Tacitus and History after Liberty

Tacitus and History after Liberty Robert J. Murray Lecture Series April 2, 2016 Actio gratiarum (Slide 1) I want to thank Shannon for her generous introduction and all of you for coming today. It is a great honor to be delivering the Murray Lecture, which recognizes the career of such a distinguished faculty member. Since I’ve had the opportunity to meet Dr. Murray, I have admired all that he has done for Xavier and the Honors Bachelor of Arts program. I would not be here, nor would many of you, if it weren’t for his decades of dedication to Xavier and the HAB program. So thank you, Bob, for providing me and other with an example for how to live a scholarly career. As Shannon mentioned the subject of this talk derives from my forthcoming book, and so I also want to express my thanks to many of you, students, colleagues, friends, and family, who have helped me bring it to fruition. You all have supported me in more ways than you realize. Thomas E. Strunk 2 Introduction Just a note, I’ll be referring to the state governed by the emperors as the Principate; this avoids the ambiguity of using Roman Empire, which can refer to the same state but has the disadvantage of also describing a geographical space which existed before there were ever emperors. And princeps is the title for the person who rules a Principate. You should have a handout with some of the terms and individuals I’ll be referring to throughout my talk. Well let’s get down to it. I often ask my students in my various courses how they define freedom, political freedom most specifically. I ask not in a Socratic way to deconstruct facile notions of freedom or to question whether freedom really exists, in part because I don’t have the philosophic rigor or acumen to take a Socratic approach and in part because I believe that freedom positively exists and that we have some inherent notion of it. So I ask in a practical way how they identify freedom. And then I ask what I believe to be a more important question – what is the first thing that someone could take away from you that would cause you to believe that you were no longer free? Slide #2 - So we might consider how we would feel if They – The State, whoever – reduced the speed limit on Victory Parkway. I might find that a diminishment of my freedom to drive at a high speed, but really it’s just an inconvenience that might make me late to class, I couldn’t really say that I’ve lost my freedom because of that. On the other end of the spectrum we might identify being imprisoned or forced into slavery as a loss of our freedom, and that would clearly seem to be true, but that’s too clear, obvious even. So if we claim the reduced speed limit as the loss of our freedom, then our ability to live in any society is going to be very difficult to say the least. If we claim that our enslavement is the first step to our loss of freedom, then we’ve waited too long to ask the question. So what are those unidentified moments, events between the change in the speed limit and imprisonment, slavery, that would Tacitus and History after Liberty 3 cause us to say that we are no longer free? Maybe throughout the lecture you can ponder that in the back of your mind, or in the front of your mind if the lecture gets too soporific. But I ask that question because it is the question that thoughtful Romans would have had to ask themselves. For almost 500 hundred years, the ancient Romans enjoyed a thriving republic, but that slowly and in many ways imperceptibly morphed into an autocracy, which was in fact elected into power by the Roman people through the traditional apparatus of the Roman constitution. How Rome went from being a republic to an autocracy in a generation is a question that has fascinated historians for millennia. I find it fascinating because I live in a republic and I often wonder how we could lose it, and are we losing it, or have we already lost, and did we ever have a republic in the first place. For understanding such things, I believe that the Roman historian Tacitus offers us a glimpse at how and why a society can drift from a republic to an autocracy. Now why do I say that? On the surface, Tacitus would seem to be an imperfect messenger for broadening our understanding of freedom and democratic republicanism. He lived under the autocratic Roman Principate, born over 70 years after Rome had anything resembling a republic, so what could he know about it? Moreover, he is limited by his time and place. He lived in a patriarchal, slaveowning society, which was highly stratified even among its free citizens. We have no evidence to suggest that Tacitus ever rose above any of these limitations; he was most likely, given his status as a Roman senator, a slave-owner. What could Tacitus possibly know about freedom that we would care to know? Well, a few thoughts. First anyone who would want to cast stones at Tacitus for his limitations might rightly start a little closer to home. Slide #3 - Abraham Lincoln, perhaps our greatest president, did not receive a single vote from a woman, that’s half the population. Was it Thomas E. Strunk 4 a free republic that elected Abraham Lincoln? I rarely hear anyone suggest otherwise. Was it a free republic that elected Franklin Roosevelt, at a time when many African Americans were still denied the right to vote? I imagine we could point to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and say, “Yes, we have finally become a free republic.” And our first democratically elected president was that great democrat Richard Nixon. I could go on about mounting obstacles to voting, such as the repeal of section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, and so on, but I won’t. So let us criticize Tacitus all we want, perhaps that would make us feel good about ourselves, but I would submit that when we in the United States take the long view, we don’t really have too many reasons for patting ourselves on the back. Cynicism and my own chronocentrism for ancient Rome aside, there are more positive reasons for considering Tacitus if we are interested in living in a healthy, democratic republic. Tacitus lived and wrote in a society that once viewed itself as free, and then this society changed into something more autocratic and there was a sense either that the freedom of the Republic had been excessive or that republican freedom had been corrupted and lost. Now that’s an interesting mindset, one which I think is quite foreign from our own. My impression is that we think we are ever becoming a more free society, a “more perfect union” is usually how we express it. So reading Tacitus reminds us that an ever-expanding freedom is not a given; freedoms can be curtailed, they can be stripped and taken away, as much as they can be extended. We do not spend much time talking and thinking about that. Further, living in such a society, Tacitus has reckoned, as well as any writer I know of, the cost of losing that freedom. Slide #4 - Rome has an interesting and useful history: it went from being a monarchy (753-509 BC) to a republic (509-42 BC) to an autocracy (42 BC – AD 476). Not every society goes through those changes – the French took a crash course in it in Tacitus and History after Liberty 5 about 25 years (1789-1815); the United States itself has its origins in monarchy before becoming a republic, so the Romans are in a unique position to help us think about change in political constitutions brought about internally. And Tacitus, who is particularly sensitive to the changes between the Republic and the Principate, provides us an important view into how a republic can turn into an autocracy and what is lost in that transition. Tacitus as a Political Thinker The Roman Principate has recently been described as “a fact, beyond deliberation” and “a conceptual prison” constructed around the Roman mind. 1 To be sure, for many Romans, Augustus, the first princeps, had reconstructed the Roman state so neatly and subtly that some never even saw the former seams. 