 1, map #3). TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 7 1967 marked the beginning of the recent stage in this long and historical conflict. After the occupation of the territories, Israel began to allow groups of Israeli Jews to settle, first under military and security pretexts and later without, in various locations within them. Israel also annexed under its jurisdiction the occupied eastern part of Jerusalem, claiming to ‘unite’ the city as its capital. This act has not been recognized by most states in the world to this day (most foreign embassies to Israel are located in Tel-Aviv, not recognizing Jerusalem as the capital city of Israel) (see Annex 1, maps #4 and #5). It was only in 1987 in what is known as ‘the first Intifada,’ a popular uprising of the occupied Palestinian population living under an Israeli military rule, that the Israeli policies towards Palestinians began to change. This uprising, was claiming an escalating price from both Israeli society and it’s military and was amplified by the end of the cold war and the first Iraqi war of 1991. Israeli political sphere and its public were influenced by these changes and voted for a new leadership that has put the resolution of this conflict as a high priority. Soon thereafter an opportunity presented itself and created the basis for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, or what is called the ‘Oslo process.’ The Oslo process and its interim agreements set up the frameworks and categories that had guided any future attempts to resolve the conflict. They included the establishment of an elected governing body, the ‘Palestinian National Authority’ (PNA) and an elected parliament. They also included a classification of the occupied West Bank to three areas: Area A (with full Palestinian responsibility for both security and civilian issues), Area B (with a Palestinian responsibility for civilian issues and an Israeli responsibility for security), and Area C (in which Israel keeps full control) (see map #6). The Oslo process also postponed negotiations of the key TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 8 disputed issues to a later stage, including: the fate of Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees, water resources, and the future of the Israeli settlements (Smith, 2013, pp. 436-447). While this process progressed and matured into a series of signed intermediate agreements (for a period of 5 years, ending in 1999), it faced growing internal opposition from both the Israeli and the Palestinian societies. Within Israel the opposition was led by right wing political parties together with civilian groups of hard-core religious settlers (there should be a distinction made here between groups of settlers that live in the occupied Palestinian territory because of their religious ideology, and a belief in a divine promise of the land to the Jewish people, from settlers who live there based on their limited financial opportunities or because they have been given governmental housing in these settlements). Smith (2013) explains that, “in the immediate aftermath of the accord’s signing, its Arab and Israeli opponents proclaimed their determination to derail its implementation” (p.441) The violent struggle against the process escalated and resulted in the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin by a young Israeli religious student in November 1995. Even though this tragic and shocking event had rattled Israeli society and exposed the threats to its democratic nature, the called up elections in May 1996 gave the political power to the right who opposed the peace process. This result was very much aided by renewed violence between Israel and the Palestinian Islamic group, Hamas, who was opposing the peace process from within Palestinian society. Since the assassination of PM Rabin, and the elections which followed it in 1996, the framework of the Oslo agreements and the peace process deteriorated. Attempts to revive it made in Camp David (2000), Annapolis (2007), and recently by the U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, have all failed. These failed attempts were accompanied or followed soon after by further TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 9 escalations and by new rounds of violence, like the second Intifada of 2000-2004, and Israeli military operations in the West Bank and Gaza (in 2004, 2006, 2008, 2013, and recently in 2014). Without a manageable peace process, or committed negotiations between the sides, each side began addressing their own needs and threats in unilateral ways. Israel has built a ‘separation barrier’ in the form of a concrete wall which separates it from the Palestinian territory while still built on occupied lands to protect Israeli settlers living within this territory (see The International Court of Justice, July 9, 2004). In 2004, Israel also decided to unilaterally ‘disengage’ from the Gaza Strip, pulling out its military forces and dismantling its civilian settlements. The Palestinians, on their part, held a round of general elections for their assembly and the PNA, in 2006, in which the Islamic opposition group Hamas rose from a popular opposition movement to official power. Hamas, affiliated with the global movement of the ‘Islamic Brotherhood’ was then already listed, in many western states, as a terrorist organization in the context of the global ‘War on Terror’. This rise to official power within the context of the Oslo structure had immediate implications on international aid given to the PNA and on the global relations of the Palestinians. The violent clashes which followed the elections, formed a split of power and led to the establishment of two governments in parts of the Occupied Territory. Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip and the PA, led by the secular Fatah party, governs the West Bank. Following this divide, Israel has changed its policies towards the Gaza Strip and declared it “a terrorist entity” (MFA, September 19, 2007), enforcing a de-facto siege over its borders with the Strip (the Gaza Strip has another land passage to Egypt which also remained tightly controlled due to internal Egyptian concerns but also due to close coordination with Israel). Another unilateral step from TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 10 the Palestinian side was taken in 2009, when the PNA approached the United Nations Security Council and other UN bodies in request to recognize Palestine as an independent state. This process is still underway. In this long and spiraling dynamic of changes and developments, the engagement of civilian forces in peacebuilding should be considered challenging, to say the least. Israeli civil society’s engagement with the Israeli populations and with the Israeli political leadership can also be described as dynamic and changing. The history of civil engagement of Israeli and Jewish publics goes back to before the establishment of the state of Israel. Then, this engagement took the form of women’s groups, youth movements, sports clubs, and labor unions. It was not until the 1967 occupation, followed by the 1973 war with Israel’s Arab neighbors, that civic engagement has become more engaged with the political issues of war and peace. Laskier (2000) links these changes, in content and approach, to an American influence. Saying that “Israeli peace movements have been influenced by antiwar and other peace protest mobilization strategies employed by the Americans” (p. 145). Describing the establishment of Israel’s first advocacy organization ‘the Association for Civil Rights in Israel’ (ACRI) in 1972, he mentions how “as Israel's foremost advocate of individual rights, the ACRI functions in the same way as the ACLU, taking selected cases to court to redress violations of civil rights and establishing precedents that aim at preventing future abuses” (p. 132). Laskier (2000) also refers to the establishment of Peace Now (PN) in 1978 as a key moment. He compares PN activities to its American counterparts, saying that, “PN organized peaceful antiwar marches that recall the Vietnam War demonstrations of 1967 to 1970. It mobilized 400,000 people for the unprecedented September 1982 demonstration against Israel's military involvement in Lebanon” (p. 146). TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 11 The influences of the American reality on civil society in Israel is not only limited to shared values and operating strategies. Laskier (2000) importantly mentions that “from 1948 well into the 1980s, Israeli nonprofit organizations were almost exclusively dependent on American and Western European Jewry for financial support” (p. 133). He notes how, “The Israeli peace movement has made important strides in its domestic and antiwar efforts. But it is still too premature to assess properly the successes and failures of their effort to condition public opinion and influence government decisions.” (p. 149) Building on its origins in the 1970s and development through the 1980s, the diversity and growth of Civil Society in Israel (especially the parts of it that are involved and engaged in the peace process) has happened in several waves, corresponding with the developments in the conflict itself. Cuhadar and Hanafi (2010) found that 62% of NGOs were established prior to the Oslo Accords, 33% of them were established during the peace process years and only 5% started operating after the outbreak of the second Intifada (p. 215) This background of both the conflict’s dynamics and the development of Israeli civil society engaged with the issues of war and peace and specifically with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, gives us the understanding we need in order to approach this case study. In the following parts the key issues and goals of this research project will be outlined and a visual and narrative map of this case study conflict will be added to this background. 1.2 Issues and Goals # 1. Issue Research of intractable conflicts suggests a Goal Collect the perceptions of risks from the Jewish need to study the conflict’s dynamics rather Israeli population and create a mapping of their than the conflict’s issues. Furthermore, risks perceptions’ relations in order to allow current Conflict Resolution research seldom better analysis of the dynamics behind the TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT relates to the concept of risks and risks 12 conflict. perception as a central variable. 2. A majority of the Israeli Jewish public has Understand the complexity of risks that Israelis lost trust in the peace process and perceive as resulting from resolving/not motivation to resolve the conflict with the resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. Palestinians. (See The Peace Index.2010; Hermann.2009; Cuhadar and Hanafi.2010) 3. Israeli Civil Society is not influential in Engage Civil Society leaders to understand and creating such motivation for resolving the communicate better their engagement with the conflict with the Palestinians. risks that Israelis perceive as resulting from resolving/not resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 13 1.3 Conflict Map – Visual and Narrative The following narrative will accompany this visual conflict map: 1.3.1 ACTORS 1.3.1.1 Primary The primary actors in our conflict map are the main civil society groups, from the political left, the political right, and those who deal with less political issues. The way these actors represent, mobilize, and influence publics and groups within the Israeli society makes key groups in the society primary actors as well. Some of the main actors that need to be acknowledged in this group are the ‘peace camp’ organizations and the ‘right wing’ group. As we have seen in the background before, ‘peace camp’ civil society groups emerged during a long period of time, from the 1970s to the 1990s, and are modeled and influenced by the American TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 14 antiwar and civil rights movements. However, since the collapse of the Oslo agreements and the renewed violence of the second intifada that brought about unilateral steps from both sides of the conflict, a more radical generation of organizations emerged, critical of the traditional ‘peace camp’. Such organizations often question the ability to end the occupation over the Palestinians while keeping Israel’s Zionist identity; they often see the political conflict as embedded in other forms of economic and political structures and privileges which Israeli Jews will have to change in order to resolve the political conflict. On the other hand, the ‘right wing’ affiliated civil society has been very much effective since the Rabin assassination in 1995, and has managed to support the growth of population in the settlements to an all-time record. However, since the unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, when their campaign to overturn the decision failed, this part of society has taken more radical tactics as well. From strategically taking over political parties to increasing their political influence in Parliament, to the more radical direct actions taken by youth groups who chose violence and intimidation tactics against Palestinians and also against left wing civil society and politicians (known as ‘price tag’ attacks. This targeting of left-leaning civil society has also taken less violent and more mainstreamed forms through suggested legislation or inquiries questioning the left-leaning CS funding sources and even through full scale public campaigns (against the New Israel Fund, for example, and lately against B’tselem). This trend has been backed by the political allies of these groups through a series of legislation, parliamentary debates and procedures aimed at limiting the work of left-oriented civil society and the peace camp specifically. Within Israeli society, some of the groups are more interesting and vital than others to a possible resolution. The Palestinian minority in Israel is a special social group with historical and TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 15 identity ties with the other side of the conflict. This puts them in a very vulnerable position especially when their freedom of speech and their political affiliation is questioned. A second important group is the immigrants from the former Soviet bloc and their younger generation of sometimes alienated communities. These communities are many times the ones who live in settlements, not from a political or religious ideology but because they have been given housing there when immigrated, so the young generation who was born into the reality they immigrated to will not easily understand and agree to seeing themselves as occupiers and consider leaving their homes and communities. The Orthodox Jews are a third important group, also many times congregated in their communities in the occupied territory and also living in poverty and marginalization from the mainstream society. These communities are not always favoring the state but are also not inclined to see the other side’s interests and concerns. The New Israel Fund is an interesting actor in that matter, and is therefore separated from the rest in the conflict map. As an umbrella organization traditionally linking the liberal Jewish public funding overseas (see secondary actors) with Israeli civil society, it have been targeted as advancing ‘foreign interests’. Looking at the development of the diverse civil society in Israel, including the non-political issues from the 1970s onward, the NIF role in this has been central and crucial. 1.3.1.2 Secondary Moving on to look at the secondary actors, they are mainly located within the Israel political sphere or benefiting from overseas financial support. The U.S. Jewish communities, and others in the U.K. and Europe, are key international players in this context. They support, financially and ideologically, many of the conflicted social groups in Israel, from the ‘peace camp’ to the settlers and the Jewish Orthodox community. All of these groups have their champions and funders in the Jewish diaspora which, especially in the U.S, also has very strong TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 16 internal political power, in Congress, which turns out to be important every so often when crucial political questions are on the agenda. 