Spoiling Peace in Cyprus

12 Spoiling peace in Cyprus Nathalie Tocci Spoiling characterizes the very nature of the persisting conflict in Cyprus. In the Cyprus context, spoiling has taken the form of actions that have strengthened one party’s position to the detriment of the basic needs of the other. Since the eruption of intercommunal fighting in 1963, and particularly since the 1974 partition of the island, the innumerable efforts of the United Nations to mediate the conflict have been victims of the spoiling activities of different actors at different points in time. But what exactly has constituted spoiling in the context of Cyprus? Spoiling has not entailed actions inherently inimical to peace and peaceful reconciliation. Nor has it meant opting for violence and discarding negotiations. Due to the absence of a comprehensive agreement since 1963, spoiling has also not involved reneging on the obligations of a settlement, thus causing its failure. Spoiling has rather taken the form of actions undertaken by parties normally involved in the long-lasting peace process under the aegis of the United Nations. These actions have been aimed at bolstering specific (spoiling) bargaining positions. They have taken place both within the context of negotiations and outside it through unilateral measures. As such, distinguishing spoiling from legitimate political actions to bolster a party’s bargaining strength has not been simple. Indeed, what has constituted spoiling to one party has represented legally and morally legitimate action to another. The distinction between spoiling and ‘‘normal politics’’ has thus been a question of degree, rather than one of clear-cut categories.1 If spoiling in Cyprus has not constituted actions inherently inimical to 262 SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 263 negotiations, but rather actions that have been inimical to a specific peace process and settlement, how can spoiling be pinpointed?2 To do so, the starting point must be an appreciation of the contours of a peaceful settlement mutually agreed upon in the context of negotiations. Such an appreciation inevitably involves a degree of normative judgement. Spoiling would then constitute the actions of any internal or external party intended to attain other (devious) objectives.3 A peaceful compromise settlement in Cyprus is one which both respects norms of democracy, human rights, and good governance and also accounts for the basic needs of all principal parties.4 In Cyprus these needs revolve around notions of self-determination, communal security, and the rectification of past injustices. The leaderships of the principal parties, supported by the governments of Greece and Turkey respectively, have sought these basic needs by presenting specific ‘‘satisfiers’’ (or bargaining positions) through which these needs could be attained.5 In Cyprus spoiling positions have constituted satisfiers revolving around ethno-nationalist ideologies and based on legalistic and modernist conceptions of sovereignty, statehood, and military power and balance. These positions have been spoiling because while aimed at fulfilling the basic needs of one party, they negate the basic needs of the other. Spoiling actions have been the activities intended to bolster the ethnonationalist and modernist discourse. In some instances this has entailed abandoning peace talks and pursuing exclusively unilateral actions outside the context of negotiations. In other instances it has meant participating in negotiations as a means to gain time or legitimacy. The essence remained the unchanged spoiling positions. Circumstances dictated the precise form in which spoiling took place. Interesting in this respect was the participation of both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaderships in the 2002–2004 peace talks. As ensuing developments demonstrated, both leaders rejected the UN-mediated talks aimed at reaching an agreement on the UN-proposed Annan Plan. Yet both engaged in the process as a means to retain legitimacy and in response to internal and external pressures. When the process reached its concluding stages, both leaders revealed their preferences. As the costs of engagement rose, they withdrew their commitments by strongly and publicly rejecting the UN plan. Spoiling has been grounded on both ideology and the perceived ability to attain maximalist objectives.6 In other words, spoiling positions have been endorsed by actors who were both ideologically committed to a particular vision of a future Cyprus and believed that such a vision was attainable. Indeed, some of the more moderate actors did not necessarily espouse ideologies that were radically different from those underlying spoiling positions. Yet their different assessment of what could be 264 TOCCI realistically achieved led them to pursue compromise agreements. Noteworthy in this respect was the attitude of former Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides in April 2004, who in supporting the Annan Plan argued that it reflected the only realistic outcome of a negotiated peace process. In contrast, the current President Tassos Papadopolous rejected the plan, arguing that the Greek Cypriots were sufficiently strong to secure a more favourable agreement in future. While ideology and perceptions of power have lain at the heart of spoiling, vested interests in the persisting conflict have also played a role. Property, business interests, and undiluted control over a given territory certainly affected conflict continuation. However, ethno-nationalism and vested interests have been interconnected. For example, Greek Cypriot spoiling positions on property have been as much about property per se as about a narrative of the Turkish invasion and occupation. Likewise, the Turkish Cypriot reluctance to allow Greek Cypriot refugees to return to northern Cyprus has been due both to the ensuing dislocation of the Turks and Turkish Cypriots living in these properties and to the fear of intercommunal intermingling that could trigger renewed violence against them. Hence, interests have strengthened and reproduced the modernist discourse, while being embedded in it. This close interrelationship is accentuated by the relatively low turnover of political élites within both communities. For example, in 2003 Presidents Rauf Denktaş and Glafcos Clerides negotiated peace in Cyprus, just as they had after the breakdown of the republic in 1963. Since 2003 southern Cyprus has been governed by Papadopolous, who back in the late 1950s was a member of the EOKA nationalist struggle against British colonial rule. In 1999–2002 Bülent Ecevit was the Turkish prime minister, just as he had been in 1974 when Turkey invaded the island following a Greek military coup. The absence of a comprehensive élite turnover has reduced the scope for constructive change by hindering a genuine transformation of élite interests, ideologies, and discourse in line with changing circumstances. The needs of the principal parties and the spoiling positions of their leaderships The existence and persistence of the