2 Certainly, the Principate established by Augustus became a historical fact, an autocracy without end. Yet the suggestion that no one was capable of imagining life without a princeps or the Principate is too tidy an explanation and does not hold up in the face of Tacitus’ historical writings. For Tacitus himself was neither hindered by imagination nor shackled by the Principate in his political thought, which is reflected in a writing style that is abrupt, obscure, sententious, and oftimes ironic, and further marked by a historiographical ethos willing to exploit chronological dislocations to bring into greater relief the Principate’s tyrannical nature. The tension between Republic and Principate and their conflicting approaches to historiography, I assert, is responsible for the unsettling and discordant style adopted by Tacitus, as my students who’ve read Tacitus with me understand all too well. He does not adopt the plain style of Caesar because the Principate is not plain to see, but hidden and obscure. Tacitus does not adopt the balanced periodic style of Cicero because the Principate is out of balance and arbitrary. Thomas E. Strunk 6 Tacitus’ Conception of Libertas Tacitus’ political thought is most productively understood through his conception of liberty - libertas. 3 Tacitus’ conception of political libertas is twofold I argue: first Tacitus negatively understood libertas to be freedom from domination (dominatio), that is, the absence of a master (dominus); second, he considered libertas positively to be the freedom to participate in the politics of a free state, or, to put it negatively as well, freedom from the usurpation of political participation. 4 Libertas as Freedom from Domination 5 6 (Slide #5) Libertas in its most fundamental meaning – the condition of a free person (liber) without a master (dominus) – stands in distinction from servitium/servitus – the condition of the slave, a servus who is subject to a dominus (Gaius Inst. 1.48–52; Dig. 1.5, 4.1). 7 The free citizen enjoys the absence of domination (dominatio) and the arbitrary interference that comes with it. The slave by contrast always suffers under the possibility of arbitrary interference even from a benevolent master. 8 The master-slave relationship can of course be applied metaphorically to the state, in which the ruler(s) is a dominus and the citizens have become slaves. 9 This by the way was a metaphor very alive in the founding of the United States. Melvin Rogers, professor of African Studies and Political Science at UCLA has reminded me of George Washington’s words that the British “will make us as tame, & abject Slaves, as the Blacks we Rule over with such arbitrary Sway." And yes we can note the irony and the horror of actual slave-owners, both ancient and modern, using this metaphor to argue for their own liberation. To return to Tacitus a dominatio is that state, that constitution which replicates the relationship between master and servant in the relationship between its citizens. I argue that Tacitus sees the Tacitus and History after Liberty 7 Principate as just such a state with the princeps as dominus and the formerly free citizens, especially the politically active elite, reduced to servitude. 10 Tacitus demonstrates a genuine proclivity for contrasting libertas with servitium and dominatio, which he does twenty–six times. 11 The frequent juxtaposition reveals that these concepts were a special concern for Tacitus. (Slide #6) One of the most striking of these passages is Tacitus’ first usage of libertas and servitus, Agricola 2.3, where he writes of his own times, dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum; et sicut vetus aetas vidit quid ultimum in libertate esset, ita nos quid in servitute, adempto per inquisitiones etiam loquendi audiendique commercio. We have given an exceptionally great proof of our submission; and just as a former age saw what was the limit of freedom, so we see the limit of servitude, with even the opportunity of speaking and hearing taken away through informers. These words could be taken as merely referring to the reign of Domitian, who had just been assassinated, after all, it is easy to malign a princeps who insisted that he be called dominus et deus – master and god (Suet. Dom. 13.1–2; Dio 67.4.7). 12 Yet Tacitus did not restrict the use of servitium and dominatio merely to the reign of Domitian. For Tacitus identifies the loss of libertas with Augustus’ establishment of the Principate. 13 The first step for Tacitus in breaking out of the conceptual prison of the Principate was to recognize that the Principate was not a mere continuation of the Republic. 14 Following 20 years of civil war, Augustus emphasized Thomas E. Strunk 8 restoration rather than revolution (Slide # 7: RG 34.1, rem publicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli, “I transferred the republic from my power to the authority of the senate and Roman people.”). Augustus, and Tiberius after him, made such claims to restoration and continuity at the same time as they were solidifying their hold on power (Ann. 1.1–3, 4, 7). Although the successive regimes of the Caesars placed a heavy emphasis on continuity to veil their autocratic power, Tacitus simply refuses to accept the lie that nothing changed when Augustus came to power. Unlike the Augustan regime, which wanted to smooth over any sense of disruption between Republic and Principate, while at the same time presenting Augustus’ rule as inevitable and necessary, Tacitus stresses that Augustus had usurped the traditional powers of the Republic and that Rome had experienced a revolution (Slide # 8), writing Augustus, rising up little by little, drew to himself the powers of the senate, the magistrates, and the laws (1.2.1, insurgere paulatim, munia senatus magistratuum legum in se trahere). One could rightly ask what was left of the political system of the Republic. Tacitus writes two chapters later that (1.4.1, igitur verso civitatis statu nihil usquam prisci et integri moris – “therefore with the state overturned there was nothing anywhere of the venerable and pure traditions”). 15 Tacitus emphasizes the fissures between Republic and Principate, not merely to show that the Republic is dead, but to show that the Principate is no republic. 16 Let us consider the first sentence of the Annales (Slide # 9: 1.1.1), “From the beginning kings ruled the city of Rome. Liberty and the consulship (the free Republic) L. Brutus established,” urbem Romam a principio reges habuere. libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit. Libertas here has been translated as “Republic” or “freedom” or “liberty,” 17 but libertas et consulatus can be read as a hendiadys: “the free Republic.” For Tacitus identifies the introduction of libertas at Rome with the foundation of the Republic. Here, and frequently Tacitus and History after Liberty 9 elsewhere, the Republic and libertas are synonymous and coterminous. 