1.3.1.3 Tertiary Third party actors or less relevant actors in our contexts, are most of the international players, the Palestinians and the Arab world, but also the Palestinian communities and actors within Israel, in civil society, as a minority and as political players. This needs to be explained not by saying they have no power or influence in regard to the resolution of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. It means that in the context of this research, about the perceptions of risks of Jewish Israelis and the role of civil society to engage this complexity, the Palestinian point of view is external and has become, even if close and influential, a third party perspective. 1.3.2 STRUCTURES 1.3.2.1 Economic Israel’s economy is heavily dependent on its high-tech and military industries and on its exposure and cooperation with international markets. The diamond trade and military/security industries are contributing high percentages to the GDP. A new developing industry of natural gas is now in rapid growth after recent discoveries of yielding gas fields in the eastern parts of the Mediterranean Sea. However, Israel’s high revenues from these industries do not distribute evenly. The Gini Index of Israel now stands on 37 and is in constant growth. In 2013, the OECD (Dattel & Feldman, May 15, 2013) ranked Israel first amongst its members, with over 20% poverty rates and a 30% growth in these rates over a period of 15 years: TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 17 Growth in poverty rates within OECD countries 1995-2010 Related to Israeli global economic exposure is the global campaign for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS). Originated in the early 2000s as a non-violent strategy endorsed by the Palestinian civil society, it has become a global call for action and since 2005 has become one of the leading global solidarity campaigns with Palestine and against the Israeli occupation. Israel is fighting this campaign with ongoing diplomatic and public relations initiatives mainly accusing the campaign as being Anti-Semitic. Since its inception, the campaign has managed to exert some effective pressure over Israel, and has been extended to include academic and cultural ties. This plight for solidarity that has originated from the Palestinian civil society and had made political and economic impacts, has also influenced the dynamic of cooperation between the two populations and especially the two civil societies. Where once cooperation and joint work were possible and welcomed by both in country organizations and external donors, there has been constant decline in such initiatives under the title of ‘normalization,’ accusing any cooperation between the conflicting sides as ‘normalizing’ the Israeli occupation. 1.3.2.2 Political TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 18 One of the key political structures is the marginalization of the left’s voice and perspective. Starting with the failure of the Camp David meetings in 2000, and in parallel to the outbreak of the second Intifada and the unilateral processes both sides of the conflict initiated, there have been ongoing claims that ‘there is no partner for peace’ and the Palestinian political leadership is unable to lead a resolution to the conflict. This process has ‘pulled the rug out’ from beneath the feet of the political agenda of the Israeli left and contributed to a clear marginalizing of their political representation and voices. The constant decline in traditional left-leaning political parties’ power and the rise of new ‘central’ parties with no clear peace agendas, are the most visible indicators of this structural change. The Peace Index (2010) Cuhadar and Hanafi (2010) say that, “This shift in opinion has also led to the weakening and shattering of the part of society – also known as the peace camp – mobilized to support the peace process down the years” (p. 210). ‘The Peace Index’ mentions that today only 13% of Israelis identify themselves as left-leaning, while 51% of Israelis identify themselves as right wing, and 28% as center (March 11, 2014). 1.3.2.3 Social Here, I have chosen two cultural structures in the context of our topic: the Zionist ideology, which is embedded in all of Israel’s social and political processes, and the education TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 19 system, which is very much aligned with the Zionist ethos and its implications. The education system does not allow the inclusion of the Palestinian perspective of the conflict in education materials, and several attempts to include these, even aimed at the Palestinian minorities, have met with decisive political objections and blocks. This system is also aligned with the militaristic security structure and militaristic images and content can be found in it from early ages. Cuhadar and Hanafi relate to this when they say that, “education for a Jewish and Zionist identity has historically been prioritized over education in liberal democratic values…” and that “there is a major gap between the socialization of secular and that of religious citizens….religious Jews are socialized in such a way that makes them more hawkish towards the establishment of a Palestinian state…” (p. 223). The Peace Index (2010) 1.3.2.4 Security It is not possible to discuss the background of this conflict today without mentioning the Arab Spring and the more violent aftermath it had in the form of Salafist Islamic violence and specifically in ISIS and its actions in Iraq and Syria. Not knowing what the future of this movement will look like and to what extent the West will fight it effectively, Israel is in the TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 20 midst of this turmoil and sometimes even exploits it to postpone addressing its own longstanding conflicts. This exploitation of regional and global security hazards to block progress on local spheres of conflict is part of a militarized discourse in society. In Israel, army enlistment is mandatory, and even the educational system is geared towards preparing youth for their obligatory military service. According to the CIA’s (2012) information by country, Israel spends approximately 6% of its GDP on military budgets, this puts it in the 4th place in the world concerning military spending. Following South Sudan, Oman, and Saudi-Arabia. 1.3.3 DYNAMICS The dynamics are all the links and relations drawn on the map between the actors and also between the actors and the structures. There are four main relations: simple connections, funding relations, alliances, and conflict. We will shortly mention the main dynamics here: 1.3.3.1 Connection Many of the actors are connected in diverse ways, which are less relevant to our context. However, it may be interesting to note the ways that different structures connect with each other and with the primary actors, for example, how the education system connects to the Zionist structure and Militarism as a security structure. 1.3.3.2 Funding Funding is one of the key dynamics that I chose to mention and is influential to our context, especially between the Jewish diaspora and the international donors that fund Israeli civil society. Here, the role of the New Israel Fund (NIF) as an intermediary is crucial. 1.3.3.3 Alliances Alliances between some of the players is an important dynamic. It is important to see, for example, how the right wing civil society is in alliance with the settlers and the right wing TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 21 political parties. Some of the members of parliament from the right wing political parties are leaders of settlers communities and have been active in various right wing civil society organizations and associations. This network of ties and relations is key to understanding today’s Israeli political trends. 1.3.3.4 Conflicts Like alliances, the conflicts between the actors could be revealing and educating. It may be revealing to see how the UN is perceived within Israeli society or how the left wing civil society is being attacked for having foreign funding (thus being accused as promoting foreign interests). The role of the BDS movement and its conflict with Israeli society and the private sector is another example of a key dynamic within the conflict. 1.4 Literature Review Following the background and context setting, it is now time to present the theoretical background for this research. Thus, here the theories that would inform this research project would be outlined and explained, and the frameworks and models that would be used for interpretation of the collected data will be introduced. The theoretical tools that will be used are taken from three main, though separate, fields of enquiry, and this project will attempt to show how a convergence between them can add value to the study of conflicts and for planning possible interventions. These three theoretic fields are: intractable conflict theories, theories about civil society and its roles, and theories about risks, especially from an anthropological perspective. Research findings from the field of emotions and conflict resolution research will be discussed briefly in order to support the selection of the dynamic system and risk theories. 1.4.1 Intractable Conflict Theory Intractable conflicts are a special kind of conflict that resists resolution through the traditional tools (Coleman, 2014). Coleman (2014) presents five theoretical paradigms for TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 22 dealing with them: a realist paradigm, a human-relations paradigm, a pathology paradigm, the postmodern one, and the systems one (pp. 709-716). Even though these paradigms allow the exploration and research of intractable conflicts, they remain difficult to engage with and to resolve. However, research suggests that this kind of conflicts accounts for just 5% of all conflicts, and should be studied through the systems paradigm (Coleman, 2011, 2014). In this study we will explore the case of Israel-Palestine as such an intractable conflict, and embrace the systems paradigm, which harnesses the principles of dynamical systems theory (DST). The selection of this theory for this project will enable us to explore the dynamics which are imbedded within this conflict and to suggest a move beyond the discussion of conflict issues. Instead, we will suggest to analyze the dynamics between the risks which are perceived by Jewish Israelis. A dynamic which some researchers suggest is contributing to the intractability of this conflict. For example, in researching the impact of emotions on motivations to resolve conflicts, Halperin (2013) refers to the dynamics of risks (through emotions like ‘fear’ and ‘threat’), saying that, “studies show that experiences of threat and fear increase conservatism, prejudice, ethnocentrism and intolerance” (p. 71). He continues to argue that research “in the framework of terror management theory, show that an existential threat leads to more right-wing inclinations and less compromising political tendencies” (Ibid). Furthermore, in negotiations settings, “fear and collective angst lead to the strengthening of ingroup ties…, risk-aversive political tendencies, and concrete objection to negotiation” (Ibid). However, emotions associated with risks are not only barriers for peace but are “very differently from hatred, the emotional goal associated with fear is to decrease levels of threat, rather than to simply hurt the outgroup” (Ibid). TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 23 Therefore, exploring the dynamics of risks as an ambiguous perception and motivation can allow new understanding of the intractability of the conflict, but also for its opportunities and possible interventions. Halperin (2013) points out that if people believe that the “risks embedded within the peace process are lower than the risks contained in rejecting the potential security that can be achieved if the process succeeds,” it is suggested that there may be a willingness to make more compromises for peace (p. 71). 1.4.2 Risk Theory Another body of theories and frameworks that will be used are theories concerning the concept of risk itself. Althaus (2005) surveyed existing theories about risk, from various disciplines, trying to “progress our understanding of risk by adopting a cumulative definitional approach that embraces the perspectives of the collective wisdom of the various disciplines” (p. 567). Her findings show how the various disciplines approach risks by applying different types of knowledge onto the ‘unknown’ or ‘uncertain’ (p. 569): TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 24 As will be mentioned below, what is mostly interesting to us is the way anthropology and psychology address this issue. Her findings are especially interesting to our own discussion, as she found that there is an absence of “a particularly political understanding of risk. There is a sense that there is something particular about political risk that has yet to be captured” (p. 580). This is not to say that political studies never treat risk theoretically, as there are bodies of theory relating to environmental politics, game theory, and public policy (p. 581). However, Althaus stresses that the political scientists “tend to be preoccupied with either elaborating various other disciplinary risk theories or advancing public policy theories rather than concentrating on what might be peculiarly political about risk” (Ibid). Mary Douglas is quoted by her as saying that “if the political dimension is there, it is not safe to evade it; the only thing to do is to confront it and include the political dialogue in your theory” (p. 580). For this study, the political dimension is a key in understanding the way perceived risks impact the intractability of a conflict and to understand the ways that civil society may best intervene and influence this dynamic. Althaus also sites Thompson (p. 568) who suggested five ways to define risk: a subjective risk, an objective risk, a real risk, an observed risk, and a perceived risk. In this study we will be considering the centrality and dynamics of the risk perceptions so that we’ll adopt the definition used for ‘perceived risk,’ which is: “the rough estimate of real risk made by an untrained member of the general public.” This definition uses ‘real risk’ which is defined as: “the combination of probability and negative consequences that exist in the real world” (p. 568). Mary Douglas is also one of the key theoreticians of risk perceptions mentioned by Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006). They have focused on the different social sciences’ research approaches to the concept of risk. Looking at economy, social-psychology, sociology, and anthropology, they show how the work of Douglas is the basis for what is known as ‘the TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 25 sociocultural approach to risk’ (p. 37). This theoretical approach is based on the core assumption “that the individual’s perception and response to risk can only be understood against the background of their embeddedness in a sociocultural background and identity as a member of a social group” (Ibid). The sociocultural approach to risk will be the background for two frameworks that we will use to analyze the collected data. According to this approach, the risks of Jewish Israelis will have to be understood as embedded in a political, social and even moral point of view. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) explain that the question about the acceptance of risks by any population is “the prime political question” (p. 4). 