Cyprus conflict are characterized by the fundamental reluctance of all principal parties to create, operate, or re-establish a unified independent Cyprus where Greek and Turkish Cypriots could peacefully coexist on the basis of a shared understanding of their political equality. This reluctance is driven by the parties’ under- SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 265 standing of the ways in which they could attain their objectives of selfdetermination, individual rights, and communal security. The conflict emerged in the 1930s–1950s when the Greek Cypriot community, supported by Greece, articulated its struggle for selfdetermination in terms of enosis, or union between Greece and Cyprus. Fearing Greek domination and spurred by the British, the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey mounted a reactive counter-enosis campaign. By the late 1950s this countermobilization crystallized in the diametrically opposed position of taksim, or partition. In 1960, through heavyhanded pressure from Greece, Turkey, and the UK, a compromise was found. Cyprus would become an independent bi-communal republic. Yet the Greek Cypriot leadership remained implicitly devoted to enosis, and by 1963 the bi-communal republic had collapsed. With its breakdown, both community leaderships lost their already limited commitment to the 1959–1960 arrangements. Little international effort was exerted to prevent the 1974 Greek coup in Cyprus and the ensuing Turkish military intervention on the island. The decades that followed the 1974 partition witnessed a series of failed negotiations and rejected proposals. Neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriot leaders were ready to abandon the status quo for the establishment of a genuine bi-zonal and bi-communal federal republic in which Cyprus would be reunified and sovereignty would be shared between its two communities. The Greek Cypriot leadership was relatively content with the legal, political, and economic supremacy of its republic. It was unwilling to relinquish this status for genuine power-sharing with the smaller Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot leadership also was unwilling to renounce its de facto independence in favour of power-sharing within a nominally reunified state. Both parties articulated their claims in the mutually exclusive language of absolute statehood and sovereignty. The sections below review the basic needs of the principal parties and the ‘‘spoiling’’ positions and actions intended to satisfy those basic needs. The Greek Cypriot community and Greece The Greek Cypriot community seeks the reunification of Cyprus and the prevention of secession or annexation to Turkey of the northern part of the island. It aims to restore to the greatest possible extent the status quo ante, i.e. that pertaining prior to the 1974 Turkish military intervention, which led to its loss of control of over 37 per cent of the island’s territory and the displacement of 140,000–160,000 Greek Cypriots. Within a reunified island, the Greek Cypriots call for a fair and fully functioning 266 TOCCI arrangement in terms of territorial distribution and government structures. This implies that the larger Greek Cypriot community would benefit from a larger share of territory and political representation. The Greek Cypriots insist on the liberalization of the ‘‘three freedoms’’ of movement, settlement, and property, and on respect for human rights, including the right of refugee return. They call for security guarantees against Turkish aggression. The perceived threat of Turkey is due to Turkey’s proximity, size, military capability, and, most critically, its history of relations with Cyprus from the days of the Ottoman Empire to the 1974 intervention. Since 1974 Greece has supported the Greek Cypriot cause of reunification. This is because of the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and historical ties between Greeks and Greek Cypriots. It is also because of Greece’s integral role in the evolution of the conflict, from its role in the enosis campaign in the 1930s–1950s to its guarantor status in the 1960 accords and the Greek military coup in 1974 that triggered the Turkish invasion. Since 1974 all Greek governments, while pursuing the Cyprus dossier with differing intensities and through different means, have always supported reunification. While backing strong ties with Cyprus, they have never advocated their pre-1974 aim of enosis. Nationalism within the Greek Cypriot community, and subsequently positions on the conflict, historically took two different forms: Hellenocentrism or Greek Cypriot nationalism, and Cyprocentrism or Cypriot nationalism.7 Greek Cypriot nationalists emphasized notions of Greekness in the Cypriot identity, and up until the 1974 partition they gathered around the banner of enosis. Since 1974, while no longer advocating enosis, they have emphasized the Greekness of Cyprus in the context of an independent republic that would be organically linked to Greece. Variants of this political ideology were espoused by the moderate centre-right (DISY), the more hard-line centre-right (DIKO), and the extreme right (New Horizons), as well as by the nationalist socialists (EDEK/KISOS) and the Greek Orthodox Church. On the other side of the political spectrum, Cypriot nationalists emphasized the sui generis nature of the Cypriot identity, shared by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, as well as the civic elements of identity based on common economic, social, and political interests. Their political ideology emerged after 1974. They imagined a shared history of intercommunal coexistence and amity. Turks, and not Turkish Cypriots, were viewed as ‘‘the enemy’’. Cypriot nationalists strongly supported the reunification of Cyprus and its independence from external interference. This also included independence from Greece, whose irredentism and ethnonationalism were seen as partly responsible for the events of 1974. Since 1974 variants of Cyprocentrism have been espoused by the leftist AKEL SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 267 (whose positions, however, had hardened by the turn of the century) as well as by the moderate liberal EDI. In their rhetoric most Greek Cypriot political parties have accepted that their basic needs could be achieved within the confines of a bicommunal and bi-zonal federal settlement in the post-1974 period. Yet a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation has meant different things to different people. Spoiling positions on all of the major elements on the conflict settlement agenda have come from various actors at various points in time, depending on their ideologies and their perceived capabilities. These positions have been advocated predominantly by ethno-nationalist actors who also genuinely believed that their views were achievable. However, on issues such as refugee rights, the ‘‘three freedoms’’, and the role of Turkey, Cypriot nationalists have also taken hard-line positions, especially in recent years. This has been due to their