18 That is the Republic was the source and citadel of libertas. Tacitus’ thoughts on where Rome stood between the poles of libertas and dominatio become clear from the structure of book one of the Annales, which highlights the opposition of liberty (libertas) and the Principate (principatus). The Annales begin with the transition from autocracy to freedom, from monarchy to Republic, but the full weight of libertas et consulatus at the beginning of book one is felt only at the book’s end, in the final chapter of which Tacitus describes Tiberius’ confusing and inconsistent handling of the elections for the consulship (Slide #10): speciosa verbis, re inania aut subdola, quantoque maiore libertatis imagine tegebantur, tanto eruptura ad infensius servitium (Ann. 1.81.4, “this was a pretense of words, empty or rather deceitful, and the more it was covered with an appearance of freedom, so much more it was about to erupt into a harsher servitude”). Servitium is the final word of book one of the Annales. Thus in the space of a book Tacitus has traced the arc of Roman history from libertas to servitium. It is useful to recall the first book of Livy’s history. Both Tacitus and Livy end their first books with an emphasis on the consulship. Unlike Tacitus, who records the marginalization of the consulship, Livy highlights the achievement of the first election of the consuls after kicking out the tyrannical kings. 19 Livy’s trajectory, which goes from monarchy to freedom is the exact opposite of Tacitus’ movement from freedom to servitude. 20 If it was not clear by the end of the first chapter of the Annales, it is clear by the end of book one that the Principate will not be a bastion of libertas. Slide #11 - Later in the first chapter of book one, Tacitus describes Augustus as taking everything wearied by civil strife under his power with the title of princeps (Ann. 1.1.1, Thomas E. Strunk 10 [Augustus] cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit). 21 Here Tacitus suggests that Augustus took advantage of the Romans’ war weariness to capture more power for himself. Slide #12 - Augustus was a master of deception though, for while he was looking for a successor, a support for his domination (1.3.1, subsidia dominationis), he made sure that outward appearances did not change, even the magistrates kept the same titles (1.3.7 eadem magistratuum vocabula). Tacitus’ description of Augustus’ rule as a dominatio at the start of the Annales is significant as it sets the tone programmatically for how Tacitus perceives the Principate as a form of government since its founding. To reveal the Principate as a dominatio and to portray it as corrupting libertas is a profound political act itself on Tacitus’ part. Yet Tacitus does not merely record the history of a dominatio. He also is a historian of libertas. Embedded in his narrative of arbitrary rule and political domination are equally important accounts of resistance to dominatio that point the way to the restoration of libertas. And this leads to my second point about Tacitus’ understanding of libertas, that is, the freedom of political participation Libertas as the Freedom of Political Participation 22 Slide #13 - Near the end of the Agricola, Tacitus writes that Domitian had silenced eloquence and the honor of political careers and sought to do the same to military glory (39.2). 23 These three spheres of Roman life – the military, the senate, and public speech – represent the traditional activities of the Roman political class. You’ll note that I have left out the public assemblies of the people. Although they were an integral part of the Roman Republic, they were first weakened by Augustus and then abolished by his successor Tiberius, so although Tacitus notes these facts, he actually has very little to comment upon. Tacitus realizes that these three Tacitus and History after Liberty 11 avenues of political participation were particularly threatened by the Principate, since the fulfillment of one’s duty in any of these pursuits represented a threat to the princeps and his supporters. I want to say a bit about these three areas of political action, particularly the last two. But let me briefly address the first, the military career under the Principate. Tacitus portrays the princeps as the greatest obstacle to the libertas and success of the Roman military commander. He shows how Roman generals were thwarted by the princeps, who recalled them from successful campaigns with little distinction, while the politically well–connected yet undeserving received the most conspicuous laurels. Augustus controlled the distribution of military commands (imperium), always serving himself as commander-in-chief (maius imperium). 24 Those who did command armies were now merely his deputies (legates) and directly subordinate to the princeps. Roman generals soon found themselves caught up in the contradictions of the Principate: if Roman commanders engaged the enemy and failed, then the res publica became threatened; but if a Roman commander was successful against the state’s enemies, then he became a threat to the princeps himself. The result, as presented by Tacitus, was an incoherent military strategy based on the need for the princeps to maintain his power at any cost, and thus, the security of the state became secondary. The senate and forum were equally corrupted by informers and flatterers. Slide # 14 Tacitus writes in book one of the Annales (Ann. 1.2.1 cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptio cecidissent, ceteri nobelium, quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus et honoribus extollerentur ac novis ex rebus aucti tuta et praesentia quam vetera et periculosa mallent – “Since the boldest died either on the battlefield or through proscriptions, the rest of the nobles, as much as each one was more eager for servitude, were elevated by wealth and offices, and having gained by the revolution they preferred the present safety to the past dangers.”). 25 The survivors found they Thomas E. Strunk 12 now operated in a world where the traditional aristocratic competition for honors and offices had become tied to the party of the princeps, rather than the favor of the citizens. Most had more to gain by adapting to the new order of things rather than by resisting. For many this meant resorting to delatio (legal accusation/informing) or adulatio (flattery) in pursuit of private gain at the cost of the public good. Slide 15 # - The informers (delatores), to whom Tacitus devotes much attention, were used to attack the opponents of the regime and were frequently successful, which led to stifling the political freedom and effectiveness of the magistrates and senate. At first glance, this may seem inaccurate, for the imperial senate had expanded powers. Unlike the Republican senate, it could pass legislation, elect magistrates, and function as a court. 26 Yet Tacitus does not boast of these changes. Instead, he laments the princeps’ interference in the senate’s business, the rise of informers (delatores), and the charge of treason (maiestas), all of which rendered the Imperial senate a mere shadow of its Republican predecessor. Nonetheless, despite the fear the informers provoked in the body politic, there were those that sought to maintain a broader participation in politics. A good example of the resistance towards the corrupting influence of the informers in the senate is provided by Thrasea Paetus and the trial of Antistius Sosianus. The case of Antistius Sosianus marked the renewal of the charge of treason (maiestas) under Nero in 62 C.E. (Ann. 14.48.2). 