1.4.3 Civil Society (in Peace Building) Theory If the acceptance of risk by the public is a political matter then this is where the third body of theory comes in, regarding the role of civil society, as an intermediate between society and the political sphere. Spurk (2010) explores the research of civil society within the development of philosophy and political thought (p. 4). According to him, research is split as to whether civil society challenges or strengthens the existing political order, or do both (pp. 5-6). But all agree that it has emerged to be seen as a separate sector from the state and from the political sphere, “due to the fact that civil society is making political demands towards the state and others” (p. 7). The term is historically linked to the developments in the West and has come to describe “the political emancipation of citizens” (p. 9), in the 18th- 19th Centuries. “Typically, various intermediaries act as connectors between the private sphere (ordinary citizens who are only occasionally directly involved in politics) and the political-administrative system (running the country with little or no direct contact with the population). Intermediaries – including political parties, associations, TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 26 social movements, and the media – establish contact and feedback among these distant spheres.” (p. 8) Robert Putnam (2000) sees ‘social capital’ and ‘social networks’ as the core elements of civil society, along with the norms it creates like reciprocity and trustworthiness. This is following de Tocqueville who, “saw associations as a schools of democracy in which democratic thinking, attitudes, and behavior are learned by individual citizens” (Spurk, 2010, p. 5). The specific engagement of civil society in armed conflicts is a sub-field of the research. Paffenholz (2010) describes how civil society has changed its position from being a marginalized player, during the cold war era, to becoming a key factor in any peacebuilding effort (p. 60). Today, “civil society is often considered within many peacebuilding theories to be a core actor in the attainment of positive peace” (p. 61). Even though comprehensive theories in this field are lacking (Spurk, 2010, p. 18; Paffenholz, 2010, p. 64), some case studies of civil society engagement in times of armed conflict show common patterns, including the limitations put on civil society’s activities and its difficulties in communicating with the public and authorities (Ibid). Another key theoretical element here, which will be important to remember in our discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian case study, is what Spurk (2010) calls the ‘uncivilized’ side of civil society (p.18). Warning that especially in times of conflict, “civil society groups might become instrumentalized by political elites on the basis of ethnicism, which in some cases leads to the “decivilization” of society” (p. 19). We shall be aided by these theoretical assumptions about civil society and its political role as an intermediate in our research. Let’s proceed now to describe the four frameworks and models, informed by these theories which will be specifically used for the interpretation of the collected data. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 27 1.5 Existing Frameworks The first framework that will be chosen will be the attractors’ model from the dynamical systems theory of intractable conflicts (Coleman, 2011, 2014). Coleman suggests that attractors are a key factor in understanding both the intractability of the conflict and the potential for a dynamic change. He lists 10 guidelines for working with long-term conflicts (Coleman, 2014, p. 726). This framework of an attractor’s landscape will help us map the dynamics of risks perceived by Jewish Israelis regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its possible resolution. We will use a dynamics mapping tool to show the interactions, loops, and attractors which these risks perceptions form. A second framework is Paffenholz and Spurk’s (2010) suggested framework of seven functions of civil society (pp. 65-66). This framework of civil society’s roles in peacebuilding processes will be adding value to our inquiry of the case study presented here: # Function What it means 1. Protection “…the provision of security and the reduction of violence” (p. 67) 2. Monitoring “…the creation of political early-warning systems and reporting on human rights abuses” (p. 68) Advocacy and “…promoting relevant social and political themes to the public agenda” (pp. Communication 68-69). In-Group “…to promote attitude changes within society by developing peaceful conflict Socialization resolution and reconciliation” (p. 70). 5. Social Cohesion “…to help groups learn how to live together in peaceful coexistence” (p.72). 6. Intermediation “…an intermediate/facilitator between citizens and the state” (p. 73). 3. 4. and Facilitation 7. Service Delivery “…it remains unclear whether or not aid delivery is a function that supports TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 28 peacebuilding” (p. 74). This framework will inform our understanding of the perceptions Israeli civil society has about its own roles in facilitating political demands from the society to the political sphere and back again, and to understand how it manages the complexity of risks that will emerge from the data collection. Cuhadar and Hanafi (2010) have done a comprehensive analysis of the Israeli and Palestinian civil societies according to this framework conflict and their findings will be incorporated (see 2.3.2.4). The third framework is a typology matrix suggested by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). In it, Douglas and Wildavsky list four types of risks based on the interaction between the social consent and the type or level of knowledge about the risk (certain or uncertain) (p. 5). KNOWLEDGE Complete Contested Consent Certain Uncertain Problem – Technical Solution – Calculation Problem – Information Solution – Research Problem – (dis) Agreement Solution – Coercion or Discussion Problem – Knowledge and Consent Solution - ? The fourth framework, which also emerged out of the sociocultural approach to risk, is what Lakoff (2007) describes as “the emergence and extension of “preparedness” as a form of rationality” (p. 247). Lakoff suggests this as a symbol of a broad cultural change that exposes a question - “what is the logic through which potential dangers to collective life are being taken up as political problems?” (Ibid). This question will contribute directly to our analysis of the data at TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 29 hand. Lakoff contrasts this new form of rationality to a former one, the rationality of insurance (pp. 249-252). In this table/model he compares the two (p. 255): This table can help us, as a framework, to understand the rationale of the perception of risks that Jewish Israelis perceive and to place them in their correct political context. Using these frameworks to interoperate the data can lead us to a reframing and rephrasing of our initial research question. 1.6 Rephrasing the Research Question Following the context setting of this chapter, including setting up the theoretical background and specific frameworks to be used in the process of the data collection and analysis, it is time to focus the research question that was set at the start. Initially, our research question was about the insights a risk dynamic can shade on the research of intractable conflicts, the barriers and opportunities they hold, and inform the role of civil society working within them. Rephrasing the research question at this point will attempt at finding: how can civil society, as a key intermediary between society and the political sphere, best influence the complexity of risks-dynamics that exist within intractable conflicts in order to change their resistance to any resolution? TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 30 To be able to answer this question we will now turn to our data collection, analysis, and interpretation. CHAPTER 2 2.1 Methodology For this research project it seems that the methodology of a case study will fit best. This is because we wish to look deeper into an intractable conflict’s dynamic. Creswell (2007) explains that a case study methodology “explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information…” (p. 73). Here we wish to converge few separate theoretical perspectives together to learn new things about intractable conflicts in general and about civil society’s engagement with risks dynamics within them. Using a case study methodology will allow us to learn these issues “not for generalizing beyond the case, but for understanding the complexity of the case” (Creswell, 2007, p. 75). The case of Israel-Palestine therefore, is chosen as a bounded system, an instrumental case study (p. 74) which will help us understand the complexity of risk dynamics in intractable conflicts and how the role of civil society can be enhanced and amplified using this understanding. To achieve this in-depth understanding we will use multiple information sources and perspectives, as was advised by Creswell. 2.2 Data Collection In order to collect the data to portray the situation of this case study, several sources of information will be used. The first will inform us about the Israeli Jewish public’s perceptions of threat and risk. This perspective will be explored through using a data base which has been regularly surveying the Israeli public since the Oslo agreements - ‘The Peace Index’ (http://www.peaceindex.org/defaultEng.aspx). Another, more official source of data which will input the perspective of the political structure into the understanding of the complexity of risks, TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 31 will be the official website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). This is where the official communication of the state is presented to the world, and the way it presents the threats to Israel will be useful to our case. A third source of information will enable us to collect the perspective of the Israeli civil society on these issues. Their perspective will be collected by preparing and disseminating a survey based on my own network of contacts within Israeli civil society (see questioner in Annex 2), but focusing on the Jewish Israeli contacts. These contacts represent a specific actor in the conflict map (see 1.3), the “Left Wing Civil Society.” A group of 32 contacts out of this actor were chosen based on their activity and connectivity. Ten are current directors of NGOs: human rights, feminist, workers’ rights, and religious groups. Five are founders of key NGOs in the peace movement in Israel. The rest are activists who are connected to these organizations and some others, but were chosen due to extensive posting and exposure of daily content on Facebook. These are nodes in the network (see 4.2) who create content which passes widely across the network and create conversations. I have excluded professional lawyers and private sector contacts from this population. Some further historical data about Israelis’ perception of risks will be collected from both media sources and from existing research. For example, several researchers use Israel as a case study to explore related topics such as in the case of Barak and Sheffer (2009), who dedicate a part of their book to “The Israeli Case and Theories of Existential Threats” (p. 177). Another one will be a research of Israeli civil society as a part of the peace process (Hermann, 2009). 2.3 Data Analysis The data collected through the three main sources and the additional academic literature will be analyzed through the four selected frameworks. 2.3.1 ‘The Peace Index’ TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 32 “The Peace Index conducts a monthly survey of a representative sample of Israel’s adult population, which includes approximately 600 men and women, Jewish and Arab citizens, residents of agricultural communities, and Jewish settlers residing beyond the Green Line” (http://en.idi.org.il/tools-and-data/guttman-center-for-surveys/the-peace-index/). From this data source we have gathered 17 risks (see Annex 3), questioned about in the surveys between January 2013 and September 2014 (January 2013 is the month in which the current government was elected). Applying the four frameworks to this data produced the following insights. 2.3.1.1 Risks Rationales This framework was developed by Andrew Lakoff (2007, see 1.5) to differentiate the ways that risks are thought of. On the one hand, there is the calculated, ‘insurance’ rationale, which deals with regularly accruing and predicted risks. On the other hand, there is another rationale that enters when we deal with unpredictable and probably catastrophic risks, this is the rationale of ‘preparedness.’ When we apply this differentiation on the 17 risks listed already (from the ’Peace Index’ database), we can mark ten as being dealt with using a rationale of ‘preparedness’ and seven as more predictable, and thus fall under the insurance rationale. 2.3.1.2 Risks Matrix The form of rationale that is used to think about each of the risks helps us to locate their position within the risks matrix. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) suggested this framework to see risks within a grid of four types. Each type is based on the interaction between the level of social consent about that risk and the level of knowledge about the risk (certainty or uncertainty). Applying this grid to the risks surveyed in the ‘Peace Index’ enables us to differentiate between the many risks asked about in the surveys. Placing these risks within the matrix was done based on the findings of the surveys (see Annex 3). A majority of the public supporting a specific answer makes the risk a ‘complete TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 33 consent,’ but if the answers were split then the risk falls under ‘contested consent.’ The level of knowledge/certainty of each risk was estimated by me, based on whether the risk has already happened (= more certain), or whether it’s a projected risk, which figures it with less certainty. Here are the results of using the framework on the data collected: Knowledge Complete Contested Consent Certain    Rockets from Gaza Palestinian reconciliation External pressure     Socioeconomic challenges Negotiations with the Palestinians Isolation Terror attacks Uncertain            Dependence on the US Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state Refugees return to Israel Existential security threat Agreement with Iran Nuclear Middle East ISIS Arab spring impacts Israel becomes a bi-national state Israel loses its Jewish majority Economic and other sanctions 2.3.1.3 Risk Dynamic Mapping In the application of dynamical systems theory to intractable conflict (Coleman, 2011), mapping the system’s dynamic is a key tool for analysis and interpretation. When we use this framework in our enquiry we come up with the following mapping of dynamics. For this map the threat of “losing Jewish majority and becoming a bi-national state” has been separated into two risks (therefore there are 18 risks on the map). Furthermore, the five risks which are located within the uncertain and contested quarter of the risks matrix are marked as most the risky on the map using the orange color. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 34 The model suggested here is based on the idea of attractors and attractor’s landscape (Coleman, 2011, p. 78). Attractors are “the somewhat stable pattern or tendencies in systems that draw us in and that resist change” (Ibid). Here, these tendencies can be located where many of the arrows, symbolizing the dynamics between the risks, are to be found. As many arrows leave or reach a risk, one would suggest that this risk is part of a larger dynamic that may become an attractor. In the theory of dynamical systems and its application to conflict situations, Coleman suggests that “the pieces of the attractor are said to be connected mostly through reinforcing feedback loops, where the various components simply fuel each other” (p. 82). This means that we should look for the attractors in this mapped system where the arrows leave a risk and return to it (creating a loop), and are of the same color (either both increasing the risk or decreasing it, so that they reinforce the dynamic). Therefore, it seems that the main attractor in this system is “the political negotiation with the Palestinians.” Another attractor can be located in the risks of “not recognizing Israel as a Jewish state,” which is linked in internal dynamics to “losing Jewish TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 35 majority,” “the return of Palestinian refugees” and “Israel becoming a bi-national state.” The risks from Iran and its nuclear power may also create a small attractor but without many dynamics around it. 2.3.2 Civil Society in Israel’s Survey The second data source that we will analyze here will be the answers received through a survey (see Annex 1) sent to Israeli civil society activists and leaders. The survey was sent to 32 contacts from my Facebook network. Ten answers have been received and are analyzed here. The questions in the survey were aimed to extract the participants’ perception of the risks facing Israeli society and their opinion on the consent/certainty. They have also been asked about the roles that civil society performs. 