insistence on the immediate intermingling between the communities and the noninterference of external actors. Concerning the constitutional structure of a future Cyprus, spoiling positions have departed from the rhetorical commitment to a genuine federation. These positions have insisted on a tightly integrated state with single and undivided sovereignty, international personality, and citizenship. Within this state most competences would be dealt with by the central level of government. Federated entities would be subordinated to the centre and would not enjoy sovereign competences as such. They would deal with limited issues in the areas of culture, education, and religion. Within the centre, representation would reflect to the greatest possible extent the demographic balance on the island. As such the centre would be controlled by the larger Greek Cypriot community. Legislative and executive decisions would be taken on the basis of majority vote. The federation would unambiguously represent the continuation of the existing Republic of Cyprus, into which the Turkish Cypriots would be reintegrated. Any ambiguity on the question of state succession would entail the recognition of the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Despite the rhetorical commitment to bi-zonality, Greek Cypriot spoiling positions have insisted both on a significant redistribution of territory to the Greek Cypriot zone and on an uncontested implementation of the right of return for all Greek Cypriot refugees. In addition, they have called for the full liberalization of the freedoms of movement, settlement, and property. Due to the numbers of Greek Cypriot refugees and the size and economic strength of the Greek Cypriot community, the full implementation of these rights and freedoms would erode bi-zonality in practice. Spoiling positions have also been categorical about the noninterference of Turkey in Cyprus’s security system. They have called for 268 TOCCI the full withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island and have rejected the continuation of the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, giving guarantors Britain, Greece, and Turkey unilateral rights of intervention in Cyprus. On the contrary, they have sought international guarantees to prevent Turkey’s interference. Spoiling positions have insisted also on the full withdrawal of all Turkish immigrants who settled in Cyprus after 1974. The Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey The Turkish Cypriot community, supported by Turkey, seeks political equality with the larger Greek Cypriot community. Its greatest fear is the return to the status quo ante (1963–1974), when following the Greek Cypriot unilateral alteration of the bi-communal 1960 constitution and the ensuing intercommunal violence, Turkish Cypriot officials left all public institutions and most Turkish Cypriots were relegated to small enclaves. In light of the 1963–1974 events, the Turkish Cypriots feel that due to their smaller size, their political equality warrants the highest degree of self-rule and physical separation from the Greek Cypriots. They also call for Turkish security guarantees, given their mistrust of other foreign involvement, which failed to prevent the injustices committed against them in the past. Turkey has specific security concerns which go beyond the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots. Due to the vicinity of Cyprus, Turkey aims to prevent Greek domination of Cyprus. Lying behind these views is the ‘‘Sèvres syndrome’’, still prevalent in Turkey’s political and security culture. The large majority of the Turkish élite and public view with suspicion European intentions, fearing that in the legacy of the Sèvres Treaty after the First World War European powers are inclined to dismember Turkey by collaborating with hostile neighbours, such as Greece. Hence, preventing Cyprus from falling into Greek hands, and thus becoming the ‘‘dagger’’ pointing at the Turkish mainland, is considered an utmost priority. Turkey has thus supported the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots, has called for a balance between the roles of Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, and has demanded a role in Cyprus’s security arrangements. Beyond the consensus on these general aims and needs, the Turkish Cypriots have been divided between the nationalist camp, which up until 2004 had been consistently in power under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş, and the centre-left and liberal camp. In Turkey divisions have also existed between those who shared the views of Turkish Cypriot nationalists and those who argued that while Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests should be protected, Turkey should loosen its grip on Cyprus and allow the island’s reunification. SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 269 The nationalist camp has emphasized the ethnic differences between Greeks and Turks and the impossibility of the two communities living together. It has stressed the commonality between Turkish Cypriots and Turks, and the organic links between the Turkish Cypriot community and ‘‘motherland’’ Turkey. The history of 1963–1974, i.e. when the 1960 constitutional arrangements collapsed and ethnic violence re-erupted, has been flagged both as evidence of the endemic incompatibility between Greeks and Turks and as the justification for rejecting an integrated federal solution. The 1974 Turkish intervention is considered as irrefutable proof that the Turkish Cypriots need and only need Turkish guarantees for their security. In northern Cyprus there have been two major parties in the nationalist camp: the UBP and the DP, which have together consistently won the lion’s share of the vote since 1976. Up until 2005 Rauf Denktaş was the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and of the de facto state in the north. The Turkish Cypriot nationalist establishment, and Rauf Denktaş in particular, enjoyed close ties with the nationalist establishment in Ankara. The Turkish Cypriot government would not take any key decisions without Ankara’s consent. Particularly in view of the non-recognized status of the TRNC, the latter could not survive without Turkey’s support. This is not to say that Denktaş was a puppet in Ankara’s hands. The Turkish Cypriot leader, having retained power longer than any Turkish politician, enjoyed considerable support and respect in Turkey, particularly amongst the military, the foreign ministry, and nationalist rightand left-wing circles. Furthermore, to the extent that Denktaş shared similar views with Turkish nationalists, the key question was not so much one of the relative strengths of Denktaş and Ankara, but the relative strengths of the conservatives/nationalists and the progressive forces in Turkey and north Cyprus combined. In this respect, Denktaş added considerable weight to the strength of the former against the latter. The centre-left camp instead, while recognizing the important differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, has