27 Antistius was accused of treason for composing verses against Nero (14.48.1, probrosa adversus principium carmina). Tacitus claims that the charge was brought against Antistius solely for the purpose of showcasing Nero’s clementia (14.48.2). Nero’s attempt to use the senate in this way is a corruption of the senate’s venerable purpose, namely to advise the magistrates. The glory that would accrue to Nero for his clemency came at the expense of the senate, which was reviving the Tacitus and History after Liberty 13 dangerous and unpredictable treason law (lex maiestatis) and setting a precedent for harsh sentencing. The consul-elect, Junius Marullus, moved that Antistius should be stripped of his praetorship and executed according to tradition (mos maiorum). While all others were displaying their assent, Thrasea strongly opposed the resolution and argued for the milder sentence of exile. He reasoned that the executioner and noose had been forgotten under an honorable princeps and a senate freed from coercion (Ann. 14.48.3). Thrasea ended his speech by claiming that Antistius would provide an example of publica clementia, public clemency, an expression which appears nowhere else in Latin literature before Tacitus (14.48.4). 28 If the Principate asserted that clementia was a virtue of the princeps, then Thrasea was re–appropriating that virtue for the senate and people of Rome. Thrasea could be criticized for merely trying to steal Nero’s thunder and seeking his own glory. Yet Thrasea, and Tacitus, knew that Nero was not always going to be merciful. Slide #16 - Tacitus writes (Ann. 14.49.1) that Thrasea’s act of freedom broke through the servility of the senate (libertas Thraseae servitium aliorum rupit) and his motion won the day, but the consuls were afraid to ratify the resolution before consulting the princeps, who rarely had to interfere in order to get his desires met (Ann. 14.49.2). Thrasea’s actions caused much consternation for Nero, who vacillated between restraint and anger. Thrasea was challenging Nero either to interfere, which would reveal his domination of the senate, or to allow the senate to proceed, which would result in free deliberation, a dangerous precedent from the princeps’ perspective. Backed into a corner, the princeps reluctantly recognized the senate’s right to offer a mild sentence or even to acquit Antistius. Nero could not overturn the senate’s decision, since the princeps stood for the virtue of clementia, yet Thrasea had stolen from him any credit for Thomas E. Strunk 14 sparing Antistius Sosianus’ life. Thrasea had saved the life of a fellow Roman and disrupted, at least for the moment, Nero’s domination of the senate. In this episode and elsewhere, Tacitus’ conception of libertas operates at two levels: the state and the individual, who must choose whether to act out of a sense of libertas for the good of the res publica, that is, the state idealized as ‘the public thing, commonwealth, common good’. Thrasea Paetus had made the free decision to serve the common good rather than the vanity of the princeps. 29 Although political liberty had been diminished significantly, individuals still had the freedom to choose their political behavior. Tacitus privileges the choice made for the common good over that of personal advantage. This is a notion with a long history at Rome, and is perhaps best exemplified by our city’s namesake Cincinnatus. This stress on the common good rather than personal gain is one of the greatest distinctions Tacitus makes between the Republic and the Principate. Tacitus praises those citizens who risked their lives on the battlefield and in the senate, not for personal gain or out of fear of the princeps, but for the betterment of Rome and its citizens. To do this was to make a free choice, an act of libertas, to serve the res publica (Ag. 42.4 rei publicae usum). To do otherwise would have meant serving not Rome but the tyrant Nero, not the res publica but informers (delatores), and flatterers (adulatores), who served their own gain. By acting as if he were in a free republic, Thrasea was taking a step towards restoring a free republic. Freedom of Speech: The Corruption and Restoration of Libertas as Freedom of Speech and Expression Let’s turn to freedom of speech. Although the Romans did not have a specific word for the freedom of speech like the Greeks, who used parrhēsía, they nonetheless practiced freedom Tacitus and History after Liberty 15 of speech and valued their tradition of free expression. 30 The word the Romans most commonly used to convey the concept of freedom of speech was libertas. 31 Under the Republic, the only case of any historical legitimacy in nearly 500 years involved the poet Naevius, who had offended the Metelli, a powerful wealthy family; in the end Naevius was exiled, but his writings were not condemned (Gell. NA 3.3.15 Jer. Chron. 135g). The case of Naevius aside, whatever the failings of the Republic, censoring speech was not one of them. Even Julius Caesar proved lenient. His adopted son proved to be less so. Although the patron of poets and historians, Augustus was no patron of free speech. 32 Under the aristocratic Republic, competition for honor and status created a plurality of voices. Slide #17 - Yet under the autocratic Principate, in which one individual and one party controlled access to honors, accepted discourse became narrowed and speech no longer served as a means to become a vir bonus dicendi peritus, that is, a good man skilled at speaking, but rather as a means to please the princeps. 33 The loss of free expression under the Principate can be attributed to two causes: dominatio and adulatio. Autocracy silenced the opposition, and in that silence adulatio replaced free speech. The Principate engaged persecution of writers and in censorship, whose random and erratic nature made it all the more terrifying and effective. Faced with this reality, poets, orators, and historians all had to adjust their style and content. Surely, the monarchical powers Augustus wielded dampened enthusiasm for criticizing those in power. Yet adulatio was another corrupting influence on free speech. Those who lauded the princeps were promoted and profited financially. Individuals discovered that little was to be gained from opposition. The willingness of many senators to flatter the princeps succeeded in isolating those who were unwilling. The fear of the autocrat led to self–censorship, which in turn led to increasing levels of adulation as individuals vied to outdo one another in their flattery. Thomas E. Strunk 16 The Principate and Bookburning Tacitus begins his literary career with a reflection on the freedom of speech and historiography. In the Agricola, Tacitus cites the cases of Arulenus Rusticus and Herennius Senecio, who had praised the executed dissidents Thrasea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus respectively in biographies. 