2.3.2.1 Risks Matrix Collecting these perceptions about the consent and certainty of the list of risks (which we have initially gathered from the ‘Peace Index’), we received the following results (10 is highest consent): Agreement between the West and Iran Israel loosing Jewish majority Peace Process with the Palestinia ns 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 4 1 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 2 1 2 2 1 3 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 6 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 0 0 7 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 2 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 9 0 1 1 1 0 1 4 2 1 2 2 4 1 1 2 2 1 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 Consent Arab Spring influence ISIS on Arab states Sanctions Violence Socioeconomic on Israel and Terror Gaps Palestinians will not Rocket Return of Dependence International recognize fire from Palestinian on the US Isolation Israel as Gaza refugees Jewish state Neuclear capacity Security International Palestinian for more Existential Pressure reconceliation states in threat the ME TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 36 This table shows how the survey respondents see the Israeli Jewish public’s consent around each of the risks we took from the ‘Peace Index survey.’ Lower marks mean less agreement with the public on the perception of this risk. The five risks the respondents see as contested by the public are: agreement with Iran, the Peace Process with the Palestinians, Arab spring influencing Arab countries, Palestinians not recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, and the Palestinian reconciliation. There are three risks that the respondents (though the Israeli Jewish public) agree on. They are: violence and terror, soci-economic gaps, and rocket fire from Gaza. These three risks are part of the six risks that the general survey of the ‘Peace Index’ identified as ‘certain’ (see 2.3.1.2). However, it is important to note that there are nine risks (more than half of the risks listed!) about which the survey respondents were not able to agree to. Moving to explore their responses regarding the certainty of the risks we find this picture (10 is the highest certainty): Certainty Agreement between the West and Iran Peace Arab Israel Process Spring loosing with the influence ISIS Jewish Palestinia on Arab majority ns states Palestinians Rocket Return of will not Sanctions Violence Socioeconomic Dependence International fire from Palestinian recognize on Israel and Terror Gaps on the US Isolation Gaza refugees Israel as Jewish state Neuclear Security capacity International Palestinian Existential for more Pressure reconceliation threat states in the ME 1 2 3 1 1 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 5 1 0 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 3 2 0 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 4 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 5 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 3 1 6 1 0 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 8 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 1 1 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 9 0 2 0 1 0 2 2 3 1 4 3 3 0 0 3 0 1 10 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 6 1 3 3 1 0 1 3 0 1 This table shows us how certain civil society respondents see the realistic chances for each of the risks. Most of the risks get a majority of votes, either for being more certain: TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 37 sanctions, violence, socioeconomic gaps, dependence on the US, isolation, rockets, and external pressure, or less certain: agreement with Iran, the peace process, the Arab spring’s influence, the return of Palestinian refugees, the nuclear capacities of ME countries, and a security existential threat. The responses remained inconclusive about the chances for three risks to occur; the Palestinian reconciliation, Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, and Israel losing its Jewish majority. Using the risks matrix to locate each one, which was given a certainty level and a consent level, we get the below matrix, which leaves three risks as uncertain but unknown in the level of consent. These are: the return of Palestinian refugees, the nuclear capacities of other states in the ME, and the existential security threat. Knowledge e Complet Contested Consent Certain    Violence and Terror Socio-Economic Gaps Rocket fire from Gaza  Palestinians do not recognize Israel as a Jewish state Palestinian reconciliation  Uncertain    Agreement with Iran The Peace Process with the Palestinians Arab spring influences Arab countries 2.3.2.2 Risks Dynamics Mapping The survey invited the respondents to provide additional risks that face the Israeli Jewish society if the conflict with the Palestinians is not resolved in the next 5 years: • Another war /violence, • Erosion of the Israeli democratic regime; Fascist trends; Racism, • Growing hatred of the Palestinians, TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 38 • Growing despair of citizens, • An apartheid regime; Strengthening of the settlements, displacement of Palestinians from their lands; the continuation of the occupation, • Further extremism on both sides; Right wing extremism, both political and religious, • Deeper isolation of the Israeli Palestinian population; further polarization between groups in the Israeli society; Social breakdown, Asking the survey respondents which of the risks are the most prominent to occur we received these answers: Risk % (#) of answers Rocket fire from Gaza 4% (1) Peace Process with the Palestinians 4% (1) International Isolation 7% (2) Arab Spring influence on Arab 7% (2) Neighbors Violence and Terror 14% (4) Economic and other sanctions 14% (4) Israel becoming an Apartheid state 18% (5) Socio-Economic Gaps 28% (8) Here is how a revised risks map would look adding in the risks that the respondents made and marking the ones they flagged to be eminent in orange – TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 39 When we look into the dynamics in this second map of risks complexity, we immediately see a new large attractor that has been added to the system. In the lower right hand side of the map, a dynamics of extremism, racism, apartheid, and social breakdown is depicted, and is a new addition to the map added by the civil society actors. This may be understandable if we refer back to the theories about the roles of civil society and consider how it has been linked to democratization and political theory. Thus, it is only natural that civil society feels the trends of shrinking democratic values and growing extremism. Tapping deeper into this dynamic of risks, the survey asked the respondents to give a short answer that they might have given to a family member when being asked about why the risks of not resolving the conflict are bigger than the risks from resolving it. This open question revealed some interesting relations between the different risks that have been mapped. These were the given answers:  The continuation of the conflict with Palestine is the equivalent of bringing an end to the idea of Israel as a democracy. Occupation is de-democracy and Israel is not sustainable in TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 40 that state. This, outside the fact that the Occupation is morally reprehensible and a violation of international law.  All of the risks that face Israel result from an unwillingness to reach a resolution with the Palestinians. Once the conflict is resolved we can deal with and resolve the other risks.  In the absence of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, security problems will increase, the economic problems will increase, the isolation in the world will grow, and also the pressures on Israel. The conflict is a root problem from which many other problems emerge.  In the current situation war is guaranteed, as well as despair and deepening socioeconomic gaps. Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israel sentiment will grow all over the world.  Israel will no longer stay a democratic state or a state with a Jewish majority, if the conflict with the Palestinians is not resolved. Today's Israel will be substituted by another being, an Apartheid state with Fascist-Nationalistic features.  From a moral perspective these risks are not bearable, even if one does not agree on their chances to materialize.  The conflict takes up futile resources, which could be better invested in strengthening the state and society.  Resolving the conflict will allow us to function as a normal state and deal with gaps, education, and all the things normal life is made of. You cannot live all the time in a conflict, its exhausts our energies.  If we do not solve the conflict, things will only get worse. Situations do not remain static, they worsen over time when groups remain in conflict. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT  41 International legitimacy, decreasing motivation for hurting us, and increasing motivation to save the fruits of agreement. A quick way to analyze the themes found in the answers to this open question would be to create a ‘words-cloud’ that will show us the most common and repeated terms. This cloud shows us the main concerns and rationale that the survey takers used when they were asked to explain why the resolution of the conflict has less risks to Israelis than the continuation of the conflict. It is important to highlight some of the responses. Some of the nouns used like ‘World,’ ‘International,’ ‘Motivation,’ ‘Gaps,’ ‘Worse,’ and ‘Normal’ can suggest what this rationale is. But even more so, are the dynamic mentioned in these verbs: ‘Increase’, ‘Grow’, ‘Get’, and ‘Deal’ tell us about the future perception of growing risks as they are perceived by the activists who took the survey. Now, as we go into the interpretation of the data, these two sets of words will be useful. 2.3.2.4 Civil Society Functions Here we use the fourth framework, developed by Paffenholz and Spurk (2010). It suggests seven different functions for civil society in peace building context. Survey respondents were asked about the functions their work within civil society is accomplishing. Their answers TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 42 are here compared to a study done by Cuhadar & Hanafi, (2010) where 63 NGOs in Israel where surveyed asking them about the functions they perform (p. 217): Israeli Civil Society Functions Service Delivery Advocacy and Communication Intermediation and Facilitation Monitoring Protection Social Cohesion In-Group Socialization 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% Cuhadar & Hanafi Survey 2.3.3 Prime Minister Netanyahu addresses the UN General Assembly (MFA website) A third source of data for our case study analysis, as was promised above, comes from the political perspective – from the Israeli government. Choosing one entry from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – the recent address by the Israeli Prime Minister to the United Nation’s General Assembly from September 2014 (MFA, 2014). This source was chosen because it is a recent summary of Israel’s foreign policy messaging given in one of the key international arenas. The Israeli PM opens his speech by framing it as a picture of risks and opportunities facing Israel, “I've come here to speak about the dangers we face and about the opportunities we see.” He goes on to explain how the dangers facing Israel are actually facing the world, and how Israel fights against these dangers is part of a global concern. He claims that Israel’s “hopes and the world’s hope for peace are in danger,” and that, “Israel is fighting a fanaticism today that TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 43 your countries may be forced to fight tomorrow.” This is why, “it’s not just our interest. It’s not just our values that are under attack. It’s your interests and your values.” He terms this mutual global enemy as “Militant Islam” and groups together under it ISIS, Hamas, and Iran. They all “seek to create ever-expanding enclaves of militant Islam where there is no freedom and no tolerance”. Iran is the embodiment of this global ambition. Netanyahu does not stop short of comparing this modern-day threat to the tragedy of Jewish history “Militant Islam’s ambition to dominate the world seems mad. But so too did the global ambitions of another fanatic ideology that swept to power eight decades ago. The Nazis believed in a master race. The militant Islamists believe in a master faith.” As a conclusion, the Israeli PM ties to the Militant Islam threat other, much less extreme actors which he blames for cooperating with it – the Palestinian Authority and the United Nation’s Human Rights Council. “I say to President Abbas, these are the war crimes committed by your Hamas partners in the national unity government which you head and you are responsible for.” And, “by investigating Israel rather than Hamas for war crimes, the UN Human Rights Council has betrayed its noble mission to protect the innocent.” To balance the dangers, he suggest possible opportunities, in the shape of forming new alliances in the Middle East, and bypassing the conflict with the Palestinians and the Palestinian Authority. Embracing some of the post Arab spring implication, the PM declares that, “leading states in the Arab world increasingly recognize that together we and they face many of the same dangers: Principally this means a nuclear-armed Iran and militant Islamist movements gaining ground in the Sunni world. Our challenge is to transform these common interests to create a productive partnership.” This is a change in the order of things because, in the past many “assumed that an Israeli-Palestinian peace can help facilitate a broader rapprochement between TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 44 Israel and the Arab World.” Now he suggests that, “a broader rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world may help facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace.” Let’s move now to look at the meanings of all this rich and diverse data collected from the various sources. 2.4 Data Interpretation 2.4.1 Civil Society Roles Paffenholz (2010) reminds us how in times of conflict, civil society finds it hard to communicate and intermediate with both the public and the state. In our case study, it is obvious that Israeli civil society does not prioritize or spend much of its time on these functions (see above 2.3.2.4). Furthermore, while it does spend much effort on the function of changing attitudes, we still saw that the Israeli public’s attitudes have been changing for the worse. Hermann (2009) also acknowledges this trend when she researched the role civil society had in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, after the Oslo accords (1993-2008). Referring to the civil society ‘peace movement’ she acknowledges that, “despite the promising developments in the early 1990s, by the mid-2000s the bottom line of the Israeli peace movement’s balance sheet was negative” (p. 242). She points to “the wide conceptual gaps between its agenda and the general public’s preferences about various aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations” (p. 246). When explaining how civil society had not managed to influence Israelis attitudes towards the peace process with the Palestinians even though 36% of civil society survey takers declare they work to do that, Hermann points to the internal dynamics within civil society, which she calls “the massive ideological shift” (p. 247), as a reason for these widening gaps. This trend has “turned the peace movement’s state of mind into something close to that of a sect” (Ibid.), she concludes. Hermann also finds a gap between the work of ‘the peace movement’ and the political establishment. When left wing political parties were in power, the movement was hesitant to TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 45 criticize them as to not indirectly help their right-wing rivals. This has led to the paradox in which, “the closer the ruling party was to the peace movement ideologically, the less able the movement was to achieve political voice and mobilize the public’s support” (p. 244). Hermann’s analysis of the role of Israeli civil society around the peace process with the Palestinians supports our findings. A gap between their roles and an understanding of the risks, combined with those of the general public’s, fails to influence positively the attitudes of the public towards support of the peace process. Hermann’s analysis about a second gap that exists between civil society and the political sphere makes it easy to understand why civil society does almost nothing as an intermediate and facilitator between the public and the political world. Let’s include now in the interpretation the political establishment’s perceptive on the risks facing Israel. 