emphasized equally the differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. As such, it has opposed the immigration of mainland Turks to the north, arguing that the different political, cultural, and economic background of the immigrants ‘‘diluted’’ the Turkish Cypriot identity. The centre-left, while sharing the leadership’s understanding of Turkish Cypriot basic aims, has been traditionally more flexible about future solutions. It has argued that Turkish Cypriot aims could be achieved within the confines of a federal settlement. A federation would guarantee maximum Turkish Cypriot selfgovernment and minimum interference of both Greek Cypriots and Turkey in Turkish Cypriot affairs. The two main parties on the centre-left have been the CTP and the TKP. Since the late 1990s the centre-left has 270 TOCCI included also the liberal business community, embodied by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. With the 2005 presidential elections, power has shifted to the centre-left camp through the election of Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of the CTP. Beginning with the constitution, Turkish Cypriot spoiling positions have generally come from the nationalist camp. These positions have insisted on unambiguously divided sovereignty as a means to ensure Turkish Cypriot political equality. Objecting to the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus, they have argued that a solution should be based on the prior recognition of two existing sovereign states. Most Turkish Cypriots have called for a loose common state, in which most competences would be dealt with separately by the two constituent states. However, spoiling positions have insisted rigidly that the centre’s competences should ‘‘emanate’’ from the divided sovereignties of the two previously independent sovereign states. At the centre, political equality should be institutionalized through the greatest possible numerical equality, rotation, and unanimity in decision-making between the communities. Turning to territory, spoiling positions have rejected extensive territorial readjustments, despite the disproportionate Turkish Cypriot control of territory (37 per cent). Perhaps most importantly, spoiling positions have refused to discuss territorial concessions before an agreement on constitutional questions, despite the clear interlinkage of these items on the conflict settlement agenda. Extensive territorial concessions (that would allow many Greek Cypriots to return to their properties under Greek Cypriot rule) have not only been rejected, but also the return to and settlement of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus have been categorically turned down. The difference between spoiling and non-spoiling positions in this respect has been one of degree. No Turkish Cypriot is willing to see an immediate huge influx of Greek Cypriots to northern Cyprus. However, spoiling positions have been more rigid on the overall numbers of Greek Cypriots allowed to return and settle in the north, as well as on the time-frames in which these movements could take place. They have insisted that reciprocal property claims should be solved almost exclusively through compensation and property exchange between the communities. Spoiling and politics Before proceeding, it is important to specify how and why the positions discussed above have been ‘‘spoiling’’ rather than normal and legitimate political positions. The spoiling nature of these positions is given by the fact that they deny the mutual fulfilment of the principal parties’ basic needs. Greek Cypriot calls for a tightly integrated federal state with sin- SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 271 gle and undivided sovereignty contradict Turkish Cypriot needs for political equality given the relative size and strength of the two communities. Turkish Cypriot calls for divided sovereignty and quasi-statehood negate Greek Cypriot needs to reunify the island and prevent secession. Spoiling on the question of state succession invalidates the other community’s reading of history. A clear-cut continuation of the Republic of Cyprus entails a dismissal of the injustices of 1963–1974 and recognition of the republic’s legitimacy as the sole representative of the Cypriots and the basis for Greek Cypriot control. Yet recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus entails legitimizing the 1974 intervention and partition, and thus the ultimate victory of the historical Turkish cause of partition. It also creates the basis for future Turkish Cypriot secession. Finally, the full implementation of the right of return and of individual freedoms refutes Turkish Cypriot calls for bi-zonality based on their understanding of communal security. Yet an absolute rejection of any Greek Cypriot presence in the north denies Greek Cypriot individual rights and fails to rectify perceived historical injustices. A final note on spoilers and spoiling positions is temporal change. Spoiling positions have not been advocated consistently by the same domestic actors; hence the inappropriate use of the term ‘‘spoiler’’, indicating a permanent characteristic of a particular political actor. Spoiling positions have not been fixed over time. Actors have changed and positions have evolved. In some instances a surge in nationalist discourse within one principal party was the result of a domestic political change. From 1974 to 1981, following the restoration of democracy in Greece, Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis (New Democracy) took a low profile on Cyprus, embracing the doctrine of ‘‘Cyprus decides, Greece supports’’.8 Yet with the election of Andreas Papandreou’s socialist PASOK in November 1981 this logic was reversed. In 1981 PASOK represented an extreme form of a populist catch-all party thriving on a nationalist rhetoric. The rhetorical positions of the same actors have also evolved over time. It was the same Clerides who in 1993 campaigned against the 1992 UN ‘‘Set of Ideas’’, and who a decade later declared himself willing to negotiate a solution on the basis of the UN Annan Plan, which provided for a more decentralized federation. It was the same Rauf Denktaş who in 1974 adamantly called for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and who in 1998 discarded a federal solution in favour of a confederal one. In Turkey the stance of the military has also changed. While historically considered a monolithic actor firmly based within the nationalist camp, in 2004 the Turkish military acquiesced to the moderate stance of the Turkish government in its support for the Annan Plan. Whether these temporal changes went beyond the level of rhetoric 272 TOCCI remains an open question. At times changes have been genuine. At other times they have been rhetorical shifts to bolster unchanged positions of substance. Actors may have felt that engagement in negotiations was beneficial to the attainment of their unchanged objectives. As such they may have modified their rhetoric to trigger a relaunch of peace talks. Yet the same actors could