34 Arulenus and Senecio were each prosecuted on capital charges for their writings under Domitian. In a public spectacle, their books were burned by their executioners in the comitium in the forum, that is, between the senate house and the speakers platform (Ag. 2.1; cf. Livy 40.29.14). Slide # 18 - Tacitus writes of the bookburnings that accompanied the executions of the dissidents (Ag. 2.2): scilicet illo igne vocem populi Romani et libertatem senatus et conscientiam generis humani aboleri abritrabantur “they thought that in that fire the voice of the Roman people and the liberty of the senate and the conscience of the human race were destroyed.” 35 He adds: memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdidissemus, si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci quam tacere (Ag. 2.3, “we also would have lost our memory itself along with our voices, if it had been in our power to forget as much as it was to keep silent”). Nonetheless, through the agency of the persecuted families, particularly the women, copies survived, which Tacitus most likely consulted for his Annales and Historiae. 36 Cremutius Cordus and the Restoration of Libertas as Freedom of Speech Slide #19 - Nowhere is Tacitus’ concern for free expression more evident than in his account of the trial and death of the historian Cremutius Cordus, who was charged with writing a history that praised the tyrannicides Cassius and Brutus and disparaged the Caesars. In 25 C.E., Cremutius Cordus was attacked by the princeps Tiberius, his henchman Sejanus, and his supporters (Ann. 4.34-35). According to Tacitus, Cremutius was charged solely for the crime of Tacitus and History after Liberty 17 publishing a history, a new and previously unheard of accusation (Ann. 4.34.1). Cremutius clearly took a partisan view in his histories, as Seneca tells us, “lamenting the civil wars and proscribing for eternity the crimes of those who had proscribed their enemies” (Sen. Marc. 26.1, civilia bella deflevit, quo proscribentis in aeternum ipse proscripsit). 37 Cremutius’ history covered the civil wars, as well as the reign of Augustus (Dio 57.2; Suet. Tib. 61.3). He praised Brutus and declared Cassius the ultimus Romanorum, an echo of Brutus’ own words, e1sxatoj a0nh\r 9Rwmai&wn (Plut. Brut. 44.1; Appian Bell. Civ. 4.114). Cremutius’ defense speech is a defense of free expression. Unlike those historians who wrote out of fear, Cremutius composed his history with courage, and his speech is a continuation of that expression of courage (Slide #20). He stressed that his words were being questioned; he was innocent of deeds (Ann. 4.34.2 verba mea, patres conscripti, arguuntur: adeo factorum innocens sum). His distinction between words and deeds echo Tacitus’ language on Augustus’ revived and expanded charge of treason (1.72.2), which under the Republic (apud veteres) pertained only to actions, such as the betrayal of an army, seditious incitement of the plebs and maladministration of the state, whereas words were immune (facta arguebantur, dicta impune erant). Under the Principate words had become fair play beginning with Augustus, who first subjected authors, such as Titus Labienus and Cassius Severus, to punishment and their books to fire. In his defense speech, Cremutius asked whether Cassius and Brutus were still arrayed for battle on the fields of Philippi and whether he was inciting the people to civil war (Ann. 4.35.2 bellum civile). 38 The question on the surface is rhetorical, for the tyrannicides were long since dead. 39 Metaphorically, however, the answer was yes, the supporters of Cassius and Brutus were Thomas E. Strunk 18 still arrayed on the fields of Philippi; Cremutius was merely engaged in the latest manifestation of that struggle between libertas and dominatio. For the seventy years that had passed from the battle of Philippi to the trial of Cremutius were not long enough to erase the ideological battle over the Republic. Tacitus’ mention of the specific date makes the images of Cassius and Brutus more vivid (Ann. 4.35.2) and recalls the obituary of Junia, in which Tacitus dates her death from the battle of Philippi (3.76.1). There is also an important implication for Tacitus. If seventy years was not enough to safeguard Cremutius, then the distance between Tacitus and the events he records are not enough to safeguard him from malicious readers either. The case of Cremutius Cordus demonstrated that there was not a statute of limitations on the politicized past. Cremutius did not wait for the senate to pass judgment. He left and committed suicide by starvation (Ann. 4.35.4). The senate not only ordered the aediles to burn his books, but also outlawed owning or reading them (4.35.4; Sen. Marc. 1.3-4; Dio 57.24.4; Suet. Cal. 16.1). Cremutius’ works did survive through the agency of his daughter Marcia (Sen. Marc. 1.3), and Tacitus certainly read them. Some fragments do remain: there is a sympathetic account of Cicero’s death preserved in Seneca the Elder (Suas. 6.19) and a passage describing the search for weapons on senators, who were compelled to approach Augustus one by one in the senate house (Suet. Aug. 35). 40 Both passages indicate Cremutius’ political leanings. Slide #21 - Tacitus closes the episode by commenting eloquently on the folly of attempting to silence the past (Ann. 4.35.4-5): libros per aediles cremandos censuere patres: <s>ed manserunt occultati et editi. quo magis socordia<m> eorum inridere libet, qui praesenti potentia credunt exstingui posse Tacitus and History after Liberty 19 etiam sequentis aevi memoriam. nam contra punitis ingeniis gliscit auctoritas, neque aliud externi reges, aut qui eadem saevitia usi sunt, nisi dedecus sibi atque illis gloriam peperere. The fathers ordered his books to be burned by the aediles, but they survived hidden and copied. It is all the more pleasurable to laugh at the folly of those who believe that by the present tyranny the memory of a following age can be extinguished too. On the contrary, the authority of oppressed talents grows; nor have foreign kings, or those who have used the same cruelty, accomplished anything except disgrace for themselves and glory for those condemned. Tacitus’ words are a warning to the present and the future in both their defiance and insistence on the enduring power of the written word. In the case of Cremutius Cordus, we see paired the negative formulation of libertas as non–domination with the positive conception of the freedom for citizens to participate in the governance of the res publica, that is, holding military commands and the magistracies, participating in the senate such as Thrasea Paetus, and expressing one’s thoughts freely and publically as Cremutius Cordus did. Conclusion: Ending the Silence Slide #22 - Tacitean libertas is thus the basis for a Tacitean republicanism, which conceives of a res publica where power is dispersed and citizens are free to act and to express their opinions without fear of reprisal. While others might take the step of opposition in the Thomas E. Strunk 20 senate, or violently removing the princeps either through conspiracy, outright civil war, or assassination, Tacitus sought his vengeance through memory. Tacitus was determined not to let the memory of the past silently slip away; and once Domitian was assassinated and the immediate threat to libertas was passed, he set his hand to work recording the virtues and vices of the past. Tacitus’ breaking the silence was a warning to the current and future principes that what had been endured was unacceptable, that tyranny, if it emerged in Rome, would at least be publically recognized as such. Tacitus’ decision to write of the past was thus an act that served the common good (usum rei publicae) analogous to the deeds of Thrasea Paetus and others. Tacitus’ chosen method of redemption and justice was highly effective. Few delatores – informers were ever convicted for their false accusations and distortion of justice, but thanks to Tacitus, posterity knows their names and their crimes. The Principate tightly controlled information, but Tacitus’ writings transformed that tightly kept information into a public record. 