2.4.2 The Political Sphere In his articulated narrative, the Israeli PM is binding together the two rationales for risks that we have described – the insurance logic and the preparedness logic. He narrates an uncertain future of ‘Islamic militarism’ objectives joined with the possibility of an Islamic nuclear state which fall under the ‘preparedness’ rational. He then links these risks with present existing risks such as the Hamas rocket attacks and the growing international criticism of Israel’s policies, through the UN Human Rights Council. These last risks should be considered as risks that can be discussed under the ‘insurance’ rational. As a conclusion, he then links the whole risks ‘package’ to Anti-Semitism trends and to the historic existential threat symbolized by the Holocaust, making no distinctions between the various threats and between Israel and the Jewish people. Maoz (2009) tells us how the security needs of Israelis have been one of the most addressed needs of the society and how, in the case of Israel, “notions of existential threats serve as a fuel for nation-building.” However, he notes a problem in the fact that “once started, it is TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 46 difficult to stop. Even when the nation was built, and when it was time to get to the serious business of peace-making, it was difficult to demystify the idea of an existential threat” (p. 209). This way of grouping together risks of different types into a political reality which serves the power holders, is exactly what Douglas referred to when saying that any risk is embedded in its cultural context. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) mentioned this too when they explained that the question about the acceptance of risks by the population is “the prime political question” (p. 4). So how does the Israeli public perceive these political portrayed risks? In the risk matrix we have created based on the surveys of the ‘Peace Index,’ we can see that these risks that the PM refers to are indeed placed into the more ‘uncertain’ part of the matrix, however many of them are still not receiving complete consent by the public. The underlying idea of an existential threat receives very low support – about 20% “think the level of military-security risk to Israel at present is very high,” and more than 60% “feel very or somewhat protected” (see Annex 3). Furthermore, 90% of the Israeli public are sure or moderately sure that the Israeli Army “is capable of meeting the security threats confronting Israel.” This can show us that the public is not following blindly the political framing of the risks they face and that the way the political sphere wishes to portray the risk dynamics is different from both perceptions, the public’s and civil-society’s. 2.4.3 The Risks Matrix Let’s see how these political framings of the risks match the findings that we collected through the risks matrixes from the public and civil society? These matrixes allowed us to sort the various risks according to the rational and cultural importance they are being given. Through matching the certainty of the risk to the level of consent regarding the risk we were able to place each risk in its political and cultural context. Indeed, this also showed us that civil society and TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 47 the public’s view have a large gap between them, and that the understanding of the risks by the public is quite different from that of civil society. It is especially important to note the risks that were put in the Uncertain and Contested rubric, as this rubric symbolizes the most difficult risks to transform, the ones usually faced with a logic of preparedness and are unexpected and potentially catastrophic. The list we compiled of such risks is not long – in the first matrix, based on the general public’s perceptions, we found five risks there, and in the second we identified only three (just one – the Arab spring influences – repeated). This leaves us with a list of 7 key risks which may not be dealt with in such a simple ‘insurance’ like logic. Interestingly enough, as the theory explains about the choice of the highlighted risks being a political one, we found five out of these seven risks in the Prime Minister’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly. Only the specific mention of “Israel as a bi-national state” and the risk of “international, economic, and other sanctions” are not directly mentioned. It is also important to note here, that from the 7 crucial risks facing Israelis according to the public and civil society’s perception, most of them are linked to existing or latent attractors which we have identified in the mapping of the attractors landscape. 2.4.4 Risks Dynamics Complexity As we have mentioned before, the mapping of the risks dynamics is showing us the attractors’ landscape of the system and the feedback loops they are comprised of. The dynamics in a system increases when the arrows connecting various elements in the system reinforce each other, thus pushing a dynamic to become an attractor in the system. The other way around is to look for inhibiting loops that connect elements in such a way that they do not reinforce but limit each other. In the maps we have drawn, a specific element emerges with arrows linking it to many other risks in the system. This element also shares more than one loop with other elements TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 48 that are inhibiting and not reinforcing. This is the element of “the dependence on the military, political, and economic assistance received from the United States.” Focusing on this element in the system will enable us to reduce some of the negative dynamics escalating this intractable system. Can this dynamic of mostly escalating loops be supported by the answers given to our open question? 2.4.5 The Word Cloud In the survey, we received some additional data by asking an open question about the answer that one would give a family member about the risks of resolving a conflict. This data interpretation would add some insights to the findings. In the analysis part above, we have collated these answers into a word cloud showing the main trending nouns and verbs that were used in the ten answers. The dynamics that can be interpreted from these words is revealing because the answers show how civil society actors are fearful of deterioration (‘worse,’ ‘increase,’ ‘grow’) if the motivations for resolving a conflict don’t change. This is reinforced by the map of risks dynamics that we gathered from the surveys, in which a latent strong attractor of extremism, racism, and social breakdown is looming beneath the surface. 2.5 From Data to Intervention Strategies Following this interpretation of collected data, let’s return to our research question which has been rephrased as, “How can civil society, as a key intermediary between society and the political sphere, best influence the complexity of risks-dynamics that exists within intractable conflicts in order to change their resistance to any resolution?” (1.6) It is now time to base a suggested intervention on our findings, and this will best be done through the identification of the needs that underline the dynamic we have described. I suggest three basic needs that can be seen emerging from all that has been analyzed and interpreted. Very much as in traditional conflict resolution processes, where conflicting positions and interests are TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 49 being reframed as conflicting needs, in our intractable case study the role of risks and their dynamics allow us to see the underlying needs. Here are, then, the three suggested underlying needs – identity, independence, and acceptance, with their respective matching pieces of collected data. Need Risks (Public Perception) Identity “The rate of Jews who perceive the socioeconomic challenges as more important for Israel’s future (58%) is now twice as high as the rate that regards the military-security challenges as more important (28%).” Independence/ Autonomy Acceptance/ Recognition “An overwhelming majority (77%) of the Jewish sample responded that it is important to them that as part of the settlement, the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people.” “The majority (79%) believes Israel’s existence currently depends to one extent or another on the military, political, and economic assistance that it receives from the United States.” “Some 73% of the Jewish public are very optimistic or moderately optimistic about the country’s future in the coming years.” “A notable majority of the Jewish public (63%) thought that, “The whole world is against us,” with only about one-third dissenting from this attitude.” Risks (Civil Society Perception) “The continuation of the conflict with Palestine is the equivalent of bringing an end to the idea of Israel as a democracy.” Risks (Political Framing) “That disease has a name. It's called antiSemitism. It is now spreading in polite society, where it masquerades as legitimate criticism of Israel.” “Israel will no longer stay a democratic state or a state with a Jewish majority.” “Once the conflict will be resolved we can deal and resolve the other risks.” “Resolving the conflict will allow us to function as a normal state.” “The isolation in the world will grow, and also the pressures on Israel.” “From a moral perspective, these risks are not “I want you to think about what your countries would do if thousands of rockets were fired at your cities. Imagine millions of your citizens having seconds at most to scramble to bomb shelters, day after day.” “For centuries the Jewish people have been demonized with blood libels and charges of deicide. Today, the Jewish state is demonized with the apartheid libel and TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 50 bearable.” charges of genocide.” “The Occupation is morally reprehensible and a violation of international law.” “Leading states in the Arab world increasingly recognize that together, we and they face many of the same dangers.” We will now suggest an intervention process that will use the role of civil society to intervene in the conflict’s dynamics to address these underlying needs. CHAPTER 3 This chapter is about change. So far, data has been gathered on the system of conflict, but the needs for change in that system will now be addressed. Two critical concepts guide our intervention – ‘dynamics’ and ‘uncertainty.’ Guided by the DST approach, the intervention seeks to contribute to change in the system’s dynamics and not to claim a specific result. Second, as we deal with the dynamic of risks, the uncertainty of future reality and its perception is crucial for the change we seek, and this will be elaborated on below. Exploring the risks perceptions of Israelis from the public, civil society, and political perspectives express three underlying needs – identity, independence/autonomy, and acceptance/recognition. In order to meet these needs, the risk dynamics in this complex conflict system should be transformed. A potential intervention entry point to engage within the system has been located through the mapping framework, in the form of the risk of Israel’s dependency on the U.S. (see 2.4.4 above). The change we seek is on the macro level (see Paffenholz, 2004), a systemic change that will transform the system of risks which threaten Israeli Jews. However, the intervention suggested is implemented at the micro level. The connection between the levels will be TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 51 explained below, but it is important to mention here that the way to make the micro level intervention impact the macro level of systemic change is through the improved role of civil society as facilitators and intermediates in the conflict system. 3.1 Intervention Method In this part of the process, the research and data collection inform a recommended intervention. As mentioned above, the conflict here is a complex dynamic system and the change sought within it relates to future uncertainties. Therefore, to best accomplish this change a ‘planning method’ from Holman, Devane, and Cady (2007) was chosen. A specific methodology was chosen in light of these guiding principles, the methodology of “Scenario Thinking,” to which two additional tools will be added. One addition is taken from “The Third Side” approach (http://www.thirdside.org/) and a second addition is taken from the Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) and is called “work on the edge of chaos” (Coleman, 2011). The methodology chosen is most relevant to the change sought, as the key change (or impact) is a long-term transformation in the motivations of the Israeli Jewish public towards a resolution of the conflict with the Palestinians. The mid-term goals, (see 1.2) are to understand the perceptions of risks and their complexity and to best engage civil society in their dynamics. For these purposes an inclusive planning and improving effort is required. A look back at the role that civil society played in the past within these dynamics of conflict (Cuhadar & Hanafi, 2010; Hermann, 2009) will add to the data collected here, both exposing a gap between CS efforts and its impact (Hermann, 2009). This intervention will lend new tools and roles for civil society to use in order to bridge this gap. Nevertheless, at this stage it is important to ask who this ‘civil society’ is that we are engaging. Is it the ‘peace movement’ that Hermann (2009) researched? Is it other women, youth, or religious groups? Is it a TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 52 combination of all these? The suggested intervention process is based on an existing network of civil society connections which have been contacted (see 2.2, 4.2). Thus, it will include representatives from all of the above mentioned groups and others. However, the logic for the selection of the network of individuals will be explored further in the next sections and especially in chapter 4. It is suffice to just mention that this network will not include civil society organizations as such but will identify individuals who could be woven into an alternative network, beyond the existing affiliation and organizational structures. Paffenholz (2004) tells us that “peace interventions are not planned from an overall matrix by multiple actors, but usually by a single actor through intuition and rule of thumb” (p. 2). To change this, the intervention suggested is planned to make CS actors aware of the dynamics of risks and help them plan ahead, for future scenarios, so that they are able to intervene in this dynamic. This planning ability will also allow CS to work on ‘the edge of chaos’ (Coleman, 2011), so that it becomes the main actor who can look for “forks in the road that can lead to qualitatively different futures” (p. 175). 3.2 Rational for the Methodologies The specific methodologies of the intervention process will now be described further. They consist of the frame of the ‘scenario thinking’ process, to which few other elements have been added. One such addition is taken from ‘The Third Side’ approach and is called ‘The Third Side Roles Exercise’ (November 6, 2014), while the other is taken from the Dynamical System Theory and is called ‘Work on the Edge of Chaos.’ The rationale for using the ‘scenario thinking’ methodology is grounded in the key principles of this process and how it has been applied to similar contexts. As a planning strategy, the ‘scenario thinking’ process is perfectly fitting to this context, as explained above. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 53 Furthermore, this process has been experimented in the past in very similar contexts, for example “as a tool for civic dialogue around large intractable issues, such as the future of South Africa at the end of apartheid” (Ertel, Fulton, & Scearce, 2007, p. 343). Although originated in the corporate world, there is evidence that it has expanded rapidly “into civil-society around the world” (Ibid.). A ‘scenario thinking’ process is a series of workshops that leads participants through a five stage process: orientation, exploration, synthesis, action, and monitoring. In the first stage of preparation, the organizers use structured interviews with key stakeholders to learn about the challenges and underlying assumptions. In the second stage, when the workshops start, exploration is achieved through identifying the ‘driving forces’ that shape the conflict. It is about agreeing on the broader context and key developments at hand. In our case of Israel dependence on the United States, it could be important to understand the dynamics that Jeffrey Goldberg portrayed in his recent piece in The Atlantic (Goldberg, 10.28.14). The third phase of the process, which will be dealt with in the next workshop (or several workshops), is a synthesis of the assumptions and the external context to create the ‘future scenarios.’ These scenarios should be created once the group “identify the two or three driving forces that are most important to the focal issue and most uncertain” (Ertel, Fulton, & Scearce, 2007, p. 338). These driving forces are also called ‘critical uncertainties.’ The process uses these uncertainties to create a matrix of four possible scenarios (see chart below). This methodology is perfectly suited to our needs, our context and to the risks dynamics that it’s based on. For example, taking some possible ‘critical uncertainties’ from the data (see chapter 2) could provide the following basis for future scenarios: TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 54 Arab spring influence and ISIS threaten Israel Sanctions on Israel No Sanctions on Israel Arab spring influence and ISIS do not threaten Israel The combination of the two ‘critical uncertainties’ creates four possible scenarios. In each scenario, the consequences of Israel’s dependence on the United States should then be expended and the roles of civil society need to be discussed, leading to the practical next steps and activities plans. The fourth phase of the process is the one “whereby discussing the implications of each scenario on the operations and assumptions of the group catalyzes patterns leading to strategic prioritization and creating action-plans for the group or its parts” (Ertel, Fulton, & Scearce, 2007, p. 339). The last phase of the process, that will be left to the last workshop and to follow-up activities, is the monitoring stage. This level is enabled by, “creating an ongoing dialogue process to identify and track leading indicators – signs of emerging change – that will tell you if a particular scenario is beginning to unfold” (Ibid.). As mentioned previously, two additional activities will be added to this process. In the fourth stage of action - prioritizing and planning, a tool that is taken from “The Third Side” methodology will be added. “The Third Side” is part of the Global Negotiation Project (formerly the Project on Preventing War) developed at Harvard University TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 55 (http://www.thirdside.org/thirdside.cfm) and is described there as “a way of looking at the conflicts around us not just from one side or the other but from the larger perspective of the surrounding community.” This specific exercise added, focuses on the suggested ten roles that each person can take or switch between. These roles could be complementary to the theoretical framework that was used in chapter 2 (the seven functions of civil society, Paffenholz & Spurk (2010), see 1.5). By using this “Third Side Roles Exercise,” participants will be given an overview of the roles and the distinctions between them so they can reflect and identify which is most comfortable or most challenging to them. The rationale for using this methodology here is based on the critical role civil society needs to play in facilitating a change at the macro systemic level. This is done in the spirit of Paffenholz’s (2004) highlight that, “the challenge is to find the optimal combination of clear strategies and instruments and a flexible way to implement and adapt them to the process.” A second addition to the process is taken from the Dynamical Systems Theory as it was adapted to intractable conflict (Coleman, 2011). This methodology or tactic is called ‘Work on the Edge of Chaos’ and is all about producing a “qualitative change” (p. 171) in the system’s dynamics. The “edge of chaos” states are anomalies in the system; “unusual incidents, tensions, hardship, stress, aggression, violence, success, luck, or despair” (p. 176). These states are called “edge of chaos” states because they are believed to “be located in the area of the system somewhere between order (the pull of attractors) and chaos (high state of complexity)” (p. 175). This tool will be introduced in the fifth stage of the ‘scenario thinking’ process, the monitoring stage, and will be incorporated into the follow-up steps (see more below in 3.5 and 4.4). TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 56 3.3 Addressing the Needs Three underlying needs have been identified from the complex dynamics of risks: identity, independence/autonomy, and acceptance/recognition. Using the dynamical system approach suggests that they could all be addressed, and indeed transformed, through looking at an entry point to transform the dynamics of the system (see Coleman, 2011; Paffenholz, 2004). This entry point was identified as the perceived dependence of Israel on the United States. 3.3.1 Need #1 – Identity In Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld (2002), the roles of civil society in Israel-Palestine, South Africa, and Northern Ireland are compared in a multiple case study research. Civil society in Israel (the left wing of it, called ‘the peace movement’) is accredited with some accomplishments – framing the occupation of the Palestinian territories as a “threat to the long-term security and the “Jewish” identity of the state” (p. 215), and also for being able to persuade the public and the political sphere in the legitimate national identity aspirations of the Palestinians. This was done through the strategies of contact and dialogue (Ibid.). As we have seen in chapter 2, the threat to the Jewish identity of Israel is very much present in the risk dynamics facing the Israeli Jewish public. However, this debate has to be considered in the broader context of the strong links to the Jewish diaspora (also mentioned in the PM’s address binding together Anti-Semitism around the world with the specific threats facing Israel, and linking these to the Holocaust). We also mentioned before (1.1) how even CS in Israel has been inspired and much influenced, both in content and funding, by the Jewish diaspora and especially by the U.S. based communities (Laskier, 2000). By choosing the right actors to come together into the ‘scenario thinking’ process, this need will be clearly met. Providing the space and process to debate and reflect safely any future TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 57 scenarios and implications will take away most of the animosity and tension ascribed to this debate when done through the media or the political sphere. This will take the form of weaving a new network of ties and connections between key actors in the Israeli CS and U.S. based actors. Monitoring and evaluating this need will be built into the process through the fourth and fifth stages. Designing the right indicators to monitor as a group will be part of the planning process and the follow up structure (see below at 3.5), such indicators could be for example public communication from US based Jewish groups regarding the identity of Israel and how they connect to it. Evaluating the possible impact of this process on the identity need of the public should be a long term endeavor. It will be measured by collecting individual change stories and by following the ‘Peace Index’ monthly surveys and comparing their trends to the ones collected here. 3.3.2 Need #2 – Independence or Autonomy This need is expressed in several ways. For the political sphere it means addressing the international pressure and criticism on Israel. From the CS perspective this need is about being proactive and facilitating the public discourse, and not being reactive to outside events. For the public it is manifested as the perception of dependence. So far, the diversity of civil society organizations has allowed them to address diverse issues, but mostly in reactive ways. This has caused a fragmentation within Israeli CS and this is exactly what Linder (2006) tells us that happens in conflict-prone settings. Actors “naturally cluster into groups, and these groups have competing objectives” (p. 6). In the intervention suggested here, the future looking ‘scenario thinking’ will allow the needed preparations and adaptation for CS actors to become more united and proactive in their action within each possible scenario. Furthermore, the additional component of the ‘Third Side Roles Exercise’ will TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 58 give CS actors the skills to become more independent and adaptive in choosing their role within the complex dynamics of the conflict. The ability to monitor this part of the intervention will be done through participation in the process with an enlisting and commitment of the various participants to take an active part in all stages of the process. A possible indicator for change is the adaptively of roles that CS takes in addressing the conflict as they will be captured through surveys. The evaluation of the impact will be achieved by testing how proactive civil society will become after a year or even two, through a survey and an analysis of initiatives starting from the network. 3.3.3 Need #3 – Acceptance or Recognition This need has to do with the threats of international isolation, sanctions, and also with the uncertainties of the Middle East context and how the impacts of ISIS and the Arab spring on the moderate Arab nations will effect Israel. Israel’s political sphere has been dealing with the Middle East threat by grouping all Islamic militants together, as could be seen from the PM’s speech (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014, September 29; 2.4.2 above). Israel has also reacted to these possible threats through blaming all criticism of Israel as Anti-Semitism but also through ongoing propaganda efforts aimed at countering the threat of sanctions by consumers in Europe and the United States. What needs to change here is to differentiate between these various risks and address them according to their appropriate rationale. By choosing the methodology of ‘scenario thinking,’ a shift for the CS activists and leaders will allow them to consider these threats within their respective scenarios and to be prepared for them. These preparations and understandings of the implications of each scenario will allow civil society to be positioned as a facilitative for the emerging realities for society and between the public and the state. The additional ‘Work the Edge of Chaos’ skill will be a key to TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 59 providing this function. Being able to recognize the edge of chaos moments brought about by these critical uncertainties, will enable CS to transform the system in key moments for which they will be prepared. Success here will depend on coming up with the right scenarios and on using diverse external experts to identify the implications that each scenario may have on the public, civil society, and the state. Some skills in facilitation, communications, and advocacy may also be required for civil society to be focusing on this function, which they now report as being the least of their focus (see 2.3.2.4). The monitoring and evaluation of the addressing of this need will follow by including the right indicators in the monitoring stage and by proper addressing of the follow up stage (see below in 3.5). Such an indicator could be an actual intervention that CS will take in a critical moment in the conflict. An evaluation of the impact on this need will be through an overall assessment of change in the dynamics of the critical threats, such as the BDS movement and the ISIS threat on Israel and how they are perceived. 3.4 Strength-Weakness-Opportunity-Threat (SWOT) Analysis We will now use the SWOT analysis tool to identify key strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities of our suggested methodologies. 3.4.1 The Scenario Thinking Process Strengths –  It uses and addresses the uncertainties of our risks Weaknesses –      approach. It’s a gradual process which includes monitoring and built in long term sustainability. It will allow civil society to plan and become proactive. It can utilize internal and external knowledge to plan alternatives.    It is based on many assumptions and imagination. Its impact is not guaranteed. It may be confusing for people who are used to following a particular status quo. It’s more than just a technique, it’s a state of mind, which is also an opportunity. It needs transparency, trust, and sharing as TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT    It combines vision and action. It allows prioritization of options and adaptation to a dynamic reality. It’s a gradual process. Opportunities –      It presents alternatives to a seemingly intractable situation. It’s more than just a technique, it’s a state of mind, which is also an opportunity. An alternative network could be weaved. It can unleash creative options. It can energize otherwise burnt-out activists.  60 a basis. It requires time from already very busy people. Threats –     The scenarios may put different people in difficult positions. It may take too many resources away from an already strained field. It may draw criticism from within civil society and from outside of it. It can exclude voices of weakened groups. 3.4.2 The Third Side Roles Exercise Strengths –  It can help diversify the roles civil society Weaknesses –      activists take. It will act to increase independence and identity of civil society. It will open up the reflection of the effectiveness of civil society within peacebuilding. It matches well with other theories (the seven functions of civil society). It will contribute to the change from reactive to proactive roles of civil society interventions. Opportunities –  Real potential to shift civil society roles  Opportunity for a reflection of strengths and weaknesses  Participants may be attached to the status quo. It requires a reflective state of mind. Threats –   It might alienate activists that wish to be directly involved and don’t see themselves as a third side. It may risk fundraising efforts. 3.4.3 The Work on the Edge-Of-Chaos Strengths –   Very effective in finding how small actions can change the system greatly. Allows civil society to assume a more proactive role. Weaknesses –   It may be elusive to grasp and understand. Identifying the situations will not guarantee effective interventions. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT     Combines well with the scenarios, monitoring and searching for the edge-of-chaos situations. Can build the credibility of civil society by building their skills. Very appropriate in a system of complex risks dynamics. Changes approach in these situations from fear to potential (from reactive to proactive). Opportunities –  A real transformative power to seize new opportunities.   61 It might take a long time and practice to get good at. It might become an internal ‘sectarian’ perspective if not shared widely. Threats –  May have a high learning cost, if edge-of  chaos situations backfire. May be too risky. Might shift the view of change from a gradual process to a spontaneous event. 3.5 Capacity Building/Sustainability The sustainability of the process should be planned from its start. In stage five of the ‘scenario thinking’ process a plan for ongoing monitoring of indicators for the future scenarios will be designed, to enable the process to continue beyond the series of workshops. However, this monitoring stage cannot be just a planning tool, it should create a mechanism that will continue to review and monitor the agreed upon indicators for a long term future (beyond the two years scope of an intervention). This can be achieved by establishing a joint ‘task force’ which will be responsible for continued monitoring of possible scenarios, and for communicating the findings, implications and relevant actions to the broader community of the civil society, participants, and non-participants alike. The task force will also take charge of planning further cycles of scenario thinking processes for more participants as a means to building the capacity and skills of CS and expanding the network. In the beginning, the participating organizations will host the task force themselves and contribute to its resources, but with time, within two years, it should develop into a stand-alone project with its own budgets and funding stream. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 62 This task force will be made up of a small group of men and women (ideally 3-4) who participated in the original ‘scenario thinking’ process, but as new processes are planned and executed, it is natural that the team members will change. Some basic administration and knowledge information management will be needed for this group. 