Committing to Conflict Prevention: The OSCE in Belarus and Ukraine

Prospects for Democracy in Belarus, 2006

Major developments in Belarusian society are analysed through the lens of public opinion.

This article analyses the significance of the OSCE Copenhagen and Moscow Documents of the early 1990s as a basis for investigating ways to make increased use of democracy commitments in the practical programming currently undertaken by ODIHR and other OSCE institutions and activities such as the field operations. The article compares the two documents with the activities of other organizations, foremost among them the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations; this comparison is necessary to help the OSCE to develop better niche areas of relative expertise. The paper concludes with five broad recommendations to “revive” the spirit of Copenhagen through practical democracy programming.

2010

During the first decade of the 21st century, a remarkable phenomenon swept through the former Soviet Union changing the political, social and cultural landscape. Popularly known as the ‘Colour Revolutions’, these non-violent protests overthrew autocratic regimes in three post-soviet republics: the Georgian Rose Revolution (2003), the Ukrainian Orange Revolution (2004) and the Kyrgyzstani Tulip Revolution (2005). This book examines the significance of these regime-change processes for the post-soviet world in particular and for global politics in the 21st century. Engaging comprehensively with the former Soviet republics, the contributors to this book ask why there wasn’t a revolution in a post-Soviet republic such as Russia, despite apparently favourable conditions. They also explore the circumstances that ensured some post-soviet countries underwent a successful colour revolution whilst others did not. Identifying the conditions for successful colour revolutions, this book asks whether there is a revolutionary blueprint that may be exported to other areas around the world that are under autocratic rule. Carefully considering the ideologies of the post-Soviet ruling regimes, this book demonstrates the manner by which political elites integrated nationalism, authoritarianism and populism into public debates. It analyzes the diverse anti-regime movements, discussing the factors that led to the rise of such factions and outlining how these opposition groups were constituted and operated. In addition, it assesses the impact of external forces including the influence of the USA, the EU and Russia. By examining the colour revolution phenomenon in its entirety, this book marks a significant contribution to both our micro and macro understanding of this tide of transformation.

AFET Study

For failure of complying with democratic standards, since 1997 Belarus has been (self-) isolated from European integration dynamics. Save for a short-lived 'thaw' with the West in 2008-2010, when Alexander Lukashenka’s regime was seeking to compensate for its degraded relations with Moscow, Belarus has been the target of EU sanctions. Yet the country remains apparently impermeable to democratisation and Europeanisation alike. A 'reluctant partner' in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus is also the cornerstone of Russia’s Eurasian Union project. In late 2011 Russia’s renewed subsidising of Belarus virtually saved the country from economic collapse. In energising its own integration offer along the Eurasian vector, Moscow offers official Minsk a cooperation prospect void of democratic conditionality which is more attractive than the EU’s could ever be. Do Lukashenka’s geopolitical preferences reflect the aspiration of the Belarusian people however? Building on the results of independent sociological surveys, this study tries to assess the worldviews, social needs and dividing lines among Belarusian society ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. It critically reviews the EU’s 'dual track' policy and instruments and calls for adopting a new strategy to draw the country closer to the EU while circumventing its authoritarian leadership. Exploring the potential of 'third track' diplomacy – towards a real, pragmatic partnership with Belarus as a country – this study advocates a more inclusive approach of neighbourhood relations, allowing for mutually beneficial cooperation for the sake of modernising and hopefully democratising Belarus.

* Publication sponsored by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany (www.auswaertiges-amt.de) The long-standing disagreements between NATO and Russia have been left unresolved for decades. In 2014 they finally escalated into an outright confrontation on the European continent, in which most European countries are now involved. Armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine, information warfare, along with a military buildup – these developments signalize clearly that European security is in danger today. If the OSCE is to resolve this crisis, there needs to be more than a high-level dialogue among the OSCE participating States on the future of European security. It could be years before such a dialogue would bring results and a way out of the dangerous confrontation would be found. Until then, this dialogue should be complemented by the OSCE’s work on the ground, through its field operations, targeted at preventing new conflicts similar to that in Ukraine. This work is particularly needed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus where the lines of geopolitical confrontation are drawn today. Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – over the fate of these six states a particularly intense struggle has unfolded. While they have been developing closer relations with NATO and the EU, the example of Georgia in 2008 has shown that Russia will oppose the Western influence in its neighbourhood. The more recent example of Ukraine has further demonstrated that the increasing instability in Europe puts even the states without ‘frozen conflicts’ on their territories at risk of an armed conflict that could lead to civil war and partition. The OSCE and its field operations have been slow to respond strategically to these new challenges. In contrast to the field operations in the Western Balkans, the OSCE operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus are much smaller and have lower budgets. Unlike the OSCE field operations in Central Asia, they do not have explicit conflict prevention mandates focusing instead on the resolution of already existing ‘frozen conflicts’. Moreover, in three of the six countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia – there is no OSCE field operations at all. This chapter will present the evidence of why the risk of new armed conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus is real. It will then argue that the OSCE should respond to the challenge by, firstly, enlarging its field operations in Moldova and Armenia, secondly, re-establishing the field operations in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and, thirdly, tasking all field operations in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus with conflict prevention.

This Mapping Study seeks to support international engagement on security sector reform in Ukraine by identifying the extent and scope of current rule of law, security sector governance (SSG) and democratic oversight programming. By covering international and regional organisations’ initiatives, as well as national projects, the Study seeks to comprehensively map programmes assisting Ukraine’s democratic institutions, executive, government, independent oversight institutions, civil society, media and the security sector itself. DCAF gratefully acknowledges the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ financial support for the project.

Irish Studies in International Affairs, 2012

"This article reviews the first two-thirds of Ireland’s chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It first examines the Cold War origins of the OSCE and its more recent evolution. The article then charts Ireland’s path to becoming chairman-in-office (CiO) for the first time in 2012 and identifies the major themes, initiatives and actions of the Irish chairmanship. Reflecting the priorities of the Irish CiO, and the OSCE as a body, this article focuses on the sphere of conflict prevention and resolution. Particular attention is given to the post-Soviet protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus and between Moldova and Transnistria. In the concluding section, an overview of the present capacity and future potential of the OSCE is provided. The central argument in this section is that the OSCE remains a convenient substitute for the involvement of great powers and absolves these great powers from acting in their own name. As the OSCE is composed of civil servants, has no hierarchy, works by consensus and gives an institutionalised veto to every member, responsibility for deadlock rests with the political masters of the member states and not with the OSCE as an entity.

The Eurasian heartland was once conceived of as the site of intense imperial power rivalry. Now a new political battleground is developing in the post-Soviet space: international election observer missions (IEOMs). Led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), since 1996 multilateral election observer missions have been conducted throughout post-communist states. These missions have recently gained signifi cance, with important consequences for several regimes in the region, including those that can be considered resistant to democratization. OSCE IEOMs have also been perceived as threatening Russian interests in post-Soviet states. In reaction to the IEOMs, several post-Soviet governments, 1 under Russia's leadership, have strenuously sought to reshape and weaken the process through three tactics: fi rst, by asserting that double standards exist in the process and by advancing an alternative language for democratization; second, by establishing alternative mechanisms and practices for IEOMs that aim to give legitimacy to that alternative conception of democracy; and third, by using those tactics to deceive their own populations and undercut domestic opposition. But, as the article indicates, the OSCE as a whole 2 and western governments have responded to these Russian-led demands and tactics, adding to the competition over IEOMs. The competition of values and practices presented by IEOMs goes beyond the OSCE/ODIHR IEOMs; it is disrupting relations more broadly among OSCE members and more widely between Russia and the West. The conclusion considers how developments in IEOMs contribute to the emergence of dividing lines in political values between post-Soviet polities, including Russia, and the West. The article begins by considering the origins of OSCE/ODIHR IEOMs and how they have gained potency.; the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine removed themselves from this grouping following the regime changes that form part of the focus of this article. 2 All post-Soviet states are members of the OSCE. That the OSCE as an organization takes measures against the interests of these states, even though they are members, is part of the political tensions in this article.

„Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”, 2014

H. Bazhenova, A chronology of key events in the history of post-Soviet states (1989–2014), Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, zeszyt 4 (2014), pp. 93–125.