41 Tacitus would use his writings to make transparent all that the regime and its flatterers (adulatores) had made obscure. Even if he writes in an enlightened age, Tacitus is a historian writing after the fall of libertas, as demonstrated by the Principate’s violence and oppression. Nonetheless, he is writing in the pursuit of freedom; he is after libertas. For to assert publically that libertas has disappeared with the autocracy of the Principate constitutes an act of freedom. Tacitus demonstrates this freedom in the choices he makes concerning the subject matter for his histories. Tacitus promised to write of the principates (principatus) of Nerva and Trajan (Hist. 1.1.4), which could have presented him with the material for patriotic Roman historiography in the tradition of Livy, but then he decided otherwise. To write of the reigns of Nerva and Trajan Tacitus and History after Liberty 21 would imply praise and consent. Tacitus decided instead to shed light on the decadent and brutal Julio-Claudian Principate. In the end, Tacitus’ analysis of libertas is a public and political matter. It was the institution of the Principate, not the princeps alone, which determined the status of libertas. Certainly, some principes were better than others, but one man rule had resulted in the misdirected competition of adulatio and delatio which no princeps could completely control. The solution to this corruption was not a better autocrat, but a more inclusive system of government. Only through the restoration of libertas and the limitation of the princeps’ power could a republic be restored in any meaningful way. Slide #23 - Although it has been a long time since Tacitus was read on the barricades, at least in Western Europe and the United States, this study has sought to return to an earlier interpretation of Tacitus as an advocate for republican government. This approach is in contrast to the prevalent scholarly understanding of Tacitus as an advocate of monarchy. Wirszubski, who wrote the book on Roman libertas, claims with unwarranted confidence, “Tacitus, needless to say, is no Republican.” 42 Yet what makes a republic or a republican? 43 How is it that such disparate societies as the United States and ancient Rome are both republics? Does a republic consist in having consuls or assemblies of the people? Surely not, for the United States has neither. Is it having a deliberative assembly with the power to legislate? Again certainly not, for the Roman Republic did not have one, while the Principate did in the form of the imperial senate. Could it be the absence of a preponderance of powers on one individual? Yet both the Roman Republic and the United States have granted broad powers to their executives, the consuls and the president. Slide #24 - Some may conclude definitively that republics elect their representatives, which the United States does and the Roman Republic did, Thomas E. Strunk 22 however manipulated by things like assemblies based on wealth or the Electoral College. Yet if we are going to insist that the United States is a republic, then in addition to the anomalies I mentioned at the start of my talk, we must add the following inconvenient facts that U.S. senators have been directly elected for only about a century now. Is that representative government; were we a republic in 1900? Is it representative government when the popular vote for president doesn’t square with the Electoral College vote as occurred in 2000? I do not wish to deconstruct the concepts of republic or republicanism, but if the United States has such constitutional anomalies, as the Romans also certainly did, then perhaps it is time to think more broadly about Roman republicanism, which when defined at all is typically overly restricted to legal and constitutional matters rather than political realities. Tacitus might have agreed that there was no return to the Republic, as many of his modern readers assert, but that does not mean that he saw no way forward to a future republic. Slide #25 - I maintain that for Tacitus what mattered ultimately in the political life of the state was libertas – freedom from a dominus and freedom to participate in political life as a citizen. Libertas was the heart of the Republic, and it was what was precisely lacking under the Principate. Law, the annual magistrates, and the senate might be outward signs of a republic that possessed libertas, but they were not individually central for a republic. Libertas was the essential component. Tacitus supplies for us important lessons, not, like Livy, about the foundation of a republic, but rather about the cost of losing a republic. His conception of libertas as freedom from a dominus and freedom to participate in political life as a citizen I believe still has relevance for us today, for I believe it encompasses both libertarian notions of freedom and Tacitus and History after Liberty 23 concepts of freedom on the Left that have frequently emphasized expanding access to the political process for groups traditionally marginalized. There is more than enough political strife to go around especially in an election year. It is tempting to give in to the weariness such dissension induces. We may long for simpler systems, which do not require the back and forth of democratic wrangling. We may hate the insults, and even the violence, inflicted by political partisans. Tacitus, however, reminds us why we tolerate and even participate in such political conflict, why we must be willing to walk on the dangerous side of political partisanship, for these are the signs of a democratic republic. Yes, he admits the toll such conflict exacts, but he better than any ancient writer, and even most modern ones, has reckoned the cost of autocracy. We ignore Tacitus at our own peril. - Slide #26, Slide # 27 1 Carlos Noreña, “The Ethics of Autocracy in the Roman World,” in A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought, ed. Ryan K. Balot (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 266-267. 2 For the Romans’ lack of recognition of a break between Republic and Principate, see Matthew B. Roller, “The Difference an Emperor Makes: Notes on the Reception of the Republican Senate in the Imperial Age,” Classical Receptions Journal 7 (2015): 11-30. Roller finds “no compelling evidence from the first 150 years or so of (what we call) the Imperial age to suggest that a rupture was generally perceived as having occurred around the advent of Augustus (15).” He cites Tacitus and Lucan as exceptional in their awareness of the split; see also Dylan Sailor, Writing and Empire in Tacitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 124–132. 