then walk out of negotiations, believing that engagement would weaken their positions. For example, in December 2001 Denktaş relaunched the peace process and modified his rhetoric, abandoning the clear-cut references to the establishment of a confederation. Yet this did not entail a genuine change in his objectives, as ensuing developments revealed. Equally difficult to disentangle are the reasons determining changing positions. Do positions alter as a result of changing ideologies and a process of socialization into different modes of operation? Or does change occur as a pragmatic and calculated response to different perceived opportunities and capabilities? At this point, suffice it to say that whether rhetorical or real, whether ideological or pragmatic, a change of context has frequently altered spoiling positions in Cyprus. Spoiling tactics and actions: Strengthening spoiling positions Spoiling may change over time as the result of interrelated domestic, regional, and international changes, and most critically as a result of actor responses to these contextual changes. The sections below examine the discursive tactics and actions used to bolster spoiling positions and garner domestic and international support. The domestic legitimization of spoiling positions All actors within the conflicting parties have attempted to legitimize their positions to garner domestic support. Following the logic of two-level games, they have done so also to bolster their bargaining strength vis-àvis each other.9 In Cyprus, technical legalistic language has been used to mask and legitimize uncompromising nationalist positions. These positions have been grounded on a notion of absolute and monolithic sovereignty that has been inherently inimical to flexibility. Spoiling positions have also been based on the discourse of moral rights, political and historical imperatives, and security needs. Since 1974 the Greek Cypriot public has been persuaded by its governments, civil society, and media of the moral and legal superiority of the Greek Cypriot cause. Refugee return and the liberalization of the three freedoms have been portrayed as undisputed human rights. Relative SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 273 Greek Cypriot control of central institutions has been described as an absolute necessity emanating from the imperatives of majoritarian democracy. The political class has never invested in arguing the need for, let alone the desirability of, true compromise with the Turkish Cypriots. In turn, the logic driving spoiling positions has never been seriously questioned. So when leaders have appeared more willing to reach out to the Turkish Cypriots they have often been punished by the people. The electoral defeat of moderate George Vassiliou in 1993 by the (then) more hard-line Glafcos Clerides and the 2003 defeat of Clerides by the tougher Tassos Papadopoulos are both cases in point. The Greek Cypriot public’s overwhelming rejection of the Annan Plan in the referendum of April 2004 (by 76 per cent) can be explained also by the community’s conviction that a better plan existed and was realistically achievable. While endorsing a similar rhetoric, spoiling tactics in Greece have rested on the additional argument of historical responsibility. Due to the 1974 Greek military coup in Cyprus that ousted Archbishop Makarios and triggered the Turkish invasion, Greece has acknowledged its share of responsibility in causing partition. As such, Greek governments have legitimized morally any policy instrument devoted to strengthening the Greek Cypriot cause. While these instruments have generally excluded the use of force, they have included defence initiatives such as the 1993 Joint Defence Doctrine promoted by Andreas Papandreou’s government in Athens. Any attempt by Greek governments to exert any pressure on the Greek Cypriot leadership has been attacked internally as a betrayal of the Greek Cypriot cause and a default of Greece’s historical responsibilities. This line of argument was used to motivate the government’s noncommittal stance towards the Annan Plan in the referendum campaign in April 2004. The government in Athens simply stated that it would support any decision taken by the Greek Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriot spoiling tactics have instrumentalized fears of renewed domination to bolster the quest for independent statehood. The return of Greek Cypriot refugees and the liberalization of the ‘‘three freedoms’’ have been equated with Greek Cypriot domination and violence against the smaller and weaker Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots have been induced to believe that intercommunal contact would entail a return to 1963. Older generations remembered the atrocities of the past; younger generations were constantly reminded of them by the media and the education system. Until April 2003 they had little way of testing this narrative through personal experience due to the blockaded green line. It was indeed interesting to observe how, following Denktaş’s decision to open the border in April 2003, nationalists on the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot side were quick to warn that the honeymoon would soon be over and intercommunal contact could spark violent intercommunal 274 TOCCI clashes. When these clashes did not materialize, the same actors argued that they would occur once the Greek Cypriots reclaimed their properties in the context of a federal settlement. Turkish Cypriot spoiling tactics have fed into fears of displacement. As far as the displacement of Anatolian settlers was concerned, evidence was often manipulated. Despite Greek Cypriot demands, federal proposals have normally provided for the retention of most settlers in Cyprus. The Annan Plan allowed most of the settlers to remain on the island. A large proportion would be naturalized as Turkish Cypriot citizens, and most of the rest could remain through residence permits. Yet Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists claimed that the plan would inhumanely force the displacement of these people. A problem in countering this argument has been the deficient communication between the moderate parties in northern Cyprus and the Turkish settlers. A more compelling argument concerned the displacement of persons as a result of territorial readjustments. Territorial readjustments are an inevitable element of a package deal. Yet spoiling positions have resisted significant readjustments. To bolster such positions, actors have emphasized the considerable human suffering that would result from the displacement of thousands of Turkish Cypriots living in the territories to be handed over to Greek Cypriot rule. In 1992 Denktaş rejected the map presented by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, arguing that it would lead to extensive Turkish Cypriot displacement. Likewise, in 2002–2004 Denktaş rejected the map presented in the Annan Plan, again referring to the displacement of persons that it entailed. Turkish spoiling tactics have also manipulated the ‘‘Sèvres syndrome’’ still prevalent in the country. Cyprus could not be compromised upon because it is key to Turkish national security, protecting Turkey against hostile Greek designs.10 No Turkish politician could afford to accept a solution in Cyprus with the slightest element of perceived treachery in it. As such, nationalists in Turkey have depicted their positions as the bastions of Turkish security and have accused moderates of bending to foreign pressure and compromising vital security interests. Indeed, when in 2004 the AKP government in Turkey declared its support for the Annan Plan, critics from the opposition CHP, from the presidency, and from the nationalist right- and left-wing circles argued that the government was dangerously compromising on Turkish security and Turkish Cypriot rights. Using and responding to the international environment Spoiling has not been justified only by presenting particular narratives of the past. Domestic actors have also actively used and responded to exter- SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 275 nal factors as a means to strengthen their positions. Since 1974 the parties have responded to EU and UN actions in particular. They have also triggered European and international decisions to bolster their positions, often beyond the awareness of these international actors themselves. Spoiling actions have used the resources bestowed by third parties to strengthen, legitimize, and attain their spoiling or devious objectives.11 Particularly since the late 1980s, the Greek Cypriot side has backed its positions through a strategy of internationalization.12 This strategy has been supported by Greece since the election of Andreas Papandreou in 1981. But how have international forums been used to strengthen Greek Cypriot positions, and how have these strategies fed into Greek Cypriot spoiling aims and positions? The Greek Cypriot side has taken advantage of its internationally recognized status as the only legitimate authority on the island. It has used this status to lobby for UN resolutions condemning Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and reinstating the RoC’s status as the sole legitimate authority on the island. These resolutions were then flagged as evidence backing rigid positions on statehood and sovereignty. When for example the Greek Cypriot leadership reacted against the UN Secretary-General’s statements in September 2000 calling for political equality, it argued that the statements ran contrary to the parameters of a solution ‘‘as determined by UN principles, decisions and resolutions’’.13 Particularly since the 1990s the Greek Cypriot authorities have also concentrated on European legal forums to ensure condemnation of Turkey. Perhaps the most critical case has been that of Titina Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot who in March 1989 attempted to cross the green line in order to reach her property in Kyrenia, and thereafter filed a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The principal aim of the case was that of setting the parameters of a future solution along Greek Cypriot lines.14 Not only did international law confer unreserved support for the Greek Cypriot position on the right of return, but the Loizidou precedent also made the acceptance of Turkish Cypriot proposals less feasible. Even if the two communities were to agree on a restricted implementation of the right of return, could the issue be considered settled if any individual could challenge the agreement by appealing to the ECHR? Since the Loizidou case there have been an unending number of Greek Cypriot cases filed against Turkey in the ECHR.15 The Loizidou case had a spoiling effect on the peace process not necessarily because of the actual ruling of the court. Its spoiling effect was due to its attempt to settle a key issue of the conflict through arbitration rather than negotiation, in a manner that would fulfil the maximalist aims of one party without accounting for the fears of the other. Finally, the Greek Cypriot side, aided by Greece, applied for and pursued EU membership. The fundamental reasoning behind this was to 276 TOCCI bolster the Greek Cypriot bargaining strength in the conflict. Cyprus’s accession process and ultimate membership would strengthen the RoC’s status as the only legitimate government on the island, would discredit further the TRNC, and would provide the RoC with an additional forum in which to present its case. Cyprus’s accession would increase Greek Cypriot leverage on Turkey both because of an expected rise in EU pressure on Turkey and because of Turkey’s own aspirations to join the EU. EU membership would also yield key security gains to the Greek Cypriots, alleviating perceived Turkish threats. Perhaps most critically, EU membership would create a framework for the liberalization of the ‘‘three freedoms’’ with the implementation of the EU acquis communautaire that provides for the liberalization of the ‘‘four freedoms’’ of movement of goods, services, capital, and people in the EU. The way in which Greek Cypriot spoiling arguments have manipulated the issue of the acquis to legitimize their discourse has been particularly interesting. Whereas in the past uncompromising positions were couched in the language of human rights and majoritarian democracy, the accession process allowed the far more specific and binding language of the acquis to justify inflexibility. EU obligations were used to criticize the United Nations and reject UN positions. This was particularly evident in the leadership’s criticism of key provisions of the Annan Plan. Since then, and with the EU accession of the divided Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot leadership has incessantly called for a ‘‘European’’ solution which would entail the full liberalization of the three freedoms. Turkish Cypriot spoiling tactics and actions have mirrored those of the Greek Cypriots. The more the international community supported the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus, the more Turkish Cypriot nationalists argued that political equality could only be secured through a prior recognition of their sovereignty. For example, the 1983 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) was made after the RoC brought its case to the UN General Assembly, securing a resolution in favour of the immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces. Frustrated by the Greek Cypriot advantages of recognized statehood, the Turkish Cypriot leadership persuaded Ankara to support the UDI.16 Nationalists also portrayed Greek Cypriot legal cases harming Turkish Cypriot interests as further justification for their calls to separate statehood. A 1994 European Court of Justice case banning Turkish Cypriot certificated exports was flagged as evidence that the TRNC needed international recognition for its economic and political survival. It was no coincidence that soon after the ruling, the Turkish Cypriot Assembly withdrew its commitment to a federal settlement and supported the recognition of Turkish Cypriot sovereignty