3.6 Impact of the Intervention The impact of the intervention will be maintained by establishing several future scenarios for civil society to prepare for and track through the creation of a task force. This will take civil society out of its reactive position and allow it to plan and directly impact the dynamics of risks that are facing the Israeli Jewish public. Through the process of ‘scenario thinking,’ with the additional components introduced into it, the skills and capacity of civil society will increase in such a way that it can becomes the key factor in the transformation of the risks dynamics in this intractable conflict. This intervention, as was mentioned above, is based on weaving a new network of civil society actors at the micro level. This network weaving process will now be discussed further. CHAPTER 4 4.1 Introduction Moving from the planned intervention to sustaining the change it will bring, it is time to refer back to the actors mapping from chapter 1 (see 1.3). Our intervention is planned for the micro level but is aimed to create an impact on the meso and the macro levels (Paffenholz, 2004), through the role played by civil society in future scenarios. Out of the conflict map that visualized the conflict’s context, several key actors will be focused on here: TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT  63 The first is the ‘Left Wing Civil Society,” which was generalized into one actor, but in reality consists of dozens of organizations and individuals who address various issues relating to the political conflict and to social justice, from human rights, labor rights, and women’s rights, to religious groups, education initiatives, and the economic participation of minority groups. It is important to mention a few groups who will be key to the intervention. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel is the oldest human rights organization in the country and very influential in litigation and policy changes. Peace Now is the first peace organization which developed into a mass movement in the 1980s. Both are well linked to supporting U.S.-based groups.  Another key actor in this intervention is the ‘Jewish Communities,’ also grouped together in the context map (see 1.3). Here, the community in the U.S. is the most important to focus on, as we are aiming to highlight Israel’s dependence on the U.S. as an entry point dynamic. Amongst U.S. based groups, it is important to mention the ‘Reform Judaism movement,’ which also has an Israeli counterpart, ‘Peace Now’ U.S., and ‘JStreet,’ which is a D.C. based political pact countering the traditional policy influences of the conservative AIPAC on Congress.  The New Israel Fund, with its Israeli and US offices, is a key link and funding channel between the Jewish world in the US and the progressive ‘left wing’ CS actors in Israel. Important new players in the US context are the Israeli organizations which are recently being established, like the American Israeli Council or Muatza Mekomit, serving the needs of the growing US based Israeli community. In order to address the needs of identity, independence, and acceptance, a planning process called ‘scenario thinking’ was designed to take place with these key groups and TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 64 individuals (see 3.2). This process will facilitate new connections or ‘weave’ (Krebs & Holley, 2002), a new network thorough a series of workshops. However, the process is designed to enable a long term change, a macro level transformation of the risk dynamics in the system rather than to change a specific issue, a change that will contribute to the ripeness of Israeli society to resolve its conflict with the Palestinians. This impact or long term change that this intervention is seeking to contribute to, would be sustained by establishing this new network. A network that will establish a ‘monitoring task force’ to conduct ongoing monitoring of the future scenarios and communicate the process to relevant stakeholders. This is designed to create a qualitative change in the skills and functions of civil society so it performs better as a facilitator of the transformation of the existing system. 4.2 The Network We should now understand the network that forms the basis for our intervention. Linder (2006) explains that often the lack of success in an intervention results from problems in the connectivity and communication inside the networks of actors (p. iv). Krebs and Holley (2002) add to this that, “before you can improve your network you need to know where you are currently” (p. 2). Here is a visual map of the existing network in which we suggest to intervene. It is based on our original conflict map (1.3), but is more focused now on the key actors we described above and their relations. This is how the connections within the network look prior to our intervention with the red dotted lines representing the connections which will be influenced by the intervention. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 65 To this ‘meta’ level visual map, a detailed ‘micro’ level view of the nodes can be added. This is a picture of the networks that we have used to collect our data in chapter 2. It is an example of what Krebs and Holley (2002) call “the old boy” network (p. 5). This is a network in which dense connections and a high degree of commonality are the basis for good working conditions but do not allow much innovation. This is the exact description of a “value homophile” based network (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001, p. 428), where the interactions are based on “attitude, belief, and value similarity” (Ibid.). TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 66 This ‘micro level’ network is located within the ‘Left Wing Civil Society’ (see 4.1 and 1.3), and was chosen to be engaged with in this research due to their potential for improved influence on the system’s dynamics. The intervention process suggested is aimed at locating the ‘structural holes’ (Burt, 2004) which are the gaps in the network’s connectivity, and to weave those (Krebs & Holley, 2002) into an alternative network so that new roles and capacities could be introduced into the system. The findings of this research show that by having such a closed network, the left wing civil society is not performing its best as a facilitator between society and the political sphere, especially within a complex dynamics of perceived risks. The sustainability of the change achieved by the intervention will rely on the ability to create new ties between currently unconnected or less connected nodes and clusters. The ability to sustain the change will emerge, as Krebs and Holley explain, by “understanding and catalyzing” these connections (p. 3). Opening up the existing closed network through connecting weak ties within it (Granovetter, 1977) is based on the understanding that “weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups” (p. 1376). The key ‘weak ties’ nodes which we will focus on here will be: 1. ‘Gilad’ – a Rabbi, director of the ‘Reform Judaism Movement in Israel’, which is strongly linked to the Reform Jewish congregation in the US. 2. ‘Mikhael’ – the director of an Israeli think tank (‘Molad’) which is devoted to strengthening Israel’s democracy, and is also strongly linked to liberal organizations and donors in the US. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 67 3. ‘Sharon’ and ‘Gili’ – the Director and the Deputy Director of ‘the Association for Civil Rights in Israel,’ the largest and oldest NGO in this camp, which is also a key player in the ‘New Israel Fund’ network and can be a broker to their clique (see Laskier (2000) as explained in 1.1). 4. ‘Lior’ and ‘Hagit’- both working for ‘Peace Now,’ which is a veteran organization well linked to the US network and to a sister organization Peace Now US (see Laskier (2000) and 1.1). 5. ‘Yariv’ - is a stockperson and an activist in the organization ‘Rabbis for Human Rights,’ which also connected with US based constituencies (and a sister organization Rabbis for Human Rights U.S). 6. ‘Sahlom’ – a prominent blogger, of Ukrainian origin, who is critically writing about the ‘sectarian’ character of the ‘Left Wing Civil Society’ in Israel. 4.3 The Intervention and Challenges to Sustainability The intervention suggested in this paper is based on a planning method called ‘scenario thinking’ and is aimed at allowing civil society to improve its role in possible future scenarios, and be prepared for various risks emanating from any ‘critical uncertainties’ (3.2). This intervention process is not just an activity but is much more a change in a societal state of mind (Ertel, Fulton, & Dcearce, 2007). The intervention consists of five stages, all implemented through workshops with a core group of activists (the 8 mentioned above will be the start). To this process two specific additions have been matched, an exercise focusing on the roles within a conflict context (called ‘the Third Side Roles Exercise’), and an approach taken from the DST, which is aimed at giving the group TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 68 the skills to identify critical moments in a complex dynamic context, called ‘Working on the Edge of Chaos.’ Devans (2007) suggests to look for six common challenges to sustainability (p. 63). Four of them are relevant to this intervention – lack of resources (time and money), the perceived value of the change, and the ties to the status quo. The lack of resources is relevant because we ask for people’s time and participation, and we may also ask for the organizations to host the follow up task force and contribute some initial resources to it. The attachment to the status quo has already been mentioned as a weakness and a threat in our SWOT analysis (3.4) and can also be detected through the network’s structure and lack of innovation within it. The fourth relevant challenge is the perceived value of change and this can only be based on the trust of the participants that a new approach and innovation of their roles could impact the system of the intractable conflict. The challenges to this intervention that are based on the characteristics of the network are several – for example, our civil society actor’s network is closed and nonhierarchical. Therefore the issues of participation, openness, and motivation might be challenging to sustain the change. Linder (2006) suggests few possible mitigations for these challenges. For once, “a stimulating vision or mission” should serve as an appropriate incentive for participation (p. 19). Additionally, “actors must also recognize that while there may be different, and in some cases, competing tactical objectives, all can derive mutual benefit from cooperation” (Ibid.). Challenges from the perceptive of the US actors are still unclear as we still do not know exactly who will be the nodes of the network. However, we can estimate that they would have different interests and motivations to participate. One thing we know about these actors is the differentiation between the U.S. Jewish community and the U.S. Israeli community. There is a TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 69 growing gap between the interests and motivations of these two communities’ engagement with Israel and with Israeli groups. From the perspective of the Israeli society, one possible challenge for a sustained change, is the feeling that the process puts them at greater risk than before. Based on the fact that our intervention and analysis of the situation are grounded in the public’s perceptions of risks, a visible change in these perceptions in the population would be key. 4.4 Strategies for Sustainability Our intervention is aimed at establishing a stronger civil society, ready for possible future scenarios, and engaged in dialogue with the public and the government. This process is suggested to be based on the perceived risk of Israel’s dependence on the US. A key element in our intervention is opening up the closed ‘core/periphery’ (Krebs & Holly, 2007) network that is existing today to establish a ‘Multi Hub Small World’ (Ibid) network. To do that we chose key nodes in our network (described above in 4.2). The first two nodes, ‘Gilad’ and ‘Mikhael’ have no direct connectivity and out of the 32 nodes in the network they have only 6 common connections between them (low number of possible routes). In the first stage I will act as a broker (p. 4) and link up these two nodes. Then, approaching the other key nodes describes above (amongst them 2 are mutual connections), especially inviting nodes from ACRI and PN (two important organizations that are relevant to our network), some strength will be added to the new connection and my brokering could be done with. A third stage will be to link to this clique (Burt, 2002) also ‘Shalom’ and ‘Yariv.’, creating an eight nodes network that could form a ‘small world’ cluster that will be then connected with participants from the US. This stage should be facilitated by the connection in the TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 70 New Israel Fund or an established common connection (from ACRI or PN). Here are the stages of linking up ‘Gilad’ and ‘Mikael’ and the additional six participants: TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 71 Following the series of workshops which make up the ‘scenario thinking’ process, a follow up ‘task force’ will be established based on this group of participants. This monitoring task force will be collecting information on the indicators agreed upon. It will also inform the parties in the network about any developments and alert them if any of their designed future scenarios becomes more plausible then others. This will allow them to start implementing their pre-meditated action plans for that scenario. The task force will also be responsible for communicating the scenarios and their probabilities to larger publics, but mainly to the civil society cluster linked to the core group. In order to perform their role in the most efficient and well-resourced manner, the task force will create a wiki, an open web platform in which all indicators for all four scenarios would be communicated and periodically updated, so they can most easily be monitored and presented to both partners in the network and to external actors (see Linder, 2006). Devane (2007) offers to look at four changes to check if sustainability has been reached – energy, direction, appropriate resources management, and distributive leadership (pp. 60-63), and suggests a few indicators for each. For this intervention one indicator for each field was chosen to be monitored. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 72 For the direction of the process the indicator would be that the new network is no longer “clinging to previously designed and implemented solutions” (p. 60). In order to achieve sustainability, the core group should communicate to other clusters in and outside of civil society whether they will share their knowledge and initiate new cycles of ‘scenario thinking processes,’ which means that the change has been sustained and is established on a solid basis. For the field of energy the indicator would be that “people experience genuine opportunities for new big things to happen” (p. 61). Following Ertel, Fulton and Dcearce (2007) who testify that the process of ‘scenario thinking’ introduces new energies to the groups who perform it, a key indicator in the existence of sustainable change would be the levels of energies and input into the follow up monitoring task force, including the levels of resources that would be committed to implement it (either from the existing resources of the parties involved or through further fund raising). In the field of resources management the indicator would be the “communication of important facts, issues and beliefs” (p. 63). This will be evaluated through the participation and contribution to the follow up task force. Finally for the field of distributive leadership, the indicator chosen will be “better results and changed behaviors” (p. 62). A key piece of evidence for the sustainable change would be the form of leadership that participants in the process and its resulting follow up task force would take. It shouldn’t be the kind directed inwards into the network itself and concentrated around key individuals. It would be the distributive one, engaging new publics and transforming the knowledge acquired through the process of scenario thinking into real communication with the Israeli publics about their risks perceptions. TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 73 After ensuring that the change sought for is sustained through network weaving and a change in direction, leadership, and resources, we can now turn to concluding this applied research. CHAPTER 5 This chapter will conclude this applied research by reflecting on the goals it was set out to achieve and by reflecting on the limitations and the possible application of the learning. 5.1 Meeting Goals 5.1.1 Collect perceptions of risks The first goal of the research was to “collect perceptions of risks from the Jewish Israeli population and create a mapping of their risks perceptions’ complexity in order to allow better analysis of the dynamics behind the conflict” (1.2). In the chapters above, this goal has been achieved by creating not one but two risk dynamics maps, one based on public surveys from the ‘Peace Index’ and another based on civil society that was surveyed. Both proved that this conflict is stuck on a few attractors risks that pull the energies of the parties and lock the conflict. None the less, the dynamics mapping allowed us to identify an entry point which could help transform the system, and it has also helped identify the key needs underlying the risks perception of Jewish Israelis. 5.1.2 Engage civil society The second goal we had was to “engage civil society leaders to understand and communicate better their engagement with the risks Israelis perceive resulting from resolving/not resolving the conflict with the Palestinians.” This goal was achieved through the participation of 10 key civil society leaders in the survey and their input. This engagement is also meant to be the TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 74 basis for suggested intervention that will empower civil society to become proactive in transforming the risk dynamics of the system. The plan to weave some weak ties within this network into a new network which will participate in a series of workshop and will start a scenario thinking process is also fulfilling this goal. 5.1.3 Understanding the complexity of risks The third and last goal was to “understand the complexity of risks that Israelis perceive as resulting from resolving/not resolving the conflict with the Palestinians.” This goal has also been reached through combining data from three sources: the public, civil society, and the political sphere. This allowed us to use the theoretical approaches and frameworks we identified to understand some deeper layers of this complexity, an understanding that promises to inform better future roles for key actors in that system. 5.2 Applications and Limitations One principled limitation of this research is that it uses a only the perspective of the Jewish Israeli public without connecting to both the Palestinian Israeli minority or to the more general Palestinian perspective of the conflict. This limitation is put on the study for two reasons – one is the limited scope of this capstone to address these further complexities, the second is the understanding that as the stronger side in the conflict, a transformation in the perception of the Jewish Israeli public would more likely create a transformation of the whole system. Never the less, a possible parallel research of risk dynamics from a Palestinian perception wither inside Israel, in Palestine or the diaspora, may be very revealing and can suggest common threats and opportunities for further joint action (as much as this may be limited due to the fear of normalization, see 1.3). TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 75 A second limitation for possible applications of this research is its role as an instrumental case study. How the learnings can be applied to other contexts is an important point to address. I believe that several points from this research can be taken beyond this specific case study for further research and application. First, the usage of risks as key concepts in analyzing conflict dynamics is something that can be adopted in dealing with other intractable conflicts, or conflicts in general. This entails the idea that through the risks perceptions, conflict resolution practitioners could reveal underlying needs and opportunities for intervention. Furthermore, the combination of theories and frameworks suggested here – the mapping of risks, the rationale of addressing them, and the roles of civil society in peace building wither through the seven functions or the ten roles of the third side can produce a more general model of intervention. This could be matched with the process of ‘scenario thinking’ as a possible way to deal with uncertainties in the system. I look forward to use all these components in my future work. Finally, I must add as a personal note that writing this applied research capstone helped me understand many new aspects of the intractability of the conflict I grew up in and worked on for most of my professional life. It has also enables me to see new opportunities for change and ways forward in places I did not expect to see them. REFERENCES Althaus, C. 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Taylor-Gooby, P., & Zinn, J. O. (Eds.). (2006). Risk in social science. Oxford, GBR: Oxford University Press, UK. Retrieved October 25, 2014, from: http://www.ebrary.com The Peace Index. (2010). [Graph illustration of the monthly support rates in the Oslo Accord]. Retrieved October 26, 2014, from: http://www.peaceindex.org/GraphsEng.aspx “Third Side Roles Exercise.” http://www.thirdside.org/ Last modified November 6, 2014: http://www.thirdside.org/3S_Roles_Exercise.pdf TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT Annex 1 – Historical Maps 81 TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 82 Annex 2 - Survey Questioner to Israeli Civil Society 1. What, in your opinion, are the three main risks facing Israel if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will NOT be resolved in the next 5 years? 1. ________________________________________________________________________ 2. ________________________________________________________________________ 3. ________________________________________________________________________ 2. Out of these risks, which are the three most eminent to the Israeli society in the coming 5 years? 1. ISIS 2. Agreement between the West and Iran 3. Israel losing its Jewish majority 4. The Peace Process with the Palestinians 5. Arab spring Influences on Arab countries 6. Israel will become a bi-national state 7. Economic and other sanctions on Israel 8. Violence and Terror 9. The socio-economic gaps 10. The Palestinian will not recognize Israel as a Jewish state 11. Dependence on the US continue 12. Isolation in the international arena 13. Rockets fire from Gaza 14. Return of Palestinian refugees into Israel 15. More Middle East countries possess Nuclear weapons 16. International pressure on Israel 17. Security existential threat 18. Palestinian reconciliation 19. Other, please specify __________________________________ 3. Can you give an estimation (in a scale of 1-10 where 10 is certain and 1 is unlikely), what are the chances of these risks (the list from question 2) to materialize? 4. Is there a consent within society about these (the list from question 2) risks (in a scale of 1-10 where 10 is full consent)? 5. Assuming you are considering the risks from continuing the conflict to be greater than the ones facing Israel if the conflict is resolved, what would you tell a family member asking you why do you think this way? _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________ 6. Which of the following functions best describe the activities you are involved in within civilsociety in Israel? 1. Service Provision 2. Monitoring Government activities TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 83 Protection of civilians Communication and Advocacy Change attitudes within society Intermediation and facilitation between citizens and Government Developing skills for co-existence Annex 3 - Risks mentioned in the ‘Peace Index’ surveys # 1. 2. 3. Jan2013-Sep2014 The Peace Index ISIS constitute a danger to Israel The agreement that was signed between the Western countries, headed by the United States, and Iran. The assumption that Israel is not the only nuclear state in the region. 55%- Not a danger to Israel, 39%-A great danger to Israel 4. The Arab countries are busy with their domestic problems 5. Rocket fire from Gaza Type of Certainty/Consent Rationality Matrix Preparedness Uncertain-Contested Insurance In the two previous measurements, about 60% of the Jewish respondents answered positively; that is, they thought it was possible to live with a nuclear Iran and that Israel should formulate a security strategy that suits the change in circumstances. In the present measurement, this rate stood at 57%. A small majority (52%) of the Jewish respondents believe the governments of the Arab countries are busy with their domestic problems and therefore will not turn against Israel in the foreseeable future. At the same time, a not inconsiderable minority (38%) sees this turmoil as dangerous to Israel because Arab governments may try to divert attention from their domestic problems by turning against Israel. A large majority of the Jewish public (71%) sees a low chance that Operation Uncertain-Complete Preparedness Uncertain-Complete Preparedness Uncertain- Contested Insurance Certain-Complete TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 6. Terror attacks 7. Israel’s existence currently depends to one extent or another on the military, political, and economic assistance that it receives from the United States. The socioeconomic challenges are more important for Israel’s future 8. Protective Edge will bring about a complete cessation of rocket fire from Gaza for at least three years from the moment it ends. A majority, not large, of the Jewish public (54%) think Israel’s official policy toward the Palestinian residents of the territories has an effect on the recent increase in terror attacks. In the Jewish public a small majority thinks the presence of the Jewish settlements has an effect (51%) compared to 46% who hold the opposite view. The gaps between the right and the left on this question are huge (right—39% think the presence of the settlements has an effect on the increase in terror attacks, moderate right—46%, center—53%, moderate left—83%, left— 91%). Majority (79%) believes Israel’s existence currently depends to one extent or another on the military, political, and economic assistance that it receives from the United States. The public prefers the two issues of a socioeconomic nature (69% combined) over… increasing Israel’s military power (10%), improving its diplomatic status in the international arena, and achieving a peace agreement with the Palestinians (9% in both cases)…compared to an identical question presented in April 2012, the priority assigned to the socioeconomic area has risen by 12%; The rate of Jews who Insurance 84 Certain-Contested Preparedness Uncertain-Complete Insurance Certain-Contested TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 9. The reconciliation agreement that was signed between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas 10. The negotiations with the Palestinians perceive the socioeconomic challenges as more important for Israel’s future (58%) is now twice as high as the rate that regards the militarysecurity challenges as more important (28%). Twelve percent think the two kinds of challenges are important for Israel’s future to the same extent; Only 38% of the Jews (32% of the Arabs) answered that they feel very or moderately stable economically, while 27% of the Jews (37.5% of the Arabs) responded that their economic situation is not very or not at all stable. A considerable majority of the Jewish public (57.5%) sees the reconciliation agreement that was signed between Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas as very dangerous or moderately dangerous for Israel. 82% of those situating themselves on the right supported the stopping of the talks compared to 59% in the center and only 26% on the left. At the same time, the public is divided on whether the freeze in the negotiations is beneficial or harmful to Israel in the short term and the long term, with slightly more seeing it as more harmful both in the short (41%-36%) and long (40%34%) terms. A small majority of the Jewish public (52%) believes it is very urgent or moderately urgent (reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians), while 45.5% say reaching an agreement is not at all or not very urgent from Israel’s standpoint. As expected, the gaps between 85 Insurance Certain-Complete Insurance Certain-Contested TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 11. Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. 12. The return of Palestinian refugees to Israel 13. Israel will eventually become a bi-national state that lacks a Jewish majority 14. Europe and the United States will step up the demand for economic and other sanctions on Israel the political camps on this question are very large. The rates of those who think the issue is very urgent or moderately urgent are 37% on the right, 68% in the center, and 87% on the left… Only a tenth of the Jewish public sees this as the first or second most important issue that the government should address. An overwhelming majority (77%) of the Jewish sample responded that it is important to them that as part of the settlement, the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. The survey shows widespread opposition in the Jewish public (80.5%) to the idea that, in return for a permanent peace settlement, Israel could agree to the return of even a limited number of Palestinian refugees. The Jewish public is almost evenly split on Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recent assertion that a peace agreement is vital to prevent a situation in which Israel will eventually become a binational state that lacks a Jewish majority. 48% think this is an accurate statement while 45% do not. 50% see the chances of such measures as high while 47% regard them as small.…on the right, 42% see the chances of boosted sanctions as high; in the center that figure comes to 52%; while on the left 71% see high chances of such a development; Opinions in the Jewish public Insurance 86 Uncertain-Complete Preparedness Uncertain-Complete Preparedness Uncertain-Contested Preparedness Uncertain- Contested TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT 15. ‘The whole world is against us’ 16. External pressure 17. Existential Security Threat are divided: about half (49%) thinks the decision entails significant danger to Israel’s international status while a similar rate (47%) does not think the decision poses such danger; Of the Jewish sample, 49% think Israel could manage with the situation; 46% are sure or think it could not. Not surprisingly, here too there are large disparities by political camp: only a minority of those on the right (32%) think Israel would have trouble withstanding the pressure without revising its positions, compared to 56% of those placing themselves in the center and 67% of those who locate themselves on the left. a notable majority of the Jewish public (63%) thought that “The whole world is against us,” with only about one-third dissenting from this attitude… on the right 69%, on the moderate right 60%, in the center 66%, on the moderate left 52%, and on the left only a minority of 31% feel this way. The rate who see Israel as under more pressure than the Palestinians stands at 85.5% of those with a rightwing identity, 57% of those who define themselves as center, and 50% of those who place themselves as left; The Jewish public is divided into two almost equal camps, with 49.5% agreeing with the claim that only external pressure will lead to an agreement and 49% disagreeing. Only about one-fifth (19.5%) of the Jewish public think the Preparedness Certain-Contested Preparedness Certain-Complete Preparedness Uncertain-Complete 87 TRANSFORMING THE RISKS DYNAMICS IN AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT level of military-security risk to Israel at present is very high. Another 47% regard this risk level as moderately high, while 31% assess it as moderately or very low; Some 73% of the Jewish public are very optimistic or moderately optimistic about the country’s future in the coming years. The degree of optimism about respondents’ personal future is even higher at 85%. Optimism about Israel’s future is lowest in the youngest age group, where only 58% are optimistic compared to 71%-80% among the older age groups; Some 90% (!) are sure or moderately sure that the IDF, in its current condition, is capable of meeting the security threats confronting Israel;. 63% of the Jewish public responded that they feel very or somewhat protected 88