3 A simple, all-encompassing definition of Roman libertas is elusive. Florentinus, the late second century C.E. jurist, provides the following definition: libertas est naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi si quid vi aut iure prohibetur (Dig. 1.5.4, “Liberty is the natural faculty of doing what is pleasing for each to do, unless it is prohibited by force or by law.”). Despite Florentinus’ attempt, libertas offered to ancients (and moderns) polyvalent connotations, for which see Wirszubski 1950, 1–30; Jochen Bleicken, Staatliche Ordnung und Freiheit in der römischen Republik (Kallmünz: M. Lassleben, 1972), 15–60; Orlando Patterson, Freedom, Volume I: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1991), 219–220; Isabelle Cogitore, Le doux nom de liberté (Bourdeaux: Ausonius, 2011), 12–19. Matthew B. Roller, Constructing Autocracy: Aristocrats and Thomas E. Strunk 24 Emperors in Julio–Claudian Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 228, argues for a single, universal meaning, “libertas means the same thing in all cases: it means ‘the (desirable) condition of not being a slave’.” Although I will argue that this is an important part of Tacitus’ conception of libertas, Roller’s statement is too absolute. 4 For this twofold conception of libertas, see Bleicken 1972, 19–20; Cogitore 2011, 69–72. 5 Over the last two decades, modern republicans have focused in on the definition of liberty as freedom from domination. See especially Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4–6, 22–25, 31; On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 26–74; Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 36–37. The concept of liberty as non-domination has been problematized by Daniel Kapust, “Skinner, Pettit and Livy: The Conflict of the Orders and the Ambiguity of Republican Liberty,” History of Political Thought 25 (2004): 377–401, who argues that Roman republicanism still fostered a sense of paternalism; Clifford Ando, “‘A Dwelling beyond Violence’: On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Contemporary Republicans,” History of Political Thought 31 (2010): 183–220, who finds Roman republicanism too frequently coopted by the forces of domination beginning with the Principate; and Patchen Markell, “The Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” Political Theory 36 (2008): 9–36, who accepts that liberty is in part nondomination but to it must be added the concept of “usurpation” which I will discuss in the next section. For excellent summaries of modern republican thought, see Kapust 2011, 8–13; Joy Connolly, The Life of Roman Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 10–15. 6 Wirszubski 1950, 1. Libertas as the distinction between freedom and servitude can be traced back to the origins of its Indo–European roots. Kurt Raaflaub, “Freiheit in Athen und Rom: Ein Beispiel divergierender politischer Bebriffsentwicklung in der Antike,” Historische Zeitschrift 238 (1984): 529–567; Pitkin 1984, 529–531. 7 Wirszubski 1950, 1–3; P.A. Brunt, “Libertas in the Republic,” in The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 283–291. For libertas as manumission, see Germ. 24.2; Ann. 4.27.1, 13.26, 14.42.1, 15.54.2. 8 Pettit 1997, 31–32. 9 Roller (2001, 214–247) has applied the master–slave metaphor to Julio–Claudian literature, most specifically Seneca; he does not discuss Tacitus in detail, however. Valentina Arena, Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Tacitus and History after Liberty 25 Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), examines such concepts in the context of the Late Republic. 10 For the attribution of this understanding of libertas to Tacitus, see Sailor 2008, 126–127; Benedetto Fontana, “Tacitus on Empire and Republic,” History of Political Thought 14 (1993): 27–40. Hammer (2014, 321–357), Boesch (1996, 85–109), and Leake (1987) analyze Tacitus’ political thought in terms of his conception of despotism. While these studies contribute much to understanding Tacitus’ political thought, they focus too much on the despot and too little on the loss of Roman libertas caused by the despot or other political actors, such as delatores (informers) and adulatores (flatterers). Although Tacitus pays special attention to the emperors and certainly finds them fascinating character studies, he is not merely writing accounts of their reigns in the form either of biographies or of res gestae (Ann. 4.33.2). 11 For passages contrasting libertas with servitium and dominatio, see Ag. 30.3, Germ. 24.2; Dial. 13.4; Hist. 1.1.2, 16.4, 2.38.1, 4.8.4; Ann. 1.8.6, 1.59.6, 2.15.3, 2.46.3, 3.45.2, 3.65.3, 4.24.1, 4.27.1, 4.46.2, 6.42.2, 12.34, 13.26.3, 13.34.2, 14.42.1, 14.49.1, 15.54.4, 15.55.2, 15.61.1, 16.11.1. Dialogus 40.2 could be added to this list if servitute is read for severitate; the passages cited above provide good reason for this reading. 12 Suetonius (Aug. 53.1) does write that Augustus despised being addressed as dominus, though this seemed ineffective in stemming the desire of others to do so; Tiberius and Claudius thought likewise (Suet. Tib. 27, Claud. 21.5; Tac. Ann. 2.87.2, 12.11; Dio 55.12.2). For Domitian’s use of dominus, see Leonard Thompson, “Domitianus Dominus: A Gloss on Statius Silvae 1.6.84,” AJP 105 (1984): 469–475. 13 Morford 1991, 3438. See also Classen 1988, 102. 14 I will use Republic and Republican, i.e. “of the Republic,” to refer to the Roman period before the Principate, and republic and republican to refer to the broader political theory of republicanism. 15 Unless otherwise specified, the texts of Tacitus used throughout are the following: M. Winterbottom and R.M. Ogilvie, Cornelii Taciti Opera Minora (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Kenneth Wellesley, Cornelius Tacitus, II.1, Historiarum Libri (Leipzig: Teubner, 1989); H. Heubner, P. Cornelius Tacitus, I, Annales (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1994). The translations are all my own unless otherwise specified. 16 In neutral settings, I prefer the word liberty to freedom because of its etymological relationship with libertas. Nonetheless, I will use both liberty and freedom interchangeably depending on English usage, e.g. English says Thomas E. Strunk 26 “freedom of speech” not “liberty of speech.” For the differences between the two words, see Hanna Pitkin, “Are Freedom and Liberty Twins?” Political Theory 16.4 (1988): 523-552. 17 Republic: W.F. Allen, Tacitus: Annals I–VI (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1890), 1; Goodyear 1972, 91; Norma P. Miller, Tacitus Annals Book I (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1992), 97. Freedom: A.J. Woodman, Tacitus: The Annals (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004). Liberty: J.C. Yardley, Tacitus: The Annals, the Reigns of Tiberius, Claudius, and Nero (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Cynthia Damon, Tacitus: Annals (New York: Penguin Classics, 2012). 18 For libertas as the Republic, see Ann. 1.1.1, 1.4.2, 1.32.2, 2.82.8, 3.27.2, 13.50.3, 15.52.15, 16.11.5; Hist. 1.16.1, 2.38.9, 3.72.2; see also Cic. Phil. 1.13, 2.42; Ad Att. 10.4; De Off. 3.21; Suet. Aug. 28.1; Wirszubski 1950, 88. For the words res publica as generally not referring to the Republic, see Roller 2015, 11-14; although, as Roller also notes, occasionally res publica does refer to the Republic. In this study, I follow the Roman practice. 19 Livy 1.60.3, L. Tarquinius Superbus regnavit annos quinque et viginti. regnatum Romae ab condita urbe ad liberatam annos ducentos quadraginta quattuor. duo consules inde comitiis centuariatis a praefecto urbis ex commentariis Ser. Tulli creati sunt, L. Iunius Brutus et L. Tarquinius Collatinus (“L. Tarquinius Superbus ruled for twenty–five years. At Rome monarchy existed from the founding of the city to its liberation for two hundred forty– four years. Then two consuls were elected by the centuriate assembly under the oversight of the prefect of the city by the classification of Servius Tullus; they were L. Junius Brutus and L. Tarquinius Collatinus.”). 20 C.S. Kraus and A.J. Woodman, Latin Historians. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 94-95. 21 For other passages documenting the usurpation of political participation, see Ag. 39.2, frustra studia fori et civilium atrium decus in silentium acta, si militarem gloriam alius occuparet; cetera utcumque facilius dissimulari, ducis boni imperatoriam virtutem esse (“In vain the contention of the forum and the prestige of civilian arts had been driven into silence, if another were to seize military glory; other achievements were more easily concealed, but being a good commander was an emperor’s virtue.”); Dial. 41.4, quid multis apud populum contionibus cum de re publica non imperiti et multi deliberent, sed sapientissimus et unus (“What need is there for constant speeeches before the people when the ignorant masses are not deliberating on matters concerning the state, but rather one very wise individual?”); Hist. 1.1.1, postquam bellatum apud Actium atque omnem potentiam ad unum conferri pacis interfuit (“after the battle of Actium and when in the interest of peace every power was conferred to an individual”; 4.11.1, Mucianus urbem ingressus cuncta simul in se traxit (“Mucianus immediately upon entering the city took Tacitus and History after Liberty 27 everything into his own power.”); Ann. 4.33.2, sic converso statu neque alia re Romana quam si unus imperitet (“now with the state overturned and with Roman affairs no different than if one man ruled”); 11.5.1, nam cuncta legum et magistratuum munia in se trahens princeps materiam praedandi patefecerat (“For the princeps took all the duties of the law and the magistrates into his own power.”). 22 Markell (2008, 9-36) argues that non-domination does not fully define liberty, since free political participation was also lost when Rome transitioned from Republic to Principate. Markell uses the negative expression “usurpation” to describe the loss of political involvement (25-31). I will often put this in the positive as the “freedom of political participation.” 23 Ag. 39.2, frustra studia fori et civilium atrium decus in silentium acta, si militarem gloriam alius occuparet; cetera utcumque facilius dissimulari, duci boni imperatoriam virtutem esse. 24 A.H.M. Jones, “The Imperium of Augustus,” in Studies in Roman Government and Law (New York: Praeger, 1960), 3-17. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Die Militärreformen des Augustus und die politische Problematik des frühen Prinzipats,” in Saeculum Augustum. I. Herrschaft und Gesellschaft, ed. G. Binder (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987), 246–307; Fred K. Drogula, Commanders and Command in the Early Roman Republic and Early Empire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 345–373. 25 Ann. 1.2.1, cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent, ceteri nobilium, quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus et honoribus extollerentur ac novis ex rebus aucti tuta et praesentia quam vetera et periculosa mallent (“The boldest died either on the battlefield or through proscriptions; the rest of the nobles, as much as each one was more eager for servitude, were elevated by wealth and offices, and having gained by the revolution they preferred the present safety to the past dangers.”). Here ferox indicates independence of action and freedom of speech; Goodyear 1972, 105-106; Traub 1953, 250–261; Vielberg 1987, 159–163. 26 For this point, see Roller 2015, 15-18, who discusses the contrasting views of Tacitus and Pliny the Younger on senatorial activity. See the caveats on Pliny the Younger in Strunk 2012, 178-192. 27 K.R. Bradley, “Tum primum revocata ea lex,” AJP 94 (1973): 172-181, argues that Tacitus has “inordinately inflated” the trial. The thereby misses the purposes of Tacitus’ narrative, which are to demonstrate the role of Thrasea in senatorial politics and to highlight the significance of the Thomas E. Strunk 28 revival of the maiestas charge, whose destructive force throughout the remainder of Nero’s reign cannot be overstated. 28 29 30 Ginsburg 1986, 538. Devillers 2003, 82, 86–87; Morford 1991, 3440–41; Ducos 1977, 208. Kurt A. Raaflaub, “Aristocracy and Freedom of Speech in the Greco–Roman World,” in Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, ed. Ineke Sluiter and Ralph Rosen (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 54–57. Wirszubski omitted freedom of speech from his study of libertas, which Arnaldo Momigliano rightly criticized (JRS 41 [1951]: 146–149). Brunt (1988, 314) writes, “Freedom of speech for a senator meant that he could speak what he felt without being subject to fear or pressure.” I would add that it also included the senator’s freedom to write what he felt. Brunt, although writing about the Republic, quotes Tacitus’ famous words from the prologue of the Historiae on the freedom enjoyed under Nerva and Trajan, sentire quae velis et quae sentias dicere licet (1.1.4). 31 For libertas as free speech in Tacitus, see Hist. 1.1.1, 1.85.3; Ann. 1.74.5, 2.87, 6.38.3, 15.61.1; Dial. 10.8, 27.3, 40.2. It should also be noted that the Romans did not have a word for censorship; see Vasily Rudich, “Navigating the Uncertain: Literature and Censorship in the Early Roman Empire,” Arion 14 (2006): 7-8. 32 Syme (1939, 486) notes, “The last years of Augustus witnessed stern measures of repression against noxious literature. Public bonfires were instituted – but not for such trifles as the Ars amatoria of Ovid. Contemporary political literature provided the cause – and the fuel.” 33 Kapust 2011, 113. 34 This passage is further proof that Tacitus was not hostile to these writers as he refers to the works of Arulenus and Senecio as monumenta clarissimorum ingeniorum. 35 Ag. 2.2, scilicet illo igne vocem populi Romani et libertatem senatus et conscientiam generis humani aboleri abritrabantur. 36 Ogilvie and Richmond 1967, 132-133. Tacitus and History after Liberty 37 29 Decidedly different in his approach to his histories was Asinius Pollio, who refrained from being overly critical. According to Macrobius (Sat. 2.4.21), Asinius Pollio remarked at ego taceo: non est enim facile in eum scribere, qui potest proscribere (But I am silent: for it is not easy to write against him who can proscribe). 38 Ann. 4.35.2, num enim armatis Cassio et Bruto ac Philippenses campos obtinentibus belli civilis causa populum per contiones incendo?( “For do I rouse the people in the assembly for the sake of civil war while Cassius and Brutus stand armed on the fields of Philippi?”). 39 Keitel 1984; MacMullen 1966, 20. 40 For the collected fragments of Cremutius Cordus see Hermannus Peter, Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967), cxiii–cxv, 87–90. 41 Devillers 2003, 76, 92; Morford 1991, 3440–41; Ducos 1977, 208. 42 Wirszubski 1950, 160. 43 Connolly (2015, 3–4, 17–20) addresses the difficulty of asking such a question.