instead. SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 277 The Greek Cypriot application for and pursuit of EU membership have also been used and abused by Turkish Cypriot nationalists to bolster their case. In the 1990s the perceived zero-sum nature of Greek Cypriot gains from membership automatically made many Turkish Cypriots view EU accession as a threat. These perceived threats were nurtured by Turkish Cypriot spoiling tactics, which consistently argued that EU accession meant an enhancement of the RoC’s status, increased leverage on Turkey, the erosion of bi-zonality on the island, and the end of Turkey’s protection of Turkish Cypriot security. Denktaş repeatedly accused the EU of wanting to reduce the Turkish Cypriots to a minority deprived of any collective rights. So, the argument went, reunification within the EU had to be avoided at least until Turkey’s own (uncertain) accession. In fact, the separate membership of Greek Cyprus could foster a permanent partition on the island. This was viewed as a more desirable outcome by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot nationalists. On the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sides, spoiling tactics have also been linked to Turkey’s own EU membership aspirations. Due to the obstacles that a divided Cyprus posed to Turkey’s own European path, a basic overlap emerged between hard-liners on the Cyprus conflict and nationalist and Eurosceptic forces in Turkey. Officially the Turkish establishment rejected any link between a Cyprus settlement and its EU membership ambitions. It feared that such a link entailed that a settlement would become a precondition for Turkey’s accession. Yet spoiling arguments implicitly linked these questions in two ways. On the one hand, they affirmed that Cyprus was a national issue which could not be compromised for the sake of the EU. Furthermore, given the perception of the EU’s bias against Turkey and its reluctance to include Turkey in the EU club, a settlement would entail unacceptable compromises for Turkey. EU decisions that were viewed as inimical to Turkey consolidated this feeling. This was particularly evident in the aftermath of the 1997 Luxembourg European Council, in which Turkey was denied EU candidacy. On the other hand, Turkish Eurosceptics felt that spoiling peace in Cyprus would add another welcome obstacle in Turkey’s EU path. This would dampen the momentum in favour of what conservatives viewed as threatening domestic reforms. In other words, to Eurosceptics a nonsolution in Cyprus became an externally given opportunity to cool down Turkey-EU relations rather than a threat to Turkey’s foreign policy goals.17 International responses to spoiling in Cyprus By way of conclusion, the following paragraphs turn to the role played by the international community in managing spoiling in Cyprus. In particu- 278 TOCCI lar, in view of the failure of the 2002–2004 peace process, in which respects did the international community fail? The UN’s role over the course of 2002–2004 was an important positive influence over negotiations, particularly in view of the publication of the Annan Plan. The plan provided for the simultaneous reunification and EU accession of the island. In doing so, it invalidated spoiling arguments by demonstrating concretely to many Turkish Cypriots that EU membership would not threaten their security, and that their needs could be fulfilled within the confines of a common state, member of the EU. Yet, other than presenting a comprehensive proposal, the UN’s potential to manage spoiling was limited. The United Nations did not have the necessary instruments to generate incentives for a settlement, either by moderating spoiling positions or by discrediting them altogether.18 At most the United Nations could have coordinated better, or rather sooner, with the EU (close coordination between the UN team and the European Commission existed, but not until late 2001, almost a decade after the launch of Cyprus’s accession process). A separate question is whether the Annan Plan could have countered more effectively Greek Cypriot resistance if its provisions had conformed more squarely with the parameters of international law. In other words, could Greek Cypriot spoiling have been managed if it had been measured against a different solution? Arguably not. Most of the details of the plan came from the bargaining positions of either the Greek Cypriot or the Turkish Cypriot negotiators. The UN mediators largely attempted to manage and balance the parties’ conflicting requests (with some input of their own). Hence, the leadership’s rejection of the plan on the basis that it was an externally imposed initiative was simply an excuse to relieve itself of the responsibility of a failure. It could still be argued that a different balance in the plan could have been possible. But a sufficiently different balance, necessary to shift the strongly opposed Greek Cypriot community, would probably not have been acceptable any more to the Turkish Cypriot public. The EU potentially did have the necessary instruments to generate incentives towards reunification.19 However, the role of the EU as an actor was far more problematic.20 Rather than fostering a new consensus within all principal parties on the desirability of shared sovereignty, multiple identities, porous borders, and collective security, many EU policies and decisions paradoxically heightened the perceived importance of recognized statehood and sovereignty, thereby bolstering spoiling tactics and arguments. This was not done intentionally. It was the unintended effect of successful spoiling policies which domestic actors in Cyprus articulated and legitimized by using and abusing the EU discourse. Spoiling by using the SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 279 EU discourse succeeded because EU actors paid insufficient attention to the reasons behind the strong Greek Cypriot commitment to join the EU. Political and security interests, specifically related to the conflict, led the Greek Cypriot side to engage in the accession process. These gains were not related to an expectation that the EU would foster the emergence of a post-nationalist Cyprus in which ethnic rivalries would subsume. The attraction was rather that of strengthening the Greek Cypriot national cause against its local enemies. As the receipt of EU-related benefits became freed from progress in the peace process, the accession process reduced the incentives to seek an early agreement of those Greek Cypriot nationalists who sought considerable changes in UN guidelines. This continues to be the case in the post-accession period. The Greek Cypriot government, represented within EU institutions, has used its comparative advantage to strengthen its bargaining position and prevent EU initiatives to improve the lot of the Turkish Cypriots by easing their international isolation. Lifting the condition of a settlement on Cyprus’s EU accession moderated the positions of the previous leadership in south Cyprus. Clerides’s presidency over the entire decade of EU accession may have had a socialization (or Europeanization) effect on the leadership, inducing its moderation.21 Yet with the rise to power of Tassos Papadopolous, Greek Cypriot nationalist discourse resurfaced. In such a context, Cyprus’s assured accession to the EU failed to deter Greek Cypriot spoiling positions.22 The views of the new leadership were shared by the wider public, as shown by the referendum results in southern Cyprus in April 2004. There appeared to be a two-way relationship between the spoiling positions of the leadership and the views of the community. Whereas the popular resistance to the Annan Plan aided the president in upholding spoiling positions vis-à-vis the international community, the president’s strong rejection of the plan influenced the people’s scepticism about the plan. Throughout the 1990s the EU also unintentionally failed to deter Turkish Cypriot spoiling. The fact that full membership of a divided Cyprus could consolidate partition was viewed as a desirable outcome by the most nationalist forces in northern Cyprus and Turkey. Their views were strengthened over the 1990s because EU actors insufficiently highlighted the attractive gains of membership and unintentionally generated (or failed to deter) Turkish Cypriot fears. In addition, the general climate of mistrust amongst the Turkish Cypriots of Greek Cypriot and EU intentions fuelled the siege mentality in northern Cyprus in the 1990s, bolstering the legitimacy of the spoiling discourse. Hence, implicit EU conditionality on the Turkish Cypriot side both hardened and legitimized Turkish Cypriot spoiling during the 1990s. 280 TOCCI By 2002–2003 the Turkish Cypriot leadership had come under increasing pressure from the people, who were increasingly persuaded of the desirability of a settlement within the EU. In the referendum of April 2004 65 per cent of Turkish Cypriots indeed voted in favour of the Annan Plan and EU accession. The growing appreciation of the gains from membership and of the inevitability of Cyprus’s accession (in Stedman’s terms, the strategy of the ‘‘departing train’’) ultimately succeeded in marginalizing Turkish Cypriot spoiling and altering the internal balance in north Cyprus in favour of moderate views. EU conditionality alone would not have triggered these key changes. Yet as it interacted with other domestic, regional, and international changes, it became a powerful external determinant of constructive domestic change. Finally, and particularly until the turn of the century, perhaps the most serious flaw in EU policy was the absence of a strategy towards Turkey. As a result, EU default incentives were insufficiently strong to trigger a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Following the Turkish elections in November 2002, the domestic dynamics in the country were seriously altered. A more credible EU accession process together with the rise to power of a government that has been seriously committed to the goal of membership transformed the internal dynamics in Turkey, bringing about a change in state policies towards Cyprus. The principal lesson drawn from the failure of EU policies in Cyprus is thus the failure to account for the diverse make-up of the parties in the conflict. With the exception of attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriot side (where the objective was manifestly that of marginalizing Denktaş), EU policies failed to appreciate the complex make-up of views within the principal parties. Their policies were not directed at discrediting spoiling positions and arguments. On the contrary, EU actors failed to appreciate how their very decisions were often manipulated and used as excuses to justify and legitimize spoiling positions. Needless to say, gaining that level of awareness and acting upon it would have necessitated a common and consistent EU foreign policy towards the conflict, which alas never materialized. Notes 1. Zahar, Marie-Joëlle. 2003. ‘‘Reframing the spoiler debate in peace processes’’, in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (eds) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2. Stedman, Stephen. 1997. ‘‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’’, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 7. 3. Richmond, Oliver. 1998. ‘‘Devious objectives and disputants’ view of international mediation: A theoretical framework’’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 6, p. 709. SPOILING PEACE IN CYPRUS 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 281 Burton, John (ed.). 1990. Conflict: Human Needs Theory. London: Macmillan. Ibid. Zahar, note 1 above. Mavratsas, C. 1997. ‘‘The ideological contest between Greek Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974–1995’’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4; Papadakis, Y. 1998. ‘‘Greek Cypriot narratives of history and collective identity: Nationalism as a contested process’’, American Ethnologist, Vol. 25, No. 2; Stavrinides, Z. 2001. Greek Cypriot Perceptions on the Cyprus Problem, available at http://website.lineone.net/~acgta/ Stavrinides.htm. Tsardanidis, C. and Y. Nicolau. 1999. ‘‘Cyprus foreign and security policy: Options and challenges’’, in S. Stavridis, T. Couloumbis, T. Veremis, and N. Waites (eds) The Foreign Policies of the EU’s Mediterranean States and Applicant Countries in the 1990s. London: Macmillan. Putnam, R. 1988. ‘‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games’’, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3. Interviews with Turkish officials and politicians, Ankara and Istanbul, February and May 2002. Richmond, note 3 above, p. 712. Stavrinides, Z. 1999. ‘‘Greek Cypriot perceptions’’, in Clement Dodd (ed.) Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives. Huntingdon: Eothen, p. 56. Republic of Cyprus. 2000. House of Representatives Resolution 11/10/00. Nicosia: RoC, available at www.pio.gov.cy/news/special_issues/special_issue034.htm. Interview with UN officials, Brussels, November 2001. Commission of the European Communities. 2002. Regular Report on Cyprus Progress Towards Accession, available at www.europa.eu.int, p. 28. Interview with a former Turkish foreign minister, Istanbul, March 2002. Brewin, C. 2000. The European Union and Cyprus. Huntingdon: Eothen, p. 192. Joseph, J. 2000. ‘‘Can the EU succeed where the UN failed? The continuing search for a settlement on Cyprus’’, paper presented at the International Studies Association Fortyfirst Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA, 14–18 March. Emerson, M. and N. Tocci. 2002. Cyprus as Lighthouse of the Eastern Mediterranean. Brussels: CEPS. Tocci, N. 2004. EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus. Aldershot: Ashgate. Stedman, note 2 above, p. 12; Borzel, T. and T. Risse. 2000. ‘‘When Europe hits home: Europeanisation and domestic change’’, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 15, available at http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-015.htm. On this see Annan, Kofi. 2004. Